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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. The 
issue of explaining ethnicity and voting in Tanzania is puzzling. The puzzle stems from the fact that 
Tanzania is less ethnically politicised compared to most African states, despite being ethnically diverse 
with over 120 ethnic groups, sharing the colonial history and an ongoing anxiety about competitive 
politics and liberal economics breeding ethnic salience in voting. 
The overriding literature on influences of ethnicity on voting in Africa revolves around the paradigms 
of ethnic structure and neo-patrimonial or hybrid systems. Whereas the concept of ethnic structure 
contends that salience of ethnicity in voting is determined by the ability of ethnic groups to form a 
minimum winning coalition (MWC) in elections, the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools explain the 
same from Africa’s presumed traditional primordialism – as opposed to legal-rational institutions of 
governance (LRIs) or historically grown values preventing ethnic voting. The assumption of ethnic 
motivations and the reference to traditional structures has long concealed the role of shared history, 
political thoughts and innovative practices in Tanzania’s management of ethnicity, particularly in 
voters’ choices in elections. Such backdrop warranted exploration of an alternative analytical 
framework. 
This study developed an analytic narrative method that mainly relied on interviews with privileged 
witnesses as well as ordinary voters (65). The fundamental factor, we established, in explaining 
ethnicity’s low salience in voters’ choices in Tanzania has been the Promises of the Independence 
Movement (PsIM), namely a political imaginary about realising and enhancing promises of national 
unity (PNU), equitable distribution of national resources (EDNR) and peace. The PsIM in sum created 
a nationalist political culture against ethnic polarisation and salience in politics capable of sustaining 
low salience of ethnicity in voting for 50 years after independence. Based on the interviews, we reject 
the neo-patrimonial theory and hybrid schools and brand them as inadequate tools for understanding 
the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. The rejection is predicated on 
the fact that the Tanzanian case does not support the primary tenets of the theory in divulging the 
influences of ethnicity on voting as explained above. Ideals deduced from a nationalist political culture 
as embedded in the PsIM, informed legal rational rules and institutions, values as well as experiences 
that militate against the salience of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices. On this basis, we can 
give credit to, but also critically examine, the indigenous political thoughts informed by African 
political thought and practices that determine voting practices.  
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 ABSTRACT  
 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de invloed van etniciteit op het bepalen van keuzes van kiezers in 
Tanzania. Het verklaren van etniciteit bij stemgedrag is ingewikkeld en verrassend in Tanzania. 
Het verrassende effect komt doordat Tanzania minder etnisch gepolitiseerd is dan de meeste 
andere Afrikaanse landen, ondanks het feit dat Tanzania een zeer etnisch divers land is, met meer 
dan 120 etnische groepen. Verder deelt het met de buurlanden ook een koloniale geschiedenis en 
een voortdurende bezorgdheid om competitieve politiek en liberale economie, zaken die 
gemakkelijk aanleiding kunnen geven tot etnische voorkeur bij stemgedrag.  
 
De belangrijkste literatuur over de invloed van etniciteit op stemgedrag in Afrika verwijst naar 
paradigma's van etnische structuur en neo-patrimoniale of hybride systemen. Het concept van de 
etnische structuur stelt dat het belang van etniciteit in stemgedrag wordt bepaald door de 
vaardigheid van etnische groepen om “minimum winning coalitions” (MWC) te vormen tijdens 
verkiezingen. Het neo-patrimoniale en hybride-model, daarentegen, verklaart alles vanuit Afrika’s 
veronderstelde traditionele primordiale ingesteldheid. Die visie staat lijnrecht tegenover het 
bestaan van juridisch-rationele bestuursinstellingen (LRIs) of historisch gegroeide waarden en 
normen die stemgedrag op basis van etniciteit tegen gaan. Dit vermoeden van etnisch gemotiveerd 
stemgedrag en de verwijzing naar traditionele structuren heeft zeer lang de rol genegeerd van een 
gezamenlijke geschiedenis, een gemeenschappelijk politiek gedachtengoed en een innovatieve 
manier op basis waarvan omgesprongen wordt met etniciteit in Tanzania. Deze achtergrond 
rechtvaardigt de verkenning van een alternatief analytisch raamwerk.  
 
Deze studie ontwikkelde een analytisch-narratieve methode die zich vooral baseerde op interviews 
met geprivilegieerde getuigen, en ook gewone kiezers (65). De fundamentele factor, zo vonden we 
uit, in het verklaren van een zeer matig belang van etniciteit in stemgedrag in Tanzania, zijn de 
Beloftes van de Onafhankelijkheidsbeweging (PsIM) geweest. Dit verwijst naar een politiek 
gedachtengoed met betrekking tot het realiseren en bevorderen van de beloftes van nationale 
eenheid (PNU), van een rechtvaardige verdeling van hulpbronnen (EDNR) en vrede. De PsIM 
creëerden een nationalistische politieke cultuur die zich verzette tegen etnische polarisatie en het 
belang ervan in politiek. Op die manier is men er de laatste 50 jaar in geslaagd etniciteit 
ondergeschikt te maken bij stemgedrag in Tanzania. Gebaseerd op de interviews die ik heb 
afgenomen, verwerp ik de neo-patrimoniale theorie en de hybride school. Ik bestempel hen als 
ontoereikend in de poging het belang van etniciteit in stemgedrag te begrijpen. Deze afwijzing is 
gebaseerde op het feit dat de impact van etniciteit op stemgedrag in Tanzania op geen enkele 
manier kan worden verklaard op basis van die theorie. Idealen, afgeleid van een nationalistische 
politieke cultuur, zoals ingebed in de PsIM, hebben aanleiding gegeven tot juridisch-rationale 
regels en instellingen, waarden en ervaringen die zich verzetten tegen het belang van etniciteit bij 
het stemgedrag van kiezers. Op basis daarvan moeten we veel waarde hechten (zonder de kritische 
blik te vergeten) aan het lokale politieke gedachtengoed dat werd geïnspireerd door Afrikaanse 
politieke ideologieën en praktijken bij het bepalen van stemgedrag 
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MUHTASARI 
Tasnifu hii imejikita kuchunguza ushawishi wa ukabila katika kuongoza maamuzi ya wapiga kura 
nchini Tanzania. Suala la kueleza ukabila na upigaji kura nchini Tanzania ni gumu na 
linakanganya. Mkanganyiko huu unatokana na ukweli kwamba nafasi ya ukabila katika masuala ya 
siasa nchini Tanzania ni ndogo ikilinganishwa na nchi nyingi za Kiafrika, licha ya kuwa na 
makabila zaidi ya 120, kupitia  historia ya utawala wa kikoloni kama mataifa mengine ya Afrika na 
wasiwasi unaoendelea kuhusu siasa za ushindani na uchumi huria kuchochea matumizi makubwa 
ya ukabila katika kushawishi upigaji kura. 
 
Maandiko mengi yahusuyo nafasi ya ukabila katika kushawishi maamuzi ya wapiga kura barani 
Afrika yanahusisha suala hilo na dhana ya muundo wa makabila na mifumo mamboleo ya  utawala 
wa kuleana  na chotara (mchanganyiko wa mfumo wa utawala mamboleo wa kuleana na mfumo 
wa utawala wa kale unaosherehesha ukabila katika uendeshaji wa siasa na mgawanyo wa rasilimali 
za taifa). Wakati dhana ya muundo wa makabila inadai kwamba matumizi makubwa ya ukabila 
katika upigaji kura unategemea uwezo wa makabila hayo kuunda muungano wenye idadi 
inayotosheleza kushinda uchaguzi (MWC), mielekeo ya mifumo wa utawala mamboleo wa 
kuleana na chotara vinaelezea nafasi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi kwa kuegemea dhana ya waafrika 
kupendelea  masuala ya desturi na jadi za utawala wa kale kuliko taasisi za utawala za kisheria 
(LRIs) na ukosefu wa maadili na historia zinazopinga kwa dhati matumizi ya ukabila katika 
kushawishi upigaji wa kura. Wazo la motisha za kikabila katika uendeshaji wa siasa na urejeaji wa 
masuala ya jadi na mifumo ya utawala wa kale katika kuelezea nafasi ya ukabila katika kushawishi 
upigaji wa kura kwa muda mrefu limefifisha nafasi ya mawazo ya historia ya pamoja, fikra za 
kisiasa, na ubunifu katika usimamizi wa ukabila nchini Tanzania, hususan nafasi yake katika 
kuongoza maamuzi ya wapiga kura wakati wa uchaguzi mbalimbali. Udhaifu huu umeshawishi 
utafutaji wa mfumo mbadala wa uchambuzi wa nafasi ya ukabila katika kushawishi upigaji kura. 
 
Utafiti huu umetumia njia ya uchambuzi simulizi uliojikita katika mahojiano na watu mashuhuri 
walioishuhudia  historia ya kisiasa ya Tanzania pamoja  na wapiga kura wa kawaida (65). Sababu 
ya msingi tuliyogundua katika kuelezea matumizi madogo ya ukabila katika kushawishi wapiga 
kura nchini Tanzania ni matumaini ya harakati za kupigania uhuru (PsIM),  yaani imani ya  kisiasa 
ya kufikia na kuboresha tumaini la kuwa na  umoja wa kitaifa (PNU), mgawanyo sawa wa 
rasilimali za Taifa (EDNR) na amani. Kwa ujumla PsIM yamesababisha kuwepo kwa utamaduni 
wa siasa za uzalendo wa kitaifa unaopingana na ubaguzi wa kikabila na matumizi ya ukabila katika 
siasa ambao umeweza kudumu kwa miaka yote 50 baada ya uhuru na hivyo kufifisha matumizi ya 
ukabila katika kushawishi upigaji kura katika kipindi hicho. Kutokana na mahojiano tuliyofanya, 
tunapinga dhana ya mfumo wa utawala mamboleo wa kuleana na chotara, na kuziita zana duni 
kwa ajili ya kuelewa umuhimu wa ukabila katika kushawishi wapiga kura nchini Tanzania. 
Msimamo wetu wa kupinga dhana ya mifumo wa utawala mamboleo wa kuleana na chotara 
unatokana na ukweli kwamba  uzoevu wa Tanzania unapingana na misingi ya nadharia hizo katika 
kuelezea nafasi ya ukabila katika kushawishi upigaji kura kama ilivyoelezwa hapo juu. Maadili 
yatokanayo na utamaduni wa siasa za uzalendo wa kitaifa kama zinavyobainishwa na PsIM, 
uwepo wa sheria mbalimbali na taasisi za kuzisimamia, na uzoevu wa muda mrefu unaopinga 
matumizi ya ukabila katika kushawishi maamuzi ya wapigaji kura vinathibitisha msimamo huu. 
Kwa msingi huu tunaweza kutoa sifa kwa, lakini pia kuchunguza kwa kina, mawazo ya kisiasa ya 
Waafrika yanayotokana na fikra zao za kisiasa na mazoea yao yanayoongoza upigaji wa kura. 
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CHAPTER I 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 1.1. Introduction and Argument 
The overriding literature on ethnicity and voting in Africa regards ethnicity
1
 as a central cleavage 
in informing voters’ choices in competitive multi-party elections (Eifert, 2010; Bratton and 
Bhavnani, 2009; Erdmann, 2007, 2004; Burgess, 2004; Berman et al 2004; Posner, 2004, 2005).  
The literature suggests that ethnicity in African elections is salient and is a significant determinant 
of voters choices. In the main, it contends that Africans use ethnic divisions for political 
mobilisation whereby contestants are said to lure their co-ethnics through promises of accessing 
public goods and favours once they are elected (Weber, 2010; Young, 2009). Such line of thinking 
suggests that Africans politicise ethnicity
2
 and are ethnic voters
3
. This implies that tribal or ethnic 
demography is a key determinant of vote allotment and thus election results reflect the distribution 
of ethnic groups in a country. Such distribution is said to occur because the contesting parties are 
organised along ethnic divisions and voters support co-ethnics either for the promises of public 
goods or as an expression of identity (McLaughlin, 2008; Ferree, 2006; Horowitz, 1985). In this 
way, ethnically based voting counteracts nation-building policies by dividing people on the basis 
of ethnic groups and disproportionately providing resources along those ethnic lines. As a result of 
disproportionate distribution of resources, conflicts which have dilapidating effects between the 
favoured and disfavoured ethnic groups ensue or are encouraged to (Miguel, 2004).  
The literature on ethnicity and voting provides numerous examples of states that have experienced 
dilapidating effects due to salience of ethnicity in Africa. I will just mention a few. For instance, in 
Nigeria ethnically based electoral competition has been a distinctive feature of the country’s 
political history. Such competition has frequently resulted into violent conflicts and voting 
divisions among the competing ethnicities (Salawu and Hassan, 2011).  Likewise, in Kenya 
ethnically anchored voting and violence has been evident in all pluralist elections (Weber, 2009; 
                                                 
1
 Ethnicity is thoroughly conceptualised in section 3.2.1 to 3.2.5. At this juncture it is worth to describe albeit in 
nutshell the term. Ethnicity stands for one’s belonging to a social group with ethnic traits known to it and others. 
2
 Politicised ethnicity is detailed in section 3.2.6. However, at this stage it is worth to note that politicised of ethnicity 
refers to a politically oriented consciousness of ethnic belonging which informs active ethnic identities engagement in 
political affairs. 
3
 Ethnic voting in this study entails expression of solidarity among ethnic group members to elevate leaders from their 
own ethnic group into positions of power.  
2 
 
Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008). The same can be said of Uganda which has a long history of ethnic 
polarisation and misunderstanding among ethnic groups which reflect voters’ choices (Rohner et 
al. 2013).  
The significance of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices highlighted above and the effects 
thereof is not immune to at least mild criticism. Recent research has suggested that the impact of 
ethnic identities is extremely complex and varied. For instance, empirical studies in Ghana 
(Lindberg and Morrison, 2008), South Africa (Piombo, 2005) and Kenya (Gibson and Long, 2009) 
challenge the centrality of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in African elections. The three 
studies recognise the role of ethnicity as important on determining voters’ choices but argue that 
economic evaluations supersede ethnicity in informing such choices. From such argument it can be 
said that Africans are more rational economic voters than ethnic ones. Concurring with Lindberg 
and colleagues’ stance on the limited role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices, Scarrit and 
Mozaffar (1999) contend that ethno-political fragmentation and the geographical concentration of 
ethnic groups in Africa are important factors in explaining the number of political parties but not 
voting patterns. This line of thought is perplexing from the partisanship voting perspective which 
contends that voters vote for the party they belong to. The attachment to the parties in voting is 
either because they perform well or benefit them personally which is referred to as patronage or 
strategic voting; or because of their unconditional affiliation to them regardless of performance and 
personal benefits which is referred to as sincere partisan voting (Young, 2009; Brody and 
Rothenberg, 1988). If Scarrit and Mozaffar’s (1999) view is right then the partisanship explanation 
of voting is rendered incompetent of explaining voting behaviour. Arguing in the same vein, 
Bannon et al. (2004) demonstrate that there is no simple relationship between ethnic 
fractionalisation and the likelihood that individuals will identify themselves first and foremost in 
ethnic terms when it comes to voting.  
The debate on the role of ethnicity in informing electoral choices presented above indicates that in 
general terms, ethnicity is an important determinant of voters’ choice in African elections. 
However, one major weakness of the literature is the lack of differentiation of levels of ethnic 
salience on the continent. Tanzania
4
 for instance, a multi-party African state with over 22 political 
                                                 
4
Tanzania is a United Republic formed as the result of a merger between Tanganyika and Zanzibar states in 1964. The 
scope of this article is the then Tanganyika.  
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parties, exhibits a striking ethnic plurality with over 120 groups socially and culturally recognised, 
but, has a lower salience of ethnicity in voting compared to most African states (Malipula, 2014; 
Bratton et al 2011; Young, 2009; Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2006; Miguel, 2004; Kiondo, 
2001; Mpangala, 2000; Jerman, 1997). A wider description of the political and electoral system of 
Tanzania is provided in the next section and in section 4.2. 
The fact that Tanzania is not being structured on this cleavage despite having around 120 ethnic 
groups is, so to speak, ‘abnormal’ for an African state as indicated in the overriding literature 
presented above. Tanzania’s less politicisation of ethnicity spares it from the effects of ethnic 
politicisation befalling other states in Africa particularly under the current multi-party era as 
indicated in the dominant scholarship on ethnicity and voting in Africa (Weber, 2010; Nyang’oro, 
2006). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that concerns that ethnic sentiments would gain salience 
after the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania in 1992 have been documented 
(Erdmann, 2002; Gasarasi, 1997; Omari 1997). These claims are understandable as such patterns 
are typical in other African countries like Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria as indicated above. The 
presumed fear as thoroughly discussed in section 4.5.2 was anchored on the general notion that 
multi-party democracy due to its competitive nature might lead to the emergence of ethnic-based 
political canvassing and eventually ethnic voting (Chaligha et al. 2002; Gasarasi 1997). These 
concerns have never been vindicated in Tanzania. Whether measured in terms of inter-ethnic trust 
or inter-ethnic discrimination, Tanzanians’ shared pride of nationhood has always been remarkably 
higher than among citizens of most other African countries (e.g. Afrobarometer
5
 2001; 2005; 2008; 
2012). This raises the question why.  
Knowledge of the causes of influences of ethnicity particularly on determining voters’ choices is 
mainly limited to ethnic structure, neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations. The ethnic structure 
school contends that a country’s ethnic structure - the number and size of ethnic groups can 
explain the influence of ethnicity in voting (Barkan, 1994; Posner, 2005). According to this line of 
thought, countries with few and large ethnic groups are expected to be prone to ethnic 
                                                 
5 The Afrobarometer is an independent, non partisan research project that conducts regular surveys measuring social, political and 
economic atmosphere in around 20 African countries. The main partners are the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-
Ghana), The Institute of Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Institute of Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP) and 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) University of Nairobi. These partners are provided technical support by the Michigan 
State University and The Democracy for Africa Research Unit (DARU), Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape 
Town. Likewise in all nations there are national partners who oversee data collection exercise. For Tanzania REPOA (Research for 
Poverty Alleviation) is responsible. 
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politicisation because they are endowed with ethnic groups large enough to form a MWC
6
 in 
elections. This MWC is said to influence voting because the voters expect rewards for being part 
of the winning coalition. The opposite is expected from countries with a collection of minor ethnic 
groups which force politicians to reach out to and win votes from numerous ethnic groups through 
nationalistic pleas (Weber, 2009). Under such circumstances, politicians strive to sustain an 
ethnically inclusive posture by equitably distributing the spoils of the state. As convincing as the 
ethnic structure view may be in terms of strategic rationality, the political-ethnographic school 
questions its validity on grounds of the dynamic and contextual reality of ethnic identities, which a 
static conceptualisation of ethnic groups and their politicising effect fails to grasp (Malipula, 2014; 
Schultz, 1984). Moreover, against both the ethnic structure argument and its critique, Miguel 
(2004) suggests that nation-building policies and practices can moderate ethnic politicisation. To 
Miguel, nation-building can mitigate politicisation of ethnicity while the lack of the same can 
exacerbate it. 
Tanzania augurs well in both the ethnic-structure and the nation-building debate. This is chiefly 
because it is recognised as a state where ethnicity is not politically salient in voting despite being 
ethnically diverse as indicated above. Specifically in electoral terms, the numbers of pronounced 
ethnic groups can hardly add up to make a MWC when it comes to presidential elections. In 
Tanzania the largest ethnic group, the Sukuma, constitutes 17 % of the population and there is 
none other that has more than 5 %; all are geographically scattered. As such, any MWC must 
involve many ethnic groups and adopt a national outlook (Malipula, 2014). However, the 
antagonism may play in the elections of parliamentarians, because constituencies in most cases 
harbour a dominant ethnic group; therefore, ethnic political canvassing can be envisaged. The 
competition might be mainly intra-ethnic rather than inter-ethnic as parties essentially sponsor 
members of the same ethnic group to compete for such seats (Nyaluke, 2013). Likewise, Tanzania 
has embarked on a sustained nation-building policy from colonialism to-date regardless of the 
political system operating in the country - mono-party or multi-party - as thoroughly expounded 
throughout the fourth chapter and in the third in sections 3.4.4.and 3.4.5. It is imperative to note 
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 The concept of a MWC, minimal winning coalition, refers to a coalition of ethnic groups with enough voters to meet 
the electorally set threshold for securing political office.   
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that almost all African countries also had similar nation-building policies and philosophies
7
 
(Rioba, 2012). However, most of these countries have not recorded the success that Tanzania has. 
A comparison of Tanzania and Kenya made by Weber (2010; 2009) suffice to shed light on the 
matter.  
In a current analysis of the causes of politicisation of ethnicity comparing Tanzania and ethnically 
salient Kenya, Weber (2010; 2009) buys into the nation-building argument, even to the point of 
dropping the structural argument altogether. Weber holds the view that Tanzania through the 
Sukuma
8
  has the potential to mobilise a “super-ethnic group” and forge the MWC to render the 
structural explanation irrelevant. Hence, lower ethnic salience in Tanzanian politics should not be 
attributed to the number (structure) of its ethnic groups but to nation-building policies, with the 
addition of two related factors: colonial history and lack of land alienation. Weber argues that the 
degree of ethnic polarisation was lower in Tanzania compared to Kenya due to less economic 
investment made by the British colonialists in the former compared to the latter. The difference of 
investment is attributed to the colonial status the British had in the two states. Kenya was a colony, 
thus the British were assured of longer stay. As a result, the British were more assured of long-
term investment and motivation of ethnic polarisation to contain strong national anti-colonial 
struggles. Tanzania attracted less investment and ethnic polarisation because the British 
established a mere trusteeship and later a protectorate charged with the role of overseeing its 
independence by the League of Nations and the United Nations respectively (Weber, 2010, 2009; 
Mwakikagile, 2010). Weber also argues that land in Kenya is disproportionately distributed among 
the economically powerful who use it to win support from their co-ethnics. In this regard, the 
economically influential inform conflicts that develop voting patterns among those accessing land 
and those who do not. The dissimilarity between Tanzania and Kenya’s colonial history makes 
                                                 
7
 Kwame Nkrumah’s African Personality ideological slogan which steered Ghanaians for national unity and 
development through a Pan- African system of values, Leopold Senghor Negritude which meant to promote African 
thinking in national unity and development in Senegal, Jomo Kenyatta’s Harambee (let’s pull together) aiming at 
promoting a spirit of national unity and working together to bring about development in Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda’s 
Humanism in Zambia and Mobutu Seseseko Authenticite in Zaire which sought to enhance psychological rebirth of a 
people freed from years of foreign domination, provide examples of the political ideologies that meant to enhance 
national integration.  
8
 The Sukuma is the biggest ethnic group in Tanzania with around 17 % of the country’s total population (Glickman, 
1995).This amount is similar to the Kikuyu in Kenya. Moreover, Sukuma could be joined by their culturally and 
linguistically near neighbours in the south, the Nyamwezi to add their numerical and political visibility. 
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Weber argue that colonially engineered ethnic polarisation cannot be a basis of ethnic voting in 
Tanzania, while it applies to Kenya. 
Weber’s explanations are central to explaining ethnic salience from the points of view of colonial 
history and land alienation, but they ignore African political thoughts that informed nationalist 
struggles as well as post-independence endeavours in making ethnicity insignificant in politics. 
From such deficiency, it is logical to appreciate Weber’s contribution that blends a structural and 
colonial historical thesis, but to add to the mix Tanzania’s ethno-political dynamics to thus capture 
the agencies of change that impact on structures is essential. The shortcomings of this school 
compel us to first explore the positions of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theses, the dominant 
explanations of African politics about the influences of ethnicity on voting behaviour. 
The neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations associate salience of ethnicity in voting in African 
states with: Lack of LRIs or their preference for traditional primordial
9
 tendencies over LRIs. They 
also attribute ethnic salience in voting in Africa to lack of shared history and values militating 
against the same (Malipula, 2014). In the view of neo-patrimonialists, primordialism exacerbates 
ethnic salience in voting due to personal rule and ethnic-based patronage while LRIs militate 
against the same through established rules and value systems (Clapham, 1985, Bayart, 1993, 
Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997, Chabal and Diloz, 1999). Since African states including 
Tanzania have decided to go multi-party and instituted LRIs, it could be unwise to say they are 
purely patrimonial. Instead, the fact is that they have the LRIs but are not well functioning 
(Makulilo, 2012). This fact informs the base of the hybrid school and makes states with such 
dysfunctional LRIs viewed as hybrid regimes pseudo-democratic regimes. To hybrid theorists, 
rulers of pseudo-democratic regimes use neo-patrimonial practices like politicising ethnicity to 
manipulate electorates and win their votes (Bratton and Posner, 1999, Schedler, 2006, Diamond, 
2002 and Levitsky and Way, 2002). In light of the hybrid school, ethnicity can be manipulated at 
will by the ruling elites to influence peoples’ electoral choices without the ruled having a say. 
From the two schools, one would expect Tanzania as an African state to be ethnic salient in voting. 
Such expectation is predicated on the fact that it is an African state and possesses hybrid and some 
neo-patrimonial characteristics, like malfunctioning LRIs and strong social and cultural ethnic 
identities like other African states, but it is not ethnically salient politically. In this regard, the 
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 Primordialism is understood as the belief in a primeval culture shared by all members of an ethnic group. 
7 
 
presence or lack of LRIs and preference to ethnic identities alone cannot satisfactorily explain the 
influences of ethnicity in voting in a state like Tanzania. Such gap casts serious academic shortage 
on the over-generalised nature of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanation of the influences of 
ethnicity on voting in Africa as it will be thoroughly unravelled in section 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.   
Furthermore, although neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations have dominated the academic 
discourse on issues related to the failures of the African state associated with the use of extra legal-
rational authority like ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices, they suffer from their biased 
treatment of African history and traditions. This critique stems from the theories’ essentialist and 
overly negative interpretation of African politics including the use of ethnicity in elections. This 
essentialist view is reluctant to appreciate alternative political ideas and structures relevant to 
Africa (Mustapha, 2002, Erdman and Engel, 2006, de Grassi, 2008, Pitcher et al. 2009). For 
instance, while the theories basically see nothing positive in the African traditions as they are 
supposed to promote traditional as opposed to modern legal rational issues including the use of 
ethnicity in elections, there is sound evidence proving limited use of ethnicity in elections in 
Tanzania (Malipula, 2014; Weber, 2009; Ole Therkildsen, 2008; Nyang’oro, 2004) as well as 
ideals and values in African traditions and history to counter the neo-patrimonialists claims 
(Malipula, 2014; Pitcher et al. 2009). The insistence on the primitive and inferior status of the 
African traditions to the “modern” western traditions embedded in the legal-rational institutions 
cornering the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools informs a research strand focusing on 
reassessing the role of African history in explaining varied social, political and economic 
phenomena (Mustapha, 2002, Erdman and Engel, 2006, de Grassi, 2008, Pitcher et al. 2009) which 
is applicable to exploring influences of  ethnicity on African politics including determining voters’ 
choices as substantiated in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. 
The current dissertation has been motivated by the reassessment of the African history school that 
criticises neo-patrimonialism and hybrid approaches analysis of the influence of ethnicity on voting. 
On its part, it employs African history informed by colonialism and the resultant PsIM to explain 
influences of ethnicity on voting in Tanzania. The dissertation endeavours to present a critique to 
the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools and set up an alternative explanation for the continued 
limited influence of ethnicity in anchoring voting in multiparty elections in Tanzania despite 
political and economic changes that have occurred over time. The alternative approach employed to 
8 
 
understand the role of ethnicity in influencing voting in multi-party elections that this dissertation 
suggests rests on the idea of a path-dependent nationalisation frame informed by the privileged 
witnesses interviewed in this study. The nationalisation frame in question results from the political 
ideas and aspirations of the independence movement, and the capacity of that movement to build a 
political organisation encompassing the political leaders, ideals of the independence movement and 
the people. The dissertation uses the 2010 General Elections (GEs) in Mwanza region as a case 
study to attest this framework. 
At its core, the dissertation explores the ramifications of the implementation of the PsIM in 
Tanzania. More specifically, it analyses how and why the implementation of the PsIM (PNU, 
EDNR and peace
10
) impacts the way Tanzanians interact and apply ethnicity in the electoral 
processes and subsequently vote. In this regard, the study gives a comprehensive account of the 
current state of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania as it has been informed by the PsIM. Cognisant of 
the fact that the degree of ethnic salience on determining voting in Tanzania is low compared to 
most African states as argued above, the dissertation provides explanations as to why it is and 
continues to be low. It is the assumption of this study that Tanzania’s extensive post-independence 
nation-building policy has created a national identity that emphasises peacefulness and national 
unity as central national values that serve as a frame through which Tanzanians reject any calls for 
violence and ethnic polarisation. This being said, however, ethnicity is dominant in Tanzania on 
social and cultural grounds and its flashes in electoral politics cannot be avoided. Therefore, the 
dissertation explores in which shapes or forms such flashes of ethnicity influence voting in 
Tanzania.  
1.2. Focus and Scope of the Study  
The analysis of the influences of ethnicity in voting in African states has been largely informed by 
neo-patrimonial and hybrid theoretical underpinnings as highlighted above. The structural analysis 
as described above sheds light on the matters but it is not the dominant explanation and lacks the 
                                                 
10
 We recognise that there are two versions of peace. One regards peace as the asbsence of war and another goes 
beyond absence of war by including presence of social justice, democracy and reconciliation. However, literature and 
interviewees’ views on ethnicity and voting mostly revolved around the violent aspects of peace and effects thereof. 
As such peacefulness in this dissertation is informed by the version of peace as absence of warfare and massive 
violence within a given society (Ramsbotham, 2006). The peacefulness of Tanzania in this context rests on the fact 
that the country has never experienced civil war or civil disobedience that has had alarming consequences as 
evidenced in countries like Burundi and Rwanda were genocide occurred, and Kenya were the ethnic-based post 2007 
elections that merited an ICC case etc.   
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agency aspect when explaining influences of ethnicity and voting. Such backdrop gives little 
explanatory power to explain a complex phenomenon like ethnicity and voting which is associated 
with an interface of many actors, institutions, structures and processes. In this regard, the analysis 
of the dissertation will be largely informed by the discourse of the dominant theoretical positions - 
neo-patrimonial and hybrid, and the legacy of the PsIM as stated by my privileged informants.  
The dominant theories as explained above essentially argue that ethnicity is salient in African 
states’ voting due to primordial ways of organising politics in Africa, Tanzania inclusive. The 
current study does not reject the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations outright but deems them 
insufficient in explaining influences of ethnicity. Tanzania has in place LRIs but also a layered 
history of constructing ideals that seem to have a role to play in explaining influences of ethnicity. 
To substantiate the study’s deviation from the established theoretical suppositions one key focus of 
the study is to make a well-founded critique of neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime literature 
relevant to ethnicity and voting and to suggest an alternative explanation. The alternative 
explanatory framework advanced to analyse the influence of ethnicity on anchoring voting is 
predicated on the PNU, EDNR and peace embedded in the PsIM in Tanzania.  
By using this framework, the current dissertation can explain how accountability to the deliverance 
of shared goals of a nation (PsIM) can inform influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ 
choices. It analyses the role of Africa’s major historical fact (colonialism) and its subsequent effect 
on the establishment and implementation of shared promises of the Tanzanian people embedded in 
the PSIM to explain the role of ethnicity in informing voting. In this way, the current dissertation 
deviates from the modernity vs. traditional, personal vs. institutional debates that are at the core of 
the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theories as presented in sections 3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. 
 Cognisant of the fact that Tanzania has undergone numerous changes since attaining its 
independence in 1961, and the level of ethnic salience has been argued to be comparatively low, 
the dissertation proposes the PsIM as explanatory framework.  Being aware of the fact that low 
ethnic salience does not mean absence of ethnicity, the dissertation also focuses on exploring the 
various shapes and forms in which ethnicity has manifested itself in Tanzanian politics. We also 
analyse the ramifications of those flashes of ethnicity in future voting trends. At this stage I should 
share the disclaimer that a part of Tanzania will be omitted in the discussion, as clarified next. 
10 
 
As indicated in 1.1 under the fourth footnote, Tanzania is a United Republic resulting from a 
merger of the previously sovereign states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 26
th
 April, 1964. 
However, the current research as indicated in the first footnote leaves out Zanzibar and deals with 
Tanganyika/Tanzania Mainland for reasons provided hereafter. The choice of one part of the URT 
in this research stems from the fact that Tanganyika and Zanzibar have dissimilar political histories 
and dynamics. Such fact renders it complicated to treat them as a single case study. The Tanzania 
that forms the base of this research achieved its independence from the British colonialists in 1961. 
At the time in question, it was under a pluralist political system with one dominant and the 
nationally inclusive political party that marshalled the fight against colonial rule - Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU). Other parties that existed at the material time were weak and 
lacked nation-wide coverage. As a result, TANU won almost all seats in the multi-party elections. 
In 1965, Tanzania was constitutionally declared a one-party state and TANU that championed the 
country’s independence movement was made the sole political party in the country (Makulilo, 
2009). TANU’s status was given to CCM in 1977 when it was formed after the merger of TANU 
and ASP following the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. It is imperative to note that although 
Tanzania was constitutionally declared a single party state in 1965, it was a de facto mono party 
state since independence (Babeiya, 2012). This argument is predicated on the fact that TANU 
enjoyed uncontestable control of the country’s political realm. In the main, this was due to its mass 
character and the role it played in the country’s struggles against the colonial rule (Mwakikagile, 
2010). In 1992, pluralist politics were reintroduced in Tanzania as a result of internal and external 
pressures of economic and political liberalisation (Babeiya, 2012). Currently, Tanzania as 
indicated in section 1.1 has 22 registered political parties and has conducted five multiparty GEs
11
. 
In all elections, the ruling party CCM has won convincingly in both the presidential and 
parliamentary races as indicated in appendix I
12
. In these elections, fears of ethnicity abounding 
were prevailing as some argued that political pluralism would inform the use of ethnicity in 
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 Tanzania has conducted multiparty general elections in 1995; 2000;2005; 2010 and 2015.The sixth is expected to be 
held in 2020 
12
 The results exclude five members elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar to the national Assembly 
who are divided among members of Zanzibar House of Representatives which happen to be divided among CCM and 
CUF, 10 presidential nominees and the Attorney General.Generally spreaking since CCM has been winning 50% of 
the House and the presidency most of the nominated parliamentarians are from CCM. In rare ocassions opposition 
leaders like Chief Abdallah Fundikira, Hon. Augustine Mrema and Hon. James Mbatia from the opposition were 
appointed. 
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political canvassing and voting (Gasarasi, 1997). These fears have never been vindicated and the 
state of ethnicity and other regional or social divides have never taken political salience in 
elections (Malipula, 2014; Weber, 2010). While this has been the case in Tanganyika, the same 
cannot be said of Zanzibar (Killian, 2010). This is chiefly due to dissimilar political histories and 
dynamics evidenced in following paragraphs.  
Elements of ethnic fragmentation in Tanganyika never had dilapidating effects. This is mainly 
because efforts of nation-building have watered down divisive politics. The same cannot be said of 
Zanzibar. This argument rests on the fact that while the independence movement in Tanganyika 
had dexterously mobilised the major social forces in Tanganyikan society to forge a high degree of 
unity upon independence and beyond (as it will be explained in detail throughout the third and 
fourth chapters), the movement in Zanzibar was divided and took structures set by the colonialists 
and their agents. It is imperative to note that Zanzibar was a satellite colony under the Sultanate of 
Oman with clear domination of trade and political affairs. The Sultanates’ hold of business and 
politics established an extremely centralised state in Zanzibar. The political system and its 
associated economic mode had implications on the ethnic structures of pre-colonial Zanzibar 
manifesting into class and racial structures. The Oman Arabs constituted the ruling class and the 
land-owning aristocracy, the Indians were the traders and financiers of the slave trade while 
Africans mainly from Tanganyika forming the class of slaves. The indigenous Zanzibar Africans 
and the Shirazi people were mere peasants (Mukangara, 2000). At this juncture, I can agree with 
Bakari (2001) who is of the view that even before colonialism the elements of racial and classical 
ethnicity in Zanzibar were developed. According to Bakari, such divisive elements coupled with 
the inability to reverse them and with undemocratic tendencies, have significant bearings on the 
racial and ethnic related conflicts during the struggle for independence and the post-independence 
politics.  
The nationally integrated nature of the Tanganyika movement informed the less competitive 
opposition and comparatively peaceful elections when multiparty politics were reintroduced in 
1992 (Mwaipopo, 2011). This was not the case in Zanzibar where political opposition is very 
strong and electoral violence serious enough to cause violence and casualties (Malipula, 2001; 
Bakari, 2001; Mukangara, 2000). The difference can be proven by the fact that in all GEs in 
Tanganyika the ruling party CCM has scooped a clear winning majority ranging between 60% and 
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80%. At the same time, in all Zanzibar elections contests are very close with the ruling party CCM 
candidate winning by 0.5 % of the vote in the 1995 presidential elections. This trend of meagre 
success in other elections against CUF opponents characterised the forthcoming elections in the 
Isles. The sustained trend of close ties in electoral results is attributed to regional differences 
(between the individual Islands forming Zanzibar: Pemba and Unguja), something absent in 
Tanganyika’s politics. 
In general, the political culture of Tanganyika differs from that of Zanzibar. Tanganyika provides 
an interesting and unique case for investigating the basis of the influence of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices in a stable, peaceful and ethnically depoliticised country since its 
independence to-date. The opportunity provided by Tanzania stands despite the country’s move 
from socialist to liberal political and economic policies. As such, Tanganyika allows an analysis of 
ethnicity and voting in the changing nature of politics and economics in this stable context. A 
detailed overview of Tanzania’s political and electoral system is provided in section 4.2. Issues of 
ethnicity and voting in Tanzania as they unfolded over time are presented in the rest of the sections 
constituting Chapter IV.  
1.3. Justification for the Study 
The influences of determinants of electoral choice including the role of ethnicity in anchoring 
voting remain to be a gaping lacuna in Tanzania’s voting behaviour literature. This is the case 
despite four competitive GEs being conducted since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 
1992 (Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Phillips, 2010). Surveys by REDET
13
  and Afrobarometer remain the 
main sources of empirical data on voting behaviour in Tanzania. However, they lack 
comprehensive analysis of the influences of ethnicity on explaining voters’ choices. REDET’s 
opinion polls
14
 and voters’ preferences provide insights into voting behaviour with a bias on the 
party preferences, electoral systems, candidate choices and performance of the incumbent. The 
Afrobarometer studies on democracy and governance provide a limited analysis of ethnicity and 
voting in Tanzania because they discuss it as an undifferentiated trend among African countries. 
The studies view Tanzania as an unrepresentative case for ethnicity in Africa (Miguel, 2004; 
Young, 2009; Bratton et al. 2011). Other studies concurring with the Afrobarometer-guided studies 
                                                 
13
 REDET is an acronym for the Research and Education on Democracy in Tanzania. REDET is housed in the  
Department of Political Science of the University of Dar es Salaam 
14
 Varied voters preference and opinion poll results can be accessed on REDET’s website 
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on ethnicity and voting include but not limited to Ole Therkildsen (2009), Nyang’oro (2006), 
Kiondo (2001) and Mpangala (2000). The studies fail to provide a thorough path-dependent 
analysis that explains in detail why the level of ethnicity is comparatively low on determining 
voters’ choices in Tanzania. Equally, we should shed light on how the factors that caused the 
limited use of ethnicity in anchoring votes have consistently managed to have their effect during 
different political and economic circumstances that Tanzania has undergone.  
This dissertation is the first comprehensive empirical study of voting behaviour in Tanzania to 
deviate from the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools of African politics. It does so by suggesting an 
empirically rigorous and theoretically grounded path-dependent historical explanation relevant for 
explaining the role of ethnicity on voters’ choices in Tanzania.  
At a broader level, the study is a step towards reducing the shortage of electoral behaviour studies 
in new democracies of which Tanzania is part, as purported by varied scholars (O’Gorman, 2012; 
Bratton et al. 2011; Phillips, 2010; Kimenyi and Romero 2008; Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Young 
2009; Erdmann, 2007; Posner 2004 and Ozcan, 2000). The limited studies of voting behaviour in 
new democracies make them rely on theories developed from experiences of established 
democracies’ to explain their voting behaviour. The negative aspect of such reliance revolves 
around the fact that architects of these theories assume that their postulations could cater for all 
democracies (advanced and new) irrespective of distinguishable socio-economic and political 
milieu within which voters live and elections are conducted (Kang, 2009). Taking this assumption 
for granted without any scientific test of their applicability is not only an empirical flaw, but indeed 
an underdevelopment of the contribution of the experience of new democracies like Tanzania in the 
field of electoral behaviour (Kang, 2009; Ozcan, 2000). 
Equally vital, because Tanzania has strived to build nationhood and national identity since 
independence, this study provides pointers to reflect about the interplay between ethnicity and the 
state’s accountability to the society’s overall nation-building enterprise in different political 
orientations. The analysis offers an indication of how national political culture envisioned under 
the monolithic political dispensation and socialist economic system has been sustained, rejected or 
accepted, and adapted by different generations. One generation of respondents had the privilege to 
witness the monolithic political and socialist economic order. The next grew up after the demise of 
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such order. Views from the two generations offer a compelling glimpse of the future of the 
influences of ethnicity on anchoring voting in Tanzanian multi-party elections. 
1.4. Research Questions  
Research questions according to Punch (2005) are essential to any research undertaking. They 
direct a research project by drawing its boundaries. Research questions enable researchers to remain 
focused during the entire research project. These questions guide the researcher to collect relevant 
data and provide an agenda for report writing (Kothari, 2009). Given the above, the fundamental 
problem that the present research endeavours to answer is:  What ramifications do the PsIM and 
their implementation have on the way Tanzanians apply ethnicity in voting in competitive elections 
in Tanzania? The central research question breaks down into three sub-questions as enumerated 
below:  
The first aspect of the dissertation deals with how the PsIM influence voting in multi-party 
elections in Tanzania. The relevant question is:  How have the PsIM and their implementation 
influenced the use of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in competitive elections in Tanzania? 
The primary focus of this question is to obtain information about the role of the legacy of the PsIM 
on determining the use of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices. The legacy of the PsIM is 
measured by the PNU, EDNR and peace. The study borrows the Afrobarometer variables to 
measure the role of PNU on determining voters’ choices. The Afrobarometer measures the role of 
national unity through interviewees’ perceptions of ethnic ethnic salience, inter-ethnic 
discrimination and inter-ethnic trust. According to the barometer low level of ethnic salience is 
measured by the following variable: preference for and identifying more with national identity 
compared to ethnic group identity. Ethnic salience is said to be high when interviewees identify 
first and foremost with the ethnic group rather than with the nation. Inter-ethnic trust according to 
the barometer is measured through interviewees’ trust in members of other ethnic groups, as no 
less trustworthy than co-ethnics. If interviewees trust the members of other ethnic groups as much 
as their own, they are viewed to harbour feelings of inter-ethnic trust. Feelings of inter-ethnic 
indiscrimination (feelings that your ethnic group or ‘tribe’15 – kabila in Swahili - is not 
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 ‘Tribe’ is a translation of the Swahil word ‘kabila’ and stands for cultural groups, namely population groups whose 
members identify with a certain common cultural tradition.These groups in Africa were fluid and manipulated by 
colonialists to serve their divide and rule policy as we will see in Chapter III and IV. 
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discriminated in various domains including distribution of the spoils of the state) are measured by 
interviewees’ denial of ethnic-based segregation and distribution of resources. Studies by Bratton 
et al. (2011) and Young (2009) provide examples of how the role of ethnicity on determining 
voters’ choices can be measured through the variables picked in this study.  
As for EDNR and peace, the views of my key informants (KIs) set the base. To them, EDNR 
should be measured by (1) the criteria and legacy of the Ujamaa
16
 villagisation processes (which 
removed people from scattered areas to live together in newly created villages to ensure collective 
production and the sharing of public goods including social amenities); (2) nationalisation of the 
major means of the economy (putting the previously private owned properties owned by foreigners 
in the hands of the Tanzanians through their government and sharing its produce) as well as (3) 
free social service distribution to Tanzanians. Where villagisation and nationalisation are 
considered to enhance unity and EDNR, the likelihood of low salience of ethnicity is deemed to be 
great. Finally, the role of the promise of peace is measured in terms of interviewees’ opposing 
views on the use of violence as a means of organising politics and acquiring public demands.  
The major assumption embedded in the variables is that the more positive the interviewees are to 
the PsIM in the form of the elements of national unity, EDNR as well as love of peace by 
denouncing violent means of acquiring public resources, the more the likelihood of low level of 
ethnic salience in voting. In this way, the PsIM can be said to have influenced voting in the non-
ethnic way it intended. 
Secondly, this study explores dynamics behind the influence of the PsIM on voters’ choices in 
Tanzania. Therefore, the relevant research question in this connection is: Why the PsIM and efforts 
to implement them have influenced the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania 
the way it has? The underlying idea of this question is to obtain information on how the PsIM 
could motivate Tanzanians’ use of ethnicity on determining their voting choices. Once again the 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
16
 The concept of Ujamma literally means familyhood. It was Tanzania’s major socio-economic philosophy that 
guided the country’s political, social and economic affairs. At its core, it aimed at bringing people together and 
cooperate in reaping the advantages of the nation in an egalitarian manner (Mesaki and Malipula, 2011).Further 
explanations of Ujamaa as enshrined in the AD which explain the philosophy are provided in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 
and further elaborated in section 4.4. For thorough understanding of Ujamaa and Ujamaa villages (see Nyerere, J. 
(1967). “Socialism and Rural Development”, in Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa-Essays on Socialism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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base for addressing the question is informed by the KIs views. The major assumption is that the 
PsIM depict the felt needs of the people (national unity, EDNR and peace) and have formed an 
identity among Tanzanians as well as pride which people do not want to see wither away. 
Thirdly, the dissertation endeavours to explore flashes or bursts of ethnicity that manifest in 
Tanzania and their role in influencing voting. For this objective the relevant research question is:  
In what forms and shapes/ bursts of ethnicity have manifested in Tanzanian elections, and how do 
they inform voters’ choices? The main intent of this question is to gather information about 
historical events heightening ethnicity during elections in Tanzania. This is useful as in Tanzania 
there are cultural and social grounds for ethnicity which might have corresponding effects on 
voters’ choices in elections. The analysis is anchored on politics of origin and belonging as defined 
in section 3.2.6. Key elements include candidates’ knowledge of the local language of the area 
he/she vies for political office (in our case Kisukuma), candidates’ ancestral origin and ownership 
of land in the area he/she seeks to be elected, as well as residence in the area of electoral contest 
and perceptions of kinship networks as defined in section 3.2.6. 
1.5. Organisation of the Dissertation 
The present dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter provides the general 
introduction of the study, in which theoretical perspectives and discussions on the politicisation of 
ethnicity and its ramification are presented. At its core, the arguments suggest Africa is an 
ethnically polarised continent whereby ethnicity is supposed to be salient in anchoring votes. 
However, it exempts Tanzania from such categorisation. The chapter presents the focus of the 
study that marks a departure from the patrimonial and hybrid schools of African politics which are 
central to explaining the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes. It does so by developing an alternative 
theoretical underpinning discussing ethnicity and voting through the legacy of the PsIM in 
Tanzania. Similarly, in the same chapter the research problem and questions as well as the 
significance of the study are presented. The chapter concludes by giving the organisation of the 
dissertation.  
 
The second chapter discusses the study’s methodology whereby information on research design 
and strategy as well as the study area and the rationale for choosing it is provided. In addition, the 
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chapter includes information on the research process, methods used to obtain, analyse and present 
data as well as limitations and delimitations of the study.  
The third chapter presents a conceptual and theoretical discussion on the literature about ethnicity 
and voting. It provides an understanding of ethnicity resulting from a critical account of the 
primordial, instrumental and social constructivist conceptions of ethnicity and the germination of 
ethnicity into a politically salient phenomenon. Theoretical and empirical literature on the 
influence of ethnicity in influencing voting in African elections and puzzles thereof are also 
treated. In this chapter, a point of departure from the ethnic structure school and the Neo-
patrimonial and hybrid regime theory in explaining ethnicity and voting is drawn. An explanation 
based on the legacy of the independent movement is made and its relevance in explaining 
depoliticised ethnicity in Tanzania is justified. Subsequently, a conceptual framework for the study 
derived from the theoretical discussions and interviews with privileged informants or KIIs as 
referred to in this dissertation is presented. 
The fourth chapter presents a concise narrative of the Tanzanian ethno-polity. It essentially 
canvasses a conceptual and contextual analysis of the ethnic, political, and economic developments 
in Tanzania from the nationalist era to the present and serves as an introduction as well as a 
theoretical and empirical foundation for the analysis of the role of ethnicity in influencing voters’ 
choices in Mwanza in the 2010 multiparty GEs. The chapter presents the essence of the 
insignificant role of ethnicity in Tanzania’s politics compared to other African countries. It goes on 
to unravel the nation-building policy in Tanzania to show how it meticulously developed a national 
identity and political culture that helped Tanzanians to enjoy peace and avoid the horrors of 
divisive politics and ethnic polarisation. The chapter indicates that the Ujamaa political culture that 
was in line with the PsIM has sustainably managed to inform the way Tanzanians behave 
politically even amid the collapse of the Arusha Declaration (AD) and challenges of liberal politics 
and economics that are against the letter and spirit of Ujamaa. 
The fifth chapter presents the empirical data and analyses made on the influence of the legacy of 
the PsIM in informing the role of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices in competitive 
elections in Mwanza region as guided by the study’s specific research questions. The results are 
examined to determine interviewees’ attitudes toward the role of ethnicity in motivating voters’ 
choices in multiparty elections in Tanzania. The interviewees’ examined in this survey offer an 
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indication of how national political culture, which was conceived and propagated under one-party 
politics and a socialist economic system, has been sustained or rejected by those who lived in the 
AD era and those who did not. This comparison is essential for drawing the path dependency by 
establishing acceptance and adoption of practices by a generation that has lived and that grown up 
after the demise of the AD dictates. The political imaginary
17
 is thoroughly path-dependent. 
Attitudes derived from such analysis offers a valuable glimpse of the future of national identity, 
divisive politics and conflicts in Tanzania. 
The sixth chapter presents my interviewees views on the future of ethnicity and voting in 
Tanzania. In the main, the chapter presents and discusses Tanzanians predictions on the role of 
ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices.  
The seventh and last chapter gives an overall summary of the dissertation, its conclusions and 
implications as well as recommending further research in the area of ethnicity and voting in 
Tanzania.  
 
 
                                                 
17
 An ‘imaginary’ is not an illusion. Images imagined may be true. Imaginary is another term for ideology but it 
includes also unconscious ideas such as metaphors.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Introduction 
Conducting research encompasses a chain of interconnected activities which are done in a logical 
manner. These activities involve conceptualisation of the problem which is being investigated, 
reviewing literature relevant to the study in question, collection of data as well as analysis and 
presentation of the collected data. Consequently, research entails discussion of the research 
findings and drawing conclusions on the basis of the research questions and findings. Throughout 
the process of conducting research a number of methods and strategies are required depending on 
the nature of the research or problem that is to be investigated.  
In this chapter, I present the methodology
18
 involved in the study. It includes the research approach, 
research epistemology, sources of data, data analysis, data validity and reliability, ethical issues, 
limitations and delimitations, and finally the chapters’ conclusion.  
2.2. Research Design  
A research design is a plan unfolding how, when and where data for a particular research has been 
collected and analysed. In other words, a research design entails the orientation of the study as a 
whole (Creswell, 2009, 2003; Walliman, 2006). This study employs qualitative research design. 
The choice has been influenced by the fact that a qualitative design is useful for descriptive studies 
as it is flexible and allows the incorporation of various methods of data collection and is suitable 
for answering “how” and “why” questions (Creswell, 2009). Since we are interested in unveiling 
how ethnicity influences voters’ choices the way it has, and give reasons for such influences, a 
choice of quantitative methods which according to Berger (2010); Hesse-Biber, (2010); Lindlof 
and Taylor (2010) are relevant to questions like how many and/or to what extent would not 
provide relevant results. Similarly, the design was preferred due to its strength in understanding a 
social or human problem and obtaining detailed views from informants in a natural setting. Since 
ethnicity is a social phenomenon with sensitive attachments, interactions with interviewees and 
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 Is a general approach to studying a research topic which includes how the research is carried out  and procedures 
involved in exploring or describing phenomena (Silverman, 2000)  
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application of methods that can ensure their involvement in a natural setting was essential for 
acquiring relevant data.   
Furthermore, qualitative designs are very useful in studies where limited information exists about a 
phenomenon (Creswell, 2009). The exploration of the PsIM is an example of such understudied 
phenomenon. The researcher’s close involvement in qualitative studies also influenced our choice. 
This is because it guaranteed the researcher an insider's view of the researched field, such as we 
seek to gain in our interviews of privileged witnesses in the political arena. This allowed the 
researcher to find issues like subtleties and complexities that according to Punch (2005); Burns 
(2000) are often missed by quantitative studies due to their emphasis on statistical analysis.  
The qualitative research strategy employed in the current dissertation is called analytic narrative. 
An analytic narrative is a theoretically informed research strategy that builds models mainly 
derived from rational choice (Bates et al. 1998). Analytical narratives do so through analysis of 
key actors in a particular matter studied; their goals and preferences as well as the effective rules 
that influence actors’ behaviours. Analytical narratives analyse and elaborate the strategic 
interactions that produce an equilibrium that constrains some actions and facilitates others. The 
drawback of rational choice is the assumption that actors, in this case, voters act rationally, and 
moreover that rationality (choosing on rational grounds) means the same thing in every culture. It 
is imperative to note therefore that although Bates et al. (1998) confesses a preference for rational 
choice theory in analytical narratives, Bates (2000) two years later changed his position and argued 
that it is not a necessary condition for an analytic narrative. Alternatively, researchers can use any 
theory or theories of choice, provided that it is sufficiently developed to provide a consistent 
technique for deducing behaviour. It is against this background that I decided to go beyond the 
rational choice theory to inform my analysis of the influences of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. 
The requirement of explicit theory (or, at least, a theory that could be formalised even if it is not) 
compels scholars to make causal statements and to identify a small number of variables (Levi, 
2002). This approach provides the researcher with some discipline as explicit theory affords the 
researcher to distill the narrative and ensure that the explanations are not informed by factors 
outside the theoretical base.  
Analytical narratives are capable of generating not only the favoured explanation of a phenomenon 
but also an alternative explanation. This is done through making assumptions clearly and 
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explicitly. As such, it provides the possibility of challenging assumptions to produce new insights 
and competitive interpretations of data. Likewise, analytical narratives entail comparative static 
results crucial for comparative research. This is because they are the basis for hypotheses of what 
could have taken place under different conditions (Bates et al.1998). When the models are game 
theoretic, they offer yet another source of hypothesis building. While rational choice emphasizes 
an actor’s motives and personal interests, the kindred approach of game theory looks at outcomes 
at the collective level, which allows for zero-sum and non-zero sum (including win-win as well as 
non-optimal) outcomes. The consideration of off-the-equilibrium path-behaviour should reveal 
reasons and reasoning for why actors took one path and not another. Indeed, what actors believe 
will happen should they make a different choice might determine what choices they do make 
(Levi, 1990).  
The analytic narrative strategy employed in this dissertation is fundamentally a basic analytic 
explanation method as put forward by George and Bennett (2005). This approach is by no means  
a rational choice analytic narrative as spearheaded by Bates et al. (1998), which he criticised later 
as pointed out above (Bates, 2000). According to George and Bennett (2005) an analytic 
explanation research strategy is conceived as a variant of process tracing methods. Its defining 
characteristic is that it converts historical narratives into analytical based explanation couched in 
explicit theoretical forms. The analytical explanation is, in essence, a narrative that ´pays attention 
to stories, accounts, and context´ and is, at the same time, a tool of analysis that ‘extracts explicit 
and formal lines, which facilitate both exposition and explanation´ (Bates, et al, 1998). 
The basic analytic narrative does indeed make use of history and share the elements of historical 
narratives. However, it has a vital advantage which makes it deviate from pure historical narratives 
(Levi, 2002; Mahoney, 1990). The merit is the fact that an analytic narrative does not necessarily 
need to be a strictly sequential narrative because it accords a researcher room of choosing key 
points of focus. As George and Bennett (2005) points out: “the explanation may be deliberately 
selective, focusing on what are thought to be particularly important parts of an adequate or 
parsimonious explanation.” In line with George and Bennett (2005) advice that analytic 
explanations could select accounts deemed relevant, I put forward the research questions to guide 
this study and constructed in Chapter IV of this dissertation a general narrative of Tanzania’s 
ethno-political experience. This narrative depicted the environment within which the questions 
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came about. It also provided the base for analysing the influences of the PsIM in informing the 
influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs. The base created in Chapter 
IV smoothens the analysis of qualitative data garnered from a survey conducted in Mwanza, KIIs 
and documentary sources meant to explain the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ 
choices in elections in Tanzania and the implications thereof.  
2.3. Research Epistemology 
Social research concedes that social inquiry is based upon the dual fundamental principles of 
epistemology and ontology (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). In a nutshell, epistemology deals with the 
issue of knowledge, and specifically, who is, or can be a “knower” (May and Williams, 1998). 
Epistemology addresses itself to issues related to knowledge like: how reality can be known; the 
interplay between the knower and what is known; the assumptions that guide the process of 
knowing and the achievement of findings, as well as the possibility of such process replicated by 
others for purposes of assessing the quality of a study and the reliability of its findings (May and 
Williams, 1998). Ontology is concerned with questions pertaining to the kinds of things that exist 
within society. It is about ways of constructing reality, how reality really is and how things really 
work (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998).  
Ontologically, this study does not differ very much from two theories which this dissertation 
critiques - neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime research. The matter and object of the study are 
political thoughts and political elites and how they use ethnicity to seek and gain political mandate 
from voters in elections. However, the study leaves aside how such influence impact upon 
legitimacy and dominance of the power gained through ethnicity in a given polity. These two 
aspects are at the core of neo-patrimonial and hybrid studies. The major dissimilarity between this 
dissertation and the approach informing neo-patrimonial and hybrid regime research projects is 
essentially in epistemology. While neo-patrimonial theory emphasises individual actions of leaders 
as the base of determination of voters choices, which made Mustapha (2002) to brand the research 
strand as one led by methodological individualism, this dissertation is guided by an epistemology 
which conceives elections in general and voting in particular as a complex process with sometimes 
unpredictable outcomes at the collective level. To this dissertation elections and voting are 
processes in which both leaders and the led in a given polity participate in shaping the processes’ 
expectations and the do and don’ts, including the salience or otherwise of ethnicity.   
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With regard to how an idea becomes shared by a collective group, the episteme employed in this 
dissertation is analogous to that used for the acquisition of knowledge and understanding of social 
realities such as a nation and nationalism conceptualised as cultural artefacts (Gellner, 1983) or 
imagined communities (Anderson, 1991). Fundamental attributes that this study shares with 
Gellner’s and Anderson’s approach to nationalism is the tracing of historical visions, ideas, socio-
economic processes and activities that came to produce these communal social realities shared by a 
collectivity of people - in our case, how they have informed the salience of ethnicity in the 
determination of voters choices. Following this methodological approach, this study traces not 
only the origins of the visions and ideas of ethnicity on determining voting that came to be shared 
by Tanzanians as a political community, but also how such ideas were used to inform ethnicity’s 
role on determining voters’ choices over time. Moreover, it is interested in unveiling why those 
ideas sustained the major political and economic reforms that took place in the Tanzanian state 
since independence.  
The last point of departure in the epistemology used by this research from neo-patrimonial and 
hybrid regime theory is that it gives credit to, but also critically examines, African ideas and 
viewpoints informed by African political thought. As such, it uses African political thought 
embedded in the PsIM as an independent variable in itself, and in this way a possible standard for 
assessing the relation between ethnicity and voting. In our case the example is the PsIM claimed to 
ensure national unity, EDNR and peace to render ethnicity insignificant in elections. Thus, the 
effectiveness of that outlook has been judged according to the standards they put forth and the 
innovations they developed to that effect. It also takes into account the particular historical milieu 
in which some individuals had, through reading, acquired academic knowledge about the neo-
patrimonial and hybrid ideas of ethnicity and voting, and thus had impacted on their concern with 
the dangers of ethnicity. However, for them and for the masses, it was the lived experience of 
politics emanating from the independence movements that primarily informed their thinking, we 
will argue. And later, in the post-independence era, leaders and individuals had the opportunity to 
combine lived experience with borrowed and learned ideas from other parts of the world to inform 
their choice of significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This position contrasts 
with the way Africans are perceived (by the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theses) to apply ethnicity 
in anchoring votes. That view has been largely Western-European centric in its epistemology, 
ignoring the influence of knowledge and experience sharing on the views of African leaders. 
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2.4. Description of the Study Area and Rationale for Choosing It 
Tanzania is a country that is constituted by 30 regions. The data-collection for this study was 
conducted in Mwanza Region specifically in Nyamagana and Misungwi districts. The region lies 
in the northern part of Tanzania, located between latitude 10 30' and 30 south of the Equator. 
Longitudinally, the region is located between 310 45' and 340 10’ east of Greenwich.  Mwanza is 
bordered by Kagera region to the west, Shinyanga to the south and south east; to the north east 
Mwanza is bordered by Mara region, while to the northern part Mwanza is bordered by Lake 
Victoria which separates the region from neighbouring countries of Uganda and Kenya (see East 
African and Tanzania and Mwanza maps below).   
MAP 1: The Map of East Africa 
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MAP 2: The Map of Tanzania and Mwanza  
 
Mwanza is a relatively small region occupying 2.3 % of the total land area of Tanzania mainland. 
The region occupies a total of 35,187 sq km., out of this area 20,095 sq km. is dry land and 15,092 
sq km. is covered by Lake Victoria. Thus 43% of the region’s surface area is water. Land wise, 
Mwanza is the fourth smallest region in Dar es Salaam after Dar es Salaam, Kilimanjaro and 
Mtwara. The region has a total of 8 districts, seven Local Government Authorities, 33 divisions, 
174 wards, 683 villages and 481 streets (the lowest administrative areas resulting from subdividing 
wards within townships, municipalities and cities). Although Mwanza is among the smallest region 
in terms of dry land area, it has a population of 2,772,509 with a population density of 292 people 
per sq.km according to 2012 National Population and Housing Census. Mwanza is the second 
densely populated region to the country’s commercial capital Dar es Salaam. Mwanza is the third 
most urbanised region of Tanzania with (18.6%) of its population urbanised. The first two mostly 
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urbanised regions in Tanzania are Dar es Salaam and Morogoro with urban populations of 89.6% 
and 21.1% respectively. 
Ethnic-wise Mwanza Region is predominantly populated by the Sukuma ethnic group which 
constitutes over 90 % of the region’s population. Other ethnic groups found in the region are the 
Zinza, Haya, Sumbwa, Nyamwezi, Luo, Kurya, Jita and Kerewe. These groups constitute small 
proportions and are mainly found in Mwanza Municipal area where the district of Nyamagana is 
located. The presence of the non-Sukuma ethnic groups is felt in Geita and Sengerema where the 
Sumbwa and Zinza are mostly found (Mwanza Social Economic Profile, 2008).  
Case selection in qualitative research requires a researcher to determine study cases which are 
unique in some way or cases which are considered typical and may also select cases to represent a 
variety of geographic regions, a variety of size parameters to mention a few (Cresswell, 2009). 
Mwanza was picked to provide the dissertation’s case study for a number of reasons. The first and 
foremost is that Mwanza is the centre of the largest ethnic group in Tanzania, the Sukuma, who 
constitute around 13 % of the country’s population (Malipula, 2014). Other regions with 
predominant Sukuma are Geita, Shinyanga, Simiyu; and Tabora that is predominantly the home of 
the Nyamwezi but with a substantial number of the Sukuma. It is imperative to note that the 
Nyamwezi and the Sukuma are culturally and lingually identical. This is because history suggests 
that the Sukuma is a breakaway of the Nyamwezi. In light of this fact in some cases, the two are 
analysed in oneness making the percentage of Sukumas rise up to 17. An interesting element of the 
Sukuma ethnic group is that despite being the largest ethnic group numerically it has never been 
known for their political activism and is only quite modestly represented in the halls of political 
power despite their size (Weber, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2006). Another important element related to 
Mwanza is the impetus that political parties and their candidates place in the region as the centre of 
the Sukuma to tap votes and influence support from other Sukuma dominant regions mentioned 
above, which through varied interactions and media sources can be reached. Harnessing the 
Sukuma peasant’s vote is reaching the mainland’s rural heart. 
The second factor that makes Mwanza interesting is the fact that the levels of political support of 
the ruling party CCM in the 2010 elections as well as those of other comparatively good 
performers in the region, CUF and UDP, decreased. While the support of CCM, CUF and UDP 
fell, CHADEMA’s support rose drastically compared to the previous three multi-party elections. In 
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2010 CHADEMA scooped the urban constituencies in Mwanza town and one in Ukerewe, and 
fared well in most constituencies across the region; something that has never happened before. In 
this regard, Mwanza provided an interesting political environment for analysing ethnicity in a 
context that electoral results reflect a changing environment where the dominance of the ruling 
party was put to test. 
Finally, Mwanza region is the home of the second largest city in Tanzania, but also harbours large 
sparsely populated rural areas within it and more predominantly rural areas in its districts, 
therefore the region permits a mapping of both urban and rural attitudes in analysing the influences 
of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. Since case selection requires a researcher to determine 
study cases which are unique in some way or cases which are considered typical and may also 
select cases to represent a variety of geographic regions, a variety of size parameters to mention a 
few. This study has opted to be moved partially by the urban-rural geographical reality of Mwanza 
to select Nyamagana and Misungwi. The districts of Nyamagana and Misungwi found in Mwanza 
Region came into picture to represent the urban and rural areas of the region respectively. 
Likewise, as indicated earlier the district of Nyamagana at the time of research was led by an MP 
from the opposition while the one in Misungwi is led by CCM.this provides information from 
people within constituencies that have support from the major political parties in the region based 
on the 2010 election results. In this sense the two districts usefully provide scenarios reflective of 
the region and therefore contribute positively in potraying the base for exploring the influences of 
ethnicity in determining electoral choices. It is against these backgrounds that Overall, the region 
and the two districts selected (Nyamagana and Misungwi) does provide a very fitting context for 
analysing the core research issues of this dissertation. 
2.5. Setting the Research Scene 
Before embarking on actual fieldwork, I toured the Mwanza region so as to have a general picture 
socioculturally mapping the study area and to introduce myself to the relevant authorities. The 
mapping started on 15
th
 October 2014 and lasted for five days covering 2 districts: Nyamagana and 
Misungwi. In these days, I have had discussions with leaders of political parties and government 
on issues relevant to the study. Most of the discussions, interlarded with informal background 
information, gave a general picture of the politics of the study area and proved significant in 
28 
 
sharpening my tools. However, they do not form part of the dissertation as they merely meant to 
give me a better understanding of the area studied.  
2.6. Sampling Procedure and Sample Size 
In this study, because of the envisaged limited number of respondents, I employed a multi-stage 
sampling procedure, to raise representativeness. The procedure is a complex type of cluster 
sampling that includes two or more stages of arbitrary sample selection. In simple terms, multi-
stage sampling allows large clusters of population to be divided into small clusters in numerous 
stages for purposes of making primary data collection manageable (Kothari, 2009). Multi-stage 
sampling addresses certain disadvantages associated with true random sampling such as being 
overly expensive and time-consuming (Patton, 2002). The procedure simplifies random sampling 
method by dividing a population into small clusters like region, districts, wards, etc. thus reducing 
costs and time that may result from random sampling which may force a researcher to get 
interviewees from scattered locations. The procedure was picked because the study in question was 
about Tanzania that has 25 regions and over 100 districts, much more wards and a lot of 
households which could not be reached by the researcher due to time and resources. Mwanza 
region was purposively selected due to factors explained in the rationale for the choice of the study 
described in section 2.4 above. Therefore, the multi-stage sampling started from Mwanza.  
The multi-stage sampling procedure with five stages was applied in this study as follows. The first 
stage was the regional level. At this point, two districts were selected from lists of urban and rural 
districts constituting Mwanza region respectively. I made a list of all districts constituting the 
region and then divided these among the dominantly urban and dominantly rural districts. From 
each list, I wrote pieces of paper with one district on each and put them in two separate bowls 
distinguishing the urban and rural districts. From the bowls, I randomly picked one piece from 
each bowl to select the districts to be included in the study. Nyamagana and Misungwi were 
randomly selected through this process.  
The second stage was the district level whereby two wards from each district were randomly 
selected from a list of wards constituting the districts. As it was the case for the choice of the 
districts, I made a list of all wards located in Nyamagana and Misungwi. The pieces of paper with 
names of the wards found in each district were put into two separate bowls. I picked two pieces 
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from each bowl to be included in the study. The wards selected in Nyamagana district were Igoma 
and Mirongo while Misungwi and Igokelo wards were selected to represent Misungwi district.  
The third stage was the ward stage where two streets or villages were randomly selected from a list 
of streets and villages depending on the nature of the status of the wards. For the urban wards, 
streets were the sampling points while villages were the appropriate sampling points for the rural 
wards. The same procedure of writing pieces of paper with names of the villages and streets found 
in each ward and putting them in separate bowls for selection was applied. The streets randomly 
selected in Igoma ward were Shamalala and Kishiri A; while Rufiji and Utemini represented 
Mirongo ward. Misungwi and Mbela villages were selected from Misungwi ward; and Mapilinga 
and Nange villages represented Igokelo ward.  
The fourth stage was selecting households in each village or street based on the village or street 
household registers. From the register, 6 households were randomly picked through a table of 
random numbers. The fifth and last stage was picking interviewees of voting age alternating from 
women to men from those households. Lists of males and females of voting age were made after 
consultation with the household head; I randomly selected the interviewee from the lists by picking 
one name from the relevant list in each household. That means in each village or street 3 males and 
3 females constituted the sample. With this strategy, the total number of individuals interviewed 
from the wards was 48. The sampling procedure has accorded the study an interesting and 
representative sample of the people in the studied area. It has an equal distribution of the sex, 
residential area, varied age groups including the youth, middle aged and elderly. The sample also 
included interviewees of varied educational backgrounds, religions and occupations. Social 
demographic distribution of the interviewees based on sex, age, residence, tribal distribution, 
marital status, educational level, religion and occupation is presented in Table I below.  
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Table I: Social Demographic Characteristics of Interviewees   
CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERVIEWEES FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
SEX   
Male 24 50 
Female 24 50 
AGE   
22 – 39 23 48 
40 – 54 16 33 
55 and above 9 19 
RESIDENCE  
Urban 24 50 
Rural 24 50 
TRIBAL DISTRIBUTION  
Sukuma 35 72 
Other 13 28 
EDUCATION LEVEL  
No formal education 1 2 
Some Primary 2 4 
Primary 25 52 
Secondary  11 23 
Tertiary 7 15 
University 1 2 
Postgraduate 1 2 
RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION  
Muslims 16 33 
Christians 30 63 
Others 2 4 
OCCUPATION  
Employed Workers 11 23 
Peasants 20 42 
Retirees 1 2 
Self employed Entrepreneur 14 29 
Students 2 4 
 
The table above indicates the social demographic characteristics which are reflective of the 
Tanzanian society. For instance, regarding sex, the distribution is equal as the percentage of 
interviewees in the study area was 50% male and 50% females. These figures are very close to the 
reality of the Tanzanian sex structure that is 49% to 51% among males and females respectively 
(URT, 2014). One may ask why I have not tried to go for the actual census percentages. I was of 
the opinion that the difference of one percentage was so minor to have any significance in 
effecting the findings towards the male sex.   
As it was the case for sex, the age distribution of the interviewees also indicated a reality of the age 
structure of the country whereby there are younger people than older ones. In this regard, although 
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I picked the interviewees randomly and ended up interviewing 48%, 33% and 19% of young, 
middle age and elderly interviewees. The Tanzanians between the age of 22 and 39 according to 
this study were conceived to be young. The choice is anchored on the fact that in Tanzania the age 
for youth ranges between 18 and 40. After 40 particularly in the political arena, a party member 
seizes to belong to the youth wing and can vie for the presidency. The constitution warrants among 
other things, presidential aspirants to be of the age of 40 or above. One could question why I do 
not have interviewees of the age of 18. The reason is that I wanted to have views of people who 
were eligible to participate in the 2010 elections. Therefore, since at the time of interviews those 
who were eligible to participate were 22 years old and above, I decided to start at 22 instead of 18. 
The second category was of the middle age that ranged from interviewees with the 40 to 54 years 
of age. This group had more interviewees compared to the group conceived to be elderly that was 
constituted by interviewees with the age of 55 and above. As indicated in the preceding sentence 
the age of 40 was the starting point for the middle aged because it is when the youth age ends. The 
choice of 54 as the end of this category was banked on the fact that in Tanzania people are allowed 
to retire on the basis of old age at 55. Therefore, that is the reason why 54 was deemed to be the 
end of the middle age and all interviewees from the age of 55 and above, were considered to be 
elderly in this study. From such categorisation, I managed to get views of all age categories that 
were eligible to participate in the elections of 2010 in Mwanza which constitutes the study’s case. 
The social demographic characteristics also indicates that the residential distribution of 
respondents in terms rural and urban residency was equal as the study purposively picked one 
urban district and another rural one to depict the Mwanza’s urban and rural characteristics as 
indicated in section 2.4 above. The ethno-cultural (‘tribal’) distribution also deviated from the 
actual percentages of the region’s tribal distribution which is 90 % Sukuma and the rest non-
Sukuma as indicated in section 2.4. The interviewees in the study were 72 % Sukuma and 28 % 
non-Sukuma. This is, as said, not reflective of the magnitude of the tribal distribution as indicated 
in the 2008 socio-economic profile of the region, probably because less rural villages could be 
included. Still, members of the dominant ethnic group make up the majority, thus having the 
highest probability of their views determining the study. More important, the data of 2008 might 
also be less realistic given the increase of urban migration in the region, particularly with the 
expansion of St Augustine University in the region, which accommodates many students and 
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workers from other regions. All in all, since the interviewees were randomly picked biases were 
minimised.  
The table also indicates that most of the interviewees belong to the two major religions in the 
country- Christianity and Islam. The number of Christians was far higher than the Muslims in the 
study area - 63% to 33% which seems to deviate from the general distribution of the religion in the 
country. Statistics indicate that the two religions have almost equal followers in Tanzania. 
However, the disparity is because the distribution of the religion in the country is not uniform in all 
areas. There are places like in the coastal areas were the number of Muslims is far higher than 
Christians, and others that have the opposite. Mwanza region is one of the areas were the number 
of Muslims is much lower than that of Christians and, therefore, it is no wonder that the 
distribution of interviewees took such look. However, the limited number cannot by any means 
entail biases in the views of the minority as they were all randomly selected and religion was not 
part of the issues researched. It is also relevant to recognise that the non-Muslims and non-
Christians were also included. Their number was nominal among the study’s interviewees (4%); 
however, this is a reality of their minority in the country’s overall religious distribution. 
As for education, a reality of the education distribution of the Tanzanian society is reflected in the 
sample as more interviewees have primary education (52%) and secondary and tertiary education 
(35%) compared to the non-formally educated and university graduates. It is the case because 
primary education in Tanzania is compulsory and almost free. More important, it is in the recent 
past that every ward has managed to build a secondary school thus providing opportunities for 
secondary education. As a result of few secondary schools, few elderly people, particularly in the 
villages, accessed secondary education. That tells the story of the shortage in the higher levels of 
education. The distribution presented, however, suggests that the study has benefitted from views 
from the non-educated to the highly educated thus providing views of a cross section of the people 
in the area studied.   
As for the main economic activities of the interviewees, the table indicates that most of them as it 
is widely known, are peasants. Indeed, the national figures suggest that agriculture is the country’s 
economic mainstay and provides livelihood to around 80% of the working population. In the study 
area the major occupation was determined by the interviewees’ responses. However, in reality, 
most of the entrepreneurs and employed workers also engage in agriculture in one way or another. 
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The major observation that can be made here is that very few interviewees are wage-earning 
employees in the formal labour market. This is a true picture of Tanzania where the levels of 
unemployment are high among people of working age. The job creation initiatives rely mostly on 
self-employment through entrepreneurial ventures. That explains why the self-employment 
categories make a cumulative 70% (derived from adding the non-formally employed and sparing 
students) compared to 23% of the wage-earning workers who in this case was influenced by the 
choice of the urban district of Mwanza and civil servants in the social sector in the rural districts. 
It is imperative to note that I also purposively selected privileged informants referred to as Key 
Informants (KIs) and political leaders in Mwanza and Dar es Salaam to complement the interviews 
with the voters in Mwanza. I included 7 KIIs from three categories relevant to the study. These 
were seasoned politicians, journalists and an expert on the social structure of Tanzanian society. A 
detailed explanation of the KIs is provided in section 2.7.2.1.  I also interviewed CHADEMA, 
CCM leaders in Mwanza. CCM and CHADEMA leaders were selected because of being the 
leading parties in the race in the Region. I also interviewed four street and four village leaders in 
Mwanza. This made a total sample size of 65
19
. The sampling procedure and sample size selection 
were done in consultation with relevant public institutions in various administrative levels 
National, Regional, District, Ward and Village; and aided by district maps.  
2.7. Research Information Sources and Tools 
The data used in the present study was garnered from interviews and documentary reviews. The 
interviews employed in this study were semi-structured and involved two main categories: the 
local people in the study area and KIIs most of which were not residents of the area studied but 
knowledgeable people on the subjects under study. A description of the interviews and reviews is 
made below. 
2.7.1. Semi-Structured Local Voters Interviews 
A semi-structured interview is a qualitative research technique used to collect data through setting 
up a context that provides interviewees time and room to talk about their opinion regarding a 
particular subject (De Fina and Perrino, 2011; Gill et al. 2008). Semi-structured interviews collect 
data from guided questions and ensure collection of extra information. This is because it enables 
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 The selection sample and determining of sample size is based on literature which suggest that there is no hard and 
fast rule in qualitative research on sample size (Travers, 2001) 
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questions/issues to be added on important aspects as they surface in the course of an interview. 
Since semi-structured interviews are conducted face to face, they provide option for more personal 
communication with the interviewees. As such, allowing a greater rapport to be established with a 
mutual relationship of trust and reciprocity. Furthermore, the face to face nature of the interviews 
allows reassurance to minimise any distress interviewees might feel relating to their experiences 
and participation on the issues studied. This is mainly the case when assurance of the complete 
confidentiality of the research was given at the opening of the interview (as we did) to encourage 
the participants to open up more as research ethics require (Patton, 2002).  
The technique was employed in this study because it allowed the researcher to ask and gain wide 
information of sensitive issues- ethnicity and voting. These issues are wide and responses of 
questions related to them normally require follow up questions to get the underlying meanings of 
the issues brought up by interviewees.  Equally important, the semi-structured interviews provided 
the space for the interviewees to provide in-depth responses and be able to reveal meanings behind 
their views on ethnicity and voting. Through this tool the researcher was able to collect appropriate 
individual experience, attitude or inner feelings of reality about ethnicity and voting in Tanzania 
from man and women of voting age in selected households in Nyamagana and Misungwi.  
Figure 1: The Researcher Conducting an Interview at one of the Interviewee’s Home 
 
  
The interviews were conducted during the day depending on the interviewee’s availability and 
time. Most interviews were taped. Therefore, I was keen in following interviewee’s narrations to 
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generate questions in response to the interviewees’ narrations. Tape recorders were used upon 
getting consent from the interviewees. Some interviews were not taped as the interviewees did not 
want to be taped therefore I had to record the responses in a notebook and ask supplementary 
questions in response to their narrations. The conversations were coupled with informal talks 
sometimes unrelated to the research topic so as to bring intimacy and to relieve interviewee’s 
tension whenever necessary. The interviews were conducted in Swahili, Tanzania’s national 
language, which is widely spoken by Tanzanians. Therefore, the content of the interviews used in 
the study have been translated by the researcher. We are aware of the limitation in interpreting data 
including cultural biases and lingual/terminological differentiations. However, the massive 
discourse against ethnicity and divisive elements in the conduct of Tanzania’s politics provided 
smooth discussions during the Swahili conducted interviews and translations of the concepts that 
are central to the study. 
2.7.2. Key Informant Interviews 
The interviews made with local people in Nyamagana and Misungwi were complemented with 
KIIs and documentary reviews. KIIs refer to getting information from an individual who is 
considered to be particularly knowledgeable about the topic of interest. The individual through 
which the information is obtained is called a Key Informant (KI). A KI is knowledgeable of the 
enquiry setting and their insights are typically valuable for understanding and explaining broad and 
specific events, thus providing additional information of a topic under study. KIs are privileged 
witnesses, or people who, due to their position, activities or responsibilities, have informed 
understanding of a problem that is explored (Creswell, 2003). Thus, a KI in this study is referred to 
anyone who could provide detailed information and opinion based on his/her knowledge on 
ethnicity and electoral choices in Tanzania as informed by the variables and measurements guiding 
the study. 
   
KIIs are normally conducted in a face to face setting which permits the researcher to seek new 
insight, ask questions, and assess a phenomenon in different perspectives (Jimenez, 1985). KIIs are 
used when there are limited records or published material on the topic studied, different 
information to the one that exists is needed and when there are KIs who are accessible and have in-
depth knowledge about the matter studied (McKillip, 1987). As for the current study KIIs were 
used because of limited published material on the voting behaviour in Tanzania in general and 
36 
 
particularly those providing a thorough ethno-political narrative of the role of the PsIM in 
influencing voters’ choices in Tanzania. This way, the dissertation benefitted from individuals with 
the first knowledge of the key issues studied.  
A KII is a qualitative research technique used to collect data through setting up a context that 
provides interviewees time and room to talk about their opinion regarding a particular subject. KIIs 
in this study were employed because they permit several questions to be asked to an interviewee 
with a broad range of coverage of an area to be explored. Likewise, KIIs provide space for an 
interviewee to provide in-depth responses and be able to reveal meanings behind an action. 
Equally important,  KIIs are known to be an appropriate and widely used research instrument to 
express an individual’s experience, attitude or inner feelings of reality (De Fina and Perrino, 2011; 
Gill et al. 2008).  
KIIs interviews are useful when they employ semi-structured interviews as opposed to strict 
interview guides (De Fina and Perrino, 2011). As it has been argued above, semi-structured 
interviews are not fixed and limited to predetermined questions as structured interviews. Semi-
structured interviews affords the researcher space to determine the information to be collected 
beyond the originally thought questions intended for the interview but deemed relevant for meeting 
the study’s objectives. In this study, the semi-structured interviews afforded the researcher the 
opportunity of garnering data relevant to the study’s main objectives and other social cleavages 
than ethnicity that were relevant in the nation-building endeavour, state formation and economic 
transformation.  
During the study, interviews were conducted starting at any time and place convenient to the KIs.  
Luckily, no KI picked a place that was not conducive for conducting an academic interview. Most 
of the interviews were held at the KIs homes or offices. For most of the KIIs there were no 
problems for them to participate in the interviews after contacting them in person and describing 
the objectives of my study and their involvement. The letters introducing me to them and 
permitting me to undertake the study were very useful (See Appendices II and III). Only in one 
incident, a wife of one of the KIs wished to go through my authorisation letter before I interviewed 
her husband. This is very uncommon for African women who are culturally required to be 
subservient and humble to men. I had to avail the documents and explain the purpose of my visit to 
create a better rapport for the interview. After doing so, she consented and told his husband that the 
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interview is worthwhile as a way of documenting experiences and contributions of key political 
figures in the country especially on things that have not been widely written.  
While some of the interviewees in the local people category refused to be taped, I taped all KIIs. 
The taping of the KIIs granted me an opportunity to keenly follow my interviewee’s narrations 
while generating supplementary questions in response to their answers. Tape recorders were used 
upon getting consent from the KIs. The interviews were conducted in Swahili, Tanzania’s national 
language, which is widely spoken by Tanzanians and, therefore, the contents of used in the 
dissertation were translated by the researcher. As indicated in the previous subsection, substantial 
discourse on politicisation of ethnicity and other divisive elements in Tanzania’s polity ensured 
proper discussions of the concepts that were vital to the study. 
2.7.2.1 Background of KIs and their Selection 
The KIs in this study were mainly people who have lived Tanzania’s history and actively 
participated in the political realm in various key political and bureaucratic positions. The KIs in 
this study were selected after thorough discussions with relevant people. For instance, the 
politicians involved are a result of numerous discussions with senior political scientists and 
colleagues from the Department of Political Science of the University of Dar es Salaam involved 
in electoral analysis. In our discussions three key categories of choice identified. The first involved 
politicians who were in the nationalist struggle and served in the first multi-racial cabinet in 1960 
illustrated in a photo and described in section 4.4.1.1. The second involved 3 politicians who 
participated in the struggle without holding position in the cabinet but played a vital role in the 
independent government and put their experiences in writing. The third involved privileged 
respondents who lived the history participated actively in the political and economic development 
as well as the electioneering processes over time. The first category has two surviving people 
Mzee
20
 George Kahama and Mzee Job Lusinde. I attempted to consult both to no avail due to 
health related issues. The second category had several people but I decided to use their literature. 
In the third category I decided to pick among individuals mentioned in my discussions the most. 
The reason behind their choice was a deep ideological, political and economic understanding of the 
topic understudy.  
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 Mzee is a Swahili term that literally means an elderly man/woman. 
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The research consulted and interviewed Mzee Kingunge Ngombale Mwiru, Dr. Juma Halifa 
Ngasongwa and Mzee Hemed Bakari Mkali. Mr. Mwiru is one of the oldest politicians who has 
lived and practised the history of politics in Tanzania. He has worked with TANU
21
 during the 
nationalistic struggles in his early age, went on to work with all governments from the first to 
current phase in strategic portfolios including the cabinet.  In one way or another, he has been 
closely related to, or at the centre of, all major political, social and policy transformation due to his 
role as the head of the ruling party’s ideological and publicity section for decades. Recently, in the 
constituent Assembly that proposed a new constitution for Tanzania to be passed or refuted by a 
referendum, he singlehandedly proposed a complete chapter about the country’s economic 
direction. Importantly, Mzee Kingunge has crossed from the ruling party CCM to the opposition. 
In this regard, he provided views of a non-sincere partisan
22
 that one would expect of him after 
playing a central role in CCM and its government for decades. This experience is the basis for his 
inclusion in the study as a KI. Dr. Juma Ngasongwa is an academic cum politician who has been 
involved in the study. He has worked as a development studies lecturer, economic advisor to the 
second phase President of URT and a cabinet minister responsible for industries and trade, natural 
resources and tourism as well as economic affairs in the third and fourth phase governments. He is 
among the Tanzanians who have been critical in the execution of the liberal economic reforms in 
the country. He has also been instrumental in the writing of the party’s ideological blueprints 
including election manifestos. Mzee Mkali as opposed to the former is more of a career politician 
who mostly worked at the district and regional levels. He worked as a primary school teacher, an 
MP for two terms, a District Commissioner and a CCM Chairman for Kinondoni district-Dar es 
Salaam and lastly as CCM Regional Chairman of Dar es Salaam for two terms. Currently, Mzee 
Mkali is the Chair of the elders of Dar es Salaam. The elders of Dar es Salaam provide a strategic 
platform for politicians particularly–the President of the URT whenever he wants to talk to the 
nation on serious national concerns. His inclusion is based on the fact that his role as a party Chair 
in Dar es Salaam, the de-facto
23
 capital city of Tanzania provides experience from a cosmopolitan 
                                                 
21
 TANU as indicated in the list of abbreviation stands for Tanzania African National Unity. It was a mass socialist 
political party led by Julias Nyerere that spearheaded Tanzania’s fight against colonial rule.  The party ruled Tanzania 
from independence to 1977 when it merged with Afro-Shirazi Party to form CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) which 
since then has been the country’s ruling party. Chama cha Mapinduzi as indicated in the list of abbreviations can be 
literally translated to mean Revolutionary Party. 
22
 Sincere partisans are those who people who support a party unconditionally, even when it is not performing. 
23
 Dodoma is the dejure capital city of Tanzania since 1973. However, the state house is still in Dar es Salaam, as are 
all government ministries and foreign diplomatic missions. Actually, some ministries have built or building offices in 
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setting with complex political, social and economic characteristics which are indeed critical in 
explaining issues of ethnicity and party identities as well as economic evaluations. 
The study also interviewed several seasoned media practitioners cum academicians. The aim was 
to garner information on the role of the media in informing the electoral choices. These 
interviewees were picked after discussions with experts from the Media Council of Tanzania. The 
interviewees in this category were Mr. Lawrence Kilimwiko, Mzee Suleiman Hegga and Mr. Doto 
Bulendu. Several categories were identified in my discussion with the Media Council. These 
include authors on media and democratisation, seasoned journalist who witnessed electoral 
reporting over time and reporters who actively participated in covering the 2010 elections in 
Mwanza. Mr. Lawrence Kilimwiko was picked due to his exemplary contributions in the 
documenting academic writings about the media and democratisation in the country. Others 
mentioned were Dr. Ayoub Rioba and Dr.Mfumbusa whose works are referred in this dissertation. 
However, Kilimwiko according to the advice of the Media Council of Tanzania is next to none 
when it comes to publishing in the area. He has over 5 publications. Mzee Suleiman Hegga is the 
only surviving seasoned journalist who worked with the state-owned national broadcaster - 
Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation during colonialism and went on to hold the top most but one 
position in its successor Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam after independence. Such experience was 
considered too important not to be involved in the study. Doto Bulendu works with the biggest 
media house in Mwanza-STAR TV as a broadcaster specialising in current affairs and political 
matters. His experience in covering the 2010 elections was deemed relevant for the study.  
Mangi Ezekiel was purposely picked after having discussions with him in Shamala and found that 
his expertise on the social structure of the Tanzanian state was very relevant to the research. At 
first, I did not plan to interview a person with this background. However, it came to be realised that 
literature on ethnicity and voting was lacking social structural elements that augur well in 
analysing ramifications of ethnicity in voting.  
Generally, the KIIs made it possible for the dissertation to obtain data on varied political, 
economic, ethnic and media developments over time. The data was very relevant in drawing the 
                                                                                                                                                                
Dar es Salaam while they have offices in Dodoma. All of these developments question the commitment to make 
Dodoma the defacto capital city of Tanzania. The only significant development to this effect apart from forming a 
Capital Development Authority to plan the city and oversee its building is the Parliament conducting its sessions in 
Dodoma. 
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path that explains the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. In other words, the 
data garnered from the KIIs complemented the documentary reviews and primary data collected in 
the field on the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. In light of the key role 
played by the KIIs I have had close academic relations and discussed with them the preliminary 
findings of my research. I intend to share with them the final results of this study once completed. 
2.7.3. Documentary Reviews 
Documentary reviews relevant to the topic under study were done to complement the data gathered 
from interviews. The reviews included library materials, information from the internet, books, 
journals and other sources of documentary material. To establish the ethno-political narrative this 
study made use of  historical records by renown Tanzanian historians such as Kimambo and Temu 
(1969), and upcoming historians like Mwakikagile (2010) as well as international historians of 
Tanzanian history for example Maguire (1969) and Illife (1979). The developments during the 
colonial regime have also been explained using historical records of British Colonial information 
Office and research information commissioned by the office. Knowing several people have lived 
the history and actively participated in the political realm, the dissertation made use of their 
writings: works of Mwalimu
24
 Julius Nyerere, Pius Msekwa and Kingunge Ngombale Mwiru were 
used. For the conduct of elections this study has exploited reports from Tanzania Election 
Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), an independent consortium of the University of Dar es Salaam 
researchers, REDET, TACCEO, MISA and Non-governmental Organisations both local and 
International, which have monitored the elections since the onset of the multiparty political system 
in 1992.  
As for literature on the state of the media and its role in elections, the dissertation employed 
materials published by renowned Tanzanian journalists, academicians and media consultants in 
Tanzania. The list includes but not limited to, Ayoub Rioba (2012, 2008), Bernadin Mfumbusa 
(2002, 2006) Lawrence Kilimwiko (2002, 2006, 2009, 2012) and Nkwabi Ng’wanakilala (1981, 
1987).  
                                                 
24
 Mwalimu is a Swahili word that literally means Teacher. Julius Nyerere was widely referred to as Mwalimu by his 
fellow countrymen. He was a teacher by learning and practice who chanced to teach among others, the third President 
of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa. 
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2.8. Data Analysis 
Data analysis entails the whole process of inspecting, categorising, tabulating and testing data 
which varies depending on the type of data to be analysed (Kohlbacher, 2005; Kleiman, 2004). In 
quantitative data, the focus is on figures, whereas the overall goal of any qualitative data analysis 
is to deal with meanings so as to uncover underlying themes, patterns, insights and understanding 
(Kothari, 2009; Patton, 2002). Data garnered in this study was chiefly qualitative in nature, thus 
necessitated qualitative methods of data analysis to illuminate, understand, and extrapolate the 
situation under study rather than to generalise (Creswell, 2003). Analyses of qualitative data are 
mainly undertaken in an inductive thematic manner. That is identifying and categorising themes 
and key issues that ‘emerge’ from the data (Patton, 2005). As for this study, it began in the 
preliminary visit that assisted in generating tentative theoretical explanations for the empirical 
work. From this base, responses gathered from interviewees in the field were analysed 
progressively at each stage of data collection. The purpose was to generate a pattern that related 
the research arguments and data collected.   
In this study, the data collected through interviews and documentary reviews were analysed using 
structural content analysis and by triangulation. Content analysis is a technique for data analysis 
which involves codifying data into pre-defined categories so as to develop patterns in the 
presentation and reporting of information which can be in a form of transcripts of 
interviews/discourses, protocols of observation or video tapes. In content analysis, emphasis is 
placed on according categories to come out from the data and on recognising the importance of 
understanding the meaning of the context in which an item is analysed (Ricceri, 2004). The 
analysis was conducted focusing on variables indicated in the conceptual framework as shown in 
the third chapter of this dissertation. I have analysed all of my interviews using standard content 
analysis mainly presented in a form of quotations and descriptions. Subsequently, results from 
qualitative sources were matched against each other so as to identify concurrences or 
disagreements in data. The work was made possible by the process of triangulation of primary data 
with secondary data. 
Triangulation is a qualitative research method that involves using multiple lines of evidences in an 
investigation to produce a thorough understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena. This method is 
used by qualitative researchers to check and establish validity in their studies by analysing a 
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research question from multiple perspectives to arrive at consistency across data sources or 
approaches. The collaboration of findings and test for validity component of triangulation raises 
some questions about the method (Punch, 2005).  The questions are predicated on the assumption 
that a weakness in one method will be compensated for by another method, and that, it is always 
possible to make sense between different accounts (Creswell, 2008).  It is not the case as 
triangulation is not geared at squarely seeking validation or verification of data instead it is a 
technique striving to ensure research outputs are rich, robust, comprehensive and well-developed. 
As such, collaboration of methods and results which could in some instances prove inconsistencies 
should not be seen as weakening study evidences, but should be viewed as an opportunity to 
uncover deeper meaning in the data (Patton, 2002). 
There are several types of triangulation in literature which revolve around four major issues: 
research methods, theories, investigators and sources of data (Hussein, 2009). The first is termed 
methods triangulation which involves checking out the consistency of findings generated by 
different data collection methods.  In this type, it is common to have qualitative and quantitative 
data employed in one study. When this is done a research elucidates complementary aspects of the 
same phenomenon. Often the points were these data diverge are of great interest to the qualitative 
researcher and provide the most insights. The second type is triangulation of sources whereby a 
researcher examines the consistency of different data sources from within the same method. For 
instance, one can triangulate sources at different points in time, sources that are public against 
those that are private and but not limited to, comparing people with different viewpoints. The third 
type of triangulation is analyst triangulation. In this type, a researcher uses multiple analysts or 
observers to review findings. This can provide a check on selective perception and illuminate blind 
spots in an interpretive analysis. It is worth noting that the intent is not to seek consensus, but to 
understand multiple ways of seeing the data. The fourth and last is theory/perspective 
triangulation. Theory triangulation involves multiple theoretical perspectives to examine and 
interpret the data.  
In this study, I was eclectic in the usage of triangulation. I have employed quantitative data to 
validate and provide further information on ethnic salience, inter-ethnic mistrust and ethnic 
discrimination. I also used triangulation of sources as most of the field data analysed was 
triangulated with varied sources and the sources themselves were in various occasions compared. 
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Similarly, various views of analysts discussing ethnicity and voting were employed in the study 
and their opinions used to provide more insights into achieving the study’s objective. The study 
also was informed by four major theoretical strands– the ethnic-structure, neo-patrimonial theory, 
the hybrid regime and the legacy of the independence movement, thus the field data was in various 
occasions analysed from these viewpoints.  
Generally, in this study words, phrases, sentences and paragraphs were considered as meaning 
units which were condensed according to their context and content to answer the study’s questions 
as indicated in section 1.4 to derive at the study’s conclusions.  
2.9. Data Validity and Reliability 
Quantitative researchers regularly criticise validity and reliability of qualitative research. Their 
critique is partly predicated on the fact that its findings cannot be generalised or used to predict 
similar situations in other cases (Kothari, 2009). Far from watering down, the critical proponents 
of qualitative research maintain that qualitative based research results should be evaluated on the 
basis of precision, transferability, credibility, dependability and reliability in its application and 
interpretation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Inferably, data validity shall not be construed to be 
about objective truth against which the credibility of results and conclusions are measured. This 
position is predicated on the fact that, it is not necessary for a qualitative research or any other to 
identify the ultimate truth for it to be believable; instead it is adequate for a study to identify a 
basis for drawing conclusions. In this regard, relevant questions to put into consideration when 
evaluating the validity of research findings should according to Massoi (2015) include: did the 
research tools measure what they were intended to? Was there consistency in their applications? 
Are the conclusions drawn consistent with the research arguments or questions?  
While conducting this research, I was mindful of the validity and reliability challenge. For 
instance, I was conscious of the fact that what people say about their behaviours during interviews 
may contrast with their actual actions particularly when what is discussed is a sensitive issue like 
ethnicity. Cognisant of this drawback known as the danger of social desirable answers, and in 
order to enhance the quality of my findings as well as avoiding possibilities of bias or 
misinformation - as indicated in the data collection section, I employed a variety of data sources 
and triangulated them as suggested by Denzin (2009) to get more valid and reliable data. It was 
important particularly for the politicians and partisan interviewees I met who in varied occasions 
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expressed their biased political orientations. Through triangulation of interviewees views with 
literature as indicated in section 2.8 above the research findings are made more valid and reliable.   
Likewise, for the purposes of ensuring construct validity, internal validity and external validity I 
used designated data gathering tools systematically and properly in collecting the evidence. As 
Walliman (2006) put it, well constructed and systematically employed data gathering tools ensures 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity. Acccording to Walliman, construct validity 
requires a researcher to use the correct measures for the concepts being studied. In this study, the 
measures of influences of ethnicity were informed by the primary and secondary sources on 
ethnicity and voting as highlighted in the research questions. The role of the KIs in providing the 
basis for measuring the PsIM role was critical. Importantly, the literature reviewed also was 
significant and the visit to Mwanza during the setting of the research was also useful in sharpening 
of tthe study’s measurements. My interactions with varied political and government leaders in 
Mwanza complemented the KIs and literature based measurements by informing the shape of  the 
measurements to closely replicate the issues of ethnicity and voting experienced in the region. As 
such, the concepts and measurements applied in the study benefited from varied sources and 
applied systematically to collect and further analyse the data in this study.  
Internal validity (especially important with explanatory or causal studies) demonstrates that certain 
conditions lead to other conditions and requires the use of multiple pieces of evidence to uncover 
convergent lines of inquiry (Cresswell, 2009). In the current study, internal validity is ensured by 
the use of multiple sources of data that establish a chain of evidence warranting forward and 
backward linkages. The use of interview guides to varied categories of interviewees employed in 
the study and literature review attest to this fact. The wide social demographic composition of the 
interviewees which represents Mwanza region as indicated in table I add weight to the internal 
validity of the research. 
External validity which entails whether or not findings are generalisable beyond the immediate 
case or cases was also considered in this study. External validity is said to be ensured when despite 
variations in places, people, and procedures a case study can withstand and still yield the same 
findings (Walliman, 2006). Techniques such as cross-case examination and within-case 
examination along with literature review help to ensure external validity (Patton, 2000). The 
triangulation of data explained above which indicates cross-examination of sources, theories and 
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views of interviewees all contributed to improve external validity and reliability. However, by 
nature a case study is relevant to the case studied and cases with similar circumstances and 
therefore its generalisability is limited compared to quantitative studies.  
All said above indicate the validity and reliability of the data gathered and analysed is banked on 
systematic data collection and analysis as well as the multiple sources the data collected which 
warranted triangulation possible. 
2.10. Ethical Issues 
 Research undertakings require researchers to conduct their research projects in an ethical manner 
or behaviour (Miller et al. 2012). An ethical behaviour in general terms represents a set of moral 
principles, rules, or standards governing a person or profession (Baqgini and Fosl, 2007). In the 
moral domains to be ethical is equated with “do good things and avoid evil ones.” Deducing from 
this conceptualisation, research ethics entail the major principles of ethical behaviour associated 
with research. In other words, research ethics are the do and don’t-s of a research activity in its 
entirety. As such exhausting the do and don’t-s of everything related to a research is indeed a 
mammoth task. In this regard, the section highlights the key ethical issues relevant to the current 
study. 
There are no clear and uniform standards for governing all research activities (Miller et al. 2012). 
They can differ regarding the nature of the studies, time, environment and other factors. However, 
there is no disagreement on the fact that researchers are supposed to be responsible and 
accountable to their research participants, colleagues and the people to whom they will present 
their findings (Miller et al. 2012; Creswell, 2009; Duncombe and Jessop, 2005). According to 
Miller et al. (2012) researchers are supposed to be able to explain how he or she ensured quality 
and integrity of their research; seek informed consent; respected the confidentiality and anonymity 
of their interviewees; ensured that their participants voluntarily participated in the study; for 
sensitive studies mainly related to human bodies how they avoided harm to their participants; and 
show their researches are independent and impartial. Relevant ethical issues to this study and how 
they were dealt are reported below. 
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2.10.1. Acquiring Research Permission 
Research ethics require a research should not commence his/her study without requesting for and 
being awarded authorisation from a competent research body (Vogts et al. 2012). It could be a 
government body, a university or research institution (Miller et al. 2012). It was essential for the 
researcher to obtain permission to carry out the study because it is a policy requisite for anyone 
wishing to conduct research in Tanzania to obtain permission from competent authorities before 
embarking on their research work.  
 
Mzumbe University granted the permission to carry out this study through  formal letters (See 
Appendices II and III). Apart from granting permission to carry out the research, the letter also 
served as an introduction to the government authorities and interviewees in the study area. I took 
the letter with me as I was moving around throughout the entire period of fieldwork. 
2.10.2. Obtaining Informed Consent  
Research ethics require interviewees to a research to freely consent to participate in a research 
project without being coerced or unfairly pressurised (List, 2008). In this regard, interviewees 
should be well-informed about what participation entailed and reassured that declining will not 
maliciously affect them in any way. During the data collection exercise, I informed my participants 
about the nature of the study and its intended objectives. He also informed the interviewees that 
they may decide to withdraw from the study whenever they feel like. They were also told that if 
they decide to drop, they should not fear of any penalty for so doing. In this study, I never 
encountered any case were interviewees wished to withdraw. In one instance, a KI rescheduled a 
family meeting to accord me time to accomplish our interview. Generally speaking, all 
interviewees were cooperative. 
2.10.3. Ensuring Confidentiality and Anonymity 
Research ethics require that information provided by individuals participating in a research shall be 
treated in a confidential manner. Consequently, the participant is entitled to expect that such 
information will not be given to anyone else and not used for any purpose other than the research 
in question (Miller et al. 2012; Vogts et al. 2012). It is, therefore, essential to protect the identity of 
the person from whom you gather information from and their views. In this regard, the identity of 
the participants must be protected at all times and not be left lying around in notebooks, tape 
recorders or un-protected computer files. In the present study, I guaranteed my interviewees’ 
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privacy and confidentiality. In the interview guide, the researcher made a statement that was read 
to his interviewees that assured them that all information garnered by him will be kept confidential 
by him and the institution he is studying at through his Supervisor (See Appendices IV, V and VI). 
The statement equally assured the interviewees that the information given will be used for the 
purpose of this study and this study alone. To execute privacy, the researchers secured his tape 
recorder and computer files including the voices of the interviewees. All views of the ordinary 
interviewees are reported without mentioning their names in the dissertation. The names of the 
KIs, who often are or have been public figures, are indicated in the report after receiving their 
consent that I used their names while reporting their views in the dissertation.   
2.10.4. Establishing Rapport  
Once participants agree to be part of a study, a researcher develops rapport in order to get them to 
disclose information. This is important because interviewees’ information provided to a researcher 
is essentially a favour. Therefore, in order to break the ‘psychological barrier’ of trust, a researcher 
is supposed to develop a sense of ‘closeness’ to his interviewee (Duncombe and Jessop, 2005). 
Meanwhile, a researcher is required to reassure his/her interviewee that the information garnered is 
genuinely of interested to him/her (Miller et al. 2012). In a way, researchers should be consistently 
receptive, pleasant, and patient to their interviewees when they are talking (Duncombe and Jessop, 
2005). In sum, researchers should make sure that they provide an environment that is trustworthy. 
In the present study, I created the rapport through explanations of the research topic while seeking 
informed consent. At the time in question, I presented myself in a humble manner and allowed 
them to raise questions about the research, and responded to the questions diligently whenever 
raised. In the course of the presentation and the questions as well as unveiling research permits, I 
managed to avail interviewees’ worries. Subsequently, interviews were smoothly conducted. The 
major interruptions faced especially during the KIIs were telephone calls in the mid of interviews. 
However, to my surprise, despite their busy schedules and important engagements, when it 
happened, most of the KIs decided to switch off their phones to avoid further interruptions.  
2.11. Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
Any research is bound to have its limitations in terms nature of the problem and the conditions 
under which the research work is carried out. The present research had several limitations that were 
adequately tackled to ensure that that the objectives of the research are met. 
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The first limitation of this study is related to power rationing that was common while collecting 
data and writing in Tanzania. The rationing of power time and again disturbed my day–to-day plan 
of activities particularly in relation to computer usage. The rationing forced me to hand write 
several notes which was time consuming and actually doubled my work, since I had to key into my 
computer the hand written notes later. The challenge was however minimised after purchasing an 
extra laptop battery and a small generator to ensure constant supply of power while writing the 
dissertation in Tanzania.  
The second limitation is related to interviewees’ suspicion of the researcher. Some interviewees, at 
first, were not cooperative and free to talk mostly due to the sensitiveness of the topic of ethnicity 
and voting. Some initially believed that I was a spy under the guise of a researcher who is trying to 
seek information on who they will vote for in the next elections. As a way of allaying their 
suspicions and reducing the impact of this limitation, I had to assure them that the objective of my 
study was not to know who they voted or wish to vote for, instead to explore the influences of 
ethnicity in voting as informed by the PsIM in Tanzania. Equally, I had to show my student 
identification as well as research clearance to justify that what I was doing was purely academic 
and not commissioned by any person or institution. Most importantly, I ensured them that their 
information will be treated in utmost confidentiality and their views will be presented 
anonymously. 
The third limitation was related to research funds as the fund provided by my employer -Mzumbe 
University for the Study was far less than the actual cost of collecting data. Needless to mention 
other costs related to successful accomplishment of the study. The limitation was addressed by 
funds added up from my BOF UGent PhD scholarship that made me and my Research Assistants 
manage to conduct the interviews in Mwanza and address the power shortage and transportation 
costs highlighted above. 
The fourth limitation is associated with language barrier. I experienced to a limited degree 
language barrier in the field, especially in the rural area of Misungwi where I met a Sukuma 
pastoralist who was not fluent in either Swahili or English- the two languages that I can follow and 
speak fluently. This complicated the interview exercise as it required involving indigenous 
research assistants who translated interview questions/discussions from Swahili to Kisukuma and 
vice versa. Such exercise was not only expensive in terms of paying a research assistant for his 
49 
 
labour, but it was also time consuming. Likewise, the research assistants from the way they 
struggled to find Swahili words to explain the issues, I was tempted to believe that sometimes the 
translated questions and answers were subjective instead of accurate.  
The fifth limitation is also related to the translations of the Swahili interviews. As indicated earlier, 
lingual/terminological differentiations do present a challange in explain any phenomenon. Indeed, 
this was the case as in some cases several Swahili words were captured by one English 
terminology that in some way did not carry the verbatim nature of the interviewees’ statements. 
However, these structural and lingual differences never stood in the way of expressing the central 
views of my interviewees.  As said in section 2.7.1 above, the massive Swahili discourse against 
ethnicity and divisive elements in the conduct of Tanzania’s politics provided room for our 
interviewees to address their views in detail during the interviews and the translations of the 
concepts well captured in English. 
The sixth and last limitation was related to poor infrastructure.  Roads from Misungwi to Igokelo 
ward, and Mapilinga and Nange villages found in the ward were rough. To make matters worse, 
there is no reliable public transport heading to the areas. It should be noted that the houses in the 
rural areas are scattered as most Sukuma have kept cattle within their compounds and own at least 
three hectares of farmland around their environs. Such situation makes an average distance from 
one house to another to be about a fifteen minutes walk. Therefore, a lot of physical walking had to 
be done in order to reach the scattered interviewees. Moreover, there are no street names, which 
mean reliance on local oral directions. Similarly, there was limited telephone communication 
network in some parts of Mapilinga and Nange villages particularly with the mobile operator I was 
using – Airtel. Also, no internet service was available in the two villages studied. With regard to 
the poor roads and transport infrastructure, I and my team, had to hire private transport to reach the 
villages in Igokelo. I had to purchase a Vodacom line that has a better coverage in the ward to 
ensure telephone communications. As for the internet constraint we had to use the services in the 
evening when we get back to Misungwi Town.  
2.12. Concluding Remarks 
Exploring the role of the PsIM in informing the influence of ethnicity on determining electorates’ 
choices is intricate given the complex nature of ethnicity and limited information that exists. In 
light of such complexity, I argue that qualitative research design in the form an analytic narrative is 
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appropriate for the study and may yield more information. This is mainly due to its flexibility in 
incorporating various research tools and allowing detailed analysis of the subject matter from a 
path dependent viewpoint. As such, allowing a discourse of the interface between the past, current 
and projection of the future. Equally, I argue that based on the nature of the study, one data 
collection tool cannot adequately provide detailed information about the subject. Therefore, a wide 
range of data collection tools were required for the study. It is against this background that in-
depth interviews with  KIIs to solicit their experience on the PsIM, and the interplay between the 
PsIM with ethnicity and voting; as well as interviews with ordinary voters in Mwanza that 
provided a case, plus documentary reviews were employed.  The selection of Mwanza as case 
study proved a good strategy for obtaining detailed information about the influences of the PsIM 
on informing the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. This is chiefly 
because case studies provide room for detailed analysis of a phenomenon under study. 
 
 In this chapter, I indicated that some preliminary activities such as obtaining research clearance 
and setting the scene for collection of data in the area of study are essential before commencing 
actual data collection. At the end of this chapter, I indicate the major limitations encountered 
during the fieldwork and their delimitations. I regarded the limitations as challenges to be solved 
rather than permanent barriers to the execution of the research project. It is against this background 
that I present how I dealt with the limitations to ensure that the objectives of the study in question 
are achieved. In the subsequent chapter, I present theoretical and conceptual issues related to the 
study. After presentation of the introduction of the study and the methodology it employed, it is 
logical to present conceptual and theoretical issues relevant to the study. 
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CHAPTER III 
ETHNICITY AND VOTING: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores extant conceptual, contextual and theoretical discourses relevant to ethnicity 
and voting. The chapter shows what is already known in the literature, identifies knowledge gaps 
and possible applications to the analysis of the influences ethnicity has on determining voters’ 
choices and thus enhancing theoretical aspects.  
 
In view of the above, this chapter has a total of five main sections organised as follows: The first 
section 3.1 provides the chapters’ introduction. Section 3.2 which follows is made of six 
subsections presents an understanding the concept of ethnicity and its germination into a politically 
salient phenomenon. Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2., 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 discussed the major theoretical 
underpinnings that define ethnicity: the primordialist conceptions of ethnicity, the instrumentalist 
view of ethnicity, the social constructivist school of ethnicity and the study’s take on ethnicity 
respectively. The last two parts of the section deal with the politics of origin, being and belonging 
and lastly ethnicity and its manifestation in politics under subsections 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 respectively. 
The third part of the chapter in section 3.3 provides an understanding of the concept of voting and 
the fourth in section 3.4 presents a theoretical overview of the relation between ethnicity and 
voting. The fourth section consists of five subsections from section 3.4.1 to 3.4.6. The titles of the 
subsections presented sequentially are ethnic structures and voting, neo-patrimonialism, ethnicity 
and voting; hybrid regimes theory, ethnicity and voting; Independence movement legacy, ethnicity 
and voting ; frames analysis and its application to ethnicity and voting in Tanzania, and a Proposed 
Path-dependent model for understanding influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices  in 
Tanzania. In the final section (3.5) I present the chapter’s concluding remarks which provides a 
concise summary of what has been discussed in the entire chapter.  
 
3.2. Understanding Ethnicity and its Germination into a Political Salient Phenomenon  
Ethnicity has never enjoyed a common conceptualisation despite being on the academic agenda of 
social scientists for a long time (Cocodia, 2008; Balcha, 2008; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lonsdale, 
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1994). Equally important, the debate on the nature and importance of ethnic identity is indeed far 
from common understanding (Jerman, 1997; Emberling, 1997). In the African context, ethnicity 
has been equated with tribalism and regarded as a problem (Chabal and Daloz 1999). That is why 
studies of ethnicity in Africa like the one informed by Afrobarometer surveys, Young (2009) and 
Weber (2009) just to mention a few, did not refrain from using the concept of tribe in their analysis 
of ethnicity and voting in Africa. According to Berman (1998) ethnicity for quite some time has 
been widely condemned by both Eurocentric and African observers as an expression of a 
traditional culture that is divisive and encroaching on the process of modernisation. In contrast to 
this view, other scholars consider ethnicity as a form of societal organisation anchored on shared 
identity and allege that it has a positive integrative potential as nationalism (Lonsdale, 1994; 
Laakso and Olukoshi, 1996). In this dissertation, our interest is not to engage in a normative debate 
on the probable effects of ethnicity, but to delineate our conceptualisation of ethnicity and ethnic 
groups, and how they come to gain social and political impetus in political processes mainly 
influencing voting in multiparty elections.  
From the onset, we wish to make it clear that in this dissertation our understanding of the concept 
of ethnicity is anchored on the contention made by scholars like Chabal and Daloz (1999), Eriksen 
(1993) and Lonsdale (1994) that ethnicity is a collective human attribute that is part of every 
individual’s identity. And, that although ethnicity has been widely researched and documented, it 
is still difficult to apply objective markers to define ethnicity and an ethnic group. It is against this 
backdrop that Posner (2007:1303) and Muigai (1995: 161) argue that ethnic groups are typically 
defined by external markers such as culture, language, tradition, region of origin and heritage. The 
centrality of the cultural components notwithstanding, Barth (1969) argues that in some instances 
ethnic groups survive radical changes of ethnic group membership and the customs and traditions 
of their ethnic group. In other cases the vice versa becomes the case as an ethnic group may 
dwindle while its customs, traditions and membership remains intact. From Barth’s argument 
therefore, it is not the cultural elements of ethnicity that matters the most, but rather the 
maintenance of ethnic boundaries vis-à-vis other groups. That is to say, the fundamental aspect of 
ethnicity is the self-recognition of an identity by members of a group, as well as the use of that 
recognition by others. It is important at this juncture to stress that the recognised identities are 
commonly predicated on cultural factors but are not by any means an unfiltered expression of 
cultural heritage. Instead, they are based on mere bits of selected primary cultural signals and 
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values. In this regard, Barth (1969) emphatically maintains that ethnic boundaries are basically 
social and are upheld by regular expressions of identity, founded on parameters that have gained 
social significance in a particular milieu.  
Barth’s contention that a group’s ascription is ethnic when it corresponds to an individual’s prime 
identity that is universally associated with his/her origin and background, suggests that ethnicity is 
both an individual and social recognition (Barth, 1969). The social aspect of ethnicity triggers a 
question of the role of ethnicity in the social and associated political and economic domains. An 
extensive debate about the social and political role of ethnicity, and how its usage is to be judged is 
at the core of the scholarly discourse of ethnicity. The academic debate in this field revolves 
around the primordial, instrumentalist and social constructivist approaches to ethnicity. At this 
juncture we provide a general view of the approaches and later engage in a broader discussion of 
the development and role of ethnicity in voting.  
3.2.1. Primordialist Conceptions of Ethnicity 
The primordialist approach to ethnicity is the oldest in sociological and anthropological writings 
which enjoyed dominance before the 1970s. It conceives ethnicity to be something ordained, 
certified at birth, deriving from the kin-and-clan-structures of human society, and thus something 
necessarilly rigid and undying (Isajiw, 1993). Primordialists’ view human society as an assortment 
of diverse social groups and once a person is born assumes membership of a particular group. In 
this context ethnic identification is predicated on unfathomable, ‘primordial’ affection to a 
particular group, established by kinship and descent. One’s ethnicity is therefore “set” and is an 
inflexible part of his/her identity.  
 
The roots of classical primordialist thinking can be traced back to the German Romantic 
philosophers, who argued for the “atavistic power” of the blood and soil that bound one closely 
with one’s people (Kreitzer, 2004). However, insignificant strand of scholarship buys into the 
classical primordialist view. Instead, contemporary primordialists conceive primordial ties from a 
biological phenomenon (socio-biological primordialism) or what Brown (1998) branded ‘quasi-
kinship’ groups; and as a result of cultural, historical, and/or foundational myths, symbols and 
memories (ethno symbolism). While the contemporary waters down the centrality of birth they 
retain the view that primordial ties to one’s group are fixed and hardly change over one’s lifetime. 
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An interesting conception of contemporary primordialism in the field of ethnicity and nationalism 
which has been developed by Smith is called ethno symbolism. Ethno symbolism views the 
essential elements of ethnic identification as psychological and emotional, emerging from a 
person’s historical and cultural background. According to Smith, the ‘epitome’ of ethnicity is 
located in the myths, values, symbols, memories and the traits of a given historic configuration 
(myth-symbol complex). Smith associates the sustained fixed nature of ethnic identities to the 
body of beliefs and sentiments, which the defenders of a particular ethnic group wish to preserve 
and impart to the generations to come. In this context, the resilience of an ethnic group rests in the 
diffusion and transmission of the myth-symbol complex to its unit of population and its future 
generations (Smith, 1991).  
The arguments made above suggest that primordialist interpretations of ethnicity conceive 
ethnicity to be a relic from a far away past. The relic conceptualises ethnicity dichotomously, 
either as an evidence of atavistic barbarianism, or, alternatively, as a romanticised notion of 
untarnished or natural communities (Gentili, 2005). According to this approach ethnicity is 
regarded as a perception of common origins, historical memories, ties and aspirations that are 
viewed by a group of people as the epitome of their people-hood (Cocodia, 2008; Balcha, 2008).  
The relevance of the primordialist approach to ethnicity tested massive criticism in the late 1960s 
and 1970s. At the said time, anthropologists led by Barth (1969) questioned the view’s supposition 
that distinctive named groups constituted the social world. That is to say, the identity of a group, in 
essence, is a fixed objective reality belonging to a cultural or ethnic group. The anthropologists 
instead argued that group identity is what emerges when a given social group intermingles with 
other social groups. To Barth and company, the ethnic groups interface points out variations 
among them and the identified cultural dissimilarities subsequently inform the creation of confines 
distinguishing one group from the other. This means as opposed to Smith, Barth contends that an 
ethnic group preserves its identity when its members interact with others.  
From Barth’s viewpoint ethnicity rests on one’s perception of “us” and “them” and not on 
objective reality that exits in the real world. This is chiefly because markers, such as language, 
religion, or rituals that serve to identify subjective ethnic boundaries can change and therefore, 
ethnicity is not fixed but situational and subjective (Nagel, 1994). A critical look at Barth’s 
position suggests that he was of the view that conceptualisation of ethnicity and ethnic group 
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identities should target the “confines” of groups, not on the groups themselves. In his line of 
thinking it was in those “confines” that ethnicity was constructed. This way, Barth detached 
ethnicity from culture; and made ethnicity a flexible, socially constructed, subjective construct. 
From Barth’s critic, it can be deduced that an ethnic group is any substantial aggregation of 
persons who are perceived by themselves and/or others to share a unique set of cultural and 
historical commonalities at a particular time and space (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996; Horowitz, 
1985). 
The significant contribution of Barth’s influence on the conceptualisation of ethnicity and ethnic 
group identities is an anthropological shift from emphasising static evocations of tribal identity as 
a feature of social structure to an acknowledgment of ethnic identity as a dynamic aspect of social 
organisation (Hummel, 2014). The shift eventually became the basic anthropological model of 
ethnicity and informed the emergence of instrumental and social constructionist theories of 
ethnicity (Jenkins. 1994). 
3.2.2. The Instrumentalist View of Ethnicity 
The instrumentalist view opposes the primordial on grounds that complex patterns of fusion and 
fission among groups warrant genealogical or cultural based definitions irrelevant (Fukui and 
Markakis 1994). Supporters of this view consider ethnicity to be a product of political, social, and 
historical situations and interests which are not necessarily genealogical or cultural (Turton, 1994). 
Arguing in the same vein, Eriksen (1993) contends that ethnicity is the relationship between 
groups whose members’ consider themselves and claim to be recognised by others sharing 
distinctive political, organisational as well as symbolic traits. 
Supporters of the instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity regard ethnicity to be flexible, 
constructed or even manipulated to gain specific political and/or economic gains (Eriksen, 
1993).The logic of the instrumentalist propositions augurs well with the elite theory, which hold 
the view that leaders in modern states use and manipulate their powers for their sake. Locating 
ethnicity in the mid of the theory suggests that perceptions of ethnic identity can be manipulated to 
further leaders self-centred interests and to maintain power (Brass, 1991). From this approach 
ethnicity and ethnic groups are perceived to be a product of the dynamics of elite competition 
within the boundaries determined by political myths and economic realities, created and 
manipulated by cultural and political elites in their quest for power and authority. According to this 
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approach, ethnicity in Africa is a modern phenomenon (Gentili, 2005). Gentili’s position is 
predicated on the view that ethnic groups that existed before the emergence of colonialism in 
Africa were highly manipulated during colonial rule to suite colonial economic and political 
interests. Independent African governments either maintained or re-organised the groups for their 
interests. The ethnic manipulations ranging from the creation of new ethnic groups, combining and 
diffusing of ethnic groups is widely documented in African history (Illife, 1969; Mpangala, 1992; 
Weber, 2009). However, in the fourth chapter the matter is described as it relates to Tanzania. 
Arguing from an electoral point of view in post colonial era Posner applies the instrumental 
explanation of ethnicity to consider politicisation of ethnicity as a tool for attaining political and 
economic resources within African polities (Posner, 2005).  
3.2.3. The Social Constructivist School of Ethnicity 
The social constructivist conceptualisation of ethnicity combines elements of the aforementioned 
approaches to provide a thorough historical account of ethnicity. It recognises the core tenet of the 
primordial and instrumentalist approaches but criticises both for failing to take into account the 
historical factors shaping and reshaping ethnicity and, therefore, disregarding a crucial 
constitutional part of ethnic identity particularly in Africa.  According to constructivists, ethnicity 
is not a given or solid identity. It is the outcome of historical processes in which political, 
economic and cultural factors all play their role. In this regard, ethnic identities in Africa are 
rooted in the socio-economic processes informing and identifying peoples ethnic belonging. 
However, its present day shape is the result of similar continuous colonial to post-colonial socio-
economic processes. Therefore, present day ethnicities are both old and new, or rather both modern 
constructions and age-old cultural expressions (Chabal, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Berman, 
1998). 
According to Isajiw (1993) social constructivist approach to ethnicity is theoretically sandwiched 
between Michel Foucault’s stress on the construction of a metaphor and Pierre Bourdieu’s notions 
of practice and habitus as the fundamental factors determining the structure of all social 
phenomena. At its core, this approach emphasises that ethnicity is being negotiated and 
constructed daily. That means ethnicity is a process which continues to unfold. The continuous 
nature of ethnicity formation coupled with the rise of the postmodern paradigms more relevant to 
nationalism has tilted the attention placed on group boundaries and identity. This is chiefly because 
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scholars subscribing to the constructivist paradigm felt those terms like “group,” “category” and 
“boundary” portend an unchanging identity, which they strived to shun away from. This elastic 
nature of the term ethnicity informed confusion as even various interest groups could claim to fit 
into the term ethnic groups. 
According to the social constructivist school, it is hard to say when a group deserves the status of 
becoming an ethnic group. There are no rigid rules or standards by which to judge. In other words, 
social collectivises of any nature and antiquity, can don the mantle of ethnicity and stake a claim to 
identity and rights as a group. From this line of thinking, attention is diverted from determination 
of a particular group’s “reality” as an ethnic group in strict sense, and what a “real” ethnic group 
is; instead, it foretells that ethnicity is so central to social discourse and competition to the extent 
that its salience and effectiveness have become attractive to all sorts of collectivities ( Eller, 1997).   
3.2.4. The Essentialist School of Ethnicity 
Another theoretical perspective relevant to conceptualising ethnicity is essentialism. Essentialists 
hold that there exist several noticeable and objective core qualities of particular groups of people 
that are inherent, eternal, and unalterable. Therefore, such groupings can be categorised in line 
with those qualities of essence, which are predicated on problematic criteria as gender, race, 
ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, and class (Hirschfeld, 1996; Mason, 1994; Solomos & 
Back, 1994). Generally these external traits are marked by visual cues to make them distinct and/or 
easier to detect. Importantly, according to the essentialist school these qualities carry with them 
social and — more importantly from an antiauthoritarian perspective — hierarchical significance 
to those marking the cues and those marked by the cues; for instance sexism in the case of gender; 
and racism in the case of skin tone. Racism, sexism, classism, and most other forms of historical 
oppression and corresponding divisions and interactions are ideologies and policies maintained and 
justified by essentialism (Van Dijk, 1987).  
 
Essentialist beliefs about social groups including ethnicity is rather recent, although the concept of 
essentialism was used by Allport (1954) and Sherif (1948) to potray prejudicial thinking based on 
beliefs that distinguish one group from another. According to Campbell (1958) the differences 
between ethnic groups are based on the prejudicial beliefs identifying ethnic groups by perceptions 
of a coherent and unified entity linked to a belief in an underlying essence glueing the groups 
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(Yzerbyt et al. 2001; McGarty et al.1995 ). These essentialist arguments in some instances could 
even emphasise stereotypes set to rationalise existing social arrangements. In this regard, 
essentialist view of ethnicity would provide an acceptable and justified account for the status quo 
maintenance of ethnic groups (Yzerbyt et al. 1997). From such point of view the essentialist 
conceptualisation of ethnicity consider ethnic groups as natural, inevitable and, therefore, 
unchangeable categories bound by particular shared belief. In this regard, ethnic groups represent 
human types, specifying that an individual is fundamentally a particular sort of person. Therefore, 
ethnic groups and ethnic related tendencies are an attempt to fix social groups on the basis of 
essential, quasi-natural properties of belonging within specific political and social contexts. 
Generally, to essentialists, ethnicity is viewed to be a static phenomenon which people cannot 
change. This is against the dynamic view of ethnicity well put forward by Barth in section 3.2.1 
above. They also suggest that ethnicity should also be seen in a divisive and conflictual manner as 
racism, classism and other forms of oppressive ideological phenomena are viewed. Moreover, 
therefore, the analysis of ethnicity has to be made along the line of oppressed and oppressors. This 
is not by any means the objective of this study as we are interested in the role ethnicity plays 
without confining it to dichotomous relations among and within ethnicities. Tending towards a 
more constructivist and instrumentalist view, we rather look at the way in which ethnicity can be 
used in the context of political tribalism
25
 and the politics of affection
26
 as further described in 
subheadings 3.2.6  and 3.2.7  below.  
3.2.5. The Study’s take on Ethnicity 
The discussions on the theoretical approaches to ethnicity made above suggest that there is a 
theoretical divergence in explaining ethnicity. However, irrespective of the divergences, the 
discussion entails that ethnicity is a clear fact in human experience built upon cultural, political 
and social factors that are meaningful to people in their self-identification. Since cultural, social 
and political factors are complex, shared identities like ethnicity are bound to be dynamic as they 
are subjected to constant expressions, creations and inventions. Cognisant of this complexity, 
ethnicity in the current dissertation is viewed as an imagined identity blend from real and 
                                                 
25
 Tthe concet referes to organisation and mobilisation of politics around tribal lines.This entail that voting is informed 
by tribal belonging and therefore members of a particular ethnic group will go for their fellow and the same applies for 
others. 
26
 Politics of affection refers to poltical preferences informed by the ability of those who wield power to lure support 
through emsuring the people disproportionate access to state resources as opposed to rationally based factors.As such 
people are not moved by overt rational theories or performance. 
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constructed realities of time which delineate groups within societies. These groups are supposed to 
be well identified by varied people as a collective and identified by others as such. For instance in 
Africa, the shape of ethnicity transformed with colonialism, moving from a rather fluid and 
malleable identity to a noticeably defined and distinguished group identity mostly in the forms of 
what Swahili speakers call kabila.  
On the basis of the discussion above, the current study conceives ethnic identity as the inclination 
of individuals to define themselves and others by their ethnic origins (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002; 
Bratton et al. 2011). Elements of the distinctive approaches to ethnicity are appreciated in the 
present study. This is because we concur with the contention that far from being primordial or 
atavistic, an ethnic identity is constructed, fluid, and one among multiple identities that actors can 
adopt depending on political mobilisation or any other pull or push factor(s) they are confronted 
with. In Africa, ethnic identity is widely perceived to be the predominant organising principle of 
society and politics and a concrete base for forming individuals’ political opinion during elections 
and stimulating political action (Eifert, 2010; Erdmann, 2007, 2004; Posner, 2005, 2004; Burgess, 
2004; Berman et al. 2004; Norris and Mattes 2003; Holm 1996 and Molutsi and Holm, 1992). 
Emphasising the same Romero (2013) adds that ethnic identity influences who one trusts, does 
business with, gets married to, and whom to vote for.  
The centrality placed on ethnic identities in the organisation of African politics (political tribalism) 
inferably suggests that ethnicity is important in anchoring votes. It is against this backdrop that the 
concept of ethnic voting which refers to the act of members of a particular ethnic group to vote as a 
bloc for a specific political party or candidate is associated with Africa (Bratton et al. 2011; 
Young, 2009; McLaughlin, 2008 Ferree, 2006; Horowitz, 1985 and Wolfinger, 1965). Elucidating 
the logic of ethnic voting, Posner (2005) argues that ethnic voters elect their fellow ethnic 
members to positions of power, particularly the top executive spot, so as to gain collective 
representation. When ethnic voting is of the highest order it can translate itself into election results 
that resemble head counts of ethnic groups or ethnic census (McLaughlin 2008; Ferree 2006; 
Horowitz, 1985; Lever, 1979). Under these circumstances, ethnic demography is the principal 
determinant of the distribution of votes. On that the claim that ethnic groups with numerical 
advantage make leaders is based.  
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While the definition of ethnicity as the inclination of individuals defining themselves and others by 
their ethnic origins will form the basis of analysing ethnicity and voting but there are other social 
identities within ethnicities. These identities are central to influencing politics and are related to 
and sometimes viewed to be ethnic. In this dissertation we look at the politics of origin, being and 
belonging as informed by Chabal. The choice of aspects of origin, being and belonging is based on 
the fact that origin, being and belonging are constitutive parts of the ethnic identities. However, 
they do not constitute ethnic identities as discussed above and particularly in the tribal sense. 
However, a less deep analysis may consider these factors as ethnic simply because of the 
constitutive nature that they have. In this dissertation we recognise origin in terms of being born or 
having ancestral roots in an area of political contest, and being and belonging as informed by 
knowledge and use of the local language of the area of contest, as well as owning land and having 
a residence in the constituency one vies for political office. These elements are taken on board in 
our analysis of the role of ethnicity in informing electoral choices because although they do not fit 
in the definition of ethnicity in terms of tribalism, I consider them as flashes of ethnicity. This is 
because they mildly reflect integral parts of ethnicity which in low salient ethnic countries like 
Tanzania might have an impact in anchoring voters’ choices.  Such conceptualisation gives me 
room to deal with ethnic group based ethnicity and voting as well as the partly tribal and extra 
tribal based elements of ethnicity and voting informed by issues of origin, being and belonging as 
further described below. 
3.2.6. The Politics of Origin, Being and Belonging 
The importance of origin in the analysis of politics in Africa is extensively documented but Patrick 
Chabal’s book The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (2009) cannot be ignored in any academic 
discourse on the same due the significance it has assigned to the topic. It is against this background 
that Chabal is widely referred in this section. According to Chabal, origin is an integral part of 
what he calls the politics of being and belonging which are central at his approach to analysing the 
role of ethnicity in voting. As a starting point, Chabal argues that there are identities that are 
negotiable and others which are not. Contextualising his stance to identity categorisation in Africa, 
Chabal contends that identities are often equated with ethnicity which is fluid, flexible and 
adjustable and thus negotiable; while factors of origin like birth, on the other hand, are not flexible 
and as such represent an integral part of anyone’s community identity (Chabal, 2009). In this 
regard, Chabal essentially argues that being born in a particular community or ethnic group is not 
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something that is negotiable and thus distinguishes the basis of origin from the flexible concept of 
ethnicity presented above. In other words, ethnicity expressed by ethnic groups cannot be wholly 
flexible as one’s ethnic group is associated with one’s birth. 
However, Chabal’s thesis of origin adds other components that go along with the inflexible birth 
requisite which could question the centrality of the line he draws between ethnicity and origin. 
These are land, ancestors and beliefs. According to Chabal apart from being born as a member of a 
group, groups have land ownership, ancestral and the beliefs systems that are expected to shape 
members’ do and don’ts. In this connection, land impacts upon self-perception of communities and 
marks its physical boundaries and determines relevant occupation of those inhabiting it. These 
impacts suggest that land is essential at shaping the self-definition, socio-political and economic 
organisation of a given community or group. Ancestors in this equation are typically related to 
land as they inhabit the lands of origin (Chabal, 2009; Ellis and ter Haar, 2007). From such 
viewpoint one can belong to an ethnic group only because he is born of a parent(s) from that group 
and can or cannot behave in line with the expectations of the group. In this regard, a tribal member 
by birth may or may not be viewed as being a member of, or belonging to the group, despite 
his/her birth right ticket. Conversely, it suggests that other people can own land and behave in a 
manner that is expected of a member of that ethnic group. Thus, one can be qualified as being and 
belonging to such ethnic group without being born by a member(s) of that group or in the 
geographical confines of the ethnic group in question.  
In Chabal’s view land and ancestors form the basis of a belief system that guides both ethical and 
socio-political values which impact voting choices within a particular locality. The belief system in 
Africa according to Chabal presupposes that authority is gained by adhering to primordial beliefs 
and reciprocity. Moreover, while primordialists reduce the adherence and reciprocity to 
“primordial, traditional or ascriptive” ethnic identities, Chabal associates them to kin which to him 
shall be understood as a large association of people, their norms and structures binding local 
societies. According to Chabal, kin-related associations form networks with other associations on 
the local and national levels. In this regard, belonging to a kinship network is essential for the 
social identity of individuals and accords value, legitimacy and worth to political action. That is to 
say, kinship networks are responsible for making an individual exist, and exist socially within a 
locality. This communal sense of identity according to Chabal has to be reflected in politics. This 
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argument is predicated on the fact that politics is about collective virtue as well as power. As such, 
politicians should exhibit the identity and qualities of their kin association on the local and national 
political levels to anchor votes. In this way, the link between kin association and the politicians 
consists of a system of obligations which extends to the political sphere to form a network of 
obligations (Chabal, 2009). These obligations in the words of Chabal are referred to as structures 
of reciprocity. These structures of reciprocity are found on definite rules of exchange of symbolic 
and material resources between leaders and the led. The exchange is often exemplified by the 
expectations of the community of origin of their rulers once they acquire political office.  
Aside from representing the interests of their constituents, politicians are also expected to assure 
certain material rewards, as well as representing numerous identity markers like ethnicity and the 
virtues that the community of origin holds of itself. All this put in one basket makes a political 
representative a proper constituent member of the kinship association as it defines itself.  To all 
intents and purposes, then, politicians’ legitimacy is anchored on their ability to meet their kinship 
obligations. These local obligations are supposed to be delivered even if politicians take on 
national attributes and identities (Chabal, 2009). The network of obligations presented put the 
notion of accountability of rulers to the ruled into practice. This is because the network of 
obligations on one hand provides informal channels of influence for ordinary citizens to check 
their representatives and have a stake in the flows of power and resources; on the other hand 
politicians get a chance to maintain legitimacy.   
As much as Chabal views the means of accountability discussed above as more relevant in the 
informal field, he acknowledges that democratic institutions may also serve as a reciprocal 
mechanism for electing representatives, distributing resources, producing legitimacy and providing 
channels of influence for local community members (Chabal, 2009). In this context, the informal 
and formal, democratic and non-democratic domains should not necessarily be viewed in 
disagreement. In this way, factors of origin could also be used for a democratic electorate to ensure 
inclusion in a polity and observance with their standards. Interesting questions to the 
accountability discussed is whether it is rational to resort to identity issues to gain leverage over 
politicians, or if personal issues associated with a person and political agenda should function as 
political accountability. 
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Chabal’s thesis on origin is quite useful in explaining the role of local interests on determining 
voters’ choices and politicians and individuals’ existence in communities. However, Chabal’s 
model apart from presenting the inflexible element of birth and the possibility of birth forming or 
not forming the base of ethnic belonging in the discussion of ethnicity, hardly distinguishes origin 
from ethnicity in broader terms. For instance, when he states that origin cannot be squarely 
attached to identity but rather to community, however, the factors that influence origin – land, 
ancestors and beliefs highlighted above – are vital in shaping a person’s identity. In addition, what 
is expected of political representatives of a community are quite in line with Lonsdale’s concept of 
moral ethnicity (defined in the following subheading) on what membership in an ethnicity involves 
and who is to represent a particular ethnic entity (Lonsdale 1994). However, Chabal’s idea of 
origin, being and belonging gives us room to unpack ethnicity proper and take into consideration 
specific ethnic related elements in politics. In this sense, Chabal’s view of origin is helpful for 
understanding how local forms of identity which could be employed in politics. This is the case 
regardless of Lonsdale’s position that these identities are considered a form of ethnicity as a 
common origin, heritage and culture form the basis of what ethnic identity is all about. However, 
according to our definition having constituent parts of ethnicity is not enough as such ingredients 
in their totally have to be recognised by the group members and others thus Lonsdale critic should 
be viewed on that limit. Chabal’s thesis provides grounds for analysing specific ingredients of 
ethnic identities as regarded important in a specific political community which on its specific 
context cannot qualify to be ethnicity in the broad sense.  
By employing Chabal’s thesis we can analyse ethnic-related political attributes relevant in 
explaining voters’ choices in elections. In the Tanzanian context, this is relevant as there is a 
common view of being and belonging: mwenzetu, translatable as ‘our own’. This concept qualifies 
people who do not belong to the ethnic group in question on pure tribal terms, but harbour and 
further some tribal or ethnic qualities. Inferably, the concept (mwenzetu) allow for previous 
outsiders to be allied and part of ‘the family’/ the group/ community and ethnic group they 
associate themselves with. The allied individuals can assume political responsibility when they are 
considered to possess the ideal leadership qualities deemed significant by the members of the 
ethnic group they are allied to. A relevant example in Tanzania can be derived from my previous 
election monitoring endeavours in Igunga and Kilombero. The election of Rostam Aziz and the 
late Abbas Gulamali to the parliament in Igunga and Kilombero respectively, provide a case. Both 
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of the politicians in question are Tanzanians of Asian origins who were considered to be ‘being 
and belonging to’ the constituencies that they contested for. For instance, Rostam’s father was a 
local businessman and a prominent traditional musician in Igunga who sang in Kinyamwezi. 
Rostam himself speaks the language and has nowhere better to call home than Igunga.  However, 
he is not a Nyamwezi in strict tribal terms as he lacks ancestral lineage. Similarly, Gulamali spoke 
Kipogoro fluently, had land and residence in Ifakara, and did business in the area. In particular, his 
buses operated from Dar es Salaam to Ifakara and rented tractors for cultivating rice which is the 
economic mainstay in the area he contested for. Gulamali wrote on his buses “Mwana wa Pakaya” 
literally meaning “a son of the land” in Kipogoro to associate himself with the Pogoros to win their 
hearts politically. In political tribalist campaigns, Gulamali’s competitors asked him and his 
supporters to justify his claim of being a son of the Pogoro land by asking about her mother: “yu wi 
mwana wa binti yani?” Who is your mother? The question was relevant to Gulamali because the 
Pogoros are matrilineal and, therefore, tribal belonging and major rituals of passage are attuned to 
one’s mother. Knowing that Gulamali’s mother is not a Pogoro, they meant to disqualify 
Gulamali’s claim of being the son of the land in strict tribal terms. The question notwithstanding, 
Gulamali won the elections and was always viewed as “mwana wa pakaya”. The current thesis 
wants to see how the mwenzetu label plays out in informing voters’ choices particularly knowing 
that the level of ethnicity in the form of tribalism is relatively low in Tanzania. However, I believe 
that considering origin, being and belonging strictly as defined by Chabal in terms of kin networks, 
land, ancestors and beliefs alone narrows the sense of origin, being and belonging. That is why in 
this study we add the aspect of knowledge of the language of the area of contest.  
Constructivists also allow for the subjective factor: the capacity to convince people of one’s 
autochthony (Hilgers, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Geschiere and Jackson, 2006; Kopytoff, 1987). 
Autochthony refers to an original belonging to a group or territory. At its core, the concept 
suggests that within social entities there are categories of people who are ‘bonafide’ members of 
the entity and those who are not, but can be ‘naturalised’ (Geschiere and Jackson, 2006).  This 
categorisation entails that members of a social entity are autochthonous compared to strangers, but 
within the entity certain lineages have a greater degree of autochthony than others. In Africa, the 
distinction between ‘firstcomers’- bonafide members or autochthons and ‘newcomers’- 
‘immigrants’  is common and formed a means of categorisation at the base of a hierarchy 
determining the distribution of rights, especially land rights, and access to resources during the 
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colonial and immediate post-colonial eras (Kopytoff, 1987). The firstcomers (autochthons) in the 
said eras enjoyed the valued and prestigious spaces in their community, and designate spaces that 
newcomers could occupy; and assure a harmonious co-existence among people, natural forces and 
invisible forces. This distinction defined the scope of integration while maintaining respect for a 
social organisation headed by the autochtons (Hilgers, 2011). Inferably, the social order, allows 
autochthony to play the role of an actual form of capital that can be invested, valued and profited 
from by the autochthons in elections.  
It is imperative to note that autochthony is rather malleable as latecomers can be integrated into the 
autochthomous status once they are given cultural resources or responsibilities such as managing 
the autochthons’ main earth-shrine (Hilgers, 2011). This mobility of identity indicates that 
‘firstcomers’ and ‘latecomers’ labels could shift and be used to anchore votes to both groups 
within a community provided that who benefits from the principle of autochthony at a particular 
time and context. Currently, urbanisation and decentralisation, as well as land and political 
conflicts inform resource-based autochthonous arguments aiming at barring a section of a 
population from accessing resources and/or basic rights. The autochthonous arguments include 
accessing property, settlement history or burial places, enjoying the right to vote, who to stand in 
elections and who to vote for (Geschiere, 2009; Geschiere and Jackson, 2006). This is because 
urbanisation and decentralisation and land and political questions revolve around distribution and 
re-distribution of resources which could influence autochthonous shifts of identities.  
From the analysis of Chabal’s politics of origin and Tanzania’s contextualisation it can be argued 
that the overarching ethnic identity of an individual in Africa may be tribal (Sukuma or Nyamwezi 
etc), but such identity can coexist with other local identities connected to a place of origin; or those 
locally set identities can happen to be a fraction of the broader ethnic identity. In some instances, 
origin might transcend beyond an area occupied by one’s ethnic group. Most zone27-related origins 
are beyond districts and regions thus binding members of different ethnic groups for political 
interests. Therefore, reference to common origin could be used as a political referent whereby 
                                                 
27
 Tanzania is divided in seven zones formed by regions that are geographically proximate. The regions on their own 
and collectively are ethnically diverse. The division is depicted in allocation of public offices to serve in the regions 
found in the zones and have bearing in national politics.Six zones are well known among Tanzanians.The Eastern 
Zone (Dar es Salaam, Coast and Morogoro); Central ( Dodoma and Singida); Lake (Mwanza, Geita, Simiyu, 
Shinyanga, Mara and Kagera); Northern (Arusha, Manyara, Tanga and Kilimanjaro); Western (Tabora, Kigoma); 
Southern Highlands(Iringa, Njombe Mbeya, Ruvuma,Songwe, Rukwa and Katavi) and Southern(Lindi and Mtwara). 
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local, district, regional, zonal or national politicians may be understood.  A detailed account of 
how ethnicity can manifest and germinate into a political salient phenomenon is presented below. 
3.2.7. Ethnicity and its Manifestation in Politics 
Ethnic identities as we saw in the discussions above can be a result of varied cultural, political, 
social and economic realities that inform the basis of people’s identification. For instance, although 
the ethnic identities in Africa took shape since humans started interactions in varied social settings 
but since the common historical reality in Africa happens to be colonialism, most studies on 
ethnicity could hardly shun away from analysing its ramifications on present ethnic identities when 
examining ethnicity in the continent (Posner, 2003; Turton, 1997). Most of the literature in their 
analysis argue that ethnicity in Africa has received its present shape, structure and even 
geographical distribution as a consequence of political, economic and cultural processes of 
colonialism (Weber, 2009; Posner, 2003; Turton, 1997; Lonsdale, 1994; Illife, 1979). Generally 
the colonialists either merged previously separate groups to create new ones, divided one into 
several or influenced formation of news completely depending on the suitability of the identities to 
the colonial project. Weber (2009) for instance, shows how ethnic groups were divided in Kenya 
by forcing association formation to be based on ethnic groups to ensure maximum yields are 
accrued from its investment compared to Tanzania were associations were supposed to be national 
in character. Illife (1979) and Mpangala (1992) provide evidence of how the German and British 
colonialists merged ethnic groups to form new grand tribal identities. In the next chapter the role of 
colonialism in shaping ethnic identities as they relate to Tanzania are discussed.  
Solid ethnic identities according to Jerman (1997) can be distinguished by cultural and social 
factors whereby the former factors inform what she conceives to be objective ethnicity and the later 
subjective ethnicity. Objective ethnicity according to Jerman refers to the existence of ethnicity as 
a cultural category of traditions, customs, languages, etc without developing into a self-ascribed 
group identity. Since this kind of ethnicity does not represent a self-reference of individuals and 
groups, its significance in social interaction is rendered irrelevant and can hardly be a base of 
social identity. On the other hand, subjective ethnicity is used to connote the form of rigidly 
defined ethnic groups. As opposed to the objective type of ethnicity, subjective ethnicity entails 
that ethnicity becomes an integral part of the self-definition of individuals and groups. In this 
regard, ethnicity gains social significance. In essence, both objective and subjective ethnicity 
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express the cultural feeling of “we-ness” and “otherness”. However, the subjective one articulates 
it in a manner useful for mobilising social and political interests (Jerman, 1997) 
The possibility of ethnicity to mobilise social and political interests intrigues a discourse between 
the link between social and political ethnicity. This is because if the categorical distinction of 
ethnicity is left at the cultural and social level, then the political process that forms the link 
between the social significance of ethnicity and the political relevance of ethnicity would be 
missed. This is relevant because ethnicity does not automatically assume political significance in a 
situation where its social significance has increased (Malipula, 2014).  
The distinction between social and political ethnicity is made on the basis of Lonsdale’s (1994) 
categorisation of ethnicity into moral ethnicity and political tribalism. In the eyes of Lonsdale, 
both moral ethnicity and political tribalism emerged as a result of the process of colonialism. 
Moral ethnicity according to Lonsdale is conceived as the moral and ethical norms and meanings 
founded on social interactions and forms of labour that exist within a community that is ‘imagined’ 
or craved to be reached (Anderson,1991). This definition is of an abstract nature but its 
interpretation is rather uncomplicated. It entails that ethnicity is an identity predicated on the 
ethical norms and rules that guide and shape people sharing a similar identity within a certain 
community. The commonality aspect of the ethical norms among members of a group stretches the 
definition to questions of negotiations concerning social rights and obligations of members of the 
group, as well as the distribution of authority and property within an ethnic group. The process of 
negotiation and definition of the boundaries of the ethnic groups in the holistic fashion explained 
in this definition occurred during colonialism and led to the formation of more rigidly defined 
ethnic groups (Lonsdale, 1994). 
The clarity of the definition of political tribalism according to Lonsdale is undoubted and does not 
require clarifications to resolve seemingly imaginary concepts like moral ethnicity. Political 
tribalism is the use of ethnic identity in political competition with other groups (Lonsdale, 1994). 
The emergence of political tribalism in Africa can be traced back to the colonial times as collective 
political action “across communities of moral ethnicity” (Berman, 1998). To begin with, it was 
employed in the struggles against the colonial domination and was later used in competition for 
power and resources between ethnic groups in the independent African nation states (Mamdani, 
1996: 23-25; Lonsdale, 1994: 139-140). Ngugi (2008: 18) presents a succinct conceptualisation of 
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political tribalism in the post-colonial context, when he refers to it as the pursuit of public 
resources on the basis and to the advantage of one’s ethnic group, at the expense of other ethnic 
groups in a country (Ngugi, 2008:18). Since the resources pursued mainly belong to the state, and 
the demands are from divergent ethnic groups, political tribalism easily becomes a “zero-sum 
game” which alienates others participating in the game (Laakso and Olukoshi, 1996:31). The 
process of political tribalism in Africa revolves around the nation state and its resources because 
the state is commonly a main provider of both employment and appropriable resources (Bates, 
2008; Azam, 2001). 
The game nature of political tribalism presupposes mobilisation of ethnic groups for competition. 
The mobilisation of ethnicity for competition with other groups calls for some measure of “myth-
making” vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups and the boundaries of the ethnic groups to be defined in 
relation to other groups (Barth, 1969; Laakso and Olukoshi 1996). Also political tribalism call for 
lines to be drawn between the self and the “other” on the basis of conceptions of good and evil, 
virtue and morality, oppressor and oppressed (Lemarchand, 1999: 4; Berman 1998: 324-25; 327-
330). In the process of this competition, ethnic myth making and rivalry are spread across the 
ethnic groups as privilege and discrimination. In this context, political tribalism and its associated 
competition for resources lay bear the fundamental questions in politics-“who gets what, when and 
how?”  
Contextualising ethnicity in post-colonial Africa, Wimmer (1997) suggests a three-staged 
explanation of the politicisation of ethnicity as summarised below. The first stage includes the act 
of one of the competing ethnic groups dominating the state bureaucracy. This stage is followed by 
systematic discrimination of elites from other groups preventing them from having an influence on 
public policy and strategic positions within the bureaucracy. Lastly, as a result of domination and 
discrimination the “ethnic grassroots” getting activated in this setting of ethnic competition as they 
find themselves excluded from the national cake (Wimmer, 1997: 632-651).  The three staged 
process of politicising ethnicity proposed by Wimmer might be considered rigid, but it is useful for 
the present study as it highlights the role of the elite in the domination of authority and the effects 
of their acts of inclusion and exclusion. Above all the study finds its way to the lower level 
communities who are excluded from the material and symbolic resources of the state.  
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Figure 2: A Scheme Explaining Politicisation of Ethnicity (Tribalism) 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Wimmer, 1997:635-51 
It is imperative to note that while Wimmer contends that politicisation of tribalism ensues from 
political competition between ethnic groups it is fuelled by what Barth (1969:33) regards as some 
mobilising efforts by political elites, or innovators. Posner (2005:2-8) agrees with the role of 
mobilisation in enhancing politicisation of tribalism but assigns the essence of the mobilisational 
role of politicisation of ethnic groups to social institutions. To him, formal rules, regulations and 
policies that structure social and political interactions determine which ethnic identities are to 
choose from and which ones will be deemed most valuable to use by individuals and groups in 
garnering resources of the state (Posner, 2005). However, Posner’s  model fails to explain why in 
some instances people choose not to voice ethnic identities politically at all, or only to a limited 
extent. 
3.3. Understanding the Concept of Voting  
Voting is a method for a group such as a meeting or an electorate to make a decision or express an 
opinion—often following discussions, debates, or election campaigns. Voting is considered an 
important form of political participation
28
 in a democracy (Oswald, 2010: xi). It is a democratic 
routine used by individuals to make a choice between two or more candidates or policy options in 
an election (Misafi, 2014:43). In this regard, voting is a formal expression of opinion or choice, 
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either positive or negative, made by an individual or body of individuals. More often than not, the 
choices are made by individuals out of free will and thus the choice to or not to vote rests with the 
individual. That is to say one may decide to or not to vote. However, in some countries, such as 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Mexico, Peru, Turkey, and Venezuela to mention but 
a few, voting is compulsory (Oswald, 2010:6). The rationale for making voting compulsory is to 
improve voters’ turnout in elections (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2009; O’Gorman, 2012). In the 
majority of countries including Tanzania, citizens are free to participate or not to participate in 
voting. In this study, I conceptualise voting as an act of casting a ballot carried out by an individual 
citizen of a voting age and with personal characteristics required by the jurisdiction of the place an 
individual wishes to exercise his voting right. Voting in this study involves individual’s liberty to 
vote or not and whom to vote for. Since this is a study of the influences of ethnicity on determining 
voters’choices, it was assumed that individuals are free to decide whether or not to vote in ethnic 
lines. Since voting is done after campaign activities during which candidates and political parties 
present their policies to the electorates, I assume there is a correlation between individuals’ view of 
ethnic salience and the candidate’s or a political party they vote for. This is because the electorate 
has the chance of scrutinising candidates and or political party policies before making the decision 
to vote for or not to vote for a particular candidate or policy.  
3.4. Ethnicity and Voting: A Theoretical Overview 
The theoretical debate on the ethnicity and voting in new democracies has for ages revolved 
around the nature of a state and its connection to society. The debate is relevant to the study in 
question because indeed Tanzania is a new democracy and state-society relationships and social 
structures have a profound impact on the relations between ethnicity and voting in any polity 
(Bayart 1989; Chabal and Daloz 1999). It is against this background that neo-patrimonial and 
ethnic structural theses are considered relevant to this dissertation.  However, because of the 
weaknesses of the ethnic structure in terms of pointing out the agents of ethnic salience indicated 
in section 1.1 less attention is provided to this school in our analysis. In this regard, a more 
relevant angle to this dissertation is the discourse on the state and its leaders’ use of non-legal 
rational elements like ethnicity to sustain power, legitimacy and control political competition (Van 
De Walle, 2003, Van Cranenburg 2003, Salih, 2003, and Bogaards, 2004; Rothchild and 
Olorunsola, 1983, Bates, 1983, and 2000, Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1993, Wamba dia Wamba, 1996). A 
critical look at the dominant literature on power sustenance in Africa points to the fact that the 
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state in Africa has patrimonial characteristics. Such characteristics tend to support traditional 
particularistic and personalised authority that gives centrality to aspects like ethnicity in 
manipulating voting choices. This explains why, recent explanations (which are viewed relevant to 
the current study) are by and large informed by neo-patrimonial theories (Bratton and Van de 
Walle, 1997).  
The argument of the neo-patrimonial rule is anchored on a blend the use of the institution of the 
presidency, the political centrality of ethnic groups support in elections and the use of state 
resources to influence voters to vote for those in power (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 61-68). 
The neo-patrimonialist suggestion that ethnicity is central in voting in Africa because leaders have 
given credence to personal rule instead of LRIs is criticised and slightly modified by hybrid regime 
researchers. Hybrid researchers are of the view that states do have in place legal-rational 
institutions but use them in a manner that ensures their survival. For  instance, hybrid theorists 
point out that regimes in Africa adhere to conducting multiparty elections but such elections are far 
away from being fair and free and employ patrimonial tendencies including the use of ethnicity to 
influence electoral choices in a manner that ensure they maintain political power.  
A critique of both theoretical positions that questions the efficacy of LRIs and the preconceived 
traditional and paternalistic nature of African states to explain influences of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices suggest an alternative explanation. This explanation stems from 
African political thought as informed by its shared historical realities particularly colonialism and 
the effects thereof. 
Below we present a theoretical discourse of the ethnic structure school, and the neo-patrimonial 
and hybrid regime approaches to ethnicity and voting and suggest an alternative model to the two 
for explaining the role of ethnicity in voting in Tanzania. The discussion is organised in four main 
parts. The five discusses the ethnic structure school, neo-patrimonial theory; the second section 
deals with hybrid regime analysis; the third presents an African centred explanation of the state, 
ethnicity and voting that is critical of the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theoretical underpinnings and 
lastly a contextualised framework for explaining the influence of ethnicity in Tanzania is 
presented. 
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3.4.1. The Ethnic Structure School and Voting 
As indicated in the general introduction, this school contends that a country’s ethnic structure - the 
number and size of ethnic groups - can explain the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ 
choices (Posner, 2005; Barkan, 1994). As such, countries with few and large ethnic groups are 
expected to be ethnically politicised as they are endowed with ethnic groups large enough to form 
MWCs. These MWCs are said to influence voting because voters expect rewards for being part of 
an MWC. The contrary is viewed to be true for countries with an array of small ethnic groups 
which force contestants to reach out to, and win votes from, a myriad of ethnic groups through a 
national appeal (Weber, 2010: 58). Tanzania would seem an instance of this kind of electoral 
process, and it helps to explain the lower levels of ethnic politicisation in the country. As 
convincing as the ethnic structure view may be in terms of strategic rationality, the political-
ethnographic school questions its validity on grounds of the dynamic and contextual reality of 
ethnic identities, which a static conceptualisation of ethnic groups and their politicising effect fails 
to grasp (Malipula, 2014:51). To this school of thought, the structural argument’s neglect of the 
dynamic and contextual nature of ethnic identities is a serious ﬂaw as ethnic groups might be re-
grouped into smaller sub-ethnic groups or larger super-ethnic groups (Weber, 2009:8). In this 
respect, then, the structural explanation is only relevant to static ethnic structures and well deﬁned 
ethnic groupings. Where does the Tanzanian case ﬁt in this broad structural debate? This question 
will be addressed below through a comparison of Tanzania and Kenya. However, against both the 
ethnic structure argument and its critique, Miguel (2004) suggests that nation-building policies and 
practices can moderate ethnic politicisation. To Miguel, nation-building can mitigate politicisation 
of ethnicity, while lack of the same can exacerbate it regardless of the ethnic structure. My focus is 
rather on the perception of nation-building, namely people’s social imaginaries, which can be 
obtained ethnographically. 
Tanzania as a polity augurs well in both the ethnic-structure and nation-building debate. Weber 
(2010) argues that Tanzania has a potential of forming MWCs in presidential elections. I disagree 
because the largest ethnic group, the Sukuma speakers, constitutes 17% of the population while 
there is none amounting to more than 5% (Malipula, 2014:54). Any MWC for the presidential seat 
would require many ethno cultural groups and a national outlook. It imperative to recall that 
Tanzania exhibits a striking plurality of ethnic groups as already indicated in section 1.1. Estimates 
differ, but 120 is the most quoted ﬁgure of ethnic groups in the country (Jerman, 1997:34). Some 
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estimates put the ﬁgure as high as 150 (Omari, 1997:51) while others (Nyang’oro, 2004) indicate 
130 and yet others 140 (Heilman and John, 2012:2). The task of providing an official number of 
ethnic groups and of their population size is substantially hindered by the 1967 legal prohibition on 
registering the population by ethnic groups and religious affiliation (Jerman, 1994:34). 
Nevertheless, estimates can be found in the literature. Glickman (1995, 308), presents estimates of 
the seven largest ethnic groups in the country by 1992. Likewise, the Afrobarometer surveys of 
2005, 2008 and 2012, which list the ethnic origin of its respondents also sheds light on the size of 
ethnic groups in Tanzania. Although the sample size of the surveys (N= 1208, N=1304 and 
N=2004 for the 2005, 2008 and 2012 surveys) might be  viewed as too small to give reliable 
estimates for the whole Tanzanian population, there is at present no better alternative to 
establishing ethnic group size. Based on these sources, the seven largest ethnic groups in Tanzania 
can be listed as follows. 
Table II: Relative Size (%) of Ethnic Groups in Tanzania 
Ethnic 
Groups 
1967 
Census 
1992 
Estimates 
Afrobarometer 
2005 
Afrobarometer 
2008 
Afrobarometer 
2012 
Sukuma 12.4% 14% 16% 17% 14% 
Nyamwezi  3.3 % 8 % 4% 4% 4% 
Chagga  3.6 % 6 % 5 % 3 % 5% 
Makonde 3.9 % 6 % 2 % 3 % 3% 
Haya  3.3 % 6 % 4 % 2 % 2% 
Hehe  N/A 6 % 3 % 2 % 3% 
Nyakyusa  N/A 5 % 3 % 2 % 2% 
TOTAL 26.5+ 51 37 33 33 
Sources: 1967 Census Tanzania; 1992 estimate figures based on Glickmann (1995: 308); 
Afrobarometer Tanzania 2005, 2008 and 2012 
 
The data presented in Table II above prove that Tanzania is an ethnically diverse state without an 
ethnic group close to commanding a simple majority in presidential elections. More importantly, such 
status could not even be achieved by a merger of the large ethnic groups as they constitute only 
around 37% of the general population
29
. Under such circumstances, grand coalitions based on ethnic 
group sizes could be beneficial to the smaller groups as their mergers can produce an MWC. 
However, the MWC requires massive canvassing in Tanzania. This structural fact provides an 
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 The 1992 estimates deviate from the rest, which raises doubts on the survey. As stated earlier, it should be noted 
however that ethnic categories are not fixed at the geographical margins. Sukuma and their southern neighbours, 
Nyamwezi, are culturally and linguistically related, with regional linguistic variants where the groups neighbour each 
other, so much so that a shift in ethnic identification is possible over only a few generations. Intermarriage is another 
element. Note that such dynamic identification is less likely in politicised ethnicity 
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incentive to nationalistic political canvassing as any ethnic move must be ethnically broad and 
inclusive to have a positive effect. It is against this background that Barkan (1994:10), Hyden 
(1994:79) and Glickman (1995: 289) partly attribute the lack of ethnic salience in politics in Tanzania 
to its ethnic composition. However, Weber (2009:7) refutes the contention by making the contrast 
with its neighbouring country Kenya. Although Kenya lacks an ethnic group with a clear majority, 
ethnicity has long played a significant role there to the extent that presidential elections resemble an 
ethnic census (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008; Barkan 1994). The argument advanced by Weber against 
the structural explanation of ethnic salience is predicated on the assumption that Kenya and Tanzania 
have the potential to forge MWCs.  
Weber, for instance, argues that in Kenya ethnic groups competing for power and resources are blocs 
made up of smaller groups appearing as one on the national political scene (Kiondo, 2001:260-61). 
The Kalenjin, which was crafted by President Moi by combining his own small Tugen and other 
cousin ethnic groups (Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo, Marakwet, and Pokot) to support his presidential bid, 
provide an example of how the politicisation of ethnicity can originate from a small ethnic group 
(Weber, 2009:8). The Kikuyu’s inclusion of the cousin ethnic groups of Embu and Meru to increase 
their number from 21% to 27% provides an example of a large ethnic group extending itself for 
political reasons (Ibid.). There are also politically motivated ethnic mergers like the Luhya and 
Mijikenda (Makoloo, 2005:11) as well as the Masai and Samburu (Ogot, 2005:291). Taking into 
consideration the Kenyan examples where ethnic groups have come together irrespective of their 
sizes, Weber wonders why the Sukuma have not made use of their numerical advantage to maximise 
their political influence. To Weber the explanation cannot be found in their size. While this idea 
might well attract support, we believe that it is open to criticism. The critique, salvaging aspects of 
the hypothesis of a structural politicisation of ethnicity, is anchored in the fact that the major ethnic 
groups in Kenya (Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba and Kalenjin) do provide an incentive for ethnic 
politics as their numbers combined is above the MWC. More precisely, if the leading ethnic groups in 
Kenyan politics – the Kikuyu and Luo – manage to court two big and a few smaller groups they can 
compose a MWC
30
. This is not the case in Tanzania where the Sukuma and Nyamwezi together 
constitute less than 25% of the general population and where none of the other 118 ethnic groups has 
more than 4% of the general population as indicated above. Under such circumstances, the Sukuma-
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 Assuming all are eligible to vote the MWC requires 19.3 million which could be met if the Kikuyu, Luhya and 
Kalenjin plus Kikuyu’s cousins Embu and Meru joined. 
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Nyamwezi conglomerate would need to embark upon pan-territorial courting of ethnic groups to 
achieve success. We also question the relevance of Weber’s choice of the Kalenjin to argue his case. 
We agree that President Moi has engineered the formation of the Kalenjin and used it for political 
visibility, but by no means has it guaranteed him the MWC. He came into power without elections as 
he succeeded President Jomo Kenyatta, who died in the middle of his term. Moi clung to power 
through the political infrastructure built by Kenyatta and utilised the advantages of his incumbency 
(Mutua, 2008:66). The advantage included the misuse of coercive organs to intimidate his opponents 
to the extent that his re-election under multi-party politics was regarded as fraudulent (Brown, 2001; 
Klopp, 2001). President Moi only managed to elevate the Kalenjin into an important bloc by 
supporting the two major political bases in Kenya, the Kikuyu and Luo, thus coaxing the ruling or 
opposition circles depending on the electoral outcomes. This potential, activated by Moi, may be 
structurally informed by the fluidity of the Kenyan ethnic groups and the real potential of making the 
MWC.  
The structural explanation for depoliticisation of the ethnicity in Tanzania is not limited to the 
presidential race. The situation is also vividly apparent in parliamentary and civic elections as the 
demarcation of most of the parliamentary and civic electoral constituencies particularly found in rural 
areas are predominantly occupied by one ethnic group (Nyaluke, 2013). The lack of divided ethnic 
groups in these constituencies principally restrains the potential for inter-ethnic conflicts as 
contestants are from the same ethnic group. Potentially intra ethnic conflicts could occur as ethnic 
groups are composed of different clans, but, there is no evidence to claim its salience in Tanzanian 
politics (ibid.). Only Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital of Tanzania is ethnically cosmopolitan to 
present an exception to constituencies’ ethnic group homogeneity. Other urban constituencies share 
Dar es Salaam’s cosmopolitan nature yet the ethnic groups inhabiting the cities or towns are often 
more populous than the immigrants, thus dampening the efficacy of politics centred around the 
original inhabitants against immigrants (ibid.). Generally speaking, the potential for politicisation of 
ethnicity suggested by Weber is, in the case of Tanzania, imaginary. The obstructions are not only 
structural but also exist at the level of political ethnic consciousness. Ethnic groups in Tanzania have 
socially active and identifiable traits that resist political manipulation. Also, the scale of ethnic 
diversity and the distribution of tribal populations make political manipulation difficult to execute; 
and attainment of the MWC by default ensures, as argued above, a national rather than ethnic 
outlook. Because of both the numerical argument for acquisition of state power and the crystallised 
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nature of the ethnic groups, the structural element still has a part to play in the explanation of 
depoliticised ethnicity in Tanzania, the exceptions to the Dar es Salaam case notwithstanding. Rather 
than asking whether or not it has a role in mitigating such politicisation, the question should be to 
what extent does it do so? Therefore, we complement the structural argument by turning to history, 
the path(s) of the past, and consider the ethnic structure in place since the colonial administration 
until the current administration. Also in order to clarify why the structure has been retained and taken 
advantage of to unite Tanzanians against ethnic salience in politics, a thorough-going historical 
perspective particularly from the nationalist era todate is required. 
From a historical perspective, Weber (2010:59) argues that the degree of ethnic polarisation is lower 
in Tanzania than in Kenya due to their different colonial status and the colonizer’s greater 
involvement in Kenya, which meant more colonial economic investment. The heavy investment in 
Kenya and its colonial status motivated colonialists to spearhead ethnic polarisation to avoid strong 
national anti-colonial struggles. The contrary was the case for Tanzania, which as a protectorate was 
less invested and was supposed to be led to independence. Likewise, Tanzania has embarked on a 
sustained nation-building policy from colonialism to-date. It is worth to recall that most African states 
had similar nation-building policies and philosophies as indicated in section 1.1 above. However, 
most of them have failed to emulate Tanzania’s success due to lack of commitment to the nation-
building enterprise and colonial history (Weber, 2010). From this angle, influences of ethnicity can be 
understood from Tanzania’s endogenous evolution, namely the line of African political thought that 
informed nationalist struggles. This is a particular social imaginary (Castoriadis 1997), converging 
into a political imaginary, that has contributed to making ethnicity insignificant in voting in Tanzania 
regardless of the ethnic structure. As such to bridge Weber’s ethnic structure explanation of the role 
of ethnicity in influencing voting, a deeper understanding of Tanzania’s political imaginaries and 
agencies that inform salience of ethnicity could be achieved through the PsIM approach described 
below. Before discussing the PsIM let us turn to the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theses.  
3.4.2. Neo-patrimonialism, Ethnicity and Voting  
Neo-patrimonialism is a complex phenomenon that incorporates varied sub-concepts like 
clientelism, ethnicity, tradition, tribalism, nepotism, etc. (Mkandawire, 2013:6). The literature 
dealing with the concept of neo-patrimonialism commonly describes it as a vague catch-all concept 
for the political problems befalling the African continent (Van de Walle, 2001:71; Theobald, 1982: 
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554–5). Arguing along the same line De Grassi considers neo-patrimonialism to be a “conceptual 
muddle” (De Grassi, 2008: 112). The basis of De Grassi’s conceptualisation is hinged upon the 
fact that the concept is difficult to pin down. To him, it embeds “thick description” and often 
imaginative descriptions of the local African scene, sated with anthropological knowingness, 
presented in colourful metaphors. These metaphors are usually characterised by unrestrained 
recourse to anecdotes, derogatory vocabulary or shameless name calling and vivid vignettes of the 
all-too-frequent cases of egregious abuse of state resources and power in Africa (Mkandawire, 
2013:6).  
The conceptual complexity notwithstanding, the concept of neo-patrimonialism from which the 
explanation of the ethnicity and voting is rooted, has been derived from the term patrimonial. The 
term according to Chabal and Daloz (1999) is an amalgam of all the cultural affairs (including 
ethnicity) that characterised the traditional pre-colonial past and informed the elite and other 
people’s organisation and livelihood. According to Ole Therkildsen (2005:41), patrimonial 
relations connote a patron-client relationship. In this relationship, a patron (a person of influence 
culturally anchored in the social and political order) bestows gifts from his resources to followers 
or ‘clients’ to obtain and strengthen their loyalty and support. Contextualising it to ethnicity and 
voting the theory infers that electorates vote for the ethnic group of their patron and /or the ethnic 
group of his choices. 
The client-patron relationship and its links to patrimonialism are of seminal significance in 
explaining the link between ethnicity and voting particularly in African states (Bayart, 1993; 
Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This is because the patron-client 
relationship in the context of African regimes is between the ‘strongmen’ or ‘big men’—the 
African term for rulers (in most states the President)—and their subjects. The strongmen are said 
to use public resources and or their positions to buy off clients to enlist their support and loyalty or 
to simply meet extended family and ethnic expectations (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 98-99). Through 
this practice Hyden (2006: 72-93) coined the term “economy of affection” literally meaning 
electoral choice and forms of supporting patrons are informed by economic rewards gained or 
expected to be gained upon supporting the patrons. 
The patrimonial character of the state in Africa described above implies that African statesmen are 
not properly institutionalised as independent actors differentiated from personal and local contexts 
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as propounded by the Weberian
31
 school of modern state. According to the Weberian school, a 
modern state has to be characterised by a set of independent political institutions and an 
autonomous bureaucracy, unbound from particularistic and personalised interest in the society 
(Hyden, 2004; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). As such, the buying of ethnically based clientelistic 
support during election can be made evitable. This is because the Weberian dictates condemns 
personal and particularistic tendencies. Basing on the demerits of politicisation of ethnicity 
explained in the general introduction one might be eager to ask why the Weberian dictates are not 
implemented in African states. 
According to Clapham (1982; 1985) neo-patrimonialistic tendencies that support the use of 
ethnicity in voting in Africa are high due to lack of common ideals and values militating against 
such practices. Clapham (1985) argues that divisive colonial orientations informed by the policy of 
divide and rule barred expression of a set of shared values among the African people which could 
instil effective LRIs, unite people and discourage ethnic polarisation in politics inferably on 
determining electorates’ choices in particular.  
Clapham’s view on ethnicity in Africa is an essential component of patrimonial mobilisation of 
votes and maintenance of political power is supported by several authors. Explicating the 
component Salih (2003) regard ethnic groups in African politics as a channel through which 
resources are distributed, support is accrued and political power is maintained. Similar views are 
held by Lindberg and Jones (2010), Arriola, (2009), Bogaards (2008), Diamond (2008), Van de 
Walle (2003) and Van Cranenburg (2003). However, this bunch of scholars maintain that ruling 
parties benefit more from the practice as they have access to resources required to practice the 
politics of affection. It can be inferred from this position that ethnic polarisation in politics and 
ethnic saliency in voting can be potentially put into effect by ruling parties. In the same vein, 
ruling parties can play a leading role in navigating away from ethnic polarisation in politics and 
ethnic saliency in voting by using the resources at its disposal in a non-particularistic and personal 
manner.  
The basis of the argument that the politics of affection can be invigorated or diffused by the ruling 
parties in Africa is well explained by Makulilo (2012) who point out that power in most African 
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 The Weberian School mentioned above is associated with Max Weber and not the less known Weber whom we 
cited earlier. 
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governments is excessively concentrated in the presidency who is the head of the respective ruling 
party in his/her state. These presidents possess such power without proper checks and balance as 
well as accountability mechanisms (Van de Walle, 2003; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Such 
state of affairs grants the holder of the office-the President, enormous power and authority to 
exercise personal rule and distribute favours to ethnic groups’ leaders and followers whose 
interests and those of politicians coincide. This provides the basis for continued loyalty when it 
comes to elections. The resources also provide room for swaying disloyal ethnicities and voters 
also to support the incumbent. 
The link of ethnicity to the patrimonial relations highlighted presents some interesting implications 
for the relation between ethnicity and voting. On one hand the patrimonial network creates 
‘disincentives’ for opposition politicians to form grand coalitions involving multi-ethnicities when 
seeking to defeat the ruling party. The reason is the likelihood of conflicts abounding among the 
united ethnicities over the control of the state (Van de Walle, 2003).  Alternatively, the patrimonial 
network influences opposition politicians to strive for personal glory by mobilising small and 
highly personalised political parties to either join the ruling party or have leverage in negotiating 
with it to access state resources. On the other hand, ethnic communities seek representatives in 
organs responsible for dividing the national cake so that they can indirectly benefit (Van de Walle, 
2003). Such interest in the spoils of the state is arguably what made Salih (2003) describe ethnic 
communities of this nature ‘interest groups’.  
The interests of the opposition parties to make small parties to access resources and ethnic groups’ 
intent to enjoy the same tend to coincide. However, since political parties are the formal organs of 
political competition in most polities, politicians are afforded an opportunity to seek ethnic support 
for political competition and ethnic elites also could find way of accessing resources through party 
tickets in elections. This way, it can be argued that the likelihood of formation of ethnic parties and 
voting patterns which cannot oust patrons but ensure possibilities of a share of the national cake 
from the patron is greater than otherwise (Arriola, 2009; Brooks 2004; Bogaards, 2004).  
According to this perspective then, voters would support the most rewarding patron and 
connections between rulers and ruled are structured according to a “vertical accountability 
modelled on the basis of economies of affection” (Lindberg and Morrison 2008). Therefore, to 
neo-patrimonialists ethnic voting in Africa is supposed to be common and informed by the 
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clientelism. That is to say, partisanship and economic evaluations which are other determinants of 
voting have no room only if they coincide with the client–patron scripture.  This assertion has 
indeed been criticised by some who argue that political programmes and past policies indeed do 
affect voters’ choices in Africa much as anywhere else (Ole Therkildsen, 2009). 
As much as the neo-patrimonial school has gained traction in explaining ethnicity and voting 
particularly in Africa, it is not free of criticism. The major critics stem on grounds that the 
influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices is not so simple to be squarely and fairly 
explained by a mere combination of the legal-rational and patrimonial elements (Erdeman and 
Engel, 2009). The critique gains credence when the neo-patrimonial school overemphasise 
accusations that African cultures are supportive of divisive ethnic tendencies in politics and other 
corruptive, unaccountable and irresponsive tendencies which can exacerbate the politics of 
affection and inform ethnic voting. This is the case because in the actual sense there is cultural 
practices in Africa that point opposite to such evil deeds (Pitcher et al. 2009). For instance, Pitcher 
et al. (2009) argues that there are numerous traditions (rituals and other cultural elements) in 
Africa that grace accountability, unity and denounce corruption. The works of anthropologists like 
Vincent (1986) and Scharzberg (2001) are but few that thoroughly document that African 
leadership is required to be accountable by reciprocities between the ruler and the ruled and not 
informed by kin or ethnic loyalty were societal do’s do not provide. For example, Botswana is one 
African state capable of refuting arguments that African cultural heritage is incompatible with 
Weberian dictates of governance and non-ethnic polarisation in elections. This position is anchored 
on the fact that a succession of Botswana elites is deeply rooted in the traditional way of life, they 
employ its power and a set of reciprocities that mended tribal divisions in elections (Pitcher, et al. 
2009).   
Another important critique of neo-patrimonialism although general is quite relevant to the ethnicity 
and voting debate; it concerns a methodological issue (De Grassi, 2008; Mustapha, 2002). De 
Grassi (2008: 112-113) criticises the neo-patrimonial perspective research methodology for 
focusing on relatively few countries and paying attention to few journals and mostly presenting 
anecdotal evidence.  Mustapha on his part concurs with De Grassi but adds more forcefully his 
disapproval to the neo-patrimonialists analysis of the influence of ethnicity and voting in Africa 
through the strongman’s whims. He is of the view that considering the strongman to be an 
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individual with only self-interests capable of manipulating everyone to evoke patrimonial 
tendencies including ethnic sentiments in voting is uncalled for (Mustapha, 2002:1- 6-9). 
Mustapha’s disapproval is anchored on the fact that the strongman credence in informing choices 
tends to neglect that ethnic groups are a complex collective social reality and its evocation in 
elections requires to be viewed as such. Reducing the influences of ethnicity on elections to the 
deeds and wishes of the strongman deprives members of ethnic groups of political agency on 
determining electorates’ choices.  
In a more particular way, Mustapha’s critique points out that the methodological individualism 
characterising the neo-patrimonial school orients the discussion on ethnicity and voting away from 
the political context of elections. An election from a political context is a group process in which 
both the rulers and the ruled participate, and exercise a measure of autonomy and political 
expectation. In this context, the agency of influencing can be initiated from either of the two- the 
rulers or the ruled. The failure of the neo-patrimonial’s approach to recognise that influences can 
emanate from the ruled reduces them to a passive mass of victims of ethnic voting. During 
elections this erroneous view suggests that patrimonial societies are full of hungry individuals 
ready to be swayed in any direction by rulers.  Considering the influences of ethnicity on voting 
from an individual perspective reduces elections to the struggles for spoils within the elite, while 
the shared values and ideals, visions and passions that have fuelled broadly based political life like 
nationalism and others which condemn the use of ethnicity in elections are rendered ineffective in 
influencing voting. In this way the neo-patrimonial school reduces the political community to 
narrow elite with greed and predation who can politicise ethnicity to access public resources.  
Basing on the critiques of the neo-patrimonial school in explaining influence of ethnicity made 
above it is only logical that we look into other theories that attempt to fill the gaps identified. In 
this regard, I turn to the Hybrid regime approach.   
3.4.3. Hybrid Regimes Theory, Ethnicity and Voting 
The concept of hybrid regimes is derived from the characteristic features of most regimes in Africa 
and other third world countries after undergoing transition towards liberal democracy in general 
and multiparty politics in particular (Diamond, 2006). At its core, the transition is considered 
incomplete as features of despotic monolithic dispensations like unlevel political playing fields for 
political parties and controlled watchdog institutions just to mention few are retained within 
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pluralistic reforms. As a result states that have these characteristics are branded hybrid, semi-
democracies, or electoral authoritarians (Schedler, 2006, 2002; Diamond, 2008 and 2002; 
Levistisky and Way, 2002). The hybrid approach poses an opposition to the neo-patrimonial 
school in the analysis of the influence of ethnicity in elections. Whereas the neo-patrimonial view 
is preoccupied with the failure of the state to institutionalise LRIs in Africa and assign that failure 
to the use of ethnicity to inform voting, the hybrid underpins how African states have redesigned 
Eurocentric LRIs to conform to local political practices including the use of ethnicity in voting, 
hence creating a genuinely indigenous state (Diamond, 2006). The hybrid regime view is 
concomitant to arguments supporting the rationality of African states resorting to ethnic loyalties 
in mobilising electoral support as a reaction to the abortive efforts towards institutionalisation of 
modern LRIs (Bayart, 1989). To this school, patronage systems and the use of ethnicity in 
anchoring votes are regarded as a response to neo-patrimonial modernisation that has brought 
increased insecurity and few benefits to the bulk of the population as it favours few who are in 
good pages of the strongmen (Bayart 2009; Bogaards, 2009; Lonsdale, 1994).  
The rise of modern statehood in societies traditionally governed by patronage envisioned by the 
hybrid school suggests a “hybrid” political culture in which the public legal-rational institutions of 
‘modern’ governance exist alongside cultural practices of indigenous “traditional” governance 
(Vida, 2010; Bogaards, 2009). As such the use of ethnicity in mobilising electoral support survives 
amid the legal ration institutions and therefore these institutions do not necessarily ensure lower 
salience of ethnicity. According to the hybrid theorists the use of either modern or traditional 
elements rests with the rulers interests’ and calculated benefits (Whitehead, 2002). That is to say, 
when ethnicity works in mobilising electoral support, it could be used to influence voters. In 
circumstances where it cannot other clientelistic and corruptive means are preferred. However, it is 
worth noting that even the clientelistic and corruptive acts could influence the use of ethnicity in 
elections as politicians benefitting and not benefitting from the corrupt transaction could resort to 
ethnic support to maintain the benefits or access them for those who have not (Bratton and Mattes, 
2009).  
The patronage nature of the hybrid regimes operating in an environment where formal and 
informal institutions coexist in ways that are not complementary, belittle the role of formal 
institutions that denounce the use of ethnicity in voting (Uslaner, 2008). This is because they are 
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often perceived as biased/unfair (Hyden, 2006). As a result, informal personalised traditional 
primordial like the use of ethnicity become essential in providing guidance on voting (Bratton and 
Mattes, 2009).  
The explanations of the hybrid regime provided above differs from the neo-patrimonial in terms of 
explaining why ethnicity has or can be resorted to determine voters’ choices. However, it retains 
the essentialist and biased nature widely discussed in the neo-patrimonial literature. It regards 
African traditions as the base of malpractices and primordial developments occurring in African 
states. While it provides room for the politicians not to use ethnicity in politics because the 
notables can use state power to manipulate LRIs and exercise corruption to wield power, it does 
not completely disentangle the role of ethnicity in elections as a way of effecting the use and/or 
monopoly of power and influencing voters’ choices. A question that is relevant with regard to the 
hybrid thesis on ethnicity and voting is the fact that there are countries like Tanzania where 
ethnicity has not been salient despite the presence of many ethnic groups and having all features of 
the hybrid system. Also, the exercise of politics in the broader spectrum has not been overtly 
organised in a manner that suggests a significant role of the notables in putting into power 
candidates through bending legal-rational rules (Nyaluke, 2013). These facts tempt me to think that 
explaining the role of ethnicity through this approach, as it is the case for the neo-patrimonial 
school, to be insufficient as it leaves a lot to be desired.  
In light of the doubts casted on the above theoretical underpinnings- neo-patrimonial and hybrid 
regime theories- in explaining the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices, this 
dissertation provides a counterexplanation.  The proposed framework informed by privileged 
informants interviewed in this study argues that a regime with high level of legitimacy gained 
through a frame informed by the PsIM has the potential of informing the significance of ethnicity 
on determining voting. This is chiefly because the frame creates a political culture away from 
divisive politics. From this viewpoint, the frame is viewed to be strong enough to sustain varied 
political and economic reforms which might occur overtime as well as the menu of manipulation 
that the hybrid regime theory suggests African states’ incumbents employ like mobilising ethnic 
support to amass electoral support and holding on to power. The proposed framework as opposed 
to the previous ones, explains the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices from a 
sociocultural and historical viewpoint. As a starting point it divulges the historical genesis of the 
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relationship between the independence movement’s ideology during the independence struggles as 
informed by the colonial deeds and misdeeds to determine the role of ethnicity on informing 
voters’ choices. It goes on to analyse the aspirations of Africans as a political community at 
independence in relation to ethnicity and voting over time. 
3.4.4. PsIM’s Legacy, Ethnicity and Voting  
The independence movements in Africa that were born to fight undemocratic, divisive and 
exploitative colonial regimes have in essence promised the African people all that colonialism had 
denied them. It is imperative to highlight albeit in a nutshell that colonialism is a policy or practice 
of acquiring full or partial political control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and 
exploiting it economically and ruling it undemocratically (Illife, 1979). Broadly speaking, the 
independence fighters promised Africans that independent African states will be politically 
democratic and just, economically developmental in nature and as welfarist as possible, and 
socially united and peaceful. These PsIM form the epitome of the ideology of the independence 
movement which meant to emancipate the colonised from the ills of colonialism and restore the 
dignity, freedom and economic welfare of the colonised (Young, 1982). It is worth noting that 
colonialists divided and manipulated ethnic groups through divide and rule policies and never held 
elections until few years before granting independence to African states including Tanzania. The 
colonialists also exploited the economies of the colonised countries through colonial economic 
policies which meant to export the riches of the colonised to their homeland and benefit the white 
and Asian traders operating within the colonies. Internally, the colonialists’ thirst of raw materials 
called for disproportionate distribution of infrasture in favour of strategic raw material producing 
areas. 
For instance in colonial Tanzania uneven regional development was evident in the infrastructure. 
This is essentially because the infrastructure was developed to support export crop production from 
the areas of production to the main exporting point, Dar es Salaam (Harnevik et al. 1988). Such 
distribution of resources evokes distant feelings of favouritism levelled against highly developed 
commercial agricultural regions like Kilimanjaro, Kagera, Mwanza and Mbeya and the 
pronounced ethnic groups of the Chagga, Haya, Sukuma and Nyakyusa found within the regions 
respectively (Jerman, 1997). Such feelings present a potential for regional and/or ethnic conflicts 
among the “developed” and “less developed” regions which could manifest on voting during 
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elections. However, this has not been experienced in Tanzania (Nyang’oro, 2004). According to 
Nyang’oro this is mainly because the advantaged regions were simply a victim of the colonial 
state’s infrastructural support meant to exploit their raw materials, therefore making the 
colonialists the centre of the blame. This suggests that the disproportionate economic statuses of 
regions could not gain political impetus to forge competing ethnic camps for mobilising votes 
when competitive elections started. Instead, it created a base for the organisation of a broadly 
based multi-ethnic group of the less privileged to demand for reversal of the exploitative colonial 
rule which went on to guide the organisation of politics. 
All said above indicate that the challenge for post-colonial Africa was to gain legitimacy to reverse 
divisive distribution of resources. As Cliffe (1969:243) put it, the development question that they 
had to answer was whether the development efforts would be for all inclusive or something 
confined to a small section of the nation. The question was critical because notable concerns of 
nepotism and lack of tangible economic development delegitimised African regimes and led to the 
intensification of ethnic political competition and, in some cases, to demands of secession of whole 
sections of communities from African nation states (Nyaluke, 2013). With the challenges enlisted 
above African leaders had to ask themselves how and by what means they would address the 
development concerns. Most African states though in different names and styles argued for and 
adopted socialism (Tanzania’s version was called Ujamaa) and monist political dispensations to 
record democracy and justice, EDNR and national unity - ingredients of the PsIM (Idahosa, 2004).  
Informed by the colonialists’ divisive and exploitative acts, most African states in the early days of 
independence as indicated in section 1.1 and specifically elaborated on in footnote 7, interpreted 
the broad PsIM into concrete socialist ideological and policy blueprints (Burgess, 2004). This was 
indeed significant because the legitimacy of the newly independent states and their leaders was 
predicated on delivering the PsIM as informed by the ideology of the independence movements 
(Young, 1982). Tanzania took six years after independence to produce a statement of socialist 
economic and political policy that set out a vision defining the focus, means and goal of 
development. This statement was contained in the AD of 1967 that is the blueprint of Tanzania’s 
Ujamaa. The six years before the AD gave the public concrete experience of economic self-
governance that would influence the choice of policy direction. 
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According to TANU (1967:1-2) the AD reiterated the economic and political promises of TANU 
dating back to its foundation in 1954, which were: 
 Ensuring that Tanzania’s resources are mobilised to eliminate poverty, ignorance 
and diseases; 
 To see that the government actively assists in the formation and maintenance of 
cooperative organisations; 
 Making government participate directly in the economic development if and when  
need be; 
 Ensuring individual’s right to receive just returns for their labour; 
 That the government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, 
discrimination, bribery and corruption;  and 
 To see that the government exercises effective control over the principal means of 
production and pursues policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of 
the resources of this country 
 
The content and tone of these objectives that formed the preamble of the AD arguably linked the 
aims of PsIM to the socialist policy of 1967. The AD included two important elements for building 
and maintaining a united political and equitable economic community. Firstly it asserted a 
commitment to national building by denouncing all divisive elements and avowing equality 
through a policy against economic exploitation. It also promulgated a leadership code that 
unequivocally prohibited leaders from engaging in business and using their positions to enrich 
themselves. At its core, the AD aimed at establishing a classless society. Arguably, the goals to 
achieve equality and the classless society without exploitation put forward in the AD and the 
commitment of the Tanzania leadership to implementing this gave the regime a coherent common 
purpose (Nyerere, 1968; Msekwa, 1979). Needless to say that the ethical contrast with the colonial 
ideology of reputedly civilised European empires could be a source of pride for Tanzanians, hence 
a motivational basis for their voting behaviour. Our qualitative research in chapter 5 will explore 
further.  
 
Tanzania’s commitment to a policy of equality limited conflicts bound to go sky-high when 
economic benefits were seen to reach only, or mostly, certain sections or areas (Miguel, 2004). 
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Through this policy then, the regime in Tanzania recreated unity cultivated in the struggle for 
independence. The leadership code that was part of the AD according to Msekwa (1979) 
contributed to enhance legitimacy of the regime in Tanzania and ensured a greater degree of 
equality. From the economic viewpoint, the leadership code formally demarcated and separated the 
public sphere and the private sphere. It made clear that as servants of the public sphere, political 
leaders could not continue to serve nor have economic interests in the private sphere. The problem 
of merging political and economic interests among politicians in current politics of Tanzania is 
well described by Kilimwiko (2012) as merchant politics, branding the development as a mockery 
of multi-party politics.  
 
The Leadership code
32
 in the AD specifically stipulated that: 
 Party or government leaders must be either a peasant or a worker, and should be in no way 
associated with the practices of capitalism and /or feudalism; 
 No leader should hold shares in any company; 
 No leader should hold directorship in any privately owned enterprises;  
 No leader should receive two or more salaries; and 
 No leader should own houses that he/she rents to others.  
 
This clear stipulation by the Tanzanian leadership of a code of conduct for leaders is important to 
this dissertation. This is because engagement of the leadership in the private economic sphere has 
often been the cause of conflict of interests, corruption and neo-patrimonial practices. How these 
practices happen and how they feature in African politics has been elaborated thoroughly in neo-
patrimonial literature (Lemarchand, 1972, Clapham, 1985, Bayart, 1993, Bratton and Van de 
Walle, 1997). In Tanzania, implementation of the leadership code was complemented by the state-
controlled economy (Lipumba, 1989). The controlled nature of the economy meant that not only 
that leaders were prohibited by the code from engaging in business but also that—given the 
smallness of the private sector—the leadership could not abuse their powers in its favour nor 
engage in it themselves (Nyaluke, 2013). In other words, the economic structure after the AD, 
presented few incentives for leaders to serve competing entrepreneurs from the private sector. In 
the same vein, the government’s commitment to expansion of the public sector and its promotion 
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 For thorough understanding of the leadership code see part five of the the AD in TANU (1967: pp 19-20) 
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of public, collective and cooperative practices, there were very few private entrepreneurs.  This 
overt separation of the private sphere and the public sphere curtailed businessmen from engaging 
in politics and seeking political office or political leadership positions (Ngowi, 2009: 263). This 
way, the statist economic system and the leadership code served to minimise abuse of leadership 
positions to implement neo-patrimonial practices that benefit leaders and influence politics. 
Inferably, the possibility of leaders having muscles for practicing the ethnic-based politics of 
affection was minimised by the leadership code. 
 
It is worth noting that the leadership code was seriously regarded as a deterrent to merchant 
politics. Leaders were given a year to choose to continue in their positions—in which case they 
had to adhere to a new code or resign (Bennett, 1969:84). In the same spirit, in the nationalisation 
of the economy that will be discussed below, several real estate properties of leaders were 
nationalised by the government through the 1971 Acquisition of Building Act geared at barring 
such endeavours seen as exploitative and a cause of land speculation and scramble (Fimbo, 1974). 
As such, nationalisation and leadership dealt a ´devastating blow´ to commercial and petty 
bourgeoisie interests that could widen economic gaps in the Tanzanian society (1974:252). The 
leadership code and the egalitarian policies of Arusha continued to monitor and deter leaders from 
engaging in private economic activities until it was officially modified by the Zanzibar resolution 
of 1992. This resolution allowed leaders to engage in economic activities for income generation 
(Mwiru, 2013). The resolution is associated with the widening economic gaps between leaders and 
the people, as well as growth of political corruption in Tanzania (Kilimwiko, 2012). 
The choice of socialist policies can be well understood from a broad ideological as well as a 
contextual position. Given the bi-polar
33
 international system in which post-independence states 
operated, African leaders faced a situation in which they could choose a variety of policies for their 
countries (Cartright, 1989: 1-2; Moshi, 1992: 60). With regard to the socio-economic domain, 
choices revolved between capitalist or socialism-oriented strategies. Socialist strategies were seen 
reasonable for regimes seeking to maintain popular support and the engagement of the entire 
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 Bi-polar international system refers to an international order organised around two superpowers with distinct 
competitive ideological orientations. The leaders of the opposing superpowers rally support from other states 
worldwide to enhance its power in domestic and international affairs in order to outpower its compitator in the global 
economic and political realm. At the time of reference the superpowers were United States of America which led a 
capitalist camp and USSR which led the socialist camp.  
89 
 
population in the economic system in a way that reflected the struggle for independence. While 
African leaders regarded the choice of socialism as an official ideology and policy rational, 
opposors contended that socialism was damaging for economic growth and development 
(Meredith, 2005). This debate has dominated the literature on development under socialism. Most 
criticism of socialist economic policies have failed to factor in —or simply ignored—the political 
logic that motivated Tanzania and perhaps other African states in adopting socialist, rather than 
liberal economic policies (Nyaluke, 2013). This overlooked feature cannot be dissociated from 
capitalism’s inability to nationally mobilise development to the majority of the population. An 
objective of this thesis, as reflected in its theory and methodology, is precisely to prevent this 
capitalist assumption of self-interest forming the final explanation of choices.  
As noted by Moshi (1992), the capitalism-oriented policies that Tanzania practised for the first six 
years of independence after independence could not guarantee broadly based development. This is 
because of capitalism’s dependency on capital and capitalists among the population, which means 
economic incentives, were given to those who had capital. Richer regions were spoiled with 
services in the hope that the economic benefits of their activities would trickle down to all citizens. 
In the agricultural sector, this meant focusing on areas which were endowed with favourable 
climatic conditions that ensure higher yields (Moshi 1992:62). In the period during which capitalist 
economic policy was implemented, scholars have reported that a majority of the people in rural 
and urban areas became disillusioned with the prospect of economic improvement while sections 
of the elite and those with capital in the private sector became richer, the position of the majority 
of the population did not improve (Cliffe 1969: 242; Coulson, 1982: 180-182). Although the 
government had followed capitalist economic policies and set a favourable environment for 
investment, the economy did not grow as expected. As such, the capitalist policy informed the 
post-independence regime to mobilise the population within an “inegalitarian” economic system, 
which was against the PsIM.  
 
For the majority of the Tanzanians such situation meant diminishing hope and enthusiasm after the 
successful struggle for independence. It is in light of this background that the AD was announced 
as a panacea to the ideological and practical problems that the Tanzanian economy and 
development endeavour faced at the time.  
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Another interesting point in the debate about the choice of socialist policy in Tanzania is 
international. This is because foreign direct investment which was seen as central to economic 
development was not forthcoming (Mtatifikolo, 2002:226). As if that was not enough, Tanzania’s 
development aid expectations in the 1960s were not met, and two of its main aid supporters, West 
Germany and United Kingdom, broke diplomatic relations
34
 with Tanzania (Coulson, 1982). Such 
shortage gave impetus to looking for alternative development financing from the socialist states 
like China and Russia which were leading the socialist bloc. In light of the ideologically 
competitive bi-polar international system, China and Russia alternatively contributed towards 
Tanzania’s socialist orientation (Nyaluke, 2013). In light of the shortfall of capitalism presented 
above Tanzania’s rejection of capitalism was because of its inconsistence with the ideology of 
PsIM. As such, the socialist choice in Tanzania was informed by its compatibility with the PsIM 
and as an alternative to the capitalist economic policy it pursued for the first six years after 
independence (Yeager, 1989; Moshi, 1992).   
 
Another strand of literature associates the rationale for adoption of socialism and monopartism to 
African political thought. To this school, the rationale for adoption of the single-party political 
systems immediately after independence was that the institutional set-up and the form of 
democracy that the one-party state provides resemble the African tradition of democracy (Fisher, 
2003). The African democracy used to bring all people in a particular community together to 
discuss matters until they reach an agreement broadly binding on the members of the community 
in question (Ake, 2000). As such, African leaders wanted to give impetus to nation-building 
processes. The processes meant to cement unity among people amalgamated within states 
characterised by arbitrary boundaries that lack historical roots (Chachage, 1998; Makulilo, 2009).  
Arguing along the same line but beyond Ake, Nyerere (1967) contended that African societies 
such as Tanganyika at independence were not class-based societies and, therefore, never needed 
many parties to represent people’s interests, which are the cocnerns of a classless society. To him, 
multi-party democracy was relevant to the class-prone societies of Europe where varied parties 
represent various classes. However, apart from the class analogy, it is imperative to note that the 
one-party state was deemed appropriate for Africa as it would also avoid political opposition and 
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ethnic polarisation architectured by the colonialists which did not serve the key aims of PsIM as 
highlighted above (Ake, 2000). In Tanzania, as it is thoroughly discussed in section 4.4.1.1, the 
monolithic order apart from legally allowing one party also incorporated all social and political 
organs into the party including government organs, the mass media, CSOs and even the militia. 
Such incorporation limited space for competing viewpoints and the room for airing dissents 
(Makulilo, 2012; Chaligha et al. 2001). In sum, the adoption of single- party political systems in 
Africa was premised on cementing inclusion, unity and solidarity of the people in political affairs.  
The unity envisaged to be furthered by the monist political order, inferably, suggests that ethnic-
based political canvassing and voting was discouraged as they go against the nationalist character 
of the PsIM.  
 
The choice of socialism equally stems from the same logic. While mono-partism was equated to 
African democracy, socialism was regarded as a socio-economic system that is similar to 
communalism which was practised in most African traditional societies. In communalism, the 
major means of production, land, was communally owned and people jointly tilled it to meet 
family and community needs. The objective of Ujamaa in Tanzania vividly exemplifies the 
communal nature of African socialism as it aimed at building a society in which every member is 
accorded equal rights and equal opportunities; in which all members live in peace with their 
neighbours without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all 
members have a basic level of material welfare before anyone lives in luxury (Nyerere 1968: 340). 
Since the Tanzanian society is predominantly rural, Ujamaa’s focus could not escape a rural 
development component. In this regard, Tanzania embarked on a massive villagisation programme 
popularly known as villagisation operation (Operesheni vijiji).The operation created thousands of 
villages in which 60% of the population was relocated to form the Ujamaa villages (Wangwe, 
2005). The reallocation exercise was mainly through encouraging people to settle in the Ujamaa 
villages. However, in some instances people were forced to live and work on a co-operative basis 
in the organised villages (Hyden, 1980). The Ujamaa villagisation and its associated agriculture 
communalisation project in Tanzania are discussed in the next chapter in sections 4.4.1.4. From the 
economic viewpoint socialism was deemed desirable for fulfilling the independence promise 
because it was meant to restrict differential acquisition of wealth and shun attendant divisions and 
conflicts, which could follow growing inequality. This was an important factor as socio-economic 
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conflicts were not only considered undesirable but also incompatible with the unity and 
development PsIM.  
The argument for socialism went beyond its resemblance to communalism. Nyerere (1974) 
considered socialism a rational choice due to the smallness of the capitalist class in African 
countries at independence. To him, state intervention in the economic sphere which socialism 
permits was central for hastening development. Such intervention was deemed significant because 
socialism promised Africans to reverse the exploitative and unequal distribution of opportunities 
and prosperity which characterised the colonial regime (Burgess 2004). It can be argued that the 
choice of socialism meant to form egalitarian nations in Africa that could discourage economic 
differences. The choice aimed at avoiding economic disparities that once politicised can fuel 
competitive political rivalry within and among societies. Inferably, because ethnic groups are 
within the society and are as indicated above capable of forming the formidable base for the 
practice of the politics of affection and forging MWCs, it is not irrelevant to argue that the fear of 
disunity and endangering PsIM can be linked to them. That is to say, the haves in a non-socialist 
economy could make use of ethnicity to gain political power and further their economic wellbeing. 
The opposite can also be said for the have-nots who can mobilise to reverse their economic 
backwardness by mobilising political support for acquiring state power ethnically.   
The Leadership elites in Africa adopted single-party political systems and socialism to meet the 
challenge of bringing about democracy, development and national unity as the PsIM required, 
arguably, with little or no opposition (Burgess. 2004). Only few cases like Angola and 
Mozambique can be picked to point to the fact that adoption of socialism in a bipolar international 
system, whereby each pole is identified with supporting the warring factions (the Western bloc 
supporting the rebels, and the Eastern the socialist ruling elites), came to be a source of protracted 
conflict between the ruling elite and the opposition (Hawkins, 2013; Leão, 2007). However, 
broadly speaking, adoption of one-party political systems by the African leadership was an attempt 
to establish ideological and institutional means by which they could achieve the PsIM and 
legitimise their rule to the people. Subsequently, divisive means of organising the society and 
soliciting political support like ethnicity can be minimised.  
A critical look at the PsIM suggests that African politics is informed by African culture, values and 
ideals just as the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theories suggested. However, the current school 
93 
 
differs from the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools on the cultures picked to be followed. While 
the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools unreasonably assume that African states and their people 
after independence settled for the guidance by the most negative aspects of their culture 
(permitting personal and particularistic tendencies including the use of ethnicity to garner electoral 
support), the PsIM subscribes to the best, as highlighted by Pitcher et al. (2009) above which 
among others denounce the use of ethnicity in elections. Based on the African culture supported by 
the independence movement and experience of colonialism, Tanzanians forged and articulated 
visions, ideals, and hopes for the new independent nation-state that anchored people’s 
expectations. These shared visions, ideals and values embedded in the PsIM as highlighted above 
have to be evaluated by the ideals and the performance of the state and its leaders at post-
independence. Thus the accountability aspect of the PsIM based on the expectations from the 
people for their leaders to implement the PsIM is expected to shape the political imaginary and 
thus the frame of practising politics. This frame among other things discourages the influence of 
ethnicity in political canvassing and voting. Below let us have a look at frames and their 
application in ethnicity and voting in Tanzania.  
3.4.5. Frames Analysis and its Application to Ethnicity and Voting in Tanzania  
Frames are a set of concepts and theoretical perspectives on how individuals, groups, and societies 
organise, perceive, and communicate about a particular social reality (Benford, 1997). Frames are 
socially constructed, structured and institutionalised. These constructs are often amplified by the 
mass media and mass movements in the political or social arenas, politicians, or societal actors and 
organisations (Chong and Druckman, 2007). In social theory, frames are geared as 
schemes of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and stereotypes, that individual rely on to 
understand and respond to events (Butler, 2009). In other words, people build a series of mental 
filters through which they make sense of the world (Chong and Druckman, 2007). The sense made, 
and the subsequent choices individuals make are influenced by their creation of a frame. Since 
individual filters are influenced by mass media, politicians or other societal agencies, it follows 
that social interaction among humans and groups are a function of varied agencies’ ability to orient 
individuals. Cognisant of the fact that there are numerous agencies in societies different influences 
and issues compete within a social world. Therefore, meticulous framing techniques are central to 
ensuring the dominance of a particular frame (Santamaria, 2004). Smart framing reduces the 
ambiguity of intangible topics by contextualising the information in a way the recipient can 
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connect to what they already know and enhance their commitment and believe in a particular 
frame (Tudor, 2007).  
Conflict management in Sukuma-speaking communities, for instance, is dominated by a play on 
frames of crisis (such as bulogi, witchcraft) and remedy (such as kupoja, cooling), according to 
Stroeken (2012), in which peasant intellectuals and local healers (bafumu) are well versed, 
regularly innovating their terminology and discourse, or their diagnostic tools and recipes, in 
function of current social processes such as modernisation, liberalisation and globalisation. These 
frames are produced and draw on the cultural imaginary, which has a long history with colonial 
continuities, but is much informed by global media, as in the youthful ‘imagined futures’ studied 
by Brad Weiss (2002) in Arusha’s barber shops and among hip hop fans. In this thesis, however, 
we will limit our delving into the (political) imaginary and stick to the concept of frames, which is 
most instrumental in understanding the ideas communicated and reproduced at a national level.   
In conflict framing theory which is relevant to among others questions of peace, ethnicity and 
voting that are at centre of this dissertation, parties to a particular conflict use frames to understand 
why a conflict exists, what important actions are to be made by the parties to the conflict, why the 
parties act as they do, and how each party should respond to the acts of the other party (Tudor, 
2007). Contextualising this to ethnicity and voting, competing ethnic groups use frames to 
understand why there is a contestation between the ethnicities for political positions, what voting 
choices should be made by members of the groups in contestation, why they vote the way do, and 
how members of each ethnic group should respond to the voting decision made by their 
counterpart. The dictates of the conflict framing theory suggest that frames can exacerbate and 
discourage ethnic voting, divisiveness and misunderstandings. Frames aggravate ethnic voting, 
divisiveness and disputes by allowing parties to a particular conflict to limit information intake, 
filtering and categorising it according to their pre-existing conflictual identities and values 
(Kaufman et al. 2003). Frames perform the opposite and provide a pacifying effect when 
interpretations are informed by an inclusive, peace-oriented national frame. Such frame serves to 
limit violent behaviour and filter out divisive ethnic influences in voting within a particular polity 
(Kaufman et al. 2003). The KIs forcefully argued that the ideology of independence movement 
embedded in its values and ideals a frame informing African people’s resistance to dictatorial, 
exploitative, divisive and uncaring post-independence regimes and all elements which according to 
95 
 
the partimonialists depict personal and particularistic tendencies including the use of ethnicity in 
garnering political  support in elections. This transcended the post-independence era and was also 
supported by most of the interviewees in this study. Tanzania provides an excellent example of 
how frames can explain ethnicity and politics. 
Tanzania, as argued in the introductory section of the dissertation, is an African state which is 
ethnically diverse with 120 ethnic groups. The state shares colonial history with other African 
states and the exploitative and divisive manipulations of the colonial masters responsible for 
making most African states susceptible to ethnic salience in politics and its dilapidating effects 
(Rohner et al. 2013; Salawu and Hassan, 2011; Weber, 2009; Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008; Posner 
2007, 2005) However, Tanzania is indeed free from ethnic salience voting (O’Gorman, 2012; 
Phillips, 2010; Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Weber, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2004). This makes it an outlier 
when it comes to analysing the role of ethnicity in elections in Africa which is viewed to be highly 
informed by ethnic polarisation.  The same can be said to issues of peace as Tanzania is relatively 
peaceful compared to other African countries in terms of violent civil or international conflicts. 
Other African states are war-torn despite the fact that they promised their people peacefulness 
(Eiffert et al.2010). Tanzania is relatively peaceful despite the fact that most of the conventional 
theories of conflict suggest that Tanzania “should” be beset by violent conflict (Eiffert et al. 2010; 
Cocodia, 2007). These theories as indicated in a nutshell in the general introduction, suggest that 
conflicts are more likely in heterogeneous countries coupled with socio-economic problems like 
high rate of unemployment and poverty, compared to homogeneous ones with the same 
characteristics (Marshall and Gurr, 2005:52-54). 
Also, Tanzania has diverse religious followers and is one among the poorest countries of the globe, 
with all of the income indicators of poverty (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). It is imperative to stress 
that Tanzania has 23 different ethnic groups that constitute more than 1% of the population, which 
ranks highest in the world in numbers of significantly sized ethnic groups (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003). The structure of Tanzania’s ethnic heterogeneity in the light of the conflict theories 
presupposes that ethnic salience in voting should be high in Tanzania (Bratton et al, 2011). 
However, it is comparatively peaceful in relation to other more developed states in Africa and has 
not been proven to be ethnically salient on determining voters’ choices as highlighted in the 
general introduction and the detailed ethno-political narrative of Tanzania in the next chapter.  
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The comparative low salience of ethnicity and peace that Tanzania enjoys has never made its 
leaders complacent. The Tanzanian state and its leadership in all the four phases
35
 have never got 
tired of accentuating the significance of national unity, peace, just and moral policies. This 
emphasis sometimes was made to the detriment of the state’s ailing economy and other selfish 
cardinal measures of national interest (Lupogo, 2001; Mamdani, 2013b).  Mzee Mwiru well 
summarised this opinion in one of my KIIs. He argued that for all standards: 
“Dhamira ya Tanzania kwa Ujamaa na utekelezaji wa sera zake zinazohusiana na haki na utu na maadili zilikuwa 
zimepewa nafasi kubwa Tanzania ukilinganisha na  mataifa mengine mengi ya kijamaa ya Afrika na zimetupa 
mafanikio makubwa yaliyojionesha dhahiri. Faida kubwa ambayo hakuna mtu wa ndani wala wa nje anayeweza 
kukanusha ni umoja wa kitaifa; na amani na utulivu.” (Mwiru, 14.05.2014). 
 
“Tanzania’s commitment to Ujamaa and implementation of its associated just and moral policies was far beyond 
most other African socialist states and has provided lots of dividends to our country and its people which speak by 
themselves. The major dividends which no one can refute, internally and externally, are national unity; and peace 
and tranquillity.”  
 
The commitment highlighted by Mzee Mwiru and widely shared among scholars has won 
Tanzania a benevolent public image domestically and internationally (Pratt, 1999). The 
implementation of Ujamaa villages’ policy and mandatory national service trainings, making 
Swahili the national language and overt denunciation of ethnicity are but just a few examples of 
nation-building policies that enhanced this image. Internationally, Tanzanians’ role in the frontline 
states and the liberation of all southern African countries all point to the benevolent image 
(Mamdani, 2013a). However, for the study at hand emphasis is on the domestic nation-building 
policy. Pertinent questions are how was it passed to Tanzanian citizens and to what extent did 
Tanzanians reject or embrace it? How has the message effected Tanzanian national identity 
formation, and, in turn, how does the built national identity effect ethnic saliency in voting? 
A shared view of my KIIs who have lived the Tanzanian history hold the view that Tanzania’s 
zealous and well-articulated nation-building policy coined around the PsIM was so convincing not 
to attract massive fellowship among its people. Such position is informed by the fact that nation-
building was so imperative after colonialism and its associated demerits as highlighted in the 
previous subheading. It is against such background that the PsIM informed a shared identity to 
guide their individual relations and political activities particularly the use of ethnicity in mobilising 
                                                 
35
 Tanzania has had four Presidents since its independence. These are Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Alhaj, Ally Hassan 
Mwinyi, Benjamin William Mkapa and the sitting President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete 
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votes during elections. According to Mzee Mkali, another KI, the PsIM were well taught in 
schools, at workplaces, and in the Ujamaa villages to the local people, widely covered on the mass 
media and in the political circles (Mkali, 10.3.2014). To Mzee Mkali the nation-building policy’s 
outright denunciation of divisive tendencies and perpetuation of inclusive nation-building rhetoric 
is responsible for the creation of a strong national identity that helps to explain the low level of 
ethnic saliency in politics and subsequently limited ethnic voting. In other words, the strong 
national identity inculcated among Tanzanians forms a frame through which Tanzanians view 
politics and society (Mkali, 10.3.2014).    
Before expounding on Mzee Mkali’s views on the nationalistic frame it is imperative to say a word 
or two on the role of the media in the propagation of the frame in question. This is because the 
centrality of the media in popularising is essential as argued above. It is worth noting that the 
media policy in post-independent Tanzania was preoccupied with issues of nation integration and 
promotion of the socialism and self-reliance development agenda (Kilimwiko, 2009; Rioba, 2008, 
Mfumbusa, 2006, 2002; Hyden and Okigbo, 2002, Sturmer and Rioba, 2000; Kasoma, 2000). The 
presidential charter of 1970, which in the view of Mfumbusa 2002 was the de facto information 
policy in place until the early 1990s assigned the mass media the role of supporting the state’s 
socialist policy-Ujamaa. To advance the political-ideological role in development, the mass media 
was ideologically indoctrinated, nationalised and co-opted by the state. It is against this backdrop 
that Nordenstreng and Ng’wanakilala (1987) argue that the ruling parties in the country TANU 
from 1961 to 1977 and later CCM from 1977 to-date attempted to turn pressmen into devoted 
advocates of the socialist ideology and its associated unification effects. Since the rulers of the day 
were against the use of divisive elements in politics and ethnicity in amassing votes the media 
projected such view. An interesting view of the working of the media in the early days of 
independence and throughout the monolithic political order given by an extended quote from 
Kilimwiko is useful to summarise how the media helped in propagating the nationalist frame in 
Tanzania. 
"Unajua vyombo vya habari vya umma wakati wa chama kimoja vilikuwa na sera ya kupanga habari kwa 
kuzingatia au tunachoita kwa katika tasnia ya habari line-up. The line-up dictates that the leading news regardless 
of the value of the event should be of the President, ikifuatiwa na habari ya Makamu wa Rais, Katibu Mkuu wa 
CCM, Mabalozi kama anakutana na Mkuu wa nchi and lastly rounding up with police news from Regional Police 
Commanders. Kwa njia hii hadithi kutoka maeneo ya vijijini inaweza tu kufanya habari ikiwa seismic! Yaani pawe 
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na tetemeko la ardhi au mafuriko ndio habari hiyo itapewa nafasi. Hali hii inafanya vyombo vya habari kuwa 
mnyororo wa kutoa taarifa zitokazo juu (Kwa viongozi wa juu) kuelekea chini (kwa wananchi) na si vinginevyo. 
Kwa muktadha huu, vyombo vya habari vikawa sehemu ya vyombo vya utawala vinavyoeneza maslahi ya serikali 
na kutia hofu pale inapobidi ili kuhakikisha wananchi wanatii sera ya serikali badala ya kuwa chombo cha 
mawasiliano. Kwa maneno mengine, vyombo vya habari vinakuwa kinywa cha serikali au kipaza sauti cha 
watawala, na walinzi wa maslahi yao ambayo yalilenga kwa dhati kutimiza ahadi za wapigania uhuru" (Kilimwiko, 
2014/11/03). 
“You know the public media outlets during single party rule had a policy of ranking news by personality or what in 
journalism is called line-up. The line-up dictates that the leading news regardless of the value of the event should 
be of the President, followed by his Vice President, the Secretary General of CCM, an Ambassador if he/she meets 
a top leader and lastly rounding up with police news from Regional Police Commanders. In this way a story from 
the rural areas can only make news if it is seismic. That is if an earthquake or floods take place. Such scenarios 
made the media conveyer belt providing information from the top (the top leaders) to the bottom (citizens) and not 
the other way round. As such, the media outlets became mostly administrative machineries furthering state 
interests and instilling fear were necessary to ensure loyalty to state policy instead of being a medium of 
communication. In other words, the media becomes nothing but a mouth piece or loudspeaker of the ruling elites 
and their interests which forcefully championed the promises of independence.”  
 
Kilimwiko’s views succinctly establish the role played by the media for the leadership in Tanzania. 
In essence, the media has been projecting and disseminating what the political leadership wished to 
hear and achieve. No alternative view was given room and, therefore, the PsIM won massive space 
on media products. If this could as well have led to opposition in the rural areas against the PsIM, 
it is imperative to note that during the single party regime all major media outlets were either 
owned by the state or the ruling party led by the head of state (Rioba, 2008). Furthermore, heads of 
these media outlets were appointed by the President and the party formed a special committee to 
supervise the functions of the media. The committee was led by a chair who was a member of the 
party's National Executive Committee (Kilimwiko, 2009). Thus Kilimwiko in an interview told me 
that: "the heads received direct orders from the president and his party, to reprint what they have 
been directed without questioning the authenticity of what they were required to write." Indeed, 
what is projected could hardly be against the interests of and policies spearheaded by the ruling 
class, which happened to be achieving the PsIM that among other things meant denouncing the use 
of ethnicity in anchoring votes. 
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Expounding on Mzee Mkali’s view on the frame that navigated Tanzania away from ethnic voting, 
Mzee Mwiru argues that all states in one way or the other are characterised by divisions and 
conflicts which might be ethnic, racial, religious, class etc; and they are addressed differently in 
different states according to a political culture developed in the particular state. According to him 
in some states, disputes are treated on their individual merits, while in others, they are politicised 
and turn out to be the ground or pretext for major societal divisions and sometimes violent conflict. 
Tanzania in the view of Mzee Mwiru has been able to create a pacifying frame that is linked with 
limiting ethnic salience in politics including downplaying the role of ethnicity on anchoring voters’ 
choices and interethnic conflicts because of its nationally inclusive character. However, Mzee 
Mwiru warns that the frame does not preclude the complete use of ethnicity in elections or flashes 
of violence, but it moderates its likelihood by influencing how people view the possibility and 
outcome of organising politics around ethnic grounds (Mwiru, 14.05.2014). In this context, the 
frame determines political ethics, creates a menu of acceptable or unacceptable responses to the 
running of political activities including campaigning for office. Therefore, it can be argued that 
Tanzanians’ resistance to mobilising political support in elections along ethnic lines – one of the 
driving forces of ethnic polarisation and interethnic conflicts in most of its neighbours – is, by and 
large, a result of ethnicity’s lack of legitimacy as a political organising mechanism within the 
Tanzanian national frame. The mutually reinforcing nature of peace and national identity is an 
important factor in the strength and persistence of Tanzania’s culture of subdued ethnicity in 
electoral politics. 
Since “political culture”36 does not crop up overnight. Instead, it is built and toughened over 
decades, involving contingent factors, this dissertation subscribes to the view that national values, 
institutions and practices that set a country away from ethnic salience in voting are consciously 
drawn from a nation’s do and don’t-s. It is against this backdrop that we employ the model of path 
dependence that argues that antecedent historical conditions make certain policy decisions more 
likely than others. From this background, the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices 
could be attributed to the path set by pre-existing political, social and economic situations 
(Schwartz, 2003; Greener, 2002; Pierson, 2000). In the Tanzanian context the pre-existing 
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 Political culture is like the ‘political imaginary’ mentioned earlier, a particular pattern of orientations to political 
action. It is a set of values, beliefs, emotions and viewpoints of people about the political system of their state. 
Normally the term is applied to explain distinctions in the way citizens of different states react to similar political 
stimuli. This is the case although political culture is not entirely uniform in any country.                                                                       
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conditions are embedded in the country’s historical realities that chiefly revolve around reversing 
the evils of colonialism through the implementation of PsIM - PNU, EDNR and peace; as 
originated by socialist socio-economic and political order mainly articulated in the AD of 1967 and 
sustained impacts. It is in the logic of such (national) frame, reproduced across generations, that 
some paths (political ideas and choices) become more likely than others at a national level. 
The AD set out Tanzania’s comprehensive development road map in which the country committed 
itself to following a socialist and self-reliant path as will be further expounded in the fourth chapter 
in sections 4.4.1.4 and 4.4.1.5. The AD was personally written by Mwalimu at first to be published 
in a newspaper but later presented in TANU meetings and got the party’s blessing to be a formal 
party and state policy (Mesaki and Malipula, 2011). The AD is arguably the very first expansively 
documented vision that informed the way Tanzania’s entire socio-economic and political domains 
had to be viewed, planned and achieved (Mwiru, 2013; Shivji, 2013; Ng‘wanza et al. 2009; 
Wangwe, 2005). The AD was informed by African political thoughts and realities that shaped 
Tanzania’s nationalist struggles and post-independence expectations of the people (Nyaluke, 
2013). Basing myself on its significance in informing the country’s socio-economic and political 
fabric as well as its ideological orientation I concur with Kessler (2006) who considers the AD to 
be the country’s main historical antecedent.  
At its core, the AD strived to make Tanzania a self-reliant state with equitable economic 
development among the people through nationalisation of previously privately owned economic 
ventures, enhancing national unity through a monolithic political dispensation as well as ensuring 
peaceful coexistence through respect of human dignity and indiscrimination of all kinds. Taken in 
wholesale the AD meant to provide a truly participatory form of socio-economic and political 
development (Shivji, 2013; Mwiru, 2013; Mesaki and Malipula, 2011; Nyang’oro, 2004). Two key 
famous products of the AD that will be discussed in the context of this study were the Ujamaa 
villages and the nationalisation of the major means of production and distribution, in sections 
4.4.1.4 and 4.4.1.5.  
The AD arguably proved to be the dominant and uncontested vision until the 1980s when 
Tanzania’s ailing economic conditions required some soul searching (Mwiru,2013). At the time in 
question internal and external initiatives to address the economic hardship were sought. Internally 
CCM reviewed its economic policies and the international donors and the IFIs pressurised for 
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implementation of economic and political liberalisation (Mwiru, 2013; Wangwe, 2005). Mwalimu 
being the architect of the AD as he wrote it and channeled it through the party organs for 
endorsement it is only logical for him to be hesitant to agree to foreign-oriented capitalist liberal 
reforms. This position can be supported by the fact that before his death, Mwalimu was asked 
about the continued validity of the AD to which he retorted, “I still travel with it. I read it over and over to 
see what I would change. Maybe I would improve on the Kiswahili that was used but the AD is still valid, I would not 
change a thing” (New Internationalist Magazine issue 309, 1999).  
Earlier, when he stepped down in 1985, Nyerere had declared, "although socialism has failed in Tanzania, 
I will remain a socialist because I believe socialism is the best policy for poor countries like Tanzania" (Mesaki and 
Malipula, 2011). It is against this background that Wangwe suggests he preferred locally made 
structural adjustments that did not temper with the core of the socialist ideology as opposed to the 
donors’ reforms which were capitalist oriented (Wangwe, 2005). However, the homegrown 
adjustments could not work mainly because they lacked donor funding. Therefore Mwalimu’s 
successor who came into power in 1985, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a conceived liberal thinker, in his 
reign swiftly negotiated liberal reform packages with donors (Costello 1996). The liberal reforms 
have failed to reverse the national integration intentions of the AD and its effects.This position is 
argued in the Tanzania’s ethno-political narrative as well as the primary data as indicated in 
Chapter IV and V.   
The path-dependence thesis, which we buy into, holds the view that structures and processes 
inform and reinforce each other in shaping outcomes or choices. Path dependence does not 
necessarily need to be structural or informed by a myriad of forces because when a state reaches a 
“critical juncture,” even a choice of one policy option can set the country on a specific trajectory 
(Mahoney, 2001:9). The adoption of the socialist AD in Tanzania in 1967 was according to my 
KIIs and other interviewees, the state’s critical juncture and its promulgation set the path for the 
conduct of politics including the influence of ethnicity in voting for years to come. This AD 
informed an extensive nation-building policy; invoked numerous socialist economic policies 
chiefly of which were villagisation and nationalisation of the major means of production and 
distribution which were mainly owned by foreigners; EDNR and consolidation of single party rule. 
An amalgamation of these socio-economic and political policies that are in line with the PsIM are 
said to have created a national political culture that set the country on a long-term path of low level 
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of ethnic salience in voting; and domestic peace and stability compared to most of its neighbours 
and fellow African states, some of which have been mentioned in the general introduction. 
According to the path dependence model once these choices are made, states tend to remain on the 
chosen path because values and institutions associated with them become self-perpetuating and 
political elites sustain values and institutions that benefit them (Mahoney, 2000, 2001; Pierson, 
2000). More so, political elites and the organs of governance commit themselves to values and 
institutions they staked their reputation on. Therefore they cannot afford to establish new ones. As 
for citizens, accepted values and institutions are viewed legitimate, and thus they voluntarily opt 
for their reproduction out of the conviction that it is the right thing to do (Mahoney, 2001: 9). A 
classic comparison, in economics, is with production units sticking together out of cost-efficiency 
(also known as the power law) and thus naturally growing into a hub (which may acquire a 
particular outlook or ‘culture’). An illustration directly relevant to our argument is that, in analogy 
with the country Tanzania, the Sukuma who are the dominant ethnic group in study area are 
historically the conglomerate of several ethnic groups that (for whatever cost-benefit advantages 
such as protection and subsistence) gradually blended into a common cultural path, without the 
whole or the parts ever being politicised as such.  
Zeroing in on the path-dependent framework I trace how lack of ethnic salience in voting is 
informed by the divisive and exploitative colonial structures that necessitated a united fight among 
the oppressed during the nationalistic struggles, and later the socialist nation-building policy which 
equitably distributed economic gains and fought discrimination of all kinds. I further look into how 
the past informs the choice of national as opposed to ethnic identities in voting in the present 
liberalisation era. I explicitly speak of depoliticised rather than unpoliticised ethnicity, since the 
latter would imply a lack of process, while I argue the absence of politicised ethnicity to result 
from a process, one that is historical and ongoing. In essence, I am tracing the long-term path of 
national identity responsible for the continued pacifying frame against divisive agendas within the 
contemporary era of liberalised economics and politics in Tanzania, which are characteristically 
different from the pre-liberal political orders. This objective tests the authenticity of Mahoney’s 
contention that “path-dependent structures and institutions endure in the absence of the processes 
that initially led to their establishment” (Mahoney, 2001). In the current study, we analyse the 
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influences of the PsIM in the conduct of Tanzania’s politics in the absence of the TANU thinktank 
and Nyerere’s genius during the last 16 years. 
3.4.6. A Hypothetical Path-Dependent Model Explaining Influences of Ethnicity on 
Determining Voters’ Choices in Tanzania  
As indicated above political culture denotes a particular pattern of orientations to political actions 
that can explain differences in the way citizens of different states react to similar political stimuli. 
On the basis of the discussion above this dissertation assumes that the political culture that 
demonstrates the influence of ethnicity in voting in Tanzania is made in the name of a path-
dependent national pacifying frame. This frame stems from Tanzania’s efforts in building an 
equitable, inclusive, and peaceful nation. The efforts that have been informed by the PsIM were 
well-entrenched in the AD, served as a buffer from ethnic divisions and violence to take root. The 
AD has been the most significant factor contributing to barring the rise of ethnicity into a political 
salient phenomenon on determining voters’ choices due to its insistence on PNU, EDNR and 
peace. 
The genesis of nation-building policies in Tanzania particularly its commitment to peace and unity, 
economic equality, and the pursuit of single party politics can be traced back to the PsIM. 
However, the dissertation picks the AD as the critical juncture (antecedent) in the nation-building 
policy in Tanzania. The choice of the AD as the critical juncture in the nation-building policy is 
predicated on the fact that the AD is a blueprint that committed Tanzania to the implementation of 
a coherent, long-term all-inclusive socialist policy direction for the nation (Shivji, 2013). The AD 
is known as Tanzania's most prominent political statement of African Socialism, Ujamaa, or 
‘familyhood’ (Mesaki and Malipula, 2001). At its core it meant to ensure human dignity, unity, 
EDNR and development as well as ensuring peace and tranquillity (Mwiru, 2013). It was clearly 
against segregation and oppression which according to Wimmer are motivators of politicisation of 
ethnicity if the divisions are ethnic-based. The commitment was not just on paper but in deeds as 
Mzee Mwiru explained above. Indeed, this is very significant particularly in Africa where policy 
promulgation does not necessarily guarantee implementation or translate into concrete policy 
outcomes. Tanzania could follow suit if the early nation-building efforts were not comprehensively 
streamlined into a vision that guided the entire political, social and economic fabric of the 
Tanzanian state and its people as the AD did.  The content of the AD as indicated above was 
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informed by the early nation-building policies that were put into place immediately after 
independence. The AD, therefore, could have firmly committed Tanzania to that path. If this is the 
case after its promulgation and implementation, turning back from the nationalist path to divisive 
ethnic trends in the organisation of politics in general and voting, in particular, should never 
provide an option. And this option should not be assumed to be deemed desirable even after the 
collapse of the AD and institution of liberal democratic market-oriented ethos that contradict the 
very fabric of the AD as will be well discussed in the following chapter. 
In this dissertation, I have differentiated the Ujamaa political culture that is viewed significant to 
explaining the limited influence ethnicity in voting into three broad components. These are 
national identity pride, unity/non-polarisation, and subject political orientation. The social 
component of the AD informed an extensive nation-building policy has shaped/reinforced a strong 
Tanzanian national identity. The identity meant to redress the divisive colonial manipulations of 
divide and rule which have had dilapidating violent effects in African states that failed to address 
them. Economically, the policies enshrined in the AD – villagisation and nationalisation of the 
major means of production and distribution that perpetuated classes in the colonial era – 
contributed to unity and non-polarisation because no ethnic group or any other group identity was 
overtly favoured. Instead, every individual or group worked together collectively for development 
purposes and the nationalised assets formed the base for equitably distributing resources. 
Politically, the AD advocated for a monolithic political dispensation that cocooned all political and 
social forces, comprising political parties, civil society organisation, the media and even the militia 
into one mass national party. That social fact should at the same time be responsible for the 
creation of a passive-subject political orientation
37
 among most Tanzanians. Such political 
orientation in any case limited the airing of dissents and possibilities of competing ideological 
viewpoints from those of the state that were pro PsIM. 
The elements of AD-based Ujamaa political culture were not acting in isolation. These elements 
were complementary and mutually reinforcing. The subject political orientation resulted from legal 
and extra-legal means leaving little public space for ethnic groups and other social forces to 
organise parochially and channel their agenda, therefore helping to suppress ethnic and other 
                                                 
37
 Subject political orientation refers to a passive and /or uncritical political orientation (Kilimwiko, 2012). Citizens 
with such orientation hardly question their political leaders, and beg for their rights instead of claiming them 
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divisive dissent to determine voters’ choices. Such suppression, in turn, contributed to a more 
unified population. The strong national identity has been responsible for making it possible for 
otherwise distinct ethnic and other groups to share common goals, thus reinforcing national unity. 
In the same vein, the unified Tanzanian population that worked collectively on common national 
objectives enshrined in the AD such as self-reliance particularly in agriculture in the villages 
advanced a sense of national pride and collective identity (Nyaluke, 2013). This view is argued in 
more detail in the ethno-political narrative and the PNU related qualitative data constituting 
Chapter IV and Chapter V respectively. 
The sense of national pride informed by the AD-based Ujamaa political culture contributed to the 
love of peace that Tanzania widely boasts compared to its neighbours, and the reinforcing effect of 
peace on this political culture helped to perpetuate this pattern. The subject political orientation 
caused Tanzanians to disapprove of civil conflict. Such disapproval left little support for any form 
of violent or non-violent disruptions including ethnic clashes to abound and disturb the peace. 
Since the Tanzanian state has remained relatively peaceful, social misunderstandings have not 
been able to create competing ethnic or other social groups to upset the subject political orientation 
of most citizens and thus give room for ethnic voting to gain salience. Likewise, unity and non-
polarised population contributed to peace because there were no significant ethnic group divisions 
that could escalate into violence that could perpetuate ethnic voting. This peace contributed to 
national unity because there were less violent conflicts among ethnic groups to divide people and 
inform ethnic voting. National identity contributed to peace because being a peaceful nation was 
central to Tanzanian national identity, so citizens engaging in political acts like politicising 
ethnicity and ethnic polarisation which are prone to escalating violence would have been betraying 
their own identity. From this framework, the PsIM are the primary source of national pride and 
identity for Tanzanians. This pride make Tanzanians define themselves nationally and contrast 
themselves with their brothers and sisters in comparatively violent and ethnic polarised 
neighbouring states. Thus, the mutual reinforcement between the three elements of Tanzanian 
political culture informed by the AD helped to keep Tanzania on a non-ethnically politicised path 
in the exercise of politics in general and elections in particular for over four decades. 
In the past ten years, the PsIM and the political culture of peace, national pride and equitable 
sharing of resources that it has created is under threat. Most of the policies that created that 
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political culture are gone: the nation-building policy lacks the immediate post-independence 
impetus, and single party politics and Ujamaa economic policies have been abandoned. The 
subject political orientation is incompatible with competitive politics that Tanzania has chosen to 
pursue in 1992, but it has not yet been replaced by a participant political orientation (Makulilo, 
2012). Emerging differences in wealth concentration and political party membership are creating 
more divisions in the population. Numerous demonstrations organised by or supported by 
opposition political parties which compelled the police to apply force, like the recent CUF 
demonstrations to register their discomfort with the conduct of the civic elections of 2014 that saw 
its national chair beaten and apprehended, were seen as instances of peace threatened rather than as 
signals for a need of change, let alone revolution (Ramadhani, 2015a). Given the importance of the 
political culture embedded in PsIM in preventing ethnic conflicts and ethnic salience on 
determining voters’ choice in Tanzania, the kind of political culture that develops in the coming 
years may well determine whether Tanzania remains on its peaceful path or whether emerging 
political divisions bring violent ethnic divisions and ethnic salience in voting that Tanzania has so 
far minimised. Figure 3 below shows the path by which the AD led to the development of the 
Ujamaa political culture and how that political culture depoliticised ethnicity in voting even after 
the collapse of the AD. 
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Fiigure 3: A Hypothetical Path Dependence Explanation Low Salience of Ethnicity in Voting in 
Tanzania 
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The figure above indicates that low salience of ethnicity on voting has its genesis in the nation-
building policies of the PsIM meant to enhance national unity, economic equity and peace as 
enshrined in the AD. It is imperative to note that the three variables picked to explain the roles of 
PsIM in our framework (PNU, EDNR and peace) are not treated in isolation because they are 
mutually reinforcing. Three policies of the AD - villagisation, nationalisation and equity, and 
impacts of implementation of such policies are viewed key in explaining salience of ethnicity in 
politics in Tanzania. It is contended that strong EDNR components of the nationalisation and 
villagisation policies cemented unity by avoiding ethnic polarisation informed by disproportionate 
ethnic distribution of resources. Also, aspects like political monism, controlled media and muzzled 
civil society that were central to ensuring national unity through creation of a passive subject 
political orientation are considered central in explaining the role of ethnicity. A passive, subject 
political orientation informed by subsuming political and social forces in the state, left little public 
space for ethnic groups and other social forces to organise parochially thus contributing in 
suppress ethnic dissents and reinforcing national identity and pride. Also because the political 
leadership and the PsIM they stood for was against the use of divisive elements in politics. In turn 
the passive orientation enhanced national unity /trust and discouraged ethnic polarisation. The 
enhanced national unity and trust informed by the the PsIM are responsible for enhanced national 
identity pride that diffused ethnic and other groups to share common goals thus reinforcing 
national unity. Also, the subject political culture and national unity perpetuate love of peace that 
informs Tanzanians to disapprove violent conflicts hence diffusing support for ethnic competition 
to abound to disturb peace. Importantly, because Tanzania is relatively peaceful, limited social 
ethnic divisions failed to undo the subject political orientation of most citizens and breed ethnic 
salience. Similarly, unity and non-polarised population contributed to peace because there were no 
significant ethnic group divisions that could escalate into violence and inform ethnic voting. Peace 
contributed to national unity because there were less ethnic violent conflicts to divide people. 
National identity contributed to peace because being a peaceful nation was central to Tanzanian 
national identity. Therefore, citizens engaging in political acts like politicising ethnicity and ethnic 
polarisation which are prone to escalating violence and salience of ethnicity in elections were 
always at the verge of betraying their own identity. This trend could not change with the reforms 
of the current liberal reforms that are not in line with some of the key elements of the AD. It is 
assumed in this study that the pluralist and liberal economic reforms enhance private ownership, 
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competition and liberal democratic ethos informed dissent views and flashes of ethnicity but the 
dissents were not ethnicised as the foundation for the mutually reinforcing components national 
identity pride, unity/non-polarisation, and subject political orientation still militate against ethnic 
salience. A detailed analysis of Tanzania’s polity based on the framework is made in the following 
chapter and a specific analysis of the 2010 elections in Mwanza further tests the frame. 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have provided a thorough conceptual overview of ethnicity and voting and its 
germination into a political salient phenomenon. Cognisant of the complexity of the concept of 
ethnicity the chapter engaged in a detailed conceptualisation of what ethnicity is and is not in the 
view of the current study. I undertook a critical review of the primordialist, instrumentalist and 
social constructivist conceptualisation of ethnicity to draw the study’s take on ethnicity which at its 
core picks elements of all four deemed relevant in explaining ethnicity as argued in section 3.2.5. 
Informed by the fact that Tanzania has low salience of Ethnicity compared to other African states 
as highlighted in the very first section of the general introduction and widely argued throughout 
this dissertation the study put forward elements of ethnicity that could prove to constitute flashes 
of ethnicity in electoral politics and have an impact on determining voters’ choices  termed as the 
politics of origin, being and belonging which in collaboration with political tribalism derived from 
the conceptualisation of ethnicity will be used to explain the influences ethnicity has on 
determining voters’ choices in elections. As such a scheme borrowed from Wimmer (1997) 
exemplifying the germination and manifestation of ethnicity into a political salient feature capable 
of informing ethnic voting is presented. The scheme in question indicated that germination of 
ethnicity has to be politicised through disproportionate distribution of public resources among 
ethnic groups. This position entails social ethnicity cannot graduate into a political salient 
phenomenon capable of influencing ethnic voting without being politicised.  
As it was the case for ethnicity voting was conceptualised to provide a general understanding of 
what it means in this thesis. As opposed to ethnicity the concept of voting was rather 
straightforward. It is regarded as a method for a group such as a meeting or an electorate to make a 
decision or express an opinion—often following discussions, debates, or election campaigns. The 
conceptualisation of the major concepts of the study provided the basis for turning to the 
theoretical discourses on the influences of ethnicity on the determination of voters’ choices.  
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In this chapter we provided a thorough account of the two dominant theoretical underpinning that 
are used to explain African politics including the role of ethnicity and voting-neo-patrimonial and 
hybrid regime theories. It is indicated that the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations associate 
the salience of ethnicity in voting in African states to preference of traditional primordial 
tendencies which give impetus to ethnicity, personal rule and patronage; over effective legal-
rational institutions whose authority is based on codified laws which set restrictions against the use 
of ethnicity in electoral politics. Although the two theories tend to converge in associating 
ethnicity and voting with preference to traditional primordial tendencies, the two theories have a 
key difference. While the neo-patrimonialist tend to deny the existence of LRIs in Africa,  the 
hybrid theorists are aware of the fact that almost all modern states have gone multi-party and 
instituted LRIs although not well functioning. Therefore, to them it is imprudent to regard them to 
be purely patrimonial. Instead they are pseudo-democratic regimes with limited elements of liberal 
democracy and legal-rational institutions but with rulers revolting to the use of neo-patrimonial 
practices like politicising ethnicity to manipulate electorates and win their votes. In this regard, 
Tanzania that possesses the hybrid regime characteristics is expected to have high ethnic salience 
in voting, but it is not. Such gap casts serious academic doubt on the over-generalised nature of the 
neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanation of the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ 
choices which demands an alternative or complementary explanation. 
 In this chapter, it is indicated that the major shortcoming of the two theories is that they suffer 
from their biased treat of African history and traditions including the use of ethnicity in elections. 
This biased view is reluctant to appreciate alternative political ideas and structures relevant to 
Africa despite sound evidence proving limited use of ethnicity in elections in countries like 
Tanzania. It is against this backdrop in this chapter that I present an alternative theoretical stand 
redefining the role of African history in explaining the influence of ethnicity on the determination 
of voters’ choices. This alternative theoretical explanation poses a critique to the neo-patrimonial 
and hybrid views. It is informed by a nationalisation frame embedded in the political ideas and 
aspirations of the independence movement (building national unity, EDNR and peace), and the 
capacity of that movement to construct a political organisation encompassing the political leaders, 
ideals of the independence movement and the people. 
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From the theoretical perspectives and discussions, I formulated a conceptual framework for this 
study. The framework indicates that low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices has 
its genesis the PsIM (national unity, economic equity and peace) as enshrined in the AD. In this 
chapter, I dissect the AD into three mutually reinforcing components to understand the influence 
ethnicity in voting. These are national identity pride, unity/non-polarisation, and subject political 
orientation. In a nutshell, strong national identity and EDNR cemented unity by avoiding ethnic 
polarisation informed by disproportionate ethnic distribution of resources. A passive, subject 
political orientation informed by subsuming political and social forces in the state, left little public 
space for ethnic groups and other social forces to organise parochially thus contributing in 
suppress ethnic dissents and reinforcing national identity and pride. National identity pride 
diffused ethnic and other groups to share common goals thus reinforcing national unity. Also, the 
subject political culture and unity perpetuate love of peace that informs Tanzanians to disapprove 
violent conflicts hence diffusing support for ethnic competition to abound to disturb peace. More 
importantly, because Tanzania is relatively peaceful, limited social ethnic divisions failed to 
reverse the subject political orientation of most citizens and breed ethnic salience. Likewise, unity 
and non-polarised population contributed to peace because there were no significant ethnic group 
divisions that could escalate into violence and inform ethnic voting. Peace contributed to national 
unity because there were less ethnic violent conflicts to divide people. National identity 
contributed to peace because being a peaceful nation was central to Tanzanian national identity. 
Therefore, citizens engaging in political acts like politicising ethnicity and ethnic polarisation 
which are prone to escalating violence and salience of ethnicity in elections were always at the 
verge of betraying their own identity.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TANZANIAN POLITY: AN ETHNO-POLITICAL AND VOTING 
NARRATIVE 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the major political and ethnic developments that the 
Tanzanian state has undergone over time. It starts by providing in a nutshell an introduction of 
Tanzania and its electoral system and goes on to present  an overview of  the key issues related to 
ethnicity and voting from the nationalist to the post-colonial era. The exclusion of a thorough 
overview of the pre-colonial and early colonial time in this section is predicated on the fact that at 
the time in question no competitive elections were conducted. However, there were some essential 
elements for understanding ethnicity and voting in the Tanzania’s nationalist era and beyond which 
will be highlighted in a nutshell as a prelude to the indended nationalist era.  
This chapter places emphasis on providing readers with a concise analytical narrative of effects of 
changing political and economic systems on manifestations of ethnic identities on the country’s 
electoral politics particularly on influencing voters’ choices. At its core, the chapter accords 
readers a background for understanding the Tanzanian state and the political milieu within which 
the current study explores and analyses the influence of ethnicity on Tanzanians’ electoral choices 
in competitive elections. This chapter then serves as an introduction to both the theoretical and the 
empirical discussions in the subsequent chapter dealing with the influences of ethnicity on 
anchoring electoral choices in Mwanza region addressed in Chapter V. Since the Tanzanian state 
and particularly its electoral background has not been introduced earlier in the dissertation, before 
embarking on the state’s ethno-political narrative, I provide such description. 
4.2. Tanzania and its Electoral System: A Prelude to the Ethno-Political and Voting 
Narrative 
As indicated in the focus the study, Tanzania is a United Republic resulting from a merger of the 
previously sovereign states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 26
th
 April, 1964. However, only one 
part of the union -Tanzania Mainland, is researched and, therefore, this prelude is relevant to that 
part of the union.  Tanzania is located in East Africa and has a total area of 881,000 square 
kilometers. The total population of Tanzania is 43,625,354 million (URT, 2014). The borders of 
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Tanzania as it is the case for almost all African states are an outcome of the struggle for power and 
influence exhibited in the Berlin conference that partitioned the continent; as well as continued 
intricacies of power politics of colonialism thereafter (Mwakikagile, 2010). The partition of the 
African continent within which Tanzania belongs, paid little regard to ensure that the people that 
became confined to the new borders are of the same ethnic background (Illife, 1979). Because of 
such partitioning it is not rear to find members of same ethnic groups belonging to two different 
states. For instance, the pastoralist Masai and the Luo who are found in both Tanzania and Kenya. 
In the said conference, the present day Tanzania was demarcated and accorded to the German 
colonialists in 1890. The Germans colonial domination lasted for two and a half decades up to 
1920 when it lost in the First World War. Following the Germans defeat in First World War, the 
League of Nations and later the United Nations gave Britain a mandate to preside over Tanzania 
until it gained its independence in 1961 (Mwakikagile, 2010).  
Tanzania through a unified nationalist movement managed to navigate its way to independence 
without a drop of blood as most of its neighbours like Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola 
had, just to mention few. The peaceful independence movement in Tanzania was spearheaded by 
TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and its leader Mwalimu Julius Nyerere rose to the 
helm of political power in the newly established independent Tanzania (Heilman and William, 
2012). Due to the unified and all inclusive independence movement TANU enjoyed almost 
uncontested support (Mamdani, 2013b; Mwakikagile, 2010; Illife, 1979). Tanzania achieved its 
independence under a multiparty political system and continued with such set-up up to 1965 when 
it officially became a one party state. TANU and later CCM (after the merger of TANU and ASP) 
were the only parties allowed to operate in Tanzania. The two parties were granted supreme 
political status over all government organs (Makulilo, 2012, 2008; Baregu, 1997). The rationale for 
the introduction of the monolithic political order was to enhance nation-building and equitable 
economic development (Coulson, 1982; Illife, 1979). In other words, a pluralistic political 
dispensation was, at the time in question, conceived as a stumbling block towards attainment of 
nation-building. This trend changed in the late 1990s when Tanzania liberalised its economic and 
political orders. 
It is imperative albeit in a nutshell to recall that liberalism was against the AD that committed 
Tanzania to following a socialist and self-reliant path as indicated in 3.4.4 and further expounded 
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in sections 4.4.1.4 and 4.4.1.5. This is mainly because liberalisation was seen as a threat to national 
unity, EDNR and peaceful coexistence as indicated in sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. Economically, the 
liberal reforms were embarked amid criticism from the pro AD dictum and those affected by the 
consequences of deregulation
38
 like privatisation related unemployment and inflation (Stein, 
1999). The liberal economic reforms went on to influence changes on the monolithic political 
stature within which it operates. Calls for a liberal democratic pluralist political order came from 
both internal and external dynamics. Internal pressure albeit minimal, came from civil society 
(mainly organised professional groups) but greater impetus came from within CCM itself and its 
national Chairman then- Mwalimu (Liviga, 2009: 6-7; Nyang’oro 2004; Chaligha et al. 2002). The 
external pressures for political pluralism in Tanzania were exerted at the time when Eastern 
European countries went multi-party and international aid agencies made going multiparty a 
prerequisite for developing countries across Africa to access aid (Liviga, 2009; Villalón and 
VonDoepp, 2005; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).  
In the early 1990s elite figures opposing single party rule formed a Steering Committee agitating 
for and mobilising people in favour of a multiparty system. The committee was headed by Chief 
Said Abdallah Fundikira. Fundikira’s committee included Mwalimu’s staunch socialist opponents 
back in the early days of independence like Lifa Chipaka, Oscar Kambona and James Mapalala. It 
also incorporated academic and civil society elites who questioned Mwalimu’s socialist and 
monolithic philosophies. According to Chege (1994: 53-4) this committee through several 
alliances led to the formation of a range of opposition parties, including NCCR-Maguezi, UMD 
and CUF. However, although the committee and the civil society had pushed for the pluralist 
reforms, most scholars argue that the major drive for the multiparty system came from within 
CCM (Barkan 1994; Chaligha et al. 2002; Erdmann 2002; Nyang’oro 2006). Mwalimu Nyerere 
has been recognised for being instrumental in leading the sentiments for the pluralist political 
change within CCM. After stepping down as CCM’s National Chairman in 1990, he argued for a 
gradual change towards multi-party democracy to avoid a conflictual transition (Nyang’oro, 2006). 
Consequently, in 1991, Mwalimu’s successor President Mwinyi appointed a presidential 
commission to solicit views on Tanzanians’ preferred political system. The Commission was 
                                                 
38
 See Chaligha et al. 2002; Wangwe, 2005 for thorough explanations of the consequences of liberal reforms 
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commonly known as the “Nyalali Commission” bearing its name from its head- the then Chief 
Justice of the URT, the late Hon. Justice Francis Nyalali. 
The Commission was assigned the task of collecting views of Tanzanian citizens and making 
appropriate recommendations on whether the country should adopt a multiparty or retain a single 
party system (URT, 1992). In its report that came out in early 1992, Nyalali’s Commission 
recommended that Tanzania’s political system should be changed from the existing one party 
system to a new multi-party system (Mwaipopo, 2011). The recommendation was made despite the 
fact that only 20 % of the Tanzanians interviewed by the commission were in favour of political 
pluralism (Chaligha et al. 2002). The option of the majority against their greater freedom of choice 
illustrates the power of the PsIM, as Tanzanians appear to associate unity with peace, and the lack 
of unity with its opposite. Two days after the commission presented its report CCM convened an 
extraordinary General Assembly to bless the commission’s recommendations. The blessing was 
followed by amendment of CURT to allow political pluralism by a CCM-only constituted national 
assembly (NA) in 1992 (Nyang’oro, 2006: 42). The NA in the same year enacted the Political 
Parties Act that permitted the formation of political parties and governed their operations 
(Makulilo, 2012). From 1992 to-date Tanzania by Article 3 (1) of CURT is a democratic country 
with a Multi-party political system. 
Several political parties were formed in the first years of multiparty politics, out of which 13 
managed to secure registration by the first multiparty GEs of 1995 (Erdmann, 2002). During the 
last elections (2010) the number raised to eighteen. These include AFP, APPT- Maendeleo, CCM, 
CHADEMA, CHAUSTA, CUF, DP, JAHAZI ASILIA, Demokrasia Makini, NCCR-Mageuzi, 
NLD, NRA, SAU, TADEA, UDP, UMD, UPDP and TLP (Mwaipopo, 2011). Currently, Tanzania 
has a sum of 22 registered political parties as indicated in section 1.1. All political parties are 
registered under the Political Parties Act, 1992. 
As a result of the political reform, Tanzania had to amend its monolithic electoral laws to be 
consonant with multi-party democratic tendencies. However, its electoral system has never 
changed much. An electoral system is the process which establishes the manner in which electoral 
votes are translated into seats in the legislature (Mwaipopo, 2011). In this regard, an electoral 
system is an electoral arrangement that places priority on the level to which the elected leader 
mirrors the beliefs and preferences of the voters. Tanzania has always been using a “First Past the 
116 
 
Post” electoral system. According to this system, the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councilor 
candidate who wins the majority share of valid votes is declared to be the winner. Therefore, even 
if contending parties are beaten by one vote they get no seat to show for its hard fought campaign 
(Kawishe, 2011). In this regard, the voice of those who voted for the losing parties are not 
reflected in the NA and in the Local Government Authorities’ Councils. 
For purposes of the GEs, Tanzania is demarcated into constituencies and wards. Each constituency 
elects an MP, while every ward elects a Councilor. There are also Women Special Seats MPs and 
Councilors who are proportionally elected to mend the gender gap in these two organs. According 
to Article 78(1) of CURT, these Women Special Seats MPs and Councilors are obtained by way of 
Proportional Representation calculated on the basis of the total votes each Party got country-wide 
in the Parliamentary Elections and the proportion of Councilor Seats each Party won in each local 
Council respectively. 
The electoral system of Tanzania consists of three types of elections, namely: The GEs, the Local 
Authority Elections (LAEs) and By-elections. The GEs are for electing the President of URT, 
MPs, and Councilors. These elections are organised by the National Electoral Commission.  The 
LAEs are for electing village, hamlet, street leaders, as well as members of village and street 
councils. These elections are organised by the ministry responsible for local government. In this 
study, I am confined to the GEs because they provide a wider avenue of intra-tribal and inter-tribal 
evocations of ethnicity. GEs also afford wider latitude for inclusion of national debates compared 
to LAEs that are more localised in terms of jurisdiction and leadership mandate.  
There are By-elections- for re-electing leaders who were elected in the previously mentioned 
elections, once such leader dies, resigns or his/her office becomes vacant for any legal reason. 
Since By–elections are meant to re-elect leadership positions that fall vacant, the competent 
organising authority falls on the jurisdiction of the institution that oversaw the original election of 
the position to be filled. Although the ministry responsible for local government and NEC are the 
principal organisers of the elections, they work in collaboration with several authorities which 
manage electoral processes in Tanzania, which include the Registrar of Political Parties, law 
enforcers like the police force, the Prevention and Combation of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) and 
the Controller and Auditor General (CAG). These authorities perform duties that fall under their 
parent jurisdictions during the electoral processes. 
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The GEs and LAEs are conducted every fifth year after the previous one. Regularly, the LAEs are 
held a year prior to the GEs. All candidates aspiring to become President of URT or MPs must be 
sponsored by a political party. No independent candidates are permitted to stand for elections in 
Tanzania (Makulilo, 2012). CCM has won an uncontested majority in all multiparty elections held 
in Tanzania from 1995 to 2010 as indicated in sections 1.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3. Since this dissertation 
deals with experiences of the 2010 elections it is worthwhile portraying the background of the 
elections before addressing issues of ethnicity and voting overtime.  
4.2.1. The 2010 General Elections in Tanzania: A pick of Key Issues 
The GEs of 2010 in Tanzania were for electing the President of the URT and parliamentarians. The 
largest political issue in the run-up to and in the actual elections revolved around graft-related 
issues popularly referred to in Swahili as ufisadi. CHADEMA during the elections repeatedly 
accused top CCM and government leaders of being involved in grand corruption. Through its 
presidential candidate Willibrod Slaa, CHADEMA and its cadres in and out of parliament, named 
and shamed notable CCM and government leaders including the president for their supposed 
engagement in ufisadi. This way, CHADEMA identified itself as a party with zero tolerance to 
graft and poor management of public resources during the elections. Accusation of ufisadi against 
the ruling party and government officials was an essential element of its campaigns (TACCEO, 
2010; Interview with Kurya street vendor in Nyamagana, held on 13.11.2014; interview with a 
retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward held on 5.11.2014). According to the 
TACCEO (2010) accusations of ufisadi levelled against CCM and government leaders were used 
as a political propaganda geared towards character assassinating and discrediting them. Since 
CHADEMA accused CCM widely, CCM had to respond to the accusations in the same magnitude. 
This makes the view that CHADEMA was instrumental in setting the agenda hold some water. 
This being said, I am not trying to argue that other issues like water, agriculture services, 
infrastructural development, housing, education, health care, peace and tranquillity were not 
important. Indeed, they were as such issues were identified by my interviewees as central election 
issues. However, they thought that ufisadi was on top of the agenda. 
 
Upon concluding the elections, Tanzania was showered with praise on its conduct of the elections 
from most of the foreign observers, heads of state and governments as well as leaders of 
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international organisations. These elections were declared by election monitors, both local and 
international as broadly free and fair
39
. The elections were mostly peaceful although there were 
many minor irregularities. It is against this backdrop each election monitoring report pointed out 
varied irregularities that need to be improved. Most of the irregularities are associated with the 
enormous power and resources that the ruling CCM enjoyed compared to the opposition parties. It 
is worth recalling that the President of the URT who normally is the Chair of CCM, appoints 
varied public office bearers including the chief of the security services, regional and district 
commissioners as well as the National Electoral Commission just to mention a few. He and his 
cabinet also retain their position while contesting for their seats, thus they enjoyed incumbency 
advantage, as we will see later in this chapter in section 4.5.2 (Makulilo, 2012).  
 
As it has been already highlighted in section 1.1 and indicated in Appendix I, CCM’s victory in the 
2010 elections was tsunamic with over 70% parliamentary seats. Excluding this fact, the elections 
are exceptional on many counts, chief of which was CHADEMA’s ability to challenge the 
incumbent during and after the elections to a magnitude that Tanzanians hardly experienced before 
(TACCEO 2010; TEMCO 2011). Reduction of the presidential vote share won by CCM in the 
2005 elections (80%) by 20% in 2010 attests to this fact. Similarly, CHADEMA for the first time 
won enough votes to be the formal opposition in the National Assembly. Whitehead (2010) argues 
that CHADEMA’s impact on the political agenda in 2010 exceeded that of previous opposition 
parties particularly Augustine Mrema’s NCCR-Mageuzi which in the 1995 elections was the 
biggest opposition party as it is projected on section 4.5.2.  
 
Mwanza was one of the regions where CHADEMA enjoyed increased support compared to the 
2005 elections. In 2005, CHADEMA only scored a mere 6.5 percent in the presidential and 
parliamentary contest. Indicating partisan voting as the voters for its presidential and parliamentary 
candidates were essentially the same.  In 2010, CHADEMA’s support unprecedentedly rose up to 
35.2% in the presidential and 30.9% in the parliamentary elections. The substantial increase was 
not only in terms of numbers. It was translated into winning two parliamentary constituencies in 
Mwanza Urban - Ilemela and Nyamagana, and another one in the island of Ukerewe. This was an 
                                                 
39
 For further understanding of the conduct of the 2010 election see the TEMCO, TACCEO, MISA and AU and the 
Commonwealth mission election monitoring reports. 
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interesting development as Mwanza has always been a CCM stronghold in multiparty elections. 
Moreover, the Sukuma are considered to be politically “docile”, or at least that they would not 
change their political preferences easily (Interview with Mzee Mkali, 10.3.2013). As such, reasons 
for CHADEMA’s sudden ascent in popularity in Mwanza were deemed significant.  My interviews 
in Nyamagana suggested that the main election issues that gave CHADEMA skyrocketing success 
in the election revolve around its anti-corruption crusade, people’s drive for change. Likewise, 
political machinations
40
 played against CHADEMA’s candidate (Ezekia Wenje) while contesting 
for CCM’s flagbearership and later when he crossed over to CHADEMA as indicated in section 
5.4.1. In my interviews in Nyamagana there was a definite irritation about the perceived arrogance 
and misuse of public office portrayed by Lawrence Masha- the then Minister for Interior affairs, to 
try denying Wenje’s candidature on grounds of citizenship. Also, interviewees expressed the view 
that large-scale corruption scandals within the ruling party and the unpopular local CCM 
candidates paved the way for CHADEMA’s success in the elections. CHADEMA’s support is well 
comprehended when elements of corruption and unpopular leaders are attributed to the perceptions 
of declining standards of living among the voters.  Such understanding informed the zeal for 
change. Interviewees who expressed their support to CHADEMA were tired of CCM. A view from 
a Kurya street vendor that I interviewed in Rufiji Street represents this position “we are tired of 
people (CCM) who are making us poor”. The views of the street vendor contended that it was not 
necessarily that voters were particularly fond of CHADEMA, but that they were simply tired of the 
ruling party due to their economic backwardness. Most interviewees who supported CHADEMA 
in Mwanza argued that people of Mwanza had not benefited from the natural resources in the 
region. They mostly referred to minerals and Lake Victoria located in Mwanza as resources that 
they are supposed to benefit from. It is imperative to recognise the fact that CHADEMA in its 
election manifesto advocated a policy of provincialism whereby regions are supposed to be joined 
administratively to form provinces and benefit from their own resources to a larger extent, rather 
than revenues being pooled nationally.  
 
Unlike the previous elections TACCEO (2011) spelt out that Tanzania experienced considerable 
                                                 
40
 It is worth noting Ezekia Wenje seeked CCM’s consent to contest for the the Nyamagana parliamentary seat against 
the incumbent then Hon.Lawrence Masha who was the Minister responsible for Home Affairs.While in CCM 
primaries he was accused of not being a Tanzanian and later formal complaint was made by Hon. Marsha to that effect 
when he was nominated to vie for the same seat through CHADEM. See The Citizen, 5.9.2010. Chadema: Masha used 
office to block our man. Accessed on 21.11.2013 via http://www.shwari.com/habari_za_nje/print.php?newsid=57 
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unrest as the announcement of results in various parts of the country were delayed in 
constituencies that CHADEMA were hopeful of winning. The state of unrest associated with 
CHADEMA’s rise in the political landscape went beyond the announcement of the results.  
Tanzanians after the declaration of the results experienced protests directly or indirectly claimed to 
be arranged by CHADEMA
41. The famous doctors’ strike demanding better pay and working 
conditions in 2012
42
; businessmen strikes mainly in Dar es Salaam over the use of electronic fiscal 
devices (EFD) meant to enhance tax collection
43
 and the nagging bus and truck drivers’ strikes 
over proper working conditions
44
. In all of these unrests CHADEMA as an opposition party 
evidently spoke in favour of the striking groups to pressurise the state to meet their demands. In 
the drivers’ strike the Chairman of CHADEMA went and participated in halting the strike. He was 
widely cheered
45
 when he urged them to continue with their services for the benefit of Tanzanians. 
CHADEMA’s support and the role of its Chair in halting the strike does not overtly entail that it 
organised it or any other. However, it signifies a fact that the interests of the striking groups and 
theirs as a government in waiting and a watchdog coincide. Thus their visibility in right-based 
strikes is warranted.   
 
A Mwanza-specific strike that was associated to CHADEMA that signified unrest and enhanced its 
political visibility was the strike organised by Marching guys, or Wamachinga, as they are branded 
in Swahili. Wamachinga are small-scale hawkers or vendors with ad hoc stalls in urban areas. In 
Mwanza they are found hawking around the city and others have their stalls in central Mwanza, 
mainly along the central Makoroboi Street. According to the CHADEMA leader and the 
parliamentary aspirant interviewed, this strike resulted from the CCM-dominated city council 
decision to move the Wamachinga out of the city centre for purposes of cleanliness.  CHADEMA 
campaigned actively for the rights of the Wamachinga to remain in the city. Interviewees in 
                                                 
41
 For more information about the demonstrations, see The Citizen, (1.3.2011). Can Chadema demonstrations oust the 
CCM government? Accessed 20.10.2014 at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/magazines/32-political-platform/8704-
canchadema-demonstrations-oust-the-ccm-government.html 
42
 For details of the doctors strike see Tanzanian Affairs, September 2012 accessed on 30.11.2014via  
http://www.tzaffairs.org/category/politics 
43
 More information about the traders boycott can be viewed on www.tanzaniatoday.co.tz/news/wafanyakazi- 
kariakoo- wagomea- mashine za EFD. Accessed on 20.11.2015 
44
 The drivers’ boycott is widely covered on www.tanzaniatoday.co.tz/news/mgomo-wa –madereva-watikisa-dar. 
Accessed on 29/11/2015 
45
 See the following clip on youtube to see how Mbowe was cheered by the striking drivers 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1fY9jYkLWQ 
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Nyamagana verified that CHADEMA’s regional leadership and its parliamentary contestants 
overtly supported the marching guys.   
 
Apart from CHADEMA’s rise as a formidable political force in the 2010 elections another 
outstanding issue about the elections is the steep decline in voter turnout compared to all other 
elections in the country as the following table entails:  
   Table III: Presidential and Parliamentary Voter turnout in Tanzania (1965 - 2010) 
Election 
Year 
Presidential Elections Parliamentary Election 
Registered 
Voters 
Voter Turnout Registered 
Voters 
Voter Turnout 
Turnout Percentage Turnout Percentage 
1965 3,373,089 2,600,040 77.08 3,373,012 2,579,040 76.46 
1970 5,051,938 3,649,789 72.25 5,051,908 3,647,101 72.19 
1975 5,577,566 4,557,595 81.71 5,577,566 4,555,992 81.68 
1980 6,969,803 5,986,942 85.90 6,969,793 5,960,121 85.51 
1985 6,910,555 5,181,999 74.99 6,910,535 5,181,576 74.98 
1990 7,296,553 5,425,282 74.35 7,296,544 5,425,282 74.35 
1995 8,929,969 6,846,681 76.67 8,928,816 6,831,578 76.51 
2000 10,088,484 8,517,648 84.43 10,088,484 7,341,067 72.77 
2005 16,401,694 11,875,927 72.41 15,705,223 11,389,530 72.52 
2010 20,146,119 8,626,283 42.83 20,398,394 8,626,283 42.29 
    Source: African Elections Database  
 
The data in Table III above indicate that voter turnout in all GEs in Tanzania has been higher than 
in the 2010 GEs. Tanzania has maintained high voter turnout even under one-party election as the 
results of turnout of the elections of 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 presented above 
substantiate. This is the case despite criticism from some scholars that single-partism narrows 
chances for voter participation (Cliffe 1967). 
 
According to a study on low voter turnout in the 2010 elections in Tanzania by Shumbusho (2012), 
twelve factors explain the phenomenon. The twelve reasons in order of importance are: First, the 
voters’ belief that their votes cannot make a change (low political efficacy). Second, due to eligible 
electors’ poverty, they have lost interest in political processes compared to income generating 
activities. Third, most Tanzanians lack knowledge on the importance of voting. Fourth, the voters 
believe that elections do not create any significant change in political system. Fifth, eligible voters 
consider not voting as a way of penalising the elected leaders and the institutions established 
through elections for their poor performance. Sixth, multiparty elections have failed to influence 
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noteworthy changes in policies since its inception. Seventh, voting is seen as a useless cost in 
terms of time and resources, which has to be avoided. Eighth, not voting was viewed to be a 
punishment to the government for inadequate performance. Ninth, eligible voters foresaw that 
CCM will win the elections due to lack of significant competition. Tenth, the new and elaborate 
CCM intra-party nomination model adopted to get flagbearers made some voters believe that 
elections were over. Eleventh, the long-term effect of the First-Past-the-Post which encourages 
wastage of votes and voter’s preference discouraged eligible voters. Twelfth and last, there were 
cases of mismanagement of Permanent National Voter Register (PNVR), which led to some 
eligible voters not to appear on the voter lists at polling stations.  
 
In an interview with the CHADEMA leader in Mwanza, it was suggested that the low turnout was 
also associated with vote rigging of the polling stations. According to this leader CHADEMA had 
in fact won more votes than it officially had and in some cases was robbed of the victory through 
the spoiling of votes. This position was even made public by Dr Wilbrod Slaa who contested for 
the presidential seat immediately after elections and recently in a press conference held at Serena 
Hotel, Dar es Salaam on 1
st
 September 2015. Another possible explanation for low voter turnout is 
buying of voting cards. Accusations to this effect go both ways. The opposition claims that CCM 
buy cards to lower the number of people able to vote in opposition strongholds and CCM casts 
similar claims on the opposition. My interviewees revealed that in the campaign rallies both parties 
urged eligible voters not to sell their voting cards. This buying of voting cards in Mwanza was not 
vividly voiced out by my interviewees but the use of money in elections was. Most interviewees in 
the rural areas confessed that they were ‘bribed’ in the form of given T-shirts, salt, caps and 
clothes and even money to support a particular candidate. Most of the voices in this regard were 
directed to CCM candidates and their agents. This position shall not be taken lightly as the CCM 
leader interviewed in Mwanza confessed that accusations of vote buying in CCM primaries are 
rampant. He told me that at various occasions, the party organs do not sponsor candidates who are 
proven to win the primaries through corruptive means. Another factor that is associated with low 
voter turnout is fear of violent acts. It was argued by interviewees in Mwanza that women and 
elderly people particularly in Nyamagana did not turn up to vote because of unusual police and 
military presence in the days preceding the 2010 elections. This account of the 2010 elections 
serves as a background for the empirical chapter in particular on the political situation in Mwanza. 
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After this general overview of the 2010 elections, now let us zero into issues of ethnicity and 
voting in Tanzania from the nationalist era to post-independence era. 
4.3. Ethnicity and Voting in Tanzania in the Nationalist Era and Beyond 
4.3.1. A lead up to Ethnicity and Voting in the Nationalist Era 
Tanzania as indicated in section 4.2 above was ruled by German colonialists and later fell under 
the British trusteeship. The German colonialists never conducted elections and the British did so in 
the late 1950s after pressures from the nationalist movement that claimed for Tanzania’s 
independence (Mwakikagile, 2010). Both administrations have as indicated in section 3.4.4 
engaged in acts that informed nationalist struggles against colonisation and the PsIM. However, 
manipulation of ethnic groups stands out to have important bearing on ethnicity and politics that 
are relevant to this dissertation as we will see below. Before digging into the ethnic manipulations 
it is useful to point out that despite the manipulations the colonialists contributed intendedly or not 
in enhancing national unity as well well. For instance, they included local people from different 
ethnic groups in their civil service and used Swahili as their formal administrative language (Iliffe, 
1979; Coulson, 1982). The use of Swahili as an administrative language led to the introduction of a 
national language that facilitated inter-ethnic dialogue and significantly contributed to the 
formation of a Tanzanian national identity (Lofchie, 2013). It is equally imperative to note that 
Swahili does not belong to any particular ethnic group- Kabila in Tanzania. Therefore, no specific 
ethnic group can use it to wield power or influence for political dominance (Omari, 1995). The 
inclusion of people of different ethnic backgrounds potrayed to some extent an inclusive civil 
service though most on the jobs held by the indigenous were mostly blue-collar. The inclusive 
character became an important element of the nationalisation movement and post-independent 
Tanzania’s administrative and political set-up (Malipula, 2014). Inferably, the elites of the day 
who become critical in the nationalist struggles were prepared to organise the broadly based multi-
ethnic national force to fight colonialism and forge strong national ties that inform the politics and 
voting in post-independence as it will be shown below. Let us turn to the ethnic manipulations that 
are important to be known before engaging in a thorough discussion of ethnicity and voting in the 
nationalist era. 
 
The administrations of both foreign powers manipulated ethnic groups and their leadership to 
perpertuate their rule. In some instances converged ethnic groups to make grand ethnic groups that 
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exist today. For instance, the British introduced a system where smaller chiefdoms were placed 
under “paramount chiefs” (Mpangala 1999). Putting the smaller chiefdoms of the Chagga ethnic 
groups located around the Kilimanjaro Mountain under one Chief (Chief Mareale) provides an 
example of the efforts made to centralise ethnic group leadership and subsequently broaden and 
solidify ethnic identities (Mamdani, 1996). The solidification of ethnic groups could have bred 
ethnic salience on voting as it broadened ethnic group sizes and visibility and provided more 
potential grounds for forging MWCs compared to fluid and less concentrated ethnic groups. 
However, it has not been the case in Tanzania because of similar structural, legal and economic 
reasons that fuelled nationalism and nation-building to be discussed in the following subheadings 
in this section.  
 
Ethnic chiefs who were symbols of ethnic orientation in various Tanzanian ethnic groups were 
used by the colonialists to enhance colonial rule. However, most of their traditional powers were 
stripped off and in some instances changed their traditional names (Mpangala, 1999). For instance, 
the Ntemi of Wanyamwezi, the Mtwa of Uhehe, the Nkonsi of the Wangoni, the Mangi of the 
Wachagga, all became Sultans altering the foundation of the ethnic groups’ political leadership 
orientation and the interst of their people. As such, the Chiefs lost their influence and respect 
among their followers (Sheriff, 1980). Although there were no elections, they lost trust and 
legitimacy required to marshall ethnic crusades for political office even when elections were 
instituted in the late 1950s (Illife, 1979). This partly explains why ethnically oriented parties never 
emerged and the traditional leaders did not champion the nationalist struggles.  
The process of creating artificial chiefdoms that is regarded by Deutsch (1996) as “tribal makeshift 
solutions” made Chiefs mere clients of their colonial masters, while retaining the patron role in 
their communities. In this setup, the colonial state was the primary source of resources meant to 
further the patron-client networks between the chiefs and the colonial state on one hand, and the 
chiefs and their subjects on the other (Berman, 1998; Lemarchand, 1972). However, the fact that 
the colonialists’ intent was to exploit the colonised, and that the ethnic manipulations and 
corresponding economic benefits had alienated the majority of Tanzanians, militated against the 
wide distribution of patronage, as the chiefs had limited access to colonial resources (Illife, 1979). 
In this regard, the traditional role and authority of the chiefs over their people was questionable. 
Therefore, they could hardly mobilise societies to feel that they should stand with their patron and 
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support. Instead, the people as a collective felt the urgency of uprooting their corrupt chiefs and 
their master (the British colonialists). From this line of thought, the neo-patrimonial explanation of 
patronage as a means of fuelling ethnic voting is rendered insufficient in explaining influences of 
ethnicity in the colonial Tanzanian politics. Such view stems from the fact that the means and 
circumstances for practising it were quite limited.  
The limited resources for exercising patronage were not the only inhibiting factor in curbing 
ethnicity from growing into a politically salient phenomenon in Tanzanian electoral politics when 
national elections took place in the late 1950s. The British colonialists’ deliberate move to disallow 
formation of parochially based political organisations in Tanzania inadvertently stimulated a 
nationally unified Independence struggle. The nationalist requirement was purposely set hoping 
that the hugeness of Tanzania and multiplicity of ethnic groups would disqualify independence 
movements’ existence (Said, 2006). However, the restriction happened to be a blessing in disguise 
as the national political organisations like Tanzania African Association (TAA) and later TANU 
(Tanzania African National Union were formed to lead a nationally unified independence 
movement in Tanzania that in all elections championed national unity and denounced the use of 
ethnicity in soliciting political support. Mzee Mwiru in his words revealed: 
"Mimi nilijiunga na TANU baada ya kumaliza Shule ya Sekondari na nilipangiwa kazi Rufiji kuhamasisha watu 
kujiunga na harakati ya uhuru. Nilinufaika sana na TAA na juhudi za nyuma yake zilizoiwezesha TANU kufanya 
kazi zake maana tulitakiwa tuwe tumetapakaa katika taifa lote ili tuweze kusajiliwa, kushindana katika uchaguzi na 
hatimaye kupata uhuru. Ilikuwa jukumu kubwa mno kupata ufuasi wa kitaifa wakati ule uzingatia ukubwa ya nchi 
yetu na rasilimali mdogo za kuwafikia watu. Kwa kweli Waingereza walijua hatukuwa na uwezo wa kuwafikia 
watu, na kwa hali hiyo wangeweza kuchelewesha upatikanaji wa uhuru wetu. Wasiwasi wao haukudhihiri, maana 
tuliweza kuwafikia wanachama nchini kote bila kujali asili ya makabila yao. Hii ilifanya TANU kuwa imara zaidi! 
Tuliweza kujenga chama kisichoyumbishwa na tofauti za kikabila, rangi na dini. Kilichodhamiriwa kuwa mzigo 
(kupata wanachama nchi nzima) ikageuka kuwa mtaji mkubwa kwa TANU katika harakati ya uhuru na zaidi ya 
hapo kwani ilimarisha umoja wa kitaifa dhidi ya masuala yote yanayogawanya watu katika utwaaji na matumizi ya 
nguvu za kisiasa."(Mwiru, 2014/05/14).  
 “I joined TANU after accomplishing Secondary School and was sent to Rufiji to mobilise people to join the 
independence movement. I benefitted a lot from the TAA and earlier efforts made to make TANU operate as we 
were required to have a national presence so that we can be registered, compete in elections and eventually gain 
independence. It was a mammoth task to get support at the time considering the hugeness of the country and 
limited resources for reaching people. In actual fact the British thought we wouldn’t be able to, and thus, they 
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could delay our independence. This was not the case as we managed to reach out to people all over the country 
irrespective of their ethnic belonging. This made TANU stronger! We managed to organise our party above ethnic, 
racial and religious divides. What was supposed to be a liability (getting members from all over the country) turned 
out to be an asset to TANU in the independence movement and beyond as it enhanced national unity over any 
divisive element in the acquisition and use of political power.”   
The worthiness of Mzee Mwiru’s words is provided in the discussion made in the subsequent 
subheading. A critical look at the prelude to ethnicity and voting in Tanzania before the height of 
the nationalists’ movement discussed below suggests identical ethno-political trends. The ethnic 
identities, their organisation and relationships never changed much with the change of colonial 
masters. The political authority of the Tanzanians through their chiefs was highly undermined as 
their working as agents of the colonialists especially discredited them in the eyes of their subjects 
and unmasked their real role as stooges of the colonialists. However, their role became a blessing 
in setting the path towards denunciation of the use of ethnicity in politics and voting in particular 
as their agent role affected their mobilisation power when it came to fighting the colonialists. This 
negative view on the traditional aristocrats and their divided structure necessitated alternative 
forces to lead the fight against colonialism. That is why in the 1950s African elites had resort to 
using a broadly based political organisation under TAA and later TANU to marshal all of the 
social forces against the British colonialists. Such movement as discussed below marks the 
beginning of the unification and consolidation of the Tanzanian state existing today and the move 
towards denunciation of ethnicity and other irreconcilable conflictual identities on determining  
political support in elections.  
4.3.2. Ethnicity and Voting during the Nationalist Movement 
Before the nationalisation efforts gained currency in Tanzania elements of ethnic fragmentation 
could never exert their dilapidating effects on the organisation of politics. Nevertheless, one cannot 
underestimate the role of the nationalist movement under TAA and TANU in sustaining such 
virtue in Tanzania as widely argued below. This is because it has dexterously mobilised the major 
social forces in Tanzania to forge a high degree of unity upon independence and created the base 
for nation-building policies that denounced the use of ethnicity for marshalling electoral support 
after independence (Malipula, 2014; Mamdani, 2013b; Weber, 2009; Illife, 1979).  
It is worth noting that from its formation throughout the 1930s and 1940s, TAA was quite weak 
and lacked a national character but was revitalised in the 1950s by the entry of young intellectuals, 
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most notably Julius Kambarage Nyerere who was elected president in 1953 (Maguire, 1969; Temu, 
1969). On the election of Mwalimu to the helm of TAA Mzee Mwiru said:  
" Mwalimu alichaguliwa na wanachama wa TAA kuwa Rais wao kutokana na  sifa zake kwani yeye kama  mtu 
anayetoka katika kabila dogo (Zanaki ), na kwakuwa mkutano huo uliompatia madaraka haukuwa  na Mzanaki 
mwingine wala wanachama wengi kutoka Musoma. Hali hii imeigwa katika chaguzi zote zilizofuata kwani 
hatujawahi kupata Rais ambaye anatoka katika kabila kubwa au aliyewekwa madarakani kwa juhudi binafsi za 
kabila lake. "( Mwiru , 2014/05/14 ). 
 
“Mwalimu was elected by TAA members to be their President on the basis of merit as he belongs to a small tribe 
(the Zanaki), and the meeting that put him to power did not have another Zanaki nor did it have many members 
from Musoma. This indeed has replicated in all elections that followed as we have never had a President who is 
from a large tribe or supported exclusively by his tribe.”    
 
TAA’s recruitment of intellectuals and the able leadership of Mwalimu marked the start of a 
massive societal integration role in the nationalist struggle. TAA achieved this by reorganising and 
merging tribal based nationalist movements spearheaded by ethnic groups, trade unions and 
cooperatives. The tribal movements reorganised by TAA for nationalist purposes during the 1940s 
and 1950s were essentially ethnic groups’ struggles against the cash-crop oriented colonial policies 
(Iliffe, 1979; Mpangala, 1999). The Sukuma Union formed in 1945, the Pare Union in 1946, the 
Chagga Kilimanjaro Union in the late 1940s, and the Meru Union in 1951 which were subsumed 
into TAA structures provide examples of tribal cooperative movements re-organised by TAA to 
forge a nationally based struggle against colonial rule that contributed towards lowering the 
salience of ethnicity on voting.  
An important point to note at this juncture is that while these “proto-nationalist organisations” 
could have developed into ethnic political parties to stand for both their economic and political 
interests, the TAA did not let that happen. This mainly because it managed to draft them into the 
mainstream nationalist movement by making them branches of TAA. The failure of the proto-
nationalist organisations to transform into fully-fledged political parties reduced the chances of 
ethnicity gaining salience in anchoring political support in elections. This is attributed to the fact 
that when the organisation of political parties was allowed, there were no ethnic parties to further 
parochial interests. Better still, TAA as the major political force in its words and deeds 
spearheaded a national agenda (Maguire, 1969). Aside from co-opting ethnic-based cooperative 
movements, TAA also skilfully managed to win over young tribal activists whose traditional 
authorities were discredited and/or manipulated by the colonial powers as exemplified in the 
colonial section above. According to my KI’s TAA’s unification of the ethnic-based forces during 
128 
 
the nationalist struggles provides a sharp difference with nationalist movements in other African 
states that were deeply polarised like Kenya and Nigeria. 
The KIs in unison presented the view that the rebranding of the TAA in the 1950s extended the 
legitimacy of the nationalist movement in Tanganyika. It made it a formidable movement for a 
cross section of the population that was against colonialism. It is worth noting that TAA is credited 
from an organisational point of view with the "organisation-is-bigger-than-individual" mantra, 
which is usually played out to undermine the indispensability of individual agency in modern 
organisations. However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that the structural and institutional 
coherence and sustainability or otherwise of organisations frequently benefit from the sanctity, 
individual brilliance and charisma of some individuals. In the Tanzanian case, Mwalimu has been 
the individual brilliant and charismatic figure that made use of every opportunity to incorporate 
factions into the nationalist movement. It is doubtful whether, without his zeal, skill and creativity, 
TAA would have enjoyed internal unity (Mamdani, 2013a). Also Nyerere’s origin as a son of a 
Chief from a small ethnic group, the Zanaki, played a crucial role in this context. This is because 
when he advocated unity, other ethnic leaders did not see him as an immediate threat to their own 
positions (Omari, 1995). The KIs told me that TAA’s elections were free to all of its members and 
no elements of ethnic discrimination were promoted. TAA’s role in nationalising the independence 
movement in Tanzania and its crusade against divisive tendencies like the use in ethnicity in voting 
was further sustained by TANU. 
As mentioned earlier the role of the TAA was further reinforced when it was transformed into a 
fully-fledged political party called TANU in 1954. TANU had three key attributes which are 
critical to furthering the PsIM and in informing the influences of ethnicity on voting in Tanzania 
(Iliffe, 1979). Firstly, TANU was unequivocally committed to the PsIM and overtly proclaimed its 
opposition to tribalism and other divisive tendencies like racism, racialism and religiosity in the 
conduct of politics including elections. Secondly, TANU allowed unions and associations (whether 
based on ethnic group or occupation) to join it and pay a “political levy”, to complement TANUs 
youth and women’s wings, which Nyerere viewed key to TANUs work. The incorporation of the  
unions and associations from varied areas and ethnic foundations bestowed the feeling of 
nationhood ahead of parochial feelings that countries like Kenya never enjoyed as their unions and 
associations were ethnically divided (Weber, 2009). Thirdly, the modus operandi of the party was 
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based on forging an inclusive elitist representation. To effect such inclusiveness the party’s 
National Executive Committee was elected by the national congress, giving considerable 
representation to the party’s base, but daily activities were carried out by elected officers and a 
Central Committee appointed by the TANU president. These presidential appointments provided 
space for Mwalimu (the then president) to appoint prominent figures from varied backgrounds 
including ethnicities. As such, it contributed in building wider national unity which militates 
against the use of ethnicity to garner political support in elections. 
The nature of the organisation of TANU and its modus operandi afforded it space to forge an 
inclusive coalition of elites that surpassed ethnic and other peace threatening divides like racial, 
religious, and occupational divides. TANU managed to implement its multi-ethnic approach and 
skilfully incorporated key figures from various ethnic groups into the movement (Omari, 1995). 
According to Omari, key leaders of ethnic groups who joined TANU included Chief Fundikira of 
the Wanyamwezi, Chief Anna Gwassa of Kasulu, Chief Therea Ntare of Heru Kasulu, and Chief 
Kasusura of Rusubi-Biharamulo. My KIs widely narrated the broadly based ethnic outlook of 
TANU ranks. In our discussions, all KIs indicated that the nationalist movement leadership not 
only incorporated tribal leaders in the movement, but also other academic elites from different 
corners of the country. As patrons or elders (wazee), these key figures and opinion leaders all had 
their networks whose support they – and indirectly the national movement - could count on and 
harness. More so, these elites were sent to mobilise support pan-territorially and not just from their 
areas of origin. The incorporation of varied ethnicities into the independence movement made 
TANU able to develop a powerful mass-based political party that mobilised thousands of peasants, 
workers and traders to the course of national independence irrespective of their ethnic orientation 
(Coulson, 1982; Iliffe, 1979). Such state of affairs made TANU appeal to all ethnic groups and win 
massively in all elections in which it participated in Tanzania before independence and beyond. 
According to Mzee Mkali, ethnicity was never considered to be the essential aspect of getting 
elected as there were people who won elections in constituencies where they do not come from. 
Election-related literature in Africa suggests that independence and the expansion of the franchise 
in many former colonies in Africa paved the way for factionalism and salience of ethnicity on 
elections (Illife, 1979). However, Iliffe excludes Tanzania from the broader African conclusion on 
grounds that the composition of the ethnic groups in Tanzania created structural impediment to the 
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use of ethnicity in influencing voters in elections. Illife’s position is predicated on the fact that 
there is no dominant ethnic group to solely wield political power and authority. Under such 
circumstances, thinking of using an ethnic ticket in Tanzania’s elections is tantamount to 
conceding defeat before a contest. Equally, and probably more important, the unified political 
posture epitomised in TANUs strong party machinery throughout Tanganyika championing for the 
wellbeing of the entire Tanzania surpassed any divisive motives, including the ethnicity that 
troubled many African states (Iliffe, 1979). This situation continued in the post-colonial era.  
4.4. Ethnicity and Voting in the Post-Colonial Tanzania  
This part endeavours to provide a concise account of the state of politics, ethnicity and voting in 
the post-colonial Tanzanian history. It discusses relevant information throughout the tenure of 
Julius Nyerere (1961-1985) which was characterised by Mwalimu’s efforts towards 
institutionalising an ideal socialist state that was predicated on the PsIM. The essence of 
prescribing the first section of the discussion on Mwalimu Nyerere’s architecture of an ideal 
socialist state is hinged on his personal and systemic leadership role in making Tanzania popularly 
described as an African state that has transcended divisions inherent in colonial set boundaries and 
state formation (Cameron and Dorman, 2009; Kaiser, 1996). Hartmann attributes the development 
to Mwalimu when he argued that Nyerere’s nation-building strategies created the Tanzanian state, 
consolidated it, and institutionalised it, so that it would give him the tools to develop an egalitarian 
political community with a common political culture that among other things denounces the use of 
ethnicity in anchoring votes (Hartmann, 1991). This section will see how the nation-building 
initiatives impacted upon the use of ethnicity in informing voting in Tanzania. Mwalimu’s era will 
be followed by an institutionalisation account of the capitalist liberal democratic market-oriented 
paradigm that mainly covers the tenures of the presidents who succeeded him. Again, the primary 
interest is to see how liberal politics and economic institutionalisation have informed the use of 
ethnicity in informing voting in Tanzania. 
4.4.1. Mwalimu's Nationalisation Mission-1961-1985 
4.4.1.1. Incorporation of Societal Organisations into the National Political Realm 
Tanzania had embarked on a broader political engineering geared towards incorporating societal 
organisations such as trade unions, parents’ associations, student groups, women’s associations, 
agricultural cooperatives into the political sphere under TANU and later CCM for purposes of 
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enhancing national unity including fighting the use of ethnicity in politics and equitably 
distributing national resources (Kelsall, 2000). Not only the societal organisations were subsumed 
in the party but TANU and later CCM were supreme to the state and the parliament (Makulilo, 
2009).  
 As a starting point, it is worth pointing out that Tanzania achieved its independence under a 
multiparty political system (Makulilo, 2008). In 1965, the interim constitution of the URT declared 
Tanzania a one party state and provided the sole party powers over the parliament and cabinet 
(Harnevik et al. 1988). The AD stood up to 1992 when the Parliament of the URT enacted the 
Political Parties Act, which reinstated multiparty politics in Tanzania’s politics in 1992. The 
adoption of one party state, though seen as the main authoritarian policy in the liberal democratic 
context, did not produce an outcry among many Tanzanians due to the unifying agenda it meant to 
serve. One of the principal arguments to support the view is that multi-party democracy provides 
room for ethnicity to determine voting as the parties themselves could be organised along ethnic 
lines (McLaughlin 2008; Ferree 2006). There were only distant voices of few elites denouncing the 
measure. Records indicate that only two prominent political elites, Kasanga Tumbo and Abdallah 
Fundikira, protested the move to political monism (Maguire, 1969). Others who protested included 
Zuberi Mtemvu who formerly ran the only prominent opposition party in the early days of 
independence and spearheaded a divisive Africanisation agenda (Illife, 1979). 
The party supremacy era was characterised by the suffocation of civil society organisations, the 
media banning of political parties and politicisation of the civil service as well as the militia 
(Lupogo, 2001; Swai, 1991). The act created a passive society as people lacked avenues to be 
critical of the system and address an alternative view (Makulilo, 2009). The process of disallowing 
political pluralism and the stifling of autonomous civic organisations were predicated on the 
pursuit for national unity, peace and promoting development-the PsIM. Rationalising this trend, 
Mwalimu Nyerere time and again argued that realisation of the twin goals of nation-building and 
economic development in the early days of independence required a united front - one that 
provides no room for ethnic polarisation in politics as it was the case during the struggle against 
colonialism (Nyerere, 1967). In other words, the democratic practices of separation of powers and 
checks and balances that open up room for different views and the use of ethnicity to mobilise 
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political support, were tantamount to retarding the unifying and developmentalist efforts of an 
infant state that had tasted overt exploitation of colonialism for decades.  
The incorporation of the societal organisations into the party never ended with the formal 
institutions. The practice also had a hand in traditional systems that had implications for ethnicity 
and voting in Tanzania. In this regard, traditional leaders who were highly weakened during the 
pre-independence period and hoped to regain some authority at independence were stripped of all 
official powers and their powers went to politically appointed commissioners at the Regional and 
district levels which did not honour the traditional areas of the defunct chiefs’ jurisdictions. This 
act according to Miguel (2002) reduced the political mobilising role of ethnicity in elections. 
Miguel’s position can be understood from a neo-patrimonialist view as the Chiefs (Patrons) could 
be at the centre of mobilising the use of ethnicity on anchoring votes as the patrons had powers and 
access to resources for practising clientelism. It is imperative to note that while tribal authorities 
were disbanded, customary law was maintained though adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law. 
This partially symbolised respect of customs albeit the recognition that keeping the traditional 
authority intact was also detrimental to nation-building as it could among others ruin the idea of a 
nation, or indeed fuel the use of ethnicity in voting. An interesting question related to the 
maintenance of customary law that should concern the hybrid theorists would be why the 
customary issues did not come up and influence traditional practices to use ethnicity in voting? 
The answer could be that the customary practices never integrated electoral experience as no 
elections were held before colonialism. Also, the nationalist movement and post-independent 
governments have proven to be strictly against the use of ethnicity on voting by words and deeds, 
as argued above and further pinpointed below. 
The abolition of chieftain authority, followed by the prohibition of the establishment of ethnic 
associations and by the promulgation of one party rule, barred the formal chance of creating 
ethnic-based political following (Deutsch, 1996). In all of my KIIs it was maintained that TANU 
and CCM governments under Mwalimu severely restrained ethnic sentiments and interests by all 
means. They shared the view that he was ready even to use force when it was necessary. Mzee 
Mkali in an interview unveiled: 
"Wakati wowote wanasiasa bila kujali nafasi zao walitamka maneno yanayoashiria mvuto wakikabila katika umma 
kushinda uchaguzi na vyombo vya chama vikasikia, hatua kubwa zilizochukuliwa dhidi ya mwanasiasa husika, 
hivyo ilikuwa vigumu sana kutumia ukabila kuwashawishi wapiga kura." ( Mkali , 2013/10/03 ). 
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 “Whenever politicians regardless of their portfolio uttered ethnic sentiments in public to win electoral support and 
the party machinery heard, serious measures were taken against the politician in question, so ethnicity was barely 
used to influence voters.”  
 
Despite the fact that political monism and the ruling party’s anti-ethnic crusade guaranteed 
suppression of formal interparty tribal politics, there is a school of thought suggesting that 
ethnicity still existed in Tanzania’s political life. Supporters of this school argue that ethnicity has 
always played a part in local level politics. In the main, the school contends that while ethnic 
sentiments have been zero-tolerated at the national level, the same cannot be said at the local level 
as efforts were made to ensure ethnic representation in the party organs of that level. Scholars in 
this school include Glickman (1995), Jerman (1997), and Omari (1997). The argument made by 
this school requires contemplation, because it could hardly apply to situations where most 
constituencies’ contestants are of the same tribal orientation. The kind of ethnicity relevant in such 
context would be intra-ethnic. It could only be inter-ethnic in cosmopolitan constituencies with 
several ethno-cultural groups, such as when indigenous ethnic groups compete with other groups 
residing in the constituency. However, given the fact that the party had a definite structure and 
committed to discouraging political mobilisation on the basis of ethnic loyalties, one would hardly 
expect this exception to be rampant. The words of Mzee Mwiru suffice to clear this doubt:  
“Japo TANU haikuwa na rasilimali nyingi siku za mwanzo za uhuru, daima ilikuwa na njia za kuwasiliana ili 
kuhakikisha kuwa kanuni za msingi za umoja zinaheshimiwa kutoka ngazi ya taifa hadi ngazi za chini. Ni 
dhahiri kwamba baadhi ya taarifa zilichelewa kufika ngazi ya kitaifa, hata hivyo, tulikuwa na ngazi za 
utendaji kwenye wilaya na mkoa na viongozi ambao walikuwa na mamlaka ya kuwashughulikia wanasiasa 
wanaotumia hisia za kikabila kuhamasisha kuungwa mkono katika uchaguzi. Chama kilitumia vyombo vyake 
vyote na vyombo vya serikali ili kupata taarifa muhimu za kushughulikia mambo yanayoweza kuleta 
mgawanyiko kwenye nchi na watu walitoa mchango muhimu katika kuwezesha vyombo hivi kupata 
mafanikio." ( Mwiru , 2014/05/14 ).  
 “TANU although never having a lot of resources in the early days of independence always had a way of 
communicating to ensure that the basic principles of unity were always respected from the national to the 
local level. Indeed, some information reached late the national level. However, we had functional district and 
regional structures and leaders who had mandate to address politicians using ethnic sentiments to mobilise for 
electoral support. The party used all organs it had and government instruments to get necessary information to 
address divisive elements in the country and people played a key role in making them successful.”   
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The words of Mzee Mwiru suggest deliberate efforts were made to fight ethnic salience in 
influencing voting. To corroborate Mzee Mwiru’s views it is worth pointing out that TANU 
adopted a series of further measures to rule out the exploitation of ethnic ties to determine electoral 
choices. The efforts include, but were not limited to, ensuring that civil servants and, at least, half 
of students attending secondary school serve and study in districts other than the one they hail or 
grew up in respectively (Heilman and John, 2012; Kaya, 2004; Maguire, 1969). In the same vein, 
the government reinforced policies begun under the German and British colonial administrations to 
promote Swahili as the language of instruction in primary schools and the language of government 
(Sigala, 2009). At the time, substantial resources were devoted to spreading literacy in Swahili, the 
national language, which as in the nationalistic liberation era was key in furthering national unity 
among Tanzania’s ethnic groups. The continuous use of Swahili as a national language reinforced 
nationhood as the language has no overarching connection to any particular ethnic group(s). In this 
regard, Swahili was consciously employed to facilitate national integration and communication 
across ethnic groups. The language developed “political idioms, which has fostered the 
development of national political culture” (Barkan, 1994). Concepts like Ujamaa (family hood), 
amani na utulivu (peace and tranquillity), umoja ni nguvu (unity is strength), Kidole kimoja 
hakivunji chawa (One finger cannot pinch lice) or Fimbo ya mnyonge ni umoja (the stick of the 
weak is unity) are but a few Swahili idioms that are so central to explaining Tanzania’s political 
culture that denounces divisive and violent tendencies.  
According to my KIs Swahili facilitated inter-elite communication that significantly contributed to 
the saliency of national identity and to cross-ethnic accommodation. It is worth stressing that 
Swahili is the primary language to most Tanzanians. This is mainly because English and other 
foreign languages are only spoken by elites in their circles. Also, to many urban youth who do not 
necessarily speak the vernaculars of their parents due to the cosmopolitan nature of urban settings 
and inter-tribal marriages, the sole language of communication is Swahili. Tanzanians in all of the 
25 regions constituting the Tanzanian state and in all social strata speak fluent Swahili with 
pleasure and pride as a genuinely national language that helps knit their country together across 
ethnic boundaries. The role of Swahili in enhancing national unity at the material time was 
complemented by national cultural festivals and competitions in the creation of an overarching 
sense of identity (Maguire, 1969). All these efforts in a way militated against the rise of ethnic 
salience that could impact voters’ choices as such influence would have been against the 
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integrating efforts that were much entrenched because of the commitment of the political 
leadership.  My interviews with the journalists involved in the study suggest that all of the nation-
building policies discussed in this section were further cemented by the maintenance of a 
monolithic political order highly publicised by a dominant state media and institution of an 
inclusive democratic order for two decades. 
4.4.1.2. Maintenance of the Monolithic Order: Situational Democracy and Inclusiveness 
The discussion related to the centralisation of political authority in Tanzania made above does 
indeed suggest clear patterns of despotism if one zero in elements of political pluralism (Makulilo, 
2012). However, Dashwood and Pratt (1999) argue that TANU’s consolidation into a powerful 
ruling party intertwined with the Tanzanian state was one of the major achievements in fighting 
divisive elements like politicisation of ethnicity that affected other African states. This position is 
anchored on grounds that the entanglement of TANU and the state hinged upon a meticulous 
combination of centralisation of political authority in the hands of TANU and inclusive 
cooperation and co-optation of notables in the exercise of political power and authority. In the 
words of Dashwood and Pratt (1999), the supremacy of TANU established an:   
“original set of political institutions that were sufficiently participatory and democratic as to limit the risk of the 
regime’s becoming severely authoritarian and corrupt, but not too open as to threaten Tanzania’s still fragile unity 
or weaken prematurely the integrating and energising capabilities of the nationalist movement”.  
 
Inferably, Dashwood and Pratt are of the view that the monolithic political order guaranteed 
achievement of the PsIM and its positive impact on denouncing the use of ethnicity on anchoring 
electoral votes. Dashwood and Pratt argued that the monolithic political dispensation in Tanzania 
provided democratic space and ensured that tribalism is disallowed as a means of mobilising 
electoral support (Pratt, 1976). Although out of the scope of the study, it is worth noting that in the 
name of the PsIM candidates were not allowed to use religious, racial and regional appeals to win 
votes. Also, as a means of avoiding class differences that can make poor people loose elections, 
candidates were barred from using their private money and other means for campaigning purposes 
(Dashwood and Pratt, 1999). All of these initiatives meant to ensure national integration which 
provides a stumbling block for the significance of ethnicity on the determination of voters’ 
choices.  
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With regard to inclusiveness, TANU in the early days of independence maintained the inclusive 
elite coalition that was largely representative of ethnic and regional divisions (Mc Gowan and 
Wacirah, 1974).  Informed by findings based on sample of 705 elites covering the period from 
1963 to 1968, McGowan and Wacirah, reveal that the composition of Tanzania’s government 
included 37 % of all of the total ethnic groups present in the country (120), and none of the 
pronounced ethnic groups enjoyed serious overrepresentation. As for regional representativeness 
McGowan and Wacirah further contend that all regions were represented in the national 
leadership, even though the northern regions (Kilimanjaro, Tanga, and West Lake) benefited from 
slightly overrepresentation. Mwalimu’s first Cabinet presented in the photo below, included 
members from varied backgrounds and social settings; and was multi-racial. It included local 
Chiefs as represented by Chief Fundikira-the then Minister for Cooperative and Trade Union, 
movement activists as represented by Mr. Paul Bomani, the then Minister for Agriculture, and Mr. 
Rashid  Mfaume Kawawa, the then Minister without Portfolio respectively. The Cabinet also was 
accommodative for non-Africans as it provided space for Europeans and Tanganyikans of Asian 
origins. The inclusion of two Europeans Sir Ernest Vasey, the then Minister for Finance, and Mr. 
Derrick Bryceson, the then Minister for Health and Labour, as well as Mr. Amir Jamal, the then 
Minister for Communications, Power and Works, attests to this fact.   
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The First Cabinet
46
of Independent Tanganyika 
An important point to make about the multi-racial first cabinet of the newly independent 
Tanganyika is that the Europeans worked for a short time. They were partly serving the interests of 
the departing colonialists who by and large were still financing the country and were in charge of 
the army. At the same time, they were preparing for the indigenous to takeover. The inclusion of 
Tanzanians with Asian origin has been normal in Tanzanian politics. For instance, Hon. Jamal (far 
right, seated in the photo above), is the first of many
47
 Tanzanians of Asian origin to serve in 
Nyerere’s cabinet and varied political portfolios. Jamal has been a long-serving cabinet member, 
who has served in the powerful portfolio of the Minister for Finance for several times (1965-1972, 
1975-77, 1979-80 and 1980-83). He also served as a Minister for Industries and Trade and 
Communications and Works and the Commissioner of Planning - often being named to posts or 
ministries needing difficult management and self-less commitment (Centre for Global 
Negotiations, 22nd March 1995, Retrieved on 23rd May 2013; sunsonline.org. 23 March 1995, 
Retrieved on 23rd May 2013). He continued to hold high office beyond Nyerere’s retirement in 
1985, including a five year stint as Tanzania’s Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva from 
1988 to 1993 upon President Ally Hassan Mwinyi’s appointment. Amir Jamal’s  close working 
relationship with retired President Nyerere continued as he became his personal representative 
when Mwalimu Nyerere was Chairman of the South Commission and then on the South Centre, 
and the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation of Uppsala, Sweden. Amir Jamal was continually re-
elected to Parliament by his Morogoro constituents with ever greater margins from 1965-1980 
                                                 
46
 Standing from left to right are Mr. Job Lusinde-Minister for Local Government, Rashid Kawawa-Minister without 
Portfolio, Mr. Nsilo Swai- Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mr. 0scar Kambona- Minister for Education, Tewa S. 
Tewa- Minister for Lands and Surveys, and Mr. Iain Macleod- Britain's Colonial Secretary. Sitting from left to right 
are Mr. Paul. Bomani, Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Chief Abdallah Fundikira-Minister for Legal Affairs, Mwalimu 
Julius Nyerere –the Right Prime Minister, Sir. Ernest Vasey-Minister for Finance and Mr. Amir Jamal- Minister for 
Communications, Power and Works. Two Ministers, Mr Geogre Kahama – Minister for Home Affairs - and Mr. 
Dereck Bryceson, Minister for Health and Labour are not in the Picture.  
47
 Other cabinet members of Asian origin include but not limited to: Al Noor Kassum – the then Minister for Energy, 
current Chancellor Sokoine University of Agriculture; Shamim Khan-the then Deputy Minister responsible for 
Community Development, Gender and Children Affairs. Other key political and bureaucratic figures at the time 
include; late Mahmood Nasser Rattansy, the former Tabora MP, and the country’s Ambassador to The Hague and 
France; Akber Salehe, the only South Asian elected Member of Parliament of the Mafia constituency and Wolfgang 
Dourado, former Attorney General of Zanzibar (The African, Tanzania on 2 October 2003). 
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despite not being a Luguru, the original ethnic group of the constituency that he represented for a 
decade and a half. This was the case while members of his racial group comprised less than 1 % of 
the population (Tanzania soko; Retrieved on 23rd May 2013). Jamal’s successive political career 
provides a testament to Tanzania’s success in making its polity a truly non-ethnic and/or racial 
based electoral community. We should add that Morogoro has a tradition of is used to be led by 
non-Lugurus as Jamal was succeeded by Shamim Parker Khan, another Tanzanian of Asian origin 
grown up, working and chiefly residing in Morogoro. It is equally worth noting that even 
Mwalimu, a Black Tanzanian hailing from Mara, a region found in the northern part of the country 
also represented the eastern constituency of Morogoro after defeating the Luguru Chief Kunambi. 
Currently, the constituency is represented by a Tanzanian of Asian origin - Abdulaziz Abood after 
a spell of 10 years without Asians in that office from 1995-2005. 
The inclusiveness depicted above and the citizen debate that took place few days before 
independence in 1961 raises an important question on aspects of the politics of origin and 
belonging that are at the core of this dissertation. The inclusion of non-Tanzanians in the cabinet 
and the citizen debate in the National Assembly (NA) raised the question whether citizenship 
should be based on race or residence (Larson and Aminzade, 2007). TANU upholding the 
inclusive national character of the PsIM stood for the latter; while its opponent African National 
Congress (ANC) for the former (Taylor, 1963). According to Larson and Aminzade (2007) during 
the debate, the ANC called for priority for “indigenous inhabitants” over “other races that have 
made their homes in Tanganyika” depicting a position that pure origin is more important than 
perceived feelings of belonging gained by residence, ownership of land and other aspects put 
forward by Chabal. Nyerere is said to have lost his temper, most uncharacteristically, and 
denounced his opponents sharply in a manner that depicts the centrality of aspects of belonging. 
Nyerere called his racialist opponents, “little Hitlers” (cited in Iliffe, 1979: 572). Mamdani further 
revealed that Nyerere argued in the debate that: 
 “If we are going to base citizenship on colour, we will commit a crime. Discrimination against human beings 
because of their colour is exactly what we have been fighting against … We glorify human beings, not colour” 
(Mamdani, 2013b). 
 
Due to TANU’s majority in the NA Nyerere defended a notion of “political citizenship” that 
accorded political rights to people regardless of their racial origin (Iliffe, 1979). As a result, a law 
was passed in 1965 allowing non-citizens to vote if they have five years residence. This epitomises 
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TANUs seriousness in its fight against racialism and unifying Tanzanians. Under such 
circumstance, it can be inferred that TANU’s emphasis on national unity went beyond unifying 
ethnicities in a way defined in the conceptual chapter, to add aspects of origin and belonging that 
constitute flashes of ethnicity in this dissertation. Such development explains the inclusion of 
several Tanzanians of Asian origin in political positions. This warrants them an opportunity to 
actively participating in a polity while they constitute a minority population-wise. In this regard, 
the role of ethnicity on voting was limited: the numbers of the minority ethnic groups in 
constituencies could not have won in ethnic-based voting. 
4.4.1.3. Economic Inclusiveness: The Bone of Contention 
The discussions above indicate that social and political domains were inclusive and created an 
environment for denouncing the use of ethnicity in voting through the inculcation of a strong sense 
of national unity. However, the greatest challenge of the post-independent era was to make the 
economy national, equitable and inclusive as the PsIM pledged. The challenge is attributed to the 
colonial economic architect that put the economy in foreign hands as highlighted earlier (Harnevik, 
1993). An important step taken was to nationalise the major means of production and distribution 
including land (Hyden 1980). The nationalisation and subsequent EDNR was quite vital to dilude 
broad societal divisions among the indigenous and foreigners and inequalities between ethnic 
groups and/ or regions in the country then (Harnevik, 1993). In other words nationalisation was 
critical to minimise “horizontal inequalities”, that is, inter-group inequalities that are arguably 
more conducive to large-scale violent conflict and misunderstanding than interpersonal (or 
“vertical”) inequalities (Stewart, 2000). In electoral terms, nationalisation meant reducing inter-
ethnic competition for political office resulting from horizontal inequalities informed by the 
divisive economic structures set by the colonialists. Cognisant of this fact a socialist-oriented 
philosophy in the name of the AD was promulgated to reverse the inequalities. Below we look at 
the AD from an ethnicity and voting point of view as informed by the PsIM. 
4.4.1.4. The AD Era  
 The AD of 1967 in this study is understood as a response to the political and economic 
contradictions within the post-colonial state impacted by the exploitative colonial legacy and 
Tanzanians mounting ambitions of enjoying the political and economic fruits of independence 
(Shivji, 2013). This broad view is preferred to the narrow views that look at the AD from the 
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perspective of interest-based conflicts within TANU elites some subscribing to the position that 
economic and political gains of independence shall go to Tanzanians of African origin alone and 
those who do not subscribe to the same (Hyden, 1980). At its core, the AD laid bare Nyerere’s 
vision of a socialist society, emphasising national unity, respect human equality and dignity, public 
ownership, self-reliance as well as the importance of agriculture and rural development (Mesaki 
and Malipula, 2011). It informed radical transformative policies – most notably large-scale 
nationalisation of the major means of production and distribution (previously owned by foreigners) 
and villagisation in the 1970s. The nationalisation and villagisation process in its broader sense 
entailed empowerment of the indigenous Tanzanians (Shivji, 2013; Mwiru, 2013; Lofchie, 2013). 
For instance, nationalisation and villagisation informed enhanced education opportunities to the 
indigenous in the villages through a universal primary education programme that wanted all kids 
of schooling age to be enrolled. The same can be said for health services. Nationalisation also 
informed Africanisation of the civil service by substituting the dominantly Asian and/or 
Tanzanians with Asian origin staffed civil service with Black Africans. Likewise, nationalisation 
meant to create patriotic nationalistic feelings among the Tanzanian youth through compulsory 
National Service military training programmes (Lofchie, 2013). All these initiatives as argued 
above militated against ethnic salience in politics as none was ethnic biased. Inferably, these 
initiatives had significant impact on furthering the PsIMs and the way ethnicity influences voting 
in Tanzania as discussed below. 
 
The AD through the nationalisation of the major means of production and distribution enhanced 
national integration and avoided class related conflicts and divisions which according to Wimmer 
(1997) potentially fuel ethnic polarisation and voting. The AD has enhanced national integration 
through nationalisation of the previously foreign own companies which broadened its capacity to 
distribute national resources equitably among regions (Khan and Gray, 2006). In the main, the 
establishment of parastatals meant to reduce fleeing of profits from the country; expanding 
investment in productive sectors, and strengthening infrastructure in the country enhanced the 
redistribution capacity (Coulson, 1982). The implementation of nationalisation within the 
monolithic dispensation highlighted above brought significant change in the direction of societal 
development and unity in Tanzania. It essentially made the TANU and later CCM leadership, the 
bureaucrats and the social base of the nationalist movement to work and grow together closely 
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(Harnevik, 1993). In this way, the colonial set exploitative capitalist development divisions that 
would have been a blessing to the Asian and European businessmen, and slightly to the minute 
class of indigenous African were reversed (Khan and Gray, 2006).Thus enhancing social 
integration among ethnicities and avoiding class related conflicts and divisions in the competition 
for state power. Mzee Mwiru was of the view that:  
"Bila juhudi mahususi za kukabiliana na matabaka ya kiuchumi kupitia Azimio la Arusha, Tanzania ingeweza 
kufungua Pandora box kuruhusu mambo yote yanayoleta mgawanyiko katika jamii ikiwemo matumizi ya ukabila 
katika uchaguzi jambo ambalo lingeathiri vibaya misingi mikuu ya dola la Watanzania - amani na utulivu, umoja 
wa kitaifa na mgawanyo sawa wa rasilimali za umma."(Mwiru, 2014/05/14).  
 
“Without deliberate efforts put to curb the rise of economic classes through the AD, Tanzania would have opened a 
Pandora box freeing all divisive elements including ethnicity in elections which would have negatively impacted 
on peremptory norms of the Tanzanian state-peace and tranquillity, national unity and equitable distribution of the 
spoils of the state.” 
   
The high degree of state intervention in the economy through the parastatals created vacancies for 
African elites as well as accommodated ethnic and regional cleavages that the few political 
openings could not accommodate. In this context, the AD equitably distributed the fruits of 
independence to the countries elites. This concretised elite unity and thereby contributed to 
political stability and national integration as opposed to ethnic salience in voting. According to 
Ngasongwa, one of my KIs, the AD is responsible for making Tanzanians feel economic control 
and made it possible for the state to distribute equitably the national cake as the PsIM wished. He 
further was of the view that: 
"... Azimio la Arusha limefifisha nafasi ya ukabila katika upigaji wa kura kwa sababu moja ya sifa kuu ya 
kugombea au kuteuliwa kushika nafasi muhimu ya kisiasa au kitaalaamu ni kupinga matumizi ya ukabila na 
mambo mengine yanayogawanya watu katika siasa na jamii. Hali hii ilibidi ithibitishwa kwa maneno ya mtu na 
matendo yake,  kwa hivyo, watu walipata viongozi ambao hawawezi kueneza ukabila na wachache ambao 
walifanya hivyo, walishughulikiwa na vyombo vya dola vilivyopewa majukumu na chama na serikali ya 
kuhakikisha umoja wa kitaifa."(Ngasongwa, 2014/05/23). 
 
 “...the AD has diffused the role of ethnicity in voting because one central qualification for contesting for or being 
appointed to hold a strategic political or technical position was being against the use of ethnicity and other divisive 
elements in politics and society. This had to be proven by one’s words and deeds and, therefore, the people get 
leaders who cannot propagate ethnicity and few who would, were dealt with by state apparatuses which were 
assigned the role of ensuring national unity by the party and government”  
 
Apart from nationalisation of the foreign owned economic ventures, Tanzania created communal 
village production units to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth accrued from 
agricultural produce between commercial farmers and peasants. It is against this that Tanzania 
created communal village production units, sometimes forcefully, to explicitly reverse the 
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dominance of large farmers in the agriculture sector. The disparity of agricultural gains was a 
lingering problem from the colonial economic set-up and the failure of the early post-independence 
period to reverse the colonial sin in the agriculture sector (Hyden, 1980: 96). The income accrued 
from villagisation enabled redistribution of economic gains to meet TANU’s intent of recording 
equitable development among people and regions to enhance national unity and avoid ethnic 
salience in politics.  
 
The villagisation policy in Tanzania so far is the largest resettlement effort known to have been 
implemented in the history of Africa with about 5 million Tanzanian rural inhabitants being 
resettled in Ujamaa villages (Hyden, 1980: 129). By 1977, there were 7684 villages involving a 
total of 13 million people Coulson (1982: 242), compared to 1956 with around 2 million people in 
1970 (Hyden, 1980:129). TANU as the political force in the country assumed a vigorous role in 
village creation by mounting explicit campaigns against capitalist farming. As a consequence of 
villagisation and nationalisation of settlers’ farms, European capitalist farmers especially those 
settled in Arusha and Kilimanjaro Regions had to leave the country marking the end of capitalist 
farming in Tanzania. Villagisation and nationalisation contained even the emerging African large 
scale farmers. As such, the two enhanced the state’s hold of the economy and its ability to divide 
or unite Tanzanians. This is because it was the custodian of the nationalised assets on behalf of the 
Tanzanian people as well as the villagisation programme that meant to improve social service 
delivery (Harnevik, 1993). A lot is documented of the positive role of villagisation in improving 
social services. 
 
It is worth noting that universal primary education and adult education programmes were 
established and health facilities in almost all villages built. This complemented the large hospitals 
that are accessed by few urban people. The government at the time channelled around 16 per cent 
of its budget to education. As a result, literacy increased from 10 per cent in 1960 to 30 per cent in 
1970 and 70 per cent by the end of the 1970s (Klugman et al. 1999: 85). By 1985 literacy rate went 
up to 90 percent (Ndulu, 1994). The health developments raised the life expectancy and reduced 
child mortality substantially (Klugman et al. 1999: 85) According to Wangwe, life expectance at 
birth improved from 41 years in 1960 to 52 years in 1980. Also, infant mortality declined from 146 
per thousand live births in 1960 to 120 per thousand live births in 1980 (Wangwe, 2005:11). 
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The income accrued from agriculture during the period was redistributed according to the overall 
TANU intent of equitable development among regions. The villages being the focal points and 
since ethnic groups are found within the villages they also had access to state resources. However, 
there is evidence that local elites typically benefited disproportionately from villagisation policies 
as they were the mangers of development in the villages and regional imbalances were maintained 
among peasants (Coulson, 1982: 246.). For instance the cash income of smallholders in Tanga, 
Kilimanjaro and Arusha were consistently high between 1969 and 1975, the cash income of 
regions like Kigoma, Mtwara, Lindi, Mwanza, Ruvuma, Coast, and Dodoma, which are considered 
of lesser development than these (yet still middle class regions in relation to the rest), were 
consistently reduced by nearly 20 per cent; an even more dwindling trend of cash income loss of 
50 percent was reported for the poor regions (Coulson, 1982: 197). The government managed to 
heal the wounds by equitably distributing social infrastructure to the economically disadvantaged 
regions in the country (Hyden, 1980: 122). However, although villagisation enhanced EDNR, 
comparatively advanced farmers in Mwanza region never supported the exercise and returned to 
their original lands (mahame) due to land erosion and spaces to limited space to keep their cattle 
among others. This said, they still benefitted from the services made possible by villagisation and 
interacted with villagers in social and cultural affairs that bound them. In this regard, a divide 
between the economic and societal benefits of the villagisation among the comparatively poor and 
rich can be drawn. However, the social reality of villagisation cannot. The poor and the rich took 
their kids to the same schools and health centres in the villages. The rich also sold their produce in 
the villages and participated in all cultural endeavours. 
Since our study is interested in ethnicity and voting, it is worthwhile to look into the debate as far 
as villagisation and ethnicity are concerned. The overriding literature on the matter suggests that 
relocations through villagisation have enhanced national unity in Tanzania as people from different 
ethnic groups were put together in one village (Klugman et al. 1999). To Klugman et al. such 
arrangement diffuses the original ethnic identities of the members forming the new village. This is 
because to their view the broader but fluid ethnic groups formed are incapable of mobilising votes 
and politicising their previous ethnic identities in favour of the new one. As much as Klugman et 
al.’s position might be logically appealing, a critical empirical consideration regarding the ethnic 
belonging of the people put together in the Ujamaa villages renders the argument questionable. 
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This position is anchored on the fact that while millions of Tanzanians were relocated into villages, 
the villages’ creation collected families within an average of around 5 square kilometres from their 
original households. Therefore, it would be an over-exaggeration to believe that within such space 
in rural areas there is a cosmopolitan ethnic base for ethnic blending (Martin, 1988). Martin’s 
stance points to the fact that villagisation has, more often than not, assembled together wider 
number of isolated households belonging to members of the same ethnic groups. In this regard, the 
view of Klugman et al. on ethnic attenuation is more applicable to urban settings which were not 
an integral part of the massive villagisation project. Seemingly in partial support of the two 
opposing stances on the role of villagisation on ethnicity, Hyden reports that there are some 
villages that took on board more than one ethnic group but the result of them teaming up was 
violent conflict over land. The fight between members of the Nyaturu and the Barabaig ethnic 
groups over land rights resulting from the enforced movement of people into villages substantiates 
the conflictual nature of villagisation that blended ethnic groups (Hyden, 1980). Such conflictual 
relations could create a basis for competing ethnicities in elections. 
 
A critical look at the arguments made on the role of villagisation on ethnicity suggests that the 
various views are complementary to each other. While Klugman et al. attribute villagisation to 
detribalisation, Martins is of the view that blending cannot satisfactorily explain minimisation of 
ethnic divisions and Hyden further looks into material conditions in place to ensure smooth 
blending of ethnic groups. In other words, the role of villagisation on ethnicity requires an eclectic 
analysis to be well understood. However, based on Martin’s critique and Hyden’s limited case of 
interethnic mingling, villagisation might have worked more significantly in solidifying intra-ethnic 
differences than interethnic divides. This is because the villagers were mainly from a single ethnic 
group. However, as indicated earlier for tribalism to gain currency in effecting voting, it has to be 
politicised, an act that was against the very intent of villagisation -enhancing unity and equitable 
distribution of public services and the overall objects of the AD as explained above. In this regard, 
villagisation through its communal nature and EDNR component militated against the 
politicisation of ethnicity. This is said cognisant of the comparatively advanced farmers in the 
Mwanza negative view of villagisation informed by their economic interests that forced them back 
to their original lands (mahame). This is partly because they were from a similar ethnic group and 
benefitted from the services made possible by villagisation. Also, they interacted with villagers in 
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social and cultural affairs that bound them. As such, competitive division necessary for 
politicisation of ethnicity hardly existed. 
 
4.4.1.5. Synthesis of the Nationalisation Era 
The AD was the key economic signpost of Tanzania’s postcolonial political and economic 
development based on Nyerere’s Ujamaa that stressed social welfare rights and equitable 
development. It marked the intricacies of an independent state responding to expectations of 
independent citizenry amid divisive colonial economic legacy. The nationalisation of the major 
economic assets made Tanzania relatively sovereign economically by ceasing the Asian and 
European hold on the economy. It granted the state the economic muscles to equitably distribute 
economic gains and exercise nationalised patron-client relations as resources were nationally 
distributed. It was believed that EDNR could ensure political stability, peace and limit divisive 
element like the use of ethnicity in voting.  Tanzania’s socialist development endeavours under 
Ujamaa as experimented through the AD failed and liberalism came into force in late 1980s. This 
is when Tanzania felt a myriad of economic problems and pressure from the Breton wood 
institutions to undergo ideological reorientation from the Ujamaa to liberal democratic market-
oriented economic and political reforms (Wangwe, 2005). Nonetheless considerable progress was 
made in nation-building. At that point in time, the post-independent government exemplified its 
dedication to the idea of building an inclusive national identity and averting the politicisation of 
ethnic identities in voting in their words and deeds. Indeed, the efforts put into nation-building 
were noble to the extent that they were widely embraced by Tanzanians throughout the country. 
The use of Swahili in governance and as a medium of instruction in primary schools, coupled by 
national cultural festivals and competitions, the policy of stationing public servants of other 
geographical and ethnic origins in other villages/districts/regions of Tanzania ensured ethnic 
diversification of the polity. As such, the initiatives contributed in cementing Tanzania’s distinct 
national identity over ethnic ones. The inclusive appointment approach exercised by Nyerere 
stroke a workable balance of social forces, ethnic groups and regions indicating efforts towards 
unifying Tanzanians and denouncing ethnicity as a means of mobilising political support. Actually, 
in general terms, the less fortunate have been equitably reaping the advantages through AD 
policies. For instance, disadvantaged regions through EDNR mostly gained through resources 
mobilised from other parts of the country. Similarly, smaller ethnic group disproportionately 
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outweighed the bigger ones in the allocation of public offices (Nyang’oro, 2004). This is a clear 
attest to equitable distribution of public responsibilities for national integrity. All of the efforts 
made under the dictates of the AD barred ethnicity from becoming salient in voting. This is 
attributed to the fact that the declaration virtually curtailed ethnic-based divisive and exploitative 
tendencies that according to Wimmer can trigger ethnic political canvassing and voting. As 
indicated earlier AD survived until the late 1980s when Tanzania economic problems warranted 
liberal democratic market-oriented economic and political reforms. These reforms brought in fears 
of nation-building and the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes (Mmuya, 1998; 2000; Gasarasi, 
1997; Campbell, 1992).  
4.5. Ethnicity and Voting in the Economic and Political Liberation Era  
4.5.1. Economic Liberalisation, Ethnicity and Voting 
In the 1980s Tanzania like many African countries was forced to embark on IMF and World Bank 
liberal democratic market-oriented economic reforms. The reforms meant to reverse the ailing 
economic hurdles associated with the failure of the Ujamaa driven centralised economic system, 
the war with Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1979, coupled with drought, productivity problems, and a 
mounting national debt (Mwiru, 2013; Heilman and John, 2012). Mzee Ngasongwa in an interview 
likened the economic hurdles of the day to a bombshell that hit hard the country’s economy. He 
further alluded that its impact is responsible for the fall of the AD and the rise of the current liberal 
economic and political policies Tanzania implements today. 
The rise of liberalism presented a blow to the economic and political fundamentals of AD that 
intended to mobilise material resources for actualising the PsIM- national unity, EDNR and peace 
(Baregu, 1994). In the views of Mzee Mkali and Mzee Mwiru, liberalisation meant to bring back 
the foreign and domestic forces that benefitted from the colonial exploitative economic structure 
through privatisation and cost sharing in service delivery. Such practices sow the seeds of class 
division as depicted by the differences of social services accessed by different people in the 
society, whereby the rich due to their ability to pay got better services compared to the poor. 
Similar views are put forward by Klugman et al. (1999) who argues that liberalism defeated 
Mwalimu and TANU’s efforts towards the creation of an ethnic free socialist society. They argue 
that TANU’s principles of equality and respect for human dignity as well as EDNR were defeated 
by liberalisation dictates of privatisation and cost sharing. To Klugman et al. liberalism 
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emphasised individualism and competition in elections. As a result, classes based on the haves and 
the have not’s emerged in electoral politics. Nevertheless, these classes did not have ethnic 
features. They were mainly economic-based.   
The views of Mzee Mkali, Mzee Mwiru and Klugman et al. suggest that liberal economic reforms 
presented chances for reinstitution of capitalistic ethos in Tanzania’s polity. And such ethos has 
had several negative impacts that took away even what had been achieved by the AD as discussed 
above. The issues that were affected in relation to nation-building and ethnicity and voting from an 
economic viewpoint are summarised in an extensive quote from Mzee Ngasongwa:  
"Mageuzi ya kiliberali yamewapa uwezo wafanyabiashara watanzania wenye asili ya Asia  nafasi ya juu katika 
umiliki wa uchumi, na mamlaka ya kushiriki kikamilifu katika siasa kwa sababu matumizi ya fedha binafsi 
zinaruhusiwa katika kampeni. Pia, kwa jina la uliberali vyama mbalimbali vya kijamii vyeny mlengo wa kikabila  
katika vyuo vikuu na maeneo mengine vimeshamiri  na wanasiasa wanashiriki mara kwa mara katika hafla 
wanazoziandaa. Mimi binafsi wamenialika mara kadhaa lakini nikawakatalia. Nawajua watu ambao walikuwa 
wanagombea nafasi za kisiasa ambayo walitumia vyama hivyo kujiombea kura. Ukiniuliza kama walifanikiwa 
katika nafasi walizoomba kwa sababu ya kujinasibisha na vyama hivi? Jibu langu litakuwa Hapana! Hii  ni 
kwakuwa msingi uliowekwa na waasisi wetu upo imara na ni vigumu sana kuuvunja hasa miongoni mwa watu wa 
vijijini walioishi Azimio na kufaidika na utekelezaji wa sera zake za usawa ukilinganisha na watu wa mijini. Hata 
hivyo hii haina maana kwamba kulikuwa hakuna matukio yaliyojaribu kutikisha hii misingi. "(Ngasongwa , 
2014/05/23). 
 
 “Liberal reforms gave power to the Tanzanian businessmen of Asian origin an upper hold on the economy, and 
power to actively participate in politics because the use of private money is allowed in campaigning. Also, in the 
name of liberalism ethnic-based associations in universities and other places mushroomed and politicians graced 
several occasions organised by them. Personally I have been invited time and again but turned down. I know 
several people who were vying for political vacancies who used such associations to win votes. If you ask me 
whether their bids were successful because of appealing to these associations for support? My answer will be No! 
This is because the foundation of the forefathers was too strong to break particularly among the rural people who 
lived the AD and benefitted from its implementation in a more egalitarian way than the urbanities. However this 
does not mean there were no incidences that tempted to dent the foundations.”  
 
The views of Ngasongwa notwithstanding, literature suggests that despite the liberal reforms, 
President Mwinyi’s leadership maintained the inclusive character of the previous government. The 
core elements of Mwalimu’s unifying efforts like the fight against ethnic and regional 
discrimination were maintained (Ole Therkildsen, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2004; Kelsall, 2002).  That is 
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to say, the fall of the AD never meant the end of key aspects of national unity and identity which 
as indicated above limited the influence of ethnicity on voting. Whether political reforms notably 
in the form of multi-party democracy 1992 have had any impact on the role of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices is of interest to this study. This is dealt with in the following section. 
4.5.2. Ethnicity and Voting under Political Liberalisation  
While economic liberalisation was comparatively easier to perfect as the IMF and World Bank 
spearheaded them with sticks and carrots to African states, political liberalisation was hard to 
perfect. This is mainly because single-partism was quite entrenched and the elite involved in it 
indeed were not in a position of losing their political hold (Baregu, 1997). In this regard, 
multiparty democracy was reinstated de jure, but a lot leaves to be desired for the system to 
operate in a manner commensurate to the dictates of liberal democracy (Makulilo, 2012). The 
failure to have a fully fledged political pluralist state presents relevant issues to the discussion on 
ethnicity and voting. One important aspect revolves around the fact that multipartism in Tanzania 
could hardly reverse the interests of the ruling elite and its nationalist foundation. This is because 
the political liberalisation in Tanzania was not the product of a popular movement initiated by the 
people (Tripp, 2000). Instead, as indicated in section 3.1 and further insisted by Hyden (1999), 
Tanzania’s democratisation initiative was informed by international democratisation developments 
and carefully imposed and managed by the CCM to Tanzanians. There were no sound calls for 
political pluralism from the civil society. Therefore, CCM elites managed to control the reform 
process in a manner that ensured maintenance of their own political power and its nationalistic 
posture (Makulilo, 2009). It is against this background that various legislations requiring political 
parties to be national in character were legislated. For instance, Tanzania’s political party Act 
demands that parties have 200 members from at least ten regions- two of which shall be from 
Zanzibar. Also, the electoral laws deny parties and their candidates’ room to campaign in 
vernaculars and uttering statements inciting ethnic divisions (Kilimwiko, 2012; Msekwa, 2006). 
CCM’s dominance in informing the pluralist reform has been vividly reflected in the political 
practices that followed the institution of multipartism. Since multipartism has been re-introduced 
in 1992, CCM has proved to be too strong for the opposition to oust, as Appendix I below 
indicates. For instance, in the 1995 GEs (the first since the re-introduction of political pluralism in 
1992) CCMs presidential candidate Benjamin Mkapa triumphed by winning 61.8 % of the valid 
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votes (URT, 1995). Augustine Lyatonga Mrema (an ex-CCM Deputy Prime Minister and Minister 
for Interior) of NCCR-Mageuzi took the second position with 27.7 % of the votes followed by 
Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba of the CUF, who won 6.4 % and John Memose Cheyo of UDP 3.9 %. 
CCM in that year also overwhelmingly dominated the parliament by scooping 80 % of the 
parliamentary seats. Only four of the 16 opposition political parties that took part in the elections 
managed to win parliamentary seats. The strongest opposition party in parliament was CUF that 
won 24 seats, mainly from Pemba where it won close to 50 % of the votes and seats, followed by 
Mrema’s NCCR-Mageuzi, which won 16 seats while CHADEMA and UDP each won three seats.  
CCM’s dominance was even clearer in the 2000 GEs as the incumbent Mkapa raised his winning 
tally to 71.7 %. Similarly, CCM won a total of 206 seats which amounts to around 90 % of the 
seats in the house. This meant their share was 10 % more than the previous election. In the 2000 
elections, the opposition only managed to get 25 parliamentary seats. As it was the case in the last 
elections, CUF won the lions’ share of 16 seats, most from Pemba, as it was the case in 1995, 
CHADEMA managed 4 seats, and the TLP this time with Mrema heading it, won 3 seats and the 
UDP got 2 seats. An interesting development in the 2000 elections apart from the enhanced win of 
CCM is the failure of NCCR-Mageuzi to defend even one out of the 16 seats it won in the 1995 
elections. This development took place after Mrema’s defection from NCCR-Mageuzi to TLP. 
Among other reasons the politics of fame and personality as opposed to institutions and ideology 
can explain the downfall. This is because NCCR managed to get its political strength after Mrema, 
a well known hard worker while working as the country’s Interior Minister and Deputy Prime 
Minister, joined the party from CCM and dwindled once he left it (O’Gorman, 2012).  
The results above justify Kelsall’s view that pluralistic politics in Tanzania has never weakened 
CCM’s vice-like grip on the political system (Kelsall, 2003). However, the votes won by Mkapa 
cannot be ethnic-based. This is because the Southern part of the country where he hails has less 
than a quarter of the Tanzanian population. As such, he could not manage to win in such margins 
had he campaigned in an ethnically biased manner. An interesting observation to be made here is 
that Mkapa managed to get more votes on his re-election. This observation also confirms that 
voters’ choices were not based on ethnicity, as the ethnic groups are not as fluid as they used to be 
earlier. Inferably, the observation entails that determinants other than ethnicity are critical in 
making voting decisions. Conventional views of my KIs asserted that President Mkapa’s increased 
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votes in 2000 were not ethnic related. They attributed the rise to his satisfactory performance in 
office and to the fall of popularity of Mrema who crossed to TLP from NCCR Mageuzi. It is 
imperative to note that despite President Mkapa’s previous serving in Cabinet as the Foreign 
Minister, Minister of Science Technology and Higher Education as well as Minister of Information 
and Culture he was not as popular and known as Mrema. Mrema who crossed from CCM to 
NCCR-Mageuzi to show his discontent about corruptive actions, climbed to eminence in his short 
stint as a Minister for Home Affairs and Deputy Premier. He was quite popular for his no-nonsense 
administrative style; possibly prefiguring the popularity of the current head of state, John Pombe 
Magufuli. 
In the 2005 elections, CCM built on the 2000 results as its new candidate Dr. Jakaya Mrisho 
Kikwete won the presidential race with an unprecedented 80.3 % vote share. Kikwete was 
followed by Prof. Lipumba of CUF who won 11 % of the votes and Freeman Mbowe of 
CHADEMA scooping 5 %, with other candidates for the post failing to attract even 1 % of the 
votes.  The parliamentary elections for the third time around were one-sided as CCM secured 206 
out of the 232 parliamentary seats. The trend in the opposition was more or less similar with CUF 
winning 19 seats, most from its Pemba stronghold, CHADEMA winning 5 seats, while TLP and 
UDP managed 1 seat each. In the 2010 elections, CCM maintained its incumbency but with a 
comparatively lesser lead. In the Presidential race President Kikwete’s vote share decreased from 
80 % in the 2005 elections to 62 % in 2010. This time Kikwete was trailed by Dr. Wilbrod Slaa 
who won 27 % of the votes, followed by Prof. Lipumba who won 8 % of the votes with other 
contestants winning 1 or less than one %. The parliamentary elections for the fourth time around 
were one-sided as CCM secured 186 out of the 239 contested seats. The trends in the opposition 
were once again more or less similar with CUF winning 24 seats most from its Pemba stronghold, 
CHADEMA winning 23 seats. NCCR winning 4 seats while TLP and UDP once again managed 1 
seat each.  
Once again the results of 2005 and 2010 presented above generally, although more convincing in 
the pre-2010 elections, vindicates Kelsall’s view that pluralistic politics in Tanzania has never 
weakened CCM’s vice-like grip on the political system. As it has been argued above President 
Kikwete could not have won to the magnitude of 80% by relying on his ethnic group –Kwere due 
to its numerical disadvantage. This position is laid bare by one of my KIs, Dr Mangi Ezekiel who 
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is the Head of the Department of Behavioural Sciences of Muhimbili University of Health and 
Allied Sciences when he highlighted that: "...kabila la Wakwere lilikuwa halijulikani na 
Watanzania wengi na yeye (Rais Kikwete) amelifanyakuwa maarufu baada ya kushinda nafasi ya 
Urais mwaka 2005. Nina uhakika kwamba Wakwere hawawezi kuwa hata asilimia moja ya idadi 
ya Watanzania"
48
  literary meaning “the Kwere ethnic group was not known to many Tanzanians 
and President Kikwete popularised it by winning the Presidency in 2005. I am pretty sure the 
ethnic group hardly makes 1% of the country’s population”  
 
The reasons for CCM's triumph divide scholars. Some point to its incumbent advantage and lack of 
will to truly democratise (Makulilo, 2007) while others, more positively, attribute CCM's 
persistent electoral victories to path dependency following nation-building policies and the love of 
peace and tranquillity (Kelsall, 2003; O’Gorman, 2012). In support of the incumbency school, 
Makulilo has recently argued with conviction that Tanzania is only a de jure multiparty state as 
CCM still dictates the major political endeavours despite the presence of multiparties (Makulilo, 
2010; 2012). Arguing in a more forceful fashion, Baregu is of the view that CCM in the multiparty 
era has been a state-party
49
 rather than a political party. To him, it is a ruling machine designed to 
maintain a grip on power through the resources of the state and manipulations of the coercive 
organs of authority as well as command over patronage (Baregu, 1994). In simple terms, the 
incumbency view of CCM maintenance of power rests with the party’s greater access to state 
resources compared to the opposition parties it is competing with (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Such 
state of affairs undermines opposition parties’ electoral chances. The views of Baregu and 
Makulilo subscribe to the neo-patrimonial and hybrid explanations that votes are won by using 
primordial tendencies like bending legal-rational rules. Omari (1997) specifically points out that 
ruling parties exhibit primordial ethnic-based patron-client relations in soliciting votes. Such acts 
could make ethnicity salient in garnering political support as votes are seen as a product of access 
to power and authority as well as the ability to practise the politics of affection. In this regard, 
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 Personal interview with Dr Ezekiel held in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 11.12.2014 
49
 The concept of state-party refers to a political party that survives and operates solely by relying on coercive instruments and 
resources of a state. In this context people could hardly distinguish between the state and the party as the fusion is almost water 
tight. Under such circumstances a state-party suffocates political space for other actors to play their roles effectively. State-party can 
either be de jure or de facto, and in some cases take both forms. In de jure, a party is made state-party by law as was the case for 
TANU and ASP, and later CCM in Tanzania. In contrast, a de facto state-party is not a product of legal enactment but vivid 
practices depicting a political marriage between the party and the state.  
 
152 
 
ideologies and policies may not be as important in garnering support. This line of thought suggests 
the neo-patrimonial and hybrid tendencies have a significant role in anchoring votes compared to 
the PsIM. 
As convincing as the incumbency school suggests being, there is a rival school that unveils several 
factors explaining CCM’s enduring supremacy which are relevant to the debate on ethnicity and 
voting. As a starting point, the crippled associational life in the name of unity, peace, tranquillity 
and creation of a socialist society during Mwalimu’s tenure is linked to the overwhelming majority 
CCM enjoyed in elections (Kelsall, 2003). While the creation of the socialist society might not be 
relevant today as the country is embracing liberal policies, Kelsall held that CCM has consistently 
advocated the national integration content of the socialist era. Such nationalistic base enjoyed by 
CCM makes the opposition parties suffer from the absence of ready-made social bases on which 
they could have built (O’Gorman, 2012). Kelsall argues that CCM has conservatively preserved 
with passion its inclusive character and mass posture that manifests varied cleavages. Its leadership 
has continuously been heterogeneously divided in its religious, regional, generational and ethnic 
identifications, and in its ideological persuasions (Kelsall, 2003). In sum, the party culturally 
reflects the nation. The general public attributes the country’s relative state of peace to the party’s 
conscious quest for national unity and equitable distribution of the national cake. These are values 
that both the Tanzanian state and its people feel proud of (O’Gorman, 2012). Nyerere’s ideal of 
Umoja
50
, long permeated the postcolonial lyrics of popular Swahili hip hop music known as Bongo 
Flava (Stroeken, 2005). All elements are there to speak of a depoliticisation of ethnicity by the 
rulers and the ruled. The inclusive nature maintained the racial and citizenship stance of 
Mwalimu’s era as Tanzanian’s of Asian origin continued to hold political posts51 as well as 
Zanzibaris being appointed to non-union
52
 portfolios.  
                                                 
50
 Umoja is a Swahili word that means unity.  
51 Asian Tanzanians who served as members of Parliament include but not limited to: Rostam Aziz-Igunga, Mohamed Gulam 
Dewji-Singida Urban, Azim Premji-Kigoma, Amirali Murji-Mtwara, Abdulaziz Abood-Morogoro, Sadick Murad-Mvomero, Bhiku 
Mohamed Bhiku, Ahmed Shabiby, Abbas Gulamali-Ukanga, Sumry, Yasmin Aloo-Special Seat, Aden Rage-Tabora, Zakia Megji-
Special Seats,Jitu Soni-Babati, Mohamed Ibrahim Sanya-, Mussa Zungu Azan-Ilala,Omar Badwell-Bahi,  etc.  
 
52 Ministries that are charged with union matters include essentially are four- Foreign Affairs, Finance, Home affairs and Defence. 
There are other Ministries that partially deal with union matters. These include: Office of the President of URT, Prime Minister’s 
Office, Vice Presidents’ Office, Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Education and Vocational Training, East African Cooperation, 
Energy and Minerals, Industries and Trade, and Communications. Zanzibaris who served in non-union ministerial posts include : 
Zakia Hamduni Meghji once served as a Minister for Health, Ahmed Hassan Diria and Muhamed Seif Khatib both  served as 
Ministers responsible for Information ,Juma Hammad Omar once served as a Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism, Hussein 
Mwinyi had two stincts in the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Prof.Makame Mbarawa is currently the Minister responsible 
153 
 
An interesting observation derived from my KIs is that while parties slightly differ on how they 
will approach varied political and economic problems, they agree on issues of national unity, the 
importance of peace and tranquillity and the adverse effects of using ethnicity in garnering 
political support. Mzee Mkali argued at length that:  
"..kwa sababu ya umuhimu wa amani na utulivu ambao tumekuwa nao kwa miaka mingi, sisi wanasiasa kutoka 
CCM na wapinzani wetu (vyama vya upinzani) kwa pamoja tunakemea matumizi ya ukabila; na mtu yeyote 
atakae kataa kufanya hivyo hawezi kushinda uchaguzi wowote  kwa sababu msingi kwa umoja wa kitaifa 
uliowekwa na Mwalimu ulikuwa na unaendelea kuwa imara na hauwezi kuvunjwaa ! Na mwanangu Watanzania 
wanasikia, kusoma na sasa kuona kwenye Televisheni kilichotokea nchini Rwanda na Burundi; majirani zetu 
Kenya, Bosnia na maeneo mengine ambapo maelfu ya maisha wamepotea kwa sababu ya kuendekeza siasa za 
ukabila. Kwanini wao wakumbatie vitendo vibaya kama hivyo? Wao (watu) kwa hakika hawawezi kuunga 
mkono siasa za ukabila, na wataendelea kuiunga mkono CCM. Sisi tunawaambia watu kwa dhati kuwa CCM 
imefanya kazi ya kuleta amani,  na Nyerere ndiye mwanzilishi wa chama chetu na taifa letu, hivyo basi,  kama 
chama chake kinagombea na maadili yake (ya Nyerere) yanakubalika, kwa nini watu wapige kura dhidi CCM? 
Katika mikutano ya kampeni sisi tunawaambia wapiga kura kuwa CCM inawakilisha nyaraka halisi (original 
document) ya Mwalimu katika masuala ya ushirikiano wa kitaifa, kukemea matumizi ya ukabila na dini katika 
siasa, amani na utulivu pamoja na mgawanyo sawa wa rasilimali za taifa: Kwa hali hii kwa nini wawapigie 
wapinzani ambayo wanachoweza nikuwakilisha nakala (photocopy) ya Mwalimu katika masuala haya?"(Mkali, 
2013/10/03).  
 “...because of the importance of peace and tranquillity that has been with us for ages we politicians both from 
CCM and our rivals(opposition parties) denounce the use of ethnicity and anyone who wouldn’t do won’t win 
any election because the foundation for national unity laid by Mwalimu were and still are so strong to break! And 
my son Tanzanians hear, read and now see on Television what has transpired in Rwanda and Burundi; our 
neighbours Kenya, Bosnia and other places where thousands of lives were claimed because of politicised 
ethnicity, why shall they embrace such negative practices? They (people) certainly will not (support politicisation 
of ethnicity) and continue to support CCM. We tell the people with passion that CCM has worked for the peace 
that we have, and Nyerere was the founder of the party and our nation, so if his party is contesting and his ideals 
stands why should people vote against it? In campaign rallies we tell voters CCM represents the true copy of 
Mwalimu when it comes to national integration, denouncing the use of ethnicity and religion in politics, peace 
and tranquillity as well as equitable distribution of resources; why should people vote for the opposition which 
could at most represent a photocopy of Mwalimu on these issues?”  
The long extract of Mzee Mkali presents an antithesis to the incumbency view regarding the use of 
authority to maintain power in elections. He subscribes to a track record path-dependency school 
                                                                                                                                                                
for Communication,  Science and Technology and Maua Daftari- had a long spell as a Deputy Minister for Communication a 
ministry that partially deals with union matters . 
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which associates attraction of votes with ideological practices that address the felt needs and 
interests of society. In his view, national integration, peace and EDNR are Tanzanians’ felt needs 
which make them vote for it sustainably. In this regard, CCM’s history of denouncing the use of 
ethnicity in mobilising political support in elections explains the less importance of ethnicity in 
garnering political support in Tanzania.  
An interesting point put forward by Mzee Mkali is the role he accorded to Mwalimu in enhancing 
peace, tranquillity and national unity. This view is in line with what Becker (2013) calls the 
official view of Mwalimu. Becker uses a commemorative song by TOT plus a CCM-owned and 
sponsored band announcing: Lulu ya amani, “The pearl of peace”. The song is full of words 
depicting the heritage of peaceful societal relations that Mwalimu is said to have bestowed on 
Tanzania – and of which the CCM avows to be the sustaining guarantor. This line of thinking is 
the nucleus of Mzee Mkali’s views and the focus of a sustained electoral campaign depicting such 
discourse in varied media.  This notion of Nyerere as the founder of a peaceful, consciously non-
violent polity in the eyes of Becker (2013) augurs well with another portrayal of him as mbabe wa 
wanyonge
53
- the “champion of the downtrodden”or as mkombozi wa wanyonge “the liberator of the 
downtrodden”. Nonetheless, the two images of Mwalimu have potentially conflicting implications. 
For CCM the invocation of Nyerere as the pioneer of peace serves as a budding legitimisation for 
crackdowns on peace threatening incidences including ethnic politicisation. Its message is clear: 
Nyerere’s peaceful legacy shall not be squandered. On the contrary, the portrayal of Mwalimu as 
mbabe wa wanyonge or mkombozi wa wanyonge could precipitate and/or legitimise dissent against 
alleged social injustice, and thus permit the downtrodden to invoke Nyerere against CCM grandees 
(Becker, 2013). In this context, therefore, it can be said that Mwalimu’s descriptions can serve 
both the ruling party and the opposition camps in Tanzania’s electoral politics. While the ruling 
party leans more towards the official version to denounce disunity, it also boasts of Mwalimu 
standing for the disadvantaged, and associates itself to both. The opposition mainly uses the 
second version to discredit the party through standards set by its founder. Who has benefitted out 
the images requires thorough analysis but with electoral results indicating CCM’s overwhelming 
majority, one can hardly deny that its use of Mwalimu’s images have contributed to its success. 
                                                 
53
 Mbabe is a Swahili word that refers to ‘lord, strong patron, strongman’, while Wanyonge refers to the downtrodden. 
It denotes both monetary poverty and a lack of social status and connections. 
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Since the study is about ethnicity and voting, therefore it is wise to amplify that CCM’s mass 
(national) posture and the projections of Mwalimu within Tanzanian’s diverse ethnic structure has 
played well to its advantage (Malipula, 2014; O’Gorman, 2012; Nyang’oro, 2004). Actually, CCM 
managed to water down fears of scholars like Mmuya (1998, 2000), Gasarasi (1997), Campbell 
(1992) who expressed concern that the introduction of multiparty politics would revive ethnic and 
regional loyalties as well as heighten tensions around class, religion and other factional 
differences. Indeed, some instances or claims point into this direction (Aminzade, 2008, 2003, 
2001; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). In the context of ethnicity, CCM has stigmatised the infant 
opposition parties with seemingly strong local bases as tribalist, thereby impeding their expansion 
into other areas (Kelsall, 2003).  
According to Kelsall, NCCR-Mageuzi, once a major contender for the presidency whose leader 
came from Kilimanjaro, has been a victim of this stigma as CCM identified it as a 'Chagga' party. 
UDP was accused of being a vehicle for Sukuma interests. Similar views are made of CHADEMA 
as a Chagga party. While CCM is bedevilling its competitors for being ethnic the current trend in 
the elections is to field local candidates in elections. This pattern is in striking contrast with the 
TANU era when Mwalimu Nyerere, Amir Jamal, Omar Muhaji and Oscar Kambona, for instance, 
stood, and won, in constituencies outside their home areas. Likewise, Derek Bryceson a white, 
Cambridge-educated prominent farmer who stood in a working class area in the current Kinondoni 
district, the numerically largest constituency in the whole country then (1960s), won massively 
(Kaya, 2004). Whether these ethnic claims are concrete enough to make an obvious trend in 
elections require a bit of analysis. 
4.5.3. Multi-Party Elections and Claims of Ethnic Political Canvassing 
As it has been highlighted above, Tanzania adopted multi-party politics in 1992 despite distant 
voices asking for it from domestic activists and most Tanzanians rejecting the idea. The reason 
cited by most Tanzanians in opposition of multi-party democracy was the fear that it will dent the 
nation-building efforts and breed ethnic related conflicting groups (Fisher, 2003). It is against this 
backdrop that the country’s Political Parties Act lays out strict requirements for political parties to 
be pan-territorial and inclusive as hinted above. Likewise, and probably more important to this 
dissertation, political parties in Tanzania are legally prohibited from objecting to exclusively 
further interests of any ethnic, racial, religious groups or region (URT, 2002). 
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Additionally, Tanzania’s Electoral Code of Conduct overtly stipulates that campaign meetings are 
to be held in Swahili. Where Swahili is not well understood an interpreter shall be used. The code 
further stipulates that campaign meetings shall not discriminate against any ethnic group or 
religion (URT, 2010). The nationalistic torn of the Political Parties Act and subsequent code of 
conduct on one hand avail the fear raised by pro-monolithic political order proponents who refused 
political pluralism and avows continuation of concerted efforts to further the nationalist 
endeavours of Julius Nyerere (Nyang’oro 2004); on the other hand, at least in part, they can be 
viewed as attempts to set hurdles on the registration procedure (Makulilo, 2009). No matter which 
school is right, a point that can be made without the fear of thoughtful criticism is that the 
possibilities of political parties to legally secure a following on ethnic or any other divisive basis 
have been truncated from the very beginning of multiparty politics (Moroff, 2010).What is the 
situation on the ground? Few examples can usefully shed some light on the matter. 
While the strict registration rules meant to bar divisive parties, some opposition political parties are 
accused of exhibiting some ethnic or regional bias (Chaligha and Mmuya, 1994; Gasarasi, 1997). 
Parties that are considered to be big in terms of winning parliamentary seats like CHADEMA, 
NCCR-Maguezi and CUF are all accused of having regional strongholds, so are some of the 
smaller parties, like UMD and UDP (Whitehead, 2009). For instance, in the 1995 presidential 
elections, NCCR-M and its candidate Augustine Mrema, an ethnic Chagga, had a sizeable 
following in his region of origin - Kilimajaro. Mrema enjoyed a support level above the national 
average by winning in all Chagga-dominated constituencies in the region (Whitehead, 2009). As if 
that is not enough, Mrema is believed to have enjoyed much support from Chaggas in all urban 
settings of the country (Gasarasi, 1997). Such following is viewed ethnic in nature and some voters 
in Shinyanga rejected Mrema and his party on grounds that they never wanted to be led by a 
Chagga party (Omari, 1997; Erdmann, 2002).  
In the same way, the electoral triumph of UDP’s John Memose Cheyo in his district of origin-West 
Bariadi and Shinyanga region was also understood as stemming from Sukuma ethnicity. Cheyo 
like Mrema in the 1995 presidential elections won a considerable support in several constituencies 
in Shinyanga, which contributed to around 67 % of his nationwide votes. Cheyo’s support was the 
most regionally concentrated compared to all candidates in the presidential contest (Whitehead 
2009). An interesting observation related to Cheyo’s support is his concerted efforts to win votes 
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from his fellow Sukuma by using Kisukuma in his campaigns (Gasarasi, 1997). Cheyo went 
beyond using Kisukuma to lure voters in Usukumani, ‘the Sukumaland54’. He conducted ethnic-
based political canvassing that is in violation of the election code cite above and Tanzania’s 
political culture against ethnic salience in voting as the following quote substantiates: 
“Several weeks ago, during his campaign as an opposition presidential candidate, John Cheyo committed 
Tanzania's cardinal sin. Cheyo, who belongs to one of this East African country's largest ethnic groups, urged his 
Sukuma tribe to become more politically active and hinted that its activism should manifest itself in votes for him. 
His suggestion brought a blaze of criticism, with opponents accusing him of embracing tribalism for political gain. 
The candidate abandoned the tactic…In many countries across Africa where ethnic strife has ripped through 
nations such as Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Ethiopia, Cheyo would have been viewed as an ordinary 
politician playing every angle for votes…… [I]n Tanzania, where political leaders and the citizenry have made 
ethnic peace a top priority, the candidate's words riled the normally placid population as perhaps no other issue 
could. “In our country, just asking someone which tribe he is from will make him suspicious of you”, said Evarist 
Maembe, a political activist here in the capital (Washington Post
55
, November 7, 1995).  
Mrema and Cheyo’s vote figures above notwithstanding, it is far from clear, however, that their 
electoral victory can be viewed strictly in terms of ethnicity, understood as Sukuma or Chagga 
ethnic group identity. This argument is based on the fact that in an actual sense such canvassing is 
not effective. For instance, although Cheyo’s support was mainly based in Sukuma dominated 
areas, he was not the most accepted candidate in Sukumaland as CCM’s presidential candidate 
Benjamin William Mkapa personally and his parliamentary aspirants then won most constituencies 
at ease, a trend that was even stronger in Mwanza, the other Sukuma-region.  The unpopularity of 
Cheyo in the broader Sukumaland can be further proven by the Shinyanga urban constituency 
results, which indicate that Cheyo lost not only to the CCM candidate Mkapa, but also to NCCR’s 
Mrema and CUF’s Lipumba (URT, 1995).   
A similar trend was evident in 2010 elections, as UDP won the Bariadi-West parliamentary seat 
but its support never stretched outside Meatu and Bariadi in Shinyanga and Magu in Mwanza, 
which constitute only a small part of the Sukumaland. From these data, UDP’s support is from the 
Sukuma, but the bulk of the Sukuma do not support UDP.  However, John Cheyo serves as a rather 
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 'Sukumaland' is a translation of people's use of the word Usukumani and not pretend an existing entity. 
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 Washington Post, November 7, 1995. Policy Helps Tanzania avoid Tribal Tensions Rifle elsewhere in Africa 
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good example of how origin plays out through representation in the way Chabal outlined earlier. 
This position is banked on the fact that Cheyo, who has won the Bariadi-West constituency for 
three consecutive terms from 2000, is a member of a family that has extended roots in the area. He 
is a prominent community member who has been the principal funder of his party and a sponsor of 
various social activities in Bariadi (Erdmann, 2002). In this regard, we buy into Whitehead’s 
(2009) thesis that Cheyo’s case augurs well into the idea of a “patron” of his place of origin. A fact 
that can further second this line of thinking is Cheyo’s victory in the 1997 Magu parliamentary by-
election. Magu is a Sukuma-dominated constituency in Mwanza, which is outside of Cheyo’s 
home constituency. However, according to the interviews in Mwanza he was considered as 
someone coming from the “exterior” to assume office in Magu despite being a Sukuma.  In this 
vein, being a Sukuma alone does not necessarily guarantee a Sukuma the status of being perceived 
locally by the constituency members outside his area of origin. Thus, this reinforces the position 
that Cheyo’s considerable parochial appeal in Bariadi based on local-level ethnicity does not 
encompass the entire Sukuma ethnic group. More important, the mobilisation potential and effect 
of Cheyo’s ethnic appeal on politics is quite limited in scope. 
Whereas Cheyo’s support was not near to exhibiting anything close to suggesting it encompassed 
the whole Sukuma ethnic group, Mrema’s hold, in turn, was not confined to the Chagga ethnic 
group. Of course, Mrema’s support among the Chagga in Kilimanjaro was outstandingly high with 
about 77.5 % in the region but in 1995 he was also the second most popular presidential candidate 
in all regions on the Tanzania mainland except for Shinyanga (Cheyo’s stronghold) and the 
Zanzibar regions (where CUF and its presidential candidate Prof Ibrahim Lipumba was the most 
popular). Mrema’s support in regions was above national average in regions like Mbeya and 
Rukwa where the Chagga influence can be assumed to be low (URT, 1995). Particularly, Mrema’s 
support was exceedingly high in the north even in those districts were the Chagga were not 
predominant like in most of Arusha region.  
Mrema’s popularity outside his home region of Kilimanjaro in the 1995 presidential elections 
became evident in the parliamentary by-election of 1996 in Temeke, Dar es Salaam. In this 
election, Mrema won the seat against a CCM’s local candidate Abdul Cisco Mtiro. Mrema won 
despite his competitor and his campaign team attempting to discredit him on the basis of being 
both Chagga and Christian, and therefore not fit to represent the predominantly Muslim 
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constituency, where the Zaramo and Ndengereko ethnic groups are apparently predominant 
(Whitehead, 2009). This example suggests that voters in Temeke were not appealed by the use of 
ethnicity and religion to undermine Mrema’s position as a political representative. At the same 
time, if Mrema would have resorted to outright political tribalism, specifically mobilising the 
Chagga as a Mchagga, probably the results of the by-elections could have read very differently.  
The scenario in the North of Tanzania mainland resembles CHADEMA’s Dr. Wilbrod Slaa’s 
support in the 2010 presidential race. Dr. Slaa, an ethnic Iraqw, won above the national average in 
the districts of Mbulu, Karatu and Hanang found in Arusha and Manyara regions where his ethnic 
group is dominant. He also secured outstanding support across the whole Northern Zone - 
Kilimanjaro, Arusha and Manyara regions (URT, 2010). It is worth noting that while Slaa won 
convincingly in Iraqw dominated areas, both Babati constituencies which are predominantly 
constituted by Iraqw inhabitants went to CCM that fielded a Tanzanian with Asian origin and a 
Tanzanian coming from Mara region. This suggests that the support that CHADEMA got in the 
region was not primarily ethnic.  The triumph experienced by Slaa in 2010 as with Mrema in 1995, 
is attributed to the fact that they were the powerful opposition candidates of the day. Moreover, 
their appeal to the Northern Zone might have been more in terms of the symbolic representation of 
origin in its wider geographical sense than ethnicity. 
While most accusations of ethnicity are leveled against the opposition, the performance of 
President Benjamin Mkapa in the 1995 presidential elections also raised eyebrows that warrant 
discussion. According to Gasarasi, Mkapa’s high performance in the said elections in the southern 
part of Tanzania (his homeland in Mtwara and regions close to it) is attributable to the “homeboy” 
effect (Gasarasi, 1997). According to Gasarasi the homeboy effect is a “milder form” of ethnic 
parochialism, associated with the local standing of a politician within a particular geographical 
area than to “ethnicity proper”. It is normally linked with expectations people have of benefitting 
in one way or the other from someone they consider to belong to their area (Gasarasi 1997). In 
connection to Mkapa, southerners expected that President Mkapa once in office would steer 
resources to the South and allocate a considerable share of cabinet positions to them (Kelsall, 
2002; Omari, 1997). Limited evidence points to any special favours being put in place conforming 
to the southerners’ expectations. However, the example indicates two implications of the politics 
of origin. On one hand, it suggests that origin-based representation may be expected to convey 
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certain advantages to the ethnic groups sharing the representative’s origin, while on the other hand 
it suggests that origin might have a cross-ethnic appeal in elections.  
On the basis of the discussion made on the claims of ethnicity under this section, a case can be 
advanced that while ethnic groups in Tanzania can be alleged to have mobilisation potential, 
identities based on ethnic, local or regional origin cannot be assumed to exhibit this inherent 
politicisation potential to the same extent. Explanations of this view lie in the failure of politicians 
and parties accused of being parochial to effectively mobilise the broader ethnic or regional bases 
that they are accused of. More important, competitions between ethnic groups as well as regional 
blocks are relatively modest (Kelsall, 2002). Likewise, while some claims suggest that some 
parties appeal to regions other than the most populous Lake region, there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that all serious presidential candidates in Tanzania focus more intensively on the Lake 
region due to its numerical advantage. This does not mean they do not target others but since 
elections are about the number of votes, only a party that does not want to win will ignore this 
region. Although the claim has not been empirically tested, the local level ethnic appeal well 
exemplified by Cheyo has seemed less dangerous for national politics despite being identity-based, 
parochial and factionalist due to its geographical confines.  
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
The comprehensive ethno-political narrative of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania presented above 
indicates that ethnicity has never been salient in influencing voters’ choices in Tanzania. As it has 
been highlighted above, most of colonial Tanzania never had the experience of conducting 
competitive elections and, therefore, no concrete knowledge of how ethnicity influenced electoral 
votes could be established. However, what was and/or was not done in those days have a bearing 
on the way ethnicity came to influence voting in elections few years before independence and 
beyond. In a nutshell, the political systems and corresponding ethnic identities in the colonial era 
were fluid and their boundaries were porous and constantly redefined that suggests that 
politicisation of such groups would have been as fluid as the ethnic group identities were had they 
been politicised for purposes of anchoring votes. Similar views can be held about the German rule 
as it inherited the fluid ethnic group identities but further undermined the potential of ethnic groups 
to enhance ethnic salience in politics as through the direct rule attempts for such groups to organise 
against ethnic lines were curtailed by the restriction put on the formation of ethnic-based political 
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organisations. The British colonial government acted in a similar manner by demanding political 
organisations to be national in character which strengthened national unity among the Tanzanians, 
and positively impacted upon the formation of a nationalist movement against colonialism. The 
movement was united and strong enough and inclusive to inform low salience of ethnicity in the 
colonially organised elections in Tanzania before independence. The low political salience of 
ethnicity in Tanzania was further crystallised by the extensive socialist nation-building policy 
predicated on the PsIM that shaped a strong national identity among citizens of the independent 
Tanzanian state regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. The identity formed that militated against 
the salience of ethnicity in voting is predicated on the socialist political and economic principles 
enshrined in the AD, which meant fighting divisive elements, equitably distributing the national 
cake and ensuring peace and tranquillity. The identity has proven to be too strong even for political 
and economic liberalisation to defeat it, as such orientation has left limited public space for pan-
territorial ethnic politicisation in the mobilisation of political support in Tanzania. Such situation 
equally suppresses real, perceived and/or manipulated forces of ethnic canvassing that multiparty 
elections was expected to bring. The national identity made Tanzanians of distinct groups share 
common goals, thus leading to greater unity and peace that bars salience of ethnic tendencies in 
influencing voters’ choices.  
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CHAPTER V 
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: PSIM, ETHNICITY AND VOTING IN 
THE 2010 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TANZANIA 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the data related to the objectives of the study as indicated in 
part 1.4 of this dissertation. The main objective as indicated in the cited section is to determine the 
influences of ethnicity on voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs. The analysis of the data in question is 
informed by the study’s research questions and related variables that measure the influence of 
ethnicity as described in the methodological section and summarised in the study’s analytical 
frame. Informed by the two types of ethnicity relevant to our discussion on ethnicity and voting – 
the politics of origin, being and belonging, and political tribalism as outlined in section 3.2.6 and 
3.2.7 respectively, I set out to explore how the PsIM have influenced the role of ethnicity in the 
2010 GEs in Mwanza region.  
The data employed in the analysis is a product of fieldwork conducted in Dar es Salaam and 
Mwanza, particularly in Nyamagana and Misungwi. The interviews were designed to extract how 
the PsIM as explained in the introductory and methodological chapters had influenced the salience 
or otherwise of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs. They also meant to 
unveil why they have influenced them the way they have. Knowing that the degree of ethnic 
salience in voting is low in Tanzania, the interviews meant to essentially unveil why that is the 
case. However, the low degree of ethnic salience in politics does not cancel out completely 
ethnicity or outbursts of ethnicity to be practiced in the electoral process. Therefore, the interviews 
intended to elicit outburtsts of ethnicity that had a role in the 2010 GEs in Mwanza and the 
implications of such flashes of ethnicity on Tanzania’s electoral scene.  The analysis strived to 
establish how and why the PsIM inform the study’s interviewees’ perceptions of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices during elections. The focus of the interviews was placed on ethnic 
identities – ethnic groups, and wider origin, being- and belonging-based identities proposed by 
Chabal (2009) – that came to the fore in various circumstances, and how they influence voters’ 
electoral choices. The analysis is done in subsequent sections (5.2, 5.3. and 5.4). 
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5.2. PsIM, Ethnicity and Voters’ Choices in the 2010 Elections in Tanzania 
The first objective of the dissertation as indicated in section 1.4 was to explore how the PsIM 
informed the way Tanzanians apply ethnicity to influence voters’ choices in elections. The main 
focus was to obtain information about the role of the legacy of the PsIM on determining the 
significance of ethnicity in electoral process in general and on influencing voters’ choices in 
particular. The analysis is informed by the following variables/promises: PNU, EDNR and peace. 
Specific analysis on the variable is made below. 
5.2.1. PNU, Ethnicity and Voters Choices 
As I have indicated in the previous chapter, the Tanzanian state informed by the PsIM has made 
concerted efforts to ensure that there is low salience of ethnicity in the conduct of politics. This 
was done by instilling in its people the sense of national unity during the nationalistic movement 
and crystallised it during the socialist AD era. However, in the 1990s the socialist principles were 
overtaken by liberal democratic market-oriented economic and political reforms. Such reforms 
brought fear of national disunity including ethnic competition in mobilising electoral votes as 
indicated in section 4.5.2. In light of these political and economic changes, I attempt to explore 
how strong the promise of PNU embedded in the PsIM and efforts meant to realise it impact upon 
ethnicity’s influence on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania through the 2010 elections in 
Mwanza.  
Based on the views of my KIs it is assumed that the PNU and varied efforts meant to put the PsIM 
into practice have created a strong sense of national unity. Such sense of unity, in turn, militates 
against the use of divisive elements like ethnicity in mobilising political support during elections. 
This is said to be the case despite liberal reforms and the associated fears that it will breed salient 
ethnic canvassing as discussed in section 3.4.4. In this regard, scholars like Nyang’oro (2004) and 
Lofchie (2013) expect Tanzanians to prefer nationhood over ethnic identities, harbour fewer 
feelings of inter-ethnic mistrust and ethnic discrimination. All of these expectations point to the 
fact that the role of ethnicity in anchoring votes in competitive elections will be nominal.  
The interviews conducted in Mwanza managed to establish how the PNU was embedded in the 
PsIM and which efforts were made to realise it; how it had influenced my interviewees’ first and 
foremost (primary) identity; and in turn, how such identity influenced their voting. I managed to 
get such data by asking my interviewees: Whether they preferred to be identified first and foremost 
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with their national or ethnic identity? Whether they harbour feelings of ethnic discrimination? 
Whether they feel inter-ethnic mistrust? And how has the nation-building socialist initiatives as 
presented in Chapter III impacted upon their choice of identity, the feelings of inter-ethnic 
discrimination and mistrust as well as electoral choices?  
5. 2.1.1. Identities and Voters’ Choices 
5.2.1.1.1. National vs. Ethnic Identity 
The data gathered through the interviews conducted in Mwanza and the KIIs in Dar es Salaam 
indicated that most of my interviewees (82%) identify first and foremost with their nation, rather 
than with an ethnic, religious, occupational or any other identity. Such response suggests that most 
of my interviewees are proud of their national identity, which overshadows association with their 
ethnic groups or regional identities. The following view of an elderly woman in Nange Village is 
one among those that well summarises the view expressed in this paragraph: 
"Mimi ni mwanawake wa kisukuma lakini napenda kutambuliwa  kama Mtanzania kwa sababu Watanzania bila ya 
kujali makabila yao wanashirikiana katika hali ya amani kama " Ndugu ". Nyerere na wenzake walifanya vizuri 
kutuunganishaa ..."
 56
 
 
“I am a Sukuma women but I like to be referred to as a Tanzanian because Tanzanians irrespective of their ethnic 
belonging cooperate peacefully as relatives “ndugu”. Nyerere and his colleagues did well to unite us...”    
 
A retired civil servant supported the view in an interview held in Rufiji Street when asked if he 
feels proud of being a Tanzanian: 
" Unataka mimi niwe nani? Mimi ni Mtanzania halisi ... Makabila ni msingi wa taifa lolote lakini yananaweza tu 
kuunganishwa na kuishi pamoja  kama hisia ya utaifa ni kubwa kuliko zile za makabila yao. Sisi (Watanzania) 
tunajisikia fahari kubwa kwa utaifa wetu na tunauthamini kuliko  makabila yetu binafsi. Kwa hakika tunamuomba  
Mwenyezi Mungu ambariki mwanzilishi wa taifa hili kwa kutuunganisha. Bila juhudi zake, ukabila ungeweza 
kutugawa na kusababisha migogoro isiyokwisha. Sera za za utaifa za Azimio la Arusha hazina budi kusifiwa kwa 
hisia za Utaifa wa watanzania.” 57 
 
“Who do you want me to be? I am a bonafide Tanzanian ... Ethnic groups are the cornerstone of any nation but 
they can only be integrated and coexist if the feeling of nationhood surpasses parochial identifications. We 
(Tanzanians) are proud of our nationhood as we put it ahead of our tribal belonging. We actually ask Almighty 
God to bless the founder of this nation for unifying us. Without his efforts, tribalism could have torn us apart and 
cause irreconcilable conflicts. The national integrative policies of the AD should be credited for Tanzanians’ 
national salience”. 
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 Personal interview with an elderly women in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015 
57
 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 
5.11.2014 
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The views of these two interviewees represent interviewees who feel proud of being Tanzanians.  
However, it is imperative to note that they are from elderly interviewees. This could beg the 
question, is such feeling shared by the younger ones involved in the study? The answer according 
to my interviewees is yes. Interviews with a young man and young woman from Utemini Street 
and Misungwi Village presented below attests to this position. The young man from Utemini 
expressed the following view:   
"Mimi ninajisikia fahari kubwa kujulikana kama Mtanzania kuliko kujulikana kwa kabila langu. Mtu yeyote 
ambaye hajisikii fahari kwa taifa lake zaidi ya utambulisho nyingine wowote ni Mtumwa! Tunavyoongea sisi ni 
maskini lakini tunafurahia amani na umoja wetu wa kitaifa ambao nchi nyingine wangependa kuwa nao .... Kwa 
hili, mimi ninajisikia fahari kutambuliwa kwa utaifa wangu. Kwanza nani analijua kabila la wakerewe? Tanzania 
inajulikana duniani kama kisiwa cha amani "
58
 
 
“I am proud to be known as a Tanzanian than by my tribe. Anyone who is not proud of his own nation above any 
other identity is a slave! As we speak, we are poor but enjoy peace and national unity that other countries wish to 
have....For this, I proudly identify with my national identity. Who knows the Kerewe tribe anyway? Tanzania is 
known globally as the Island of peace” 
 
Arguing along the same line the young woman in Misungwi had this to say:   
"Najisikia fahari kuwa Mtanzania zaidi ya  kabila langu. Kwa nini nisijisikie hivyo wakati Tanzania ni nchi ya 
amani ikilinganishwa na majirani zetu?"
59
 
 
 “I feel proud to be a Tanzanian above my ethnic group. Why shouldn’t I be while Tanzania is peaceful compared 
to our neighbours? ” 
 
Similar views were aired by a hawker from Kishiri A when he asserted that: 
"Nimezaliwa hapa. Naipenda  nchi yangu na najivunia kuwa Mtanzania. Mimi sina mahali pa kwenda na 
hataningelikuwa na pakwenda sitaki kwenda popote. Sisi Watanzania tumeunganishwa na tuna amani. Unadhani ni 
rahisi kupata faraja kama hiyo katika nchi zingine? Huna haja ya kujibu. Siyo rahisi! Maisha yangu yanategemea 
shughuli zinazofanyika nchini kote na ninaweza  kwenda mkoa wowote na kuishi kwa amani bila ya kuulizwa 
kuhusu kabila langu."
60
 
  
“I was born here. I love my country and feel proud to be a Tanzanian. I have nowhere to go and don’t want to go 
anywhere anyway. We Tanzanians are unified and peaceful; do you think it is easy to find such comfort in other 
countries? You don’t need to answer. It is not! My life depends on activities done throughout the country and I can 
go to any region and settle peacefully without being asked about my tribe.” 
 
A critical look at the views above indicates that the interviewees are proud of their national 
identity and prefer it to be their first and foremost identity. However, the views present a 
difference in depth of explanations regarding interviewees’ choice of national identity. The 
difference is that all point of views except one, indicates the pride one feels for belonging to a state 
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 Personal interview with a young man in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 7.11.2014 
59
 Personal interview with a young woman in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District held on  
17.01.2015 
60
 Personal interview with a male hawker at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 09.11.2014 
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where people co-exist and interact peacefully compared to other countries. Violent incidences in 
ethnically polarised countries like Kenya Nigeria, Rwanda and Burundi as indicated in the general 
introduction partly informed this choice. The view from the retired civil servant went beyond 
mentioning peace and unity as the source of national pride. It associated the cause of pride to the 
socialist policies of the AD as indicated at length in Chapter III and IV. This line of thought is 
further contextualised to our case in the analysis and discussion of the second objective in section 
5.3 below.  
The choice of national identity above ethnic identities provides a case for questioning the neo-
patrimonial theory. This is because the theory suggests that Africans prefer traditional issues 
compared to modern ones. In this regard, neo-patrimonialists would expect my interviewees to 
prefer ethnic group identifications to their modern national one. This is because ethnic identities 
ensure the traditional paternalistic ties for traditional patron-client relations as opposed to the 
broader nationalistic ones. As such, the preference to national identity and pride questions the 
validity of the parochialistic and paternalistic nature of Africans which is said to inform ethnic 
salience in voting. More important, it enhances national patronage practices that militate against 
ethnic salience in politics including determining voters’ choices. This is because politicians tend to 
associate with issues that can move voters. In this case, national salience is of interest over 
parochial ethnic identities. In this sense, the ethnic-based patronage thesis advanced by neo-
patrimonial theorists as a source of their position on ethnic salience is baseless.  More important, 
as indicated in other elements of the PNU presented in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, the choice of 
national identity waters down the ethnic patron-client relations. Also, the association of the AD 
with unity and peace indicate another area of disagreement with the neo-patrimonial view that 
Africa lacks ideas and history against ethnic salience in politics. 
Although most interviewees indicated that they are proud of being Tanzanians and hold high national 
identity over their ethnic identities, I met a few (18%) who did not buy into this general choice. This 
group was either pro-ethnic identities or discouraged to be national salient identity due to 
embezzlement of public resources by public servants. The following view of a middle aged female 
teacher in Nange Village represents the pro-ethnic identity stance: 
  "Napendelea utambulisho wa kabila langu zaidi ya wa taifa langu. Taifa ni muunganiko wamakabila na hivyo 
hatuna budi kujivunia  makabila yanayotengeneza taifa. Kutoa sadaka utambulisho wa kikabila kwasababu ya 
utambulisho wa kitaifa utaua historia na utamaduni wa watu wetu. Tupende taifa letu lakini tusichukie makabila 
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yetu. Sidhani kama waasisi wa taifa letu walitaka tuyatelekeze makabila yetu wakati waliposisitiza umoja wa 
kitaifa.” 61 
 
 “I prefer my ethnic identity over the national identity. A nation is an amalgamation of ethnic groups and thus we shall 
be proud of what make a nation. Sacrificing ethnic identities for a national one will bury the history and culture of our 
people. Let us love our nation but not hate our tribes. I don’t think the founders wanted us to abandon our tribes when 
they championed national unity.”  
 
The views of the teacher presented above looked at carefully suggest that ethnic and national 
identities shall be balanced. To the teacher, this is critical because the foundation of national 
identity has its root from the combination of varied ethnic identities. Such ethnic groups for 
reasons of unity or any other interest make nations. In this regard, the ethnic groups’ identities 
should not wither away in favour of a collective identity willingly made by them. The inevitability 
of ethnic identities thesis advanced by the teacher suggests that ethnic salience in politics could be 
viewed as a means of perpetuating Tanzanians primordial and essentialist identities. This is against 
the national unifying spirit of the PNU. This apparent resistance to the PNU spirit of unity may be 
perceived as harmful to the PsIM intent. The words of my privileged interviewees which echoed 
their idol Julius Nyerere while addressing the CCM congress in Dodoma when CCM was voting 
for its flag bearer for the 1995 GEs pose a relevant question to the teacher. In his speech,
62
 
Mwalimu identified that there is a small section of the Tanzanian society that worships tribalism 
over nationality, which if left to grow can disturb Tanzania’s unity. He pleaded with the members 
of the CCM Congress to elect a flag bearer who is anti-tribalist and can help the nation to avoid 
ethnic polarisation. He asked the Congress if in the 21
st
 century it was ideal to board a bus that 
heads Tanzanians to ethnic polarisation. A situation that has proven dilapidating effects in 
Tanzania’s neighbours as indicated in section 1.1. The question is relevant to the views of the 
teacher from Nange but she would have answered Mwalimu that there is no harm. This is because 
the passengers in the bus should have bifocal identities and balance them in a manner that would 
not disturb national unity. In other words, the teacher recognises the significance of bifocal identity 
as Mwalimu himself does, but she goes for her ethnic identity first. This is contrary to the 
nationalists who also recognise bifocal identity but choose national identity over tribal identities. 
Mwalimu seems to belong to the nationalists as many of the interviewees.  
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 Personal interview with a mid aged female teacher in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on  
15.01.2015 
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 Hotuba ya Mwalimu Nyerere, Mkutano Mkuu wa CCM Dodoma-1995- Mwalimu’s Speech at the CCM Congress, 
Dodoma-1995 can be traced on http://.youtube.com/watch?v=GAEpisZ3CuK 
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Views garnered from a mid aged female food vendor from Shamalala further presents the view that 
ethnic identity is preferred to national identity:  
"Mimi sijivunii kuwa Mtanzania kwa sababu ya ufisadi unaoendelea bila ya woga wa kuchukuliwa hatua za 
kisheria. Viongozi wetu wanakwenda kinyume na mafundisho ya Mwalimu. Kutambuliwa kwa kabila langu 
kunaniokoa katika aibu ambazo Watanzania wanapata kutokana na matendo maovu ya viongozi wao. Mimi 
ninapenda umoja lakini viongozi wanaotumia ofisi za umma kwa manufaa yao binafsi yanatufanya baadhi yetu 
kupendelea utambulisho wa kikabila."
63
 
 
 “I am not proud of being a Tanzanian because of graft-ufisadi that goes on with impunity. Leaders are against 
Mwalimu’s teaching. Identifying with my tribe saves me from the embarrassment Tanzanians get because of evil 
acts of their leaders. I love unity but leaders who use of public office for their selfish ends evoke ethnic preferences 
in some of us.” 
 
While the teacher’s salient ethnic view is predicated on primordial and essentialist approaches to 
ethnicity, the street vendor’s is informed by an ad hoc instrumentalist viewpoint that accords her 
leverage of disassociating with the public resource embezzling label. The vendor’s view is 
informed by a calculated analysis of how one is viewed through his/her leaders. Since leaders who 
carry with them national stature are associated with graft she disassociates with that identity. 
Analysed critically, her choice of the ethnic identity over the national one is to avoid being 
associated with elements that are against the dictates of the AD. The AD as indicated in 4.4 among 
other things barred leaders to aggrandise public resources and distribute public goods 
disproportionately. In this regard, she is not ethnic salient by conviction. In addition, better 
performance in stamping graft can sway her back to national salience. Interestingly, when I asked 
the vendor of cases of ethnic-based distribution of the embezzled resources, she could not provide 
any. One of my KIs, Dr. Ezekiel well expressed this observation in an interview held in Shamalala 
on 11.12.2014. In this interview among other things, he claimed that selfish parochial and divisive 
ethnic favours that leaders are believed to have practised, propel ethnic identification among some 
people. However, he contended that for it to gain salience, it needs to be widely perceived and the 
ethnic identifications proven to be presenting an alternative better than the national one. To his 
position, the feelings of favouritism might be held by a section of the Tanzanian people but ethnic 
identifications are not providing an alternative worth turning to. This is because national unity has 
facilitated peaceful co-existence and solidarity among members of varied ethnic groups. To him 
this widely explains the greater pride interviewees have on their national identity.  
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  Personal interview with a mid aged female food vendor in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held 
on 14.11.2014 
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The fact that ethnic identities are in the minds of some interviewees providing an alternative to 
national identity (while based on the evidence they should not) confirms the significance of the 
political imaginary, namely its success in establishing a dualism of national unity versus ethnic 
division. This dualism is at the same time its weakness, since a weakly performing State apparently 
conjures up reliance on the ethnic group. In some instances when such boomerang effects were 
mitigated, either by individualising corruption (as in cases of the ruling party naming and 
prosecuting individual members) or by over-generalising it, as in media and music performances 
extrapolating cases of embezzlement to a complicity and mindset shared by all members of society 
(cf. Mbembe 1999, Stroeken 2005). In both cases the nation Tanzania dating from Nyerere’s days 
appears as today’s victim rather than culprit. 
 
The results found in Mwanza on the way Tanzanians first and foremost identify themselves are in 
line with the pan-territorial Afrobarometer surveys held in Tanzania in 2005, 2008 and 2012. Table 
IV below presents a concise summary of how Tanzanians identified themselves in the three 
Afrobarometer surveys. 
  Table IV: Tanzanians Identification Ethnic vs. National  
Identity 2005 2008 2012 
Ethnic Identity  6% 7% 3% 
National and ethnic identities equal 6% 13% 29% 
National Identity  84% 78% 68% 
Don’t Know 4% 2% 0% 
Total 1,248 1,208 2388 
 Source: Afrobarometer data 2005, 2008 and 2012 
 
The results presented above indicate that there has been a substantially strong sense of national 
identity in Tanzania. As noted in the table above around 84% identify themselves with the nation. 
A remarkable 76 % responded that they felt only Tanzanian, and 8 % felt more Tanzanian than 
their ethnic affiliations. Similar trends were experienced three years later albeit the figure dropping 
to 78 %, with 69 % feeling only Tanzanian and 9 % feeling more Tanzanian than their ethnic 
groups. Four years later 97 % responded that they identify with the nation, with 68 % exclusively 
identified with the national identity only, and 29 % felt more Tanzanian than their ethnic 
affiliations. Interestingly, the share of interviewees who declared that they feel equally ethnic and 
Tanzanian increased over three times from 9 to 29 % between 2008 and 2012 surveys. The results 
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indicate that national identification is quite strong in Tanzania. However, the degree of strength 
tends to decrease as time passes mildly justifying the fears raised by Gasarasi and colleagues in 
4.5.2. After establishing the way Tanzanians identify themselves along the ethnic salient and non- 
salient continuum, now let us explore how such identification influence the role of ethnicity in 
anchoring voting choices.  
5.2.1.1.2 Identity and Voting 
The results from interviews point out that the strong national identification discussed above has 
informed low ethnic salience in motivating votes. This position is predicated on the fact that most 
voters (86%) prefer candidates who uphold nation-building policies and parties which do not incite 
people into divisive ethnic tendencies. This is confirmed by a young man in Shamalala Street who 
disclosed that: 
".... Waasisi wa nchi hii hawakuwa watu wasioona mbali walipotuonya dhidi ya matumizi ya ukabila na mambo 
mengine yanayogawa watu  kama dini na ubaguzi wa rangi  katika kuamua nani wa kumpigia kura. Maneno ya 
viongozi hawa wakubwa yameepusha Watanzania kuangukia mtego wa kuchagua viongozi kwa misingi ya 
makabila yao."
64
 
 
 “....the founding fathers of this country were not short-sighted to warn us against the salience of ethnicity and 
other divisive elements like religion and racialism in deciding who to vote for. The words of these great leaders 
avoid Tanzanians from falling into the trap of electing leaders on the basis of their tribes.” 
 
This line of thought was further insisted by a staunch CCM supporter in Utemini who expressed 
the following view:  
“ Watanzania wanajivunia sana kwa msingi ya umoja wa kitaifa iliyowekwa na CCM wakati wa utawala wa chama 
kimoja. Msingi huu umeunganisha zaidi ya makabila 120 na kuipa Tanzania utulivu wa kisiasa mkubwa zaidi 
ikilinganishwa na majirani zake. Demokrasia ya vyama vingi ilipokuja katika miaka ya 1900 imeshindwa kuvunja 
msingi huu. Vyombo vya habari, asasi za kiraia, vyama vya siasa na wagombea wao hukemea matumizi ya ukabila 
katika kuwahamasisha maamuzi ya wapiga kura kama waasisi wetu walivyohubiri kabla yao.” 65 
 
 “Tanzanians are very proud of the foundation of national unity set by CCM during the single party rule. This 
foundation unified over 120 ethnic groups and given Tanzania political stability compared to its neighbours. 
Multiparty democracy that came in the 1900s has failed to break this foundation. The media, the civil society, 
political parties and their candidates denounce the use of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices as our founders 
preached before.” 
 
Similar views were advanced by a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street: 
" Umoja wa kitaifa unaosisitizwa na Azimio la Arusha ni suala la msingi na ambalo linakwenda zaidi ya mfumo 
wowote ya siasa. ... Umoja huleta nguvu, wakati mfarakano husababisha kutokuelewana na kuzuia kufikiwa kwa 
malengo ya maendeleo. Nani anataka machafuko na kukosekana kwa maendeleo? Matumizi ya ukabila katika 
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 Personal interview with a young man in Shamalala, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 16.11.2014 
65
 Personal interview with a CCM supporter in Utemini, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 09.11.2014 
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kuvutia kura kutatuongoza katika mifarakano ambayo tumeiipinga tangu uhuru. Kwa nini tuipe mifarakano uzito 
sasa kwa kuendekeza matumizi ya ukabila katika kutafuta wafuasi wa kisiasa wakati wa uchaguzi?" 
66
 
 
 “The unifying character of the AD is a matter of principle that goes beyond any form of politics. ... Unity brings 
strength, while disunity causes misunderstanding and bars attainment of developmental goals. Who wants chaos 
and underdevelopment? The use of ethnicity in soliciting votes will lead us to disunity which has been denounced 
since independence. Why shall we give disunity weight now by championing the use of ethnicity in seeking 
political support during elections?” 
 
Likewise, views of a nurse in Mbela corroborate the above views as she authoritatively asserted: 
"Umoja ni kitu ambacho dunia nzima inajua kuwa ni tabia ya Watanzania. Hakuna mfumo wa kisiasa uliofanikiwa 
kutufanya kurudisha nyuma juhudi za waasisi wa taifa letu kudhibiti ukabila katika kuomba kura wakati  uchaguzi. 
Sisi si kama Kenya ambako mgawanyiko wa kikabila ni tabia yao ya upigaji kura.” 67 
 
 “Unity is something that the entire world knows is a character of Tanzanians. No political system has made us turn 
our back on the efforts put in by the founders of this country to control ethnicity in soliciting electoral votes. We 
are not like Kenya were ethnic divisions characterise voting.” 
 
Analysis of the interviews above suggests that the foundations of national unity meant to unify 
Tanzanians beyond ethnic groups’ parochial boundaries are intact. The foundation is strong 
enough even in circumstances were the very ideological antecedents that informed it– the socialist 
AD is no longer in existence. That is to say, the liberal democratic pluralist political reforms could 
not reverse the national integration efforts spearheaded in the socialist monolithic political 
dispensation discussed throughout Chapter IV. This can be proved by the fact that most of my 
interviewees (84%) did not support the view that ethnicity was the most important means of 
gathering political support during the 2010 elections. Furthermore, they did not want ethnic-based 
political campaigning to be allowed. Views derived from an interview with a female farmer in 
Misungwi Village and an elderly man in Nange Village below attests respectively: 
" Ukabila haukuwa muhimu katika kampeni za uchaguzi na nisingependa uwe. Kuna watu kutoka makabila 
mbalimbali ambao wanaishi kwa amani hapa Misungwi. Umoja huo ni muhimu na nisingependa kuona unapotea  
kwa sababu ya ushindani wa nafasi za kisiasa."
68
 
 
 “Tribalism was not important in election campaigns and I would not want it to be. There are people from different 
tribes who peacefully co-exist in Misungwi. Such unity is important and I would not like to see it go simply 
because of competition for political office.” 
 
 “Makabila ni muhimu kwa ushirikiano wa kijamii na si kwa kampeni za kisiasa wakati wa uchaguzi. Ukabila 
haujawahi kutumika waziwazi kuhamasisha upigaji wa kura kufuata makabila ya wapiga kura na wagombea .... 
Nisingependa kuishi muda wa kutosha kushuhudia hali kama hiyo ikijitokeza.”69 
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 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 05.11.2014 
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 Personal interview with a nurse in Mbela, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015 
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 Personal interview with a female farmer in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 
18.01.2015 
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 Personal interview with an elderly man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 14.01.2015 
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Tribes are for social engagements and not for political canvassing during elections. The ethnic ticket has never 
been overtly used to propel ethnic voting.... I would not want to live long enough to witness such development” 
 
The above views notwithstanding, there were some few interviewees (16%) who claimed that 
ethnicity was used in elections and felt it was not a threat to unity as the following words of a 
housewife in Mbela suggested: 
"Mambo ya ukabila ni ya kawaida katika uchaguzi wa serikali za mitaa na Udiwani. Katika uchaguzi huo watu 
wanaulizia asili ya wagombea na kumchagua mmoja anayetoka Misungwi. Kama mgombea si Msukuma, ni 
vigumu kushinda. ... Tunahitaji mtu tunayemjua na hii haihatarishi umoja na amani kwa sababu makabila yenye 
watu wachache watatuelewa. Kwa nafasi ya ubunge watu hawana mpango na kabila  la mgombea kwa sababu 
wapiga kura wanavutiwa na uwezo wa wagombea kuleta maendeleo bila kujali makabila yao.” 70  
  
 “Issues of ethnicity are normally experienced in lower local government and Councillorship elections. In those 
elections people ask for the origin of candidates and elect one that is from Misungwi. If a candidate is not from the 
Sukuma tribe, it is hard to win. ...we need someone we know and this does not endanger unity and peace because 
the minority tribes will understand us. For the parliamentary post people do not bother about a candidate’s tribe 
because they are motivated by candidates’ ability to bring development irrespective of their ethnic group.”  
 
The views of the woman in Mbela concur with those of Omari (1997) who argues that the level of 
ethnic salience in Tanzania is higher in the lower levels of political positions (hamlet, village, 
streets and ward councillor positions) compared to the higher ones (parliamentary and presidential 
seats). It is imperative to note that the lower level elections were not part of the 2010 GEs as 
indicated in section 4.2. Interestingly, the woman from Mbela despite pledging her preference to 
elect a fellow ethnic group mate to address the problems in the lower levels of governance, she still 
loves national unity. This seems to present a contradiction as national unity and ethnic polarisation 
tend to pull apart. In her view, this is not the case. This is because she feels that the ethnic voting 
based on a competent Sukuma will be understood by members of the minority ethnic groups in the 
villages. More important, the limited number of the non-Sukuma cannot cause conflicts and ethnic 
voting because their numbers would not motivate them to invoke either of the two. The ethnic 
voting rationale suggested by the lady of Mbela which is in line with bi-focal identity, is against 
the conflict theories as highlighted by Eiffert et al. (2010) and Cocodia, (2007). Eiffert et al. (2010) 
and Cocodia, (2007) suggest ethnic voting and competitions propel conflictual relations regardless 
of the composition of the conflicting ethnic groups. 
In an interview with a farmer in Mapilinga Village, I noted the following: 
 
"Matumizi ya ukabila katika kushawishi wapiga kura kuchagua wagombea hayakuwa wazi hapa kwasababu 
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 Personal interview with a housewife in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 11.01.2015 
173 
 
serikali inakataza matumizi ya ukabila katika kampeni za kisiasa. Hata hivyo, wagombea na mawakala wao 
wanakwenda kwenye majumba ya watu kuwashawishi watu wawapigie kura kwa kutumia hoja za kikabila."
71
 
  
“The use of ethnicity in soliciting votes was not overt here because the state prohibits the use of ethnicity in 
political campaigning. However, candidates and their agents go to people at their homes and convince people to 
vote in their favour using the ethnic card.” 
 
Interestingly, when they were asked whether multiparty democracy vindicated fears of ethnic 
salience on determining electoral votes abounding, most interviewees (82%) replied negatively. In 
the main, they were of the view that no party would be unintelligent enough to pursue the ethnic 
ticket to mobilise electoral support. This is because ethnicity has never been proven significant in 
the politics of Tanzania. A long comment made by a lady in Kishiri A below well describes the 
issue: 
"... Watanzania wanajulikana kwa makabila yao lakini utambulisho huo kamwe hauwezi kuzidi utambulisho wao 
wa kitaifa uliojengwa na wapigania uhuru wetu ... Kutambuana kwa makabila ni muhimu katika utani wakati wa 
mazishi. Si katika Siasa! Unaweza kuona jinsi gani CHADEMA kinavyopinga shutuma zinazotolewa dhidi yake 
kuwa ni chama cha Wachagga. Hii ni kwa sababu muonekano huo hauna msaada kwake kisiasa. Walikuja hapa 
(Mwanza) mara kadhaa na helikopta zao wakati wa kampeni kutuambia kwamba wao sio chama cha Wachagga 
bali ni kwa ajili ya ustawi wa taifa zima. Walisikilizwa (CHADEMA) na matunda yake ni ushindi wa viti viwili 
vya ubunge Mwanza Mjini- Ilemela na Nyamagana. Hakuna chama kinachoweza kushinda mioyo ya Watanzania 
na kupigiwa kura za kushika madaraka kwa kuchochea migawanyiko ya kikabila. Upigaji wa kura kwa kufuata 
ukabila haujawahi kuwa tabia ya kupiga kura ya Watanzania wakati wa mapambano ya kudai uhuru wala baada ya 
kupata uhuru." 
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“... Tanzanians have ethnic identities but such identities will never supersede the national identity built by our 
freedom fighters... Tribal identities are important in joking relationship during funerals. Not in Politics! You can 
see how hard CHADEMA denounces the accusations levelled against it that it is a Chagga party. This is because 
such label does not help it politically. They came here (Mwanza) time and again with their helicopters during the 
campaigns to tell us that they are not a Chagga Party, and are for the entire nation’s wellbeing. They were heard 
and rewarded by two parliamentary seats in Mwanza Urban- Ilemela and Nyamagana. No party can win 
Tanzanians’ heart and be voted into power by championing ethnic divisions. Ethnic voting has neither been a 
characteristic of Tanzania’s voting during the struggles for independence nor after gaining independence.” 
 
The views of the lady in Kishiri A are in line with the views of Malipula (2014), Weber (2009), 
and Nyang’oro (2004), who argue that the mobilisational effect of ethnicity has never been deemed 
significant in politics in Tanzania from the struggles of independence to-date. However, she 
presents an important dimension in the role of ethnicity in mobilising electoral support. In the 
main, she concurs with the view that salience of cultural and social ethnicity does not translate into 
political tribalism as defined in section 3.2.7 unless it is triggered by systemic ethnic–based 
disproportionate distribution of political and economic resources. The political and economic 
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factors potential of breeding ethnic salience in voting revolves around disproportionate division of 
political offices as well as public goods among ethnic groups. On the other hand, the example 
presented of CHADEMA’s efforts to clear accusations levelled against it, suggest that ethnic and 
zonal labels drawn along the zone defined in section 3.2.6 are against the letter and spirit of 
national unity embedded in the PsIM. As such, the labels have an adverse effect in its bid to 
acquire state power in a multi-ethnic state like Tanzania with over 120 ethnic groups without any 
big enough to form a MWC in the presidential race (Malipula, 2014; Weber, 2009). At most, the 
label can ensure its visibility and some parliamentary seats in the area they are accused of being 
dominant if they appeal to it. However, it is relevant to analyse CHADEMA’s accusations from a 
historical perspective to put them in the context of the study.  
As a starting point, it is imperative to hereby detail our earlier analysis of CHADEMA’s electoral 
performance in the multi-party era, and more rigorously in the 2010 elections, to be able to 
understand and analyse the claim and link it to the PNU. The general verdict is that as much as 
CHADEMA is accused of being a Chagga Party or party for the Northern Zone (Kilimanjaro, 
Arusha and Manyara regions), it has hardly managed to win commandingly presidential votes or 
parliamentary seats in the Kilimanjaro region (the homeland of the Chagga ethnic group) in 
particular and the Northern Zone in general. For instance, in the 1995 elections of which 
CHADEMA did not field a presidential candidate but all of the parliamentary seats in the Chagga-
dominated
73
 constituencies in Kilimanjaro went to NCCR-Mageuzi under the chairmanship of 
Augustine Mrema, a prominent Chagga and nationally known politician as argued in section 4.5.2. 
In the 1995 and 2000 GEs CHADEMA only managed 18 % and 23% of the parliamentary votes in 
Kilimanjaro respectively (URT, 1995; 2000). As if this is not enough, Kigoma (which is not a 
Chagga dominated region) in both elections happened to be CHADEMA’s stronghold in terms of 
winning electoral votes with a total of 21% and 26.8% in the 1995 and 2000 elections respectively. 
The results in Kigoma were also above the other Northern region of Arusha, in which CHADEMA 
scooped 10.5 and 17.5% in 1995 and 2000 elections respectively. In 2005, CHADEMA’s 
outstanding performance in the presidential race came from Kilimanjaro, which was 20.6 % of the 
region’s votes. It is imperative to note that CHADEMA‘s presidential candidate in that year’s 
election, Freeman Mbowe, is a Chagga from Kilimajaro and some associate the performance 
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mainly to his candidacy (Whitehead, 2009). However, it is fascinating to note that his votes were 
below half of the Kilimanjaro voters and even in his home constituency of Hai, his non-Chagga 
competitor Dr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the then President of the URT, won more votes than him. 
In sum, then, there is no compelling case for an extraordinarily disproportionate support among the 
Chagga of Kilimanjaro or the Northern Zone to substantiate the claim that CHADEMA is a 
Chagga party based on the 1995-2005 election results. The fact that Kigoma outsmarted 
Kilimanjaro and Arusha in a decade suggests that the party had something more than ethnicity to 
offer in exchange of political support in non-Chagaa regions. The 2010 results are more interesting 
to this dissertation because CHADEMA’s support happened to increase tremendously in the Lake 
zone particularly in Mwanza and in the entire Sukumaland which by all standards is not a Chagga 
dominated area as depicted in the description of the study area. 
In 2010, CHADEMA managed to win an average of around 42.6% and 39.3% in the Presidential 
and parliamentary elections in the Northern Zone respectively. However, in both contests, 
CHADEMA won more votes in Manyara and Arusha compared to Kilimanjaro (URT, 2010). A 
close look at the presidential race suggests CHADEMA was not that superior in Kilimanjaro as its 
candidate only managed to win the presidential votes in one of the Chagga dominated 
constituencies-Moshi Urban, while the remaining five went to CCM’s Kikwete (URT, 2010). In 
the parliamentary race, however, CHADEMA managed to win 3 out of the 5 Chagga dominated 
constituencies, 2 went to CCM and 1 won by Mrema who represented TLP this time around. Such 
division does indicate that CHADEMA has won most seats in the Chagga dominant constituencies 
of Kilimanjaro but does not entail clear dominance in those constituencies. In Hai where 
CHADEMA’s national chair Freeman Mbowe, an ethnic Mchagga and the incumbent MP won the 
parliamentary seat by a narrow margin and President Kikwete of CCM once again defeated 
CHADEMA’s candidate in the constituency (URT, 2010). More important, CHADEMA won 23 
parliamentary seats in Tanzania out of which only 6 approximately a quarter of them came from 
the Northern Zone 3 less than the ones they won in the Lake Zone- Mwanza, Shinyanga, Mara, 
Kagera, Geita and Simiyu after massive campaigning in the area. In some cases as it will be 
discussed in section 5.4. CHADEMA won without even having candidates with blood ties in the 
constituency of contest. Other seats came from Mbeya, Iringa and Dar es Salaam. With this data, 
again there is little evidence to support any claims of the party’s alleged Chagga dominance. Of 
course, the party received considerable support from Chagga dominated areas and the Northern 
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Zone but also won more seats out of the Northern Zone and particularly enjoyed the support of the 
urbanites in Dar es Salaam, Geita, Mwanza, Iringa and Mbeya (where they won parliamentary 
seats) and in other urban settings as well. All of the facts concerning CHADEMA’s electoral 
performance question the ethnic claims highlighted in section 4.5.2 and suggest a more nationalist 
approach to winning voters’ support.   
The all round performance of CHADEMA point to the fact that ethnicity in the form of political 
tribalism was not given salience in its political canvassing in the 2010 election in the country and 
particularly in Mwanza where the Chagga are not dominant. In this regard, the constant 
accusations levelled against it are mere mud-sliding by CCM meant to discredit it in the general 
public for endangering a sacrosanct value among Tanzanians - national unity, by practising 
ethnicity in mobilising support as argued by (Whitehead, 2009; Shaba, 2010) and highlighted in 
part 4.5.2. The discussion on the accusations of CHADEMA suggests that national unity as 
envisioned by the PsIM is critical for mobilising votes. This can be evidenced by CHADEMA’s 
denial of being a Chagga Party and CCM’s sustained accusations that it is one as Whitehead 
(2009) managed to associate the accusations with current chair of CCM and his predecessor in 
their campaigns. Concurrently, CCM projecting itself as a national integrator that wins it votes as 
widely discussed in chapter four. Such national integration projection concurs with the official 
view of Nyerere as argued by Becker (2013) that CCM claims its ownership and association. The 
strong discourse on the importance of national unity by CCM, its accusation on CHADEMA as 
well as CHADEMA’s strong denial of ethnic and regional bias signify the limited role and efficacy 
that ethnic mobilisation can have in luring electoral support in Tanzania. In other words, 
nationalistic views preside over ethnic salient ones on determining voting in Tanzania. Such state 
of affairs is against the paternalistic explanations of the neo-patrimonial schools that suggest that 
divisive ethnic-based patron–client relations would take credence in informing ethnic salience in 
voting as discussed in section 3.4.2. 
The nationalistic views downplaying the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices 
presented above are in line with the vote intentions of the three Afrobarometer surveys that took 
place in Tanzania in 2005, 2008 and 2012. The Afrobarometer results of the said years established 
that most voters in Tanzania are nationalistic regardless of the electorates’ party affiliation. This is 
proven by the fact that the ruling party in Tanzania - CCM and the opposition parties in their totality 
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have been supported by over three-quarters of voters harbouring national identification first and 
foremost. This fact diffuses the commonly viewed notion that opposition political parties use the 
ethnic card to mobilise followers for electoral support. This concurs with the opinion expressed by 
Mzee Mwiru in section 4.5, that all contending parties in Tanzania do not primarily run their 
campaigns on an ethnic line. According to Mzee Mwiru political parties in Tanzania are aware that 
the foundation of unity informed by the PsIM will act against them if they decide to evoke ethnic 
political canvassing during elections. Therefore, Mzee Mwiru insisted all of the parties strive to 
uphold nationalist tendencies and avoid issues that discriminate against ethnic groups. Mzee 
Mwiru’s views are in line with Mushi and Baregu (1994) who argue that candidates in elections 
compete on how they will keep alive national integration ethos by condemning divisive elements 
like race, religion, and ethnicity.  
5.2.1.1.2. Inter-ethnic Discrimination and Voters’ Choices 
Avoidance of ethnic discrimination is one among the key issues that the PsIM have strived to 
achieve as the detailed narrative presented in the fourth chapter suggests. In our interviews in 
Mwanza, we managed to establish that people harbour low feelings of inter-ethnic discrimination 
(13%) and inter-ethnic mistrust (11%) which entail limited ground for ethnic political mobilisation. 
This observation is logical in the eye of Fearon and Laitin (2003) who contend that feelings of the 
ethnic discrimination tend to take the lead where the sense of nationhood is nominal due to 
disproportionate distribution of public goods and ethnic polarisation. With the deliberate policies 
of the AD, and the elite inclusive character of the Tanzanian state traced way back to the 
nationalist struggles as depicted throughout the fourth chapter, it is only logical to find that the 
feelings of ethnic discrimination are nominal. Therefore, it took no trouble for most of my 
interviewees (87% and 89%) to suggest that the national unity initiative diffused inter-ethnic 
discrimination and mistrust respectively. Additionally, such diffusion, in turn, informed low 
salience of ethnicity in the mobilisation for voters’ support and actual voting in the 2010 elections. 
The words of a young woman from Shamalala succinctly summarises this position: 
 
"Ubaguzi wa kikabila siyo sera ya Tanzania. Hatuna makabila ya daraja la kwanza na ya la pili. Sisi sote ni 
Watanzania na tunajivuia makabila yote kushirikiana bila ya tatizo. Matatizo binafsi kati ya watu wa makabila 
tofauti katika mahusiano yao yanaweza kuwepo, lakini si makubwa ya kutosha kuwafanya watu wapige kura 
kikabila."
74
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“Discrimination against ethnic groups is not our policy in Tanzania. We do not have first and second rate ethnic 
groups. We are all Tanzanians and proudly co-exist. Personal problems between people of different ethnic groups 
in their interaction may exist but not big enough to inform ethnic voting.”  
 
It is imperative to note that the low feelings of ethnic discrimination are prevalent despite the fact 
that 76% of my interviwees acknowledged that there are some ethnic groups in Tanzania like the 
Chagga, Haya, Nyakyusa and Sukuma that are comparatively developed than others. However, they 
do not associate the development to disproportionate distribution of the national cake done by the 
independent government. In this context, they have no reason to feel discriminated. This explains 
why 74% of my interviwees claimed that the distribution of resources by the state is fair and not the 
source of the differences. These views inferably augur well with the historical explanations of 
developmental differences among regions as highlighted in the ethno-political narrative that 
constituted the fourth chapter. The historical explanation shed the blame to the colonialists who 
disproportionately distributed infrastructure in the areas where the ethnic groups are located because 
of their richness in raw materials badly needed by European industries. A detailed account of these 
issues will be presented in section 5.3 where the reasons as to why ethnicity influences voting the 
way it does are provided. At this juncture it is worth having the views of a learned interviewee 
below that gives a summary of the point made in this paragraph. 
"Maendeleo ya Wanyakyusa, Wahaya na makabila mengine na yenye malighafi yamesababishwa na wakoloni 
waliohakikisha reli zinajengwa ili waweze kusafirisha pamba, mkonge na malighafi nyingine kwenda Ulaya 
kupitia bandari ya Dar es Salaam. Kwa sababu ya rasilimali hizi walipewa shule zaidi na hospitali. Kwa sababu ya 
miundombinu na mali zao wameaendelea! Tatizo lipo wapi? Uzuri, Azimio la Arusha limejaribu kubadili tofauti 
hii ya kihistoria kwa madhumuni ya umoja wa kitaifa na kuepusha migogoro ya kikabila yanayotokana na 
mgawanyo wa rasilimali. Kwa kweli sasa hivi utajiri wa makabila yaliyoendelea yananufaisha maendeleo ya 
makabila mengine kupitia kodi. Kwa hali hii ni kwa jinsi gani ubaguzi wa kikabila unaweza kutumika kushawishi 
upigaji kura wa kikabila?" 
75
 
 
“The development of the Nyakyusa, Haya, and other tribes with abundant raw materials was perpetuated by the 
colonialists as they ensured railway roads are built so that they can transport cotton, sisal and other raw materials to 
Europe via Dar es Salaam port. Because of these resources they were given more schools and hospitals. Because of 
the infrastructure and wealth they are developed! What is the problem with that? Better still, the AD tried to 
reverse this historical imbalances for purposes of national unity and avoiding inter-ethnic resource based conflicts. 
Actually the riches of the developed tribes are enjoyed by other less developed tribes through tax. Under such 
circumstances how can inter-ethnic discrimination inform ethnic voting?” 
 
To show that developmental imbalances have never entailed sour relations among ethnic groups, 
88% of my interviewees did not recommended for deliberate measures to reverse perceived or real 
inter-ethnic development imbalances. This is the case despite the potential of the imbalances to 
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breed salience of ethnicity in voting. They were of the view that there is no need for doing 
anything against the richer ethnic groups as their riches have no political impact. Their position 
was anchored on the supposition that the proper foundation of national unity and indiscrimination 
was set by the implementation of the PsIM in the distribution of political positions and economic 
resources that reflect nationhood. Such argument is indicative of the views widely argued my KIs 
and the overriding literature throughout Chapter IV on the matter. An interesting observation 
derived from an elderly man in Mapilinga following a question that meant to gauge interviewees’ 
views on discrimination among ethnic groups in Tanzania augurs well with the low feelings of 
ethnic discrimination. The elderly man disclosed that:  
"Mtu yeyote anaweza kuwa Rais wa Tanzania, hata kama yeye hatokani na makabila makubwa kama ilivyokuwa 
kwa  marais wetu wote, ili kuhakikisha umoja. Nina hakika siku moja Rais atatoka katika kabila hili kubwa la 
Wasukuma! Kwa nini isiwe hivyo? Kwanza hakuna Msukuma wamaana aliyejitokeza kugombea nafasi hiyo katika 
chaguzi zilizopita. Mtu wamaana hasa kupitia tiketi ya CCM akijitokeza, atachaguliwa. Unajua kwamba sisi 
(Wasukuma ) si wakaidi na wala hatuna kiburi. Tunapenda amani na kwa vyovyote vile wingi wetu na utajiri wetu 
hautatibua umoja wa nchi yetu uliojengwa kwa muda mrefu." 
76
 
 
“Anyone can be a President in Tanzania, even if he does not come from the big tribes like all of our presidents 
have, to ensure unity.  I am sure one day the President will hail from this giant Sukuma tribe! Why not? By the 
way, no serious Sukuma candidate has ever contested for the position in the elections. Once a serious one contests 
for the post especially through CCM’s ticket, will be elected. You know that we (Sukuma People) are not stubborn 
and arrogant. We are peace loving and by no means can our big population and wealth disturb the unity of this 
country well built for ages.” 
 
 The views of the elderly man presented above suggest that inter-ethnic discrimination was not an 
important factor in informing electoral choices. This situation leans toward the view expressed 
above that economic differences among ethnic groups in Tanzania are not a source of political 
division as they are not attributable to the independent state. This is chiefly because independent 
governments have strived to avoid the colonially set ethnic discrimination described in section 
3.4.4. An interesting point here is that positive discrimination of having members of less 
pronounced ethnic groups on grounds of avoiding the possibility of enhancement of ethnic salience 
once the pronounced and numerically bigger one’s like the Sukuma hold state power.  
One would wonder why the more populous ethnic groups like the Sukuma would agree to be ruled 
by members of the less populous ethnic groups. The question gains impetus when one buys into 
the views of Weber (2009) who claims that the Sukuma can mobilise their numbers to form a 
super-ethnic group capable of forming a MWC and enhancing its visibility in electoral politics. 
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The view of Weber is somewhat realistic in the question of enhancing political visibility and at 
most informing ethnic voting among the less nationalist voters in Mwanza. As for the possibility of 
forging a MWC for winning the presidency, it is far-fetching as the number of the Sukuma is 
around 17% of the entire population of Tanzania. Even if you add the entire Lake Zone, the 
numbers would not add up to a MWC. More important, in light of the discussion on the 
hypothesised Northern amalgam, the Sukuma will be accused of national disintegration. Better 
still, if other ethnic groups team up against the Sukuma conglomerate, they will triumph over it 
numerically (Malipula, 2014). Equally important, the elderly man suggested that for one to be 
viewed as worth for being elected to a political post, a candidate has to be competent, peace loving 
and have a national outlook. Therefore, the Sukuma have not and should not team up 
discriminately against other ethnic groups to solicit political support nationally, neither, should 
they do the same in local level politics. This is because it will be against the political culture of 
national unity as enshrined in the PsIM and supported by Tanzanians. From the discussion held 
above the Sukuma to engage in an ethnic move for power will be prove futile as elements of 
national unity are entrenched in the minds of the people as highlighted throughout this section as 
well as in the fourth chapter. 
5.2.1.1.3. Inter-ethnic Trust and Voters’ Choices 
In the above subsections we unveiled that Tanzanians harbour feelings of national identity over 
ethnic identity, and have low feelings of ethnic discrimination. Such revelations point towards low 
significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. In this subsection we unveil Tanzanians 
perceptions on inter-ethnic trust and their implication on voting. Views derived from the 
interviews I conducted in Mwanza suggest that the level of inter-ethnic trust is high (89%) among 
the interviewees. Therefore, matching of ethnic groups between voters and contestants is not 
significant in informing voting. A comment from a young man in Nange succinctly expresses this 
feeling: 
“Watanzania kwa ujumla wanaaminiana na kupendana. Hatuna hisia kubwa za kutoaminiana kiasi kwamba 
hatuwezi kumpigia Kura mtu ambaye siyo wa kabila lako. Tuna zaidi ya makabila 120 na hakuna uwezekano 
katika kinyang'anyiro cha urais au katika nafasi nyingine yeyote makabila yote yawe na mgombea wa kabila lao 
wakumchagua” 77  
 
“Tanzanians generally trust and love one another. We don’t have big feelings of mistrust to the extent that we 
cannot vote for someone who does not belong to your tribe. We have over 120 tribes and there will never be a day 
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that in a presidential race or in any other election people from all tribes will have a candidate from their ethnic 
group to elect”  
 
A Young man in Mapilinga Village had echoed the same view when he disclosed that: 
 “Katika uchaguzi sisi tunangalia sifa ya mtu ya uaminifu wake bila kujali kabila lake. Uaminifu miongoni mwa 
watu wa makabila tofauti ni binafsi kwani mtu anaweza kuhukumu kabila kwa kutazama vitendo vya watu 
wachache anaohusiana nao. Hii si sawa na hawapaswi kuwa njia ya kufanya maamuzi ya kupiga kura."
78
  
 
“In elections we look at one’s qualities of trustworthiness regardless of his/ her ethnic group. Personal trust among 
people of different tribes is mostly subjective as one can base his/her trust on the acts of few people they interact 
with which is not the rifght way of making electoral choices” 
 
Arguing along the same line an NGO worker in Misungwi had this to say: 
"Uaminifu miongoni mwa watu wa makabila tofauti nchini Tanzania bado ni mzuri, tunafanya kazi pamoja, 
tunasali na kushirikiana katika masuala mbalimbali. Kama tuna tatizo ni la mtu binafsi na halipaswi kwa njia 
yoyote kuongoza upigaji wa kura. Siwezi kumwaadhibu mgombea mwenye uwezo kwa sababu tu ya kabila lake! 
Wakati tunakwenda kupiga kura hatuendi kupigia kura makabila bali watu kwa misingi wa uwezo wao. Watu 
wanasema Chagga wanapenda fedha na Sukuma ni mazoba licha ya idadi yao kubwa. Nimpigie kura Sukuma 
yeyote kwa mategemeo kwamba yeye si mbadhirifu wa fedha za umma na kumuacha Chagga mwenye uwezo kwa 
sababu tu kabila lake linashutumiwa kuwa linapenda sana fedha?” 79  
 
 “Inter-ethnic trust in Tanzania is still intact as we work together pray and engage in numerous issues. If we have a 
problem with someone it is personal and should not in any way guide my judgment when it comes to elections. I 
cannot punish a competent candidate just because of his tribe! When we go to vote we do not vote tribes but people 
on the basis of their competence. People say the Chagga like money and the Sukuma are docile despite their large 
number. Shall I vote for any Sukuma hoping that he will not embezzle public funds and leave a competent Chagga 
simply because his tribe is accused of being harbouring feelings of money mongering?” 
 
The key point in the views of the three interviewees presented above is that the level of inter-ethnic 
mistrust in Tanzania is low. Such situation makes ethnicity less significant on determining 
electoral votes as there was no inter-ethnic mistrust to be politicised. However, flashes of mistrust 
raised by the minority of my interviewees (11%) are merely personal and subjective. In this regard, 
they lack the salience needed for broadly based inter-ethnic mistrust that could inform the 
significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. As such, the limited feelings of inter-
ethnic mistrust and the role it plays in influencing an insignificant role of ethnicity on determining 
voters’ choices, depict a positive contribution to the realisation of the PNU enshrined in the PsIM. 
The views presented above on inter-ethnic discrimination and inter-ethnic trust concurs with the 
findings of the Afrobarometer surveys of 2005, 2008 and 2012. The feeling of ethnic 
indiscrimination in the 2008 and 2012 Afrobarometer surveys in Tanzania were well above 
average. This is proved by the fact that 57% and 66% of the 2008 and 2012 respondents held the 
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position that their ethnic groups were never discriminated respectively; while 23% and 18% felt 
less discrimination (sometimes) respectively. The 2005 survey results suggest a divided opinion as 
far as the question of ethnic discrimination is concerned. However, though the majority still belong 
to the group who feel no or less ethnic discrimination. This is supported by the fact that only 44 % 
of the interviewees were clear enough to say they are not discriminated. 37% are holding the view 
that they are discriminated in different degrees, either sometimes, often or always. A clear verdict 
of the degree of the ethnic discrimination in the 2005 survey is blurred by the 17 % of interviewees 
who claimed they do not know whether their ethnic groups are discriminated or not. This could be 
a function of the migratory processes and or detaching themselves from their roots or fear of 
responding to the question that carries with it some elements of sensitivity. However, working with 
the distinctive choices-those who feel discriminated and those who do not, the results indicate that 
all parties garnered higher support from interviewees who feel no or less discrimination 
(sometimes). Therefore, ethnic unfairness which could fuel ethnic voting among the beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries of discrimination cannot constitute an incentive for canvassing meaningful 
electoral support as the feeling is not entrenched in the voters regardless of the position of the 
competing parties.  
The verdict given on inter-ethnic discrimination by the Afrobarometer resembles the barometer’s 
findings on inter-ethnic trust. The Afrobarometer discloses that Tanzanians do not conceive inter-
ethnic mistrust in the country as unproblematic. This is evidenced by the total of 66 % of 
interviewees indicating that they trusted members from other ethnic groups somewhat or a lot, 
compared to 33 % who do not trust completely or have a little trust on members of other ethnic 
groups. These results are in line with the first round of Afrobarometer surveys held in 2001 which 
documents that 68 % of interviewees in that survey were of the opinion that they trust Tanzanians 
from other “ethnic groups” (Chaligha et. al. 2002). However, it is worth noting that a comparative 
look of interethnic and intra-ethnic trust among the 2005 interviewees suggests that intra-ethnic 
trust is higher than interethnic trust. This is evidenced by a total of 80 % who trusted members of 
their ethnic group compared to the 67 % trust placed on members of other ethnic groups. Although 
the comparison indicates a stronger intra-ethnic trust against interethnic trust, both figures are 
substantially high to indicate trust among ethnic groups, which again suggests low salience of 
ethnicity. The percentages went up in 2008 as a total of 76% affirmed their trust in members of 
other groups while and 23% declared that they do not trust members of other groups.  
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With regard to the way interviewees harbouring feelings of interethnic mistrust and those who do 
not vote, Afrobarometer surveys of 2005 and 2008 indicate that the ruling party which claims 
association to the PsIM enjoys a greater support of inter-ethnic trusting voters as the 67% and 76% 
compared to an average of around 50% and 62% for opposition parties in the 2005 and 2008 
surveys respectively. This distribution entails that the voting patterns are nationalist although CCM 
that claims to be more nationalist wins more nationalist voters compared to opposition parties. 
However, in general terms, all parties enjoy support from Nationalist voters’ thus ethnic mistrust 
cannot be an all round trunk card in luring voters in Tanzania. 
5.2.1.2. Synthesis of the PNU, Ethnicity and Voting 
A critical analysis of the element of national unity, ethnicity and voting based on the issues 
discussed above suggests that the PNU enshrined in the PsIM have informed low salience of 
ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in the studied area. The degree of national identification 
over ethnic and any other identities was evident and their national pride was very high. The 
national pride has been attributed to the implementation of national integration policies that 
militated against salience of ethnicity on determining electoral support. Thus, questioning the 
parochial and paternalistic claims that neo-patrimonialsts strongly subscribe to while describing 
the salience of ethnicity in the conduct of African politics.  
The few ethnic salient voters encountered could hardly make a difference to this direction in terms 
of number and logic. This is chiefly because the material conditions for ethnic salience revolving 
around ethnic discrimination and mistrust barely exist, and /or carry with them no salience to 
inform significant feelings of ethnic salience in voting. In this regard, the wise decision among 
contestants and parties was to canvass along nationalist policies for political success in the 2010 
elections. It is imperative to note that deep feelings of national unity and its mitigating effects on 
ethnicity argued is surviving years after the collapse of the socialist AD that provided its 
foundation. Therefore, I argue that the PNU transcends ideological orientations because its effect 
on informing low salience of ethnicity in voting still stands. This conclusion logically begs the 
question why? Responses to the question will be provided in section 5.3 below. Meanwhile, let us 
see how another PsIM- EDNR informed the influence of ethnicity on voting. 
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5.2.2. EDNR, Ethnicity and Voting 
The second PsIM was EDNR.  As we briefly highlighted in the study’s analytical frame and 
further expounded in the fourth chapter, the AD was instrumental in making this promise a reality 
through the implementation of socialist and self-reliant policies. The espousal of the AD, and its 
consequent implementation was a vital stage in Tanzanian history. It set Tanzania on a unique 
historical path in terms of nation-building, EDNR and moving it towards domestic tranquillity 
while its neighbours moved toward factionalism and internal warfare (Shivji, 2013; Mwiru, 2013; 
KAS, 2010). Two aspects elaborately described in sections 4.5.1.4 and 4.5.1.5 will be used to 
measure the role of EDNR on informing the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices 
in the 2010 elections. These are the establishment of Ujamaa villages and nationalisation. The 
intent is to see how the promise of EDNR enshrined in the PsIM and efforts put to implement it 
has informed low or high salience of ethnicity in the determination of electoral votes in the 2010 
elections. The assumption behind this section is that the promise of EDNR and implementation of 
the policies geared towards implementing them has improved inter-ethnic cooperation and diffused 
the role of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices. The basis of this assumption is informed by 
conflict and neo-patrimonial theses that suggest that discriminative ethnic-based clientelistic 
resource distribution hamper inter-ethnic co-operation by causing conflicts between beneficiaries 
of the clientelistic networks and those who do not benefit (Rohner et al. 2013; Salawu and Hassan, 
2011; Weber, 2009; Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008; Posner 2007, 2005). Contextualised towards the 
current study, the salience of ethnicity on determining voting will inform voting patterns around 
the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the clientelistic distribution of resources (Chandra, 2004; 
Posner, 2005). According to Posner (2005) where ethnic-based clientelistic resources-distribution 
stands, politicians are encouraged to emphasise ethnic affiliations to attract voters and once a party 
is elected, it distributes national resources to its ethnic supporters to ensure continued support. Was 
this the situation in Mwanza? 
 5.2.2.1. Villagisation, Ethnicity and Voting 
As for the first aspect, establishment of Ujamaa villages and the influence of ethnicity in soliciting 
voters’ support, my interest was to see how the villages and their associated intent of EDNR to 
villagers have had an influence on the way ethnicity motivate voting. The views of my 
interviewees (77%) pointed to the position that Ujamaa villages put people closer and the 
communal nature of production and distribution of public gains, had enhanced social cohesion and 
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unity promised by the PsIM.  More important, they were of the view that the villages improved the 
wellbeing of the many in the society. This is mainly because before Ujamaa villages most people 
lived in scattered huts next to their small agricultural plots, making it almost impracticable for the 
state to provide basic social amenities and/or mobilise them politically. The following words 
express this view: 
"Vijiji vya Ujamaa vimetuunganisha na kutufanya wakisasa sana. Unajua kabla ya vijiji sisi tulikuwa tukiishi 
mbalimbali na ilikuwa vigumu sana kupata huduma za kisasa za afya. Shule zilikuwa mbali sana kiasi kwamba 
ilibidi twende shule tukiwa na umri mkubwa. Vijiji vimetuleta pamoja na kutuletea huduma za jamii karibu na bila 
ubaguzi. Ukaribu huu uliboresha mwingiliano na ulipunguza ukabila katika siasa kwakuwa wanakijiji wote ni 
ndugu” 80 
 
“Ujamaa villages have unified and modernised us a lot. You know before villagisation we were living very far 
from one another and it was very hard to get modern health care. Schools were very far to the extent that we had to 
go to school at an advanced age. The villages brought us together but also brought social services close to all of us 
indiscriminately. This closeness improved interactions and stands against tribalism in politics as all villagers are 
relatives in the villages.”  
 
Arguing along the same line a male retail shop owner in Mbela Village asserted: 
 
  "Vijiji vya Ujamaa vimeleta huduma za jamii za bure karibu na watu. Nyerere alituhamasisha kujenga shule na 
zahanati kwa kushirikiana na serikali na serikali ikaviendesha ili kuhakikisha kila mtu ananufaika na rasilimali 
hizo. Sote katika kijiji bila kujali makabila yetu tulifaidi huduma hizi. Sera hii ilizuia ubaguzi wa kikabila katika 
maisha ya kila siku na zaidi wakati wa kuchagua viongozi."
81
  
 
“Ujamaa villages brought free social services close to the people. Nyerere mobilised us to build schools and 
dispensaries in collaboration with the government and the government run them to ensure that everyone can enjoy 
the resources. All of us in the village regardless of our tribes are served by these facilities for services. Such policy 
bared tribal discrimination in daily life and much more when it comes to choosing leaders.” 
 
Another young man in Mapilinga echoed the view that Ujamaa villages have lowered the influence 
of ethnicity in voting when he divulged that:  
"Vijiji vya Ujamaa na huduma za jamii ilizokuja nazo zilfanya watu wa asili tofauti ambao walikuwa 
wametawanyika kuja pamoja na kuishi kama familia moja. Shule na vituo vya afya vilivyojengwa vililikuwa kwa 
ajili ya matumizi ya wote. Hakuna kabila lilopendelewa, na hadi sasa ndivyo ilivyo. Watu wa makabila yote 
walipata huduma, kwahiyo sidhani kama vijiji vinaweza kuwa msingi wa ushindani wa kikabila katika uchaguzi. 
Badala yake Ujamaa umetufanya sote tuwe wamoja na kufikiria hivyo wakati wa kuchagua viongozi wetu."
 82
  
 
“The Ujamaa villages and the social service that they brought made people of different backgrounds who were 
scattered come together and live as one family. The schools and health facilities built were for the use of all. No 
ethnic group was given favour and up to now that is not the case. People of all tribes get the services and therefore 
I don’t think the villages can be the base of ethnic competition in elections. Instead the familyhood that it created 
makes us all one and think that way while choosing our leaders.” 
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 Personal interview with an elderly man in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015 
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 Personal Interview with a male retail shop owner in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 
16.01.2015 
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 Personal interview with a Young man in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015 
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Arguing from a different angle one interviewee in Mbela suggested that villagisation strengthened 
the visibility and reach of the ruling party. In the context of ethnicity, villagisation enhanced 
CCM’s ability to mobilise voters to reject the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes as the following 
views evidence:  
“Vijiji vya Ujamaa vimefanya Watanzania kuwa wamoja na kutoa jukwaa kwa TANU na CCM kwa ajili ya 
kulaani matumizi ya ukabila katika kuomba kuungwa mkono kwenye uchaguzi katika nchi nzima. Maoni haya 
yalirejewa katika kampeni na wanakijiji wote huheshimu wito huu."
83
 
 
 “The Ujamaa villages unified Tanzanians and gave TANU and CCM a platform for denouncing the use of 
ethnicity in soliciting electoral support across the entire country. These views were echoed in the campaigns and all 
villagers respect this call.”  
 
The views presented above suggest that the villagisation exercise was positive to most people by 
bringing them together and according to them access to social amenities. These services could 
hardly be provided to them by the state because the scattered nature of their houses before 
villagisation. More important, the views suggest that public resources related to the villagisation 
were for the use of all and not ethnically divided to wield political support from the beneficiaries. 
In this regard, the resource distribution did not create room for inter-ethnic conflict among 
ethnicities which could influence voting. If the distribution was for enlisting support, then it was 
from the multi-ethnic members of the Ujamaa villages. In this way, villagisation diffused 
ethnically resource based clientelism and ethnic competition for votes that neo-patrimonialism 
consider being a feature of African voting. Also the view that the villages strengthened CCMs 
political organisation and mobilisation ability in villages suggest that they furthered the objectives 
of the PsIM. This position is predicated on the fact that CCM as the ruling party is the custodian of 
the PsIM and, therefore, furthering them is logical. The integrative character of villagisation 
coincides with Wangwe (2005) who argues that the Ujamaa villages managed to improve social 
cohesion and integration among villagers through communal farming; construction and running of 
public schools and health centres shared by all villagers. He also went on to tell that the villages 
also strengthened CCMs branches for political organisation and mobilisation.  
The views expressed above are relevant to our dissertation in varied counts. They suggest that the 
elements of the promise of EDNR and efforts to implement them through the Ujamaa villages 
diffused the role of ethnicity. This is predicated on the fact that there were no conflictual elements 
of disproportionate distribution to inform voting. Also, the views suggest that the Ujamaa villages 
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 Personal Interview with a  male Primary School Teacher in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held 
on 16.01.2015 
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had more weight in the rural areas than in the urban settings. This is understandable as the 
urbanites have not experienced directly the intricacies of the villagisation process. Equally, their 
socio-economic demands are different as explained in the subsequent paragraph. The equitable 
sharing of the national resources practiced in the villages is against the neo-patrimonial view that 
there is rampant divisive ethnic distribution of public resources in Africa that breeds ethnic voting. 
According to the neo-patrimonialists such state of affairs inevitably leads to ethnic voting and 
continued distribution of resources to supporters of the establishment. The people of Mwanza have 
in the 2010 elections proven the neo-patrimonial view irrelevant, as the basis for exercising this 
type of logic did not vividly exist. 
As much as the most interviewees were pro the limited role of ethnicity on determining 
electorates’ choices in the rural areas, it is important to note that some interviewees (23%) were 
against the view. They hold the view that villagisation has caused competition between the ethnic 
groups that mingled as a result of villagisation. According to this group of interviewees these 
divisions manifest in elections whereby the Sukuma originating from the core or close to the 
villages feel they have more rights to lead than others who came from far. While the dominant 
view considers villagisation to be a blessing due to communal production and distribution of social 
amenities, there is a minority view that harbours a rival view. Their position is banked on the idea 
that the Ujamaa villages undermined people’s initiative to succeed individually and perpetuate 
social and economic individualism. To this group, the scattered nature of their livelihood was 
better than the collective view of Ujamaa and its associated distribution of social services. This 
position is relevant to the comparatively richer villagers who had to leave their ancestral land and 
belonging to join the villages.  
 A critical look of the anti-villagisation proponents suggests that they were against the PsIM meant 
to spearhead national integration and diffuse salience of ethnicity in voting through fair and 
equitable distribution of national gains. The individualistic arguments based on the economic 
prowess of the comparatively richer people and their selfish ancestral origin, navigates away from 
the promise of EDNR. To this group, social differentiations should have been allowed as well as 
native based identities which according to Posner (2005) can fuel ethnic salience in voting. The 
views of this group, particularly in the rural areas, are not sound enough to reflect a general 
picture. This position is anchored on the fact that no evidence could be proven of such intra-ethnic 
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competition in the elections of Councillors that is the lowest in the GEs in Tanzania. Needless to 
mention the higher ones that are exonerated by Omari (2007) from sound claims of ethnic salience. 
The claims could be relevant to the village government elections where the demarcations of origin 
can be easily drawn and competing ethnic identities put into play as argued by (Glickman 1995; 
Jerman 1997; Omari, 1997) in section 4.4.1.1. Unfortunately, the village elections were not part of 
the 2010 elections. Although data did not widely support ethnic salient political canvassing and 
voting as well as the fact that the village level elections were not part of the 2010 elections, it is 
relevant to be known that such feelings exist. This necessity stands on the fact that further research 
can be done to unveil such observations.  
It is equally imperative to note that despite the limited cry of the economic disadvantages of 
villagisation and disruption of ethnic originality, very few interviewees (2%) managed to confess 
to the researcher that villagisation has significantly affected their primordial ethnic ties. This view 
is based on the fact that most of them are from the same ethnic group, spare newcomers from other 
places who joined the villages. In the same token, their relationship with their ancestors is intact as 
the places are reachable. And the social as well as cultural traditions like rituals of passage, 
initiations burials etc were shared. This is in line with the debate on villagisation and ethnicities in 
section 4.4.1.4 that indicate that the villages served intra-ethnic as opposed to inter-ethnic 
integration. As such, the ethnic canvassing that could have been effected would be intra-ethnic. 
However, the EDNR that accompanied villagisation as argued above did not give room for both 
inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic political canvassing to grow and gain salience. This is because it 
disallowed ethnic divisive clientelistic distribution. The words of a parliamentary aspirant I 
interviewed in Nyamagana are quite relevant in summing up the debate on villagisation, ethnicity 
and voting: 
"Vijiji vya Ujamaa vinakosolewa kwa mtazamo wa kiuchumi wa kibepari ambao unaamini katika umiliki binafsi 
wa rasilimali. Vijiji vilipingana na ubinafsi na kuunganisha watu wa Makabila mbalimbali na kuboresha juhudi zao 
kupitia mgawanyo sawa wa huduma za jamii, hivyo kupunguza tofauti za upatikanaji wa huduma za umma kati 
yao. Kwa sababu hii, matumizi ya Ukabila katika kupiga kura ni madogo."
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“Ujamaa villages are criticised from a capitalist economic viewpoint that believes in private ownership and 
individualism. The villages fought individualism by unifying people beyond ethnic groups and complementing 
their efforts through equitable distribution of social services, thus mending disproportionate distribution of public 
services among them. Because of this, ethnic salience in voting is nominal.”  
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 Personal interview with an MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana held on 12.11.2014 
 
189 
 
On the basis of the discussion presented above, I argue that villagisation has contributed towards 
low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This is due to its role in enhancing inter 
and intra–ethnic integration as well as EDNR. This argument is based on the fact that ethnic 
integration and disproportionate distribution of public goods stand in the way against ethnic 
gaining salience. Such position is predicated on the fact that they form the opposite of the 
constitutive ingredients of politicised ethnicity as advanced by Wimmer 1997 in section 3.2.7. 
After establishing the influence of villagisation on informing the role of ethnicity on determining 
voters’ choices, let us turn to the other variable picked to analyse the influence of the second 
variable under EDNR: nationalisation.  
 
5.2.2.2. Nationalisation, Ethnicity and Voting 
Nationalisation in Tanzania as widely discussed in section 4.4.1.4  was responsible for confiscating 
privately owned properties and putting them in the hands of the state to benefit Tanzanians 
indiscriminately (Shivji, 2013; Mwiru, 2013; Mesaki and Malipula, 2011). The intent was to 
ensure that the resources of the country are equitably divided among Tanzanians and benefit all of 
them equitably. The intent of nationalisation justifies the broader definition of nationalisation that 
goes beyond confiscation of the major means of production and distribution. This broader 
definition includes Africanisation of the bureaucracy civil service, expansion of educational 
opportunities through universal primary education and creation of a National Service programme 
meant to instil the sense of nationhood into youths (Lofchie, 2013). Below we present and discuss 
data related to the implications of nationalisation on informing the role of ethnicity on determining 
voters’ choices. 
The general view of my interviewees (78%) is that nationalisation has contributed towards 
enhancing the sense of nationhood and improving nation integration. This in turn contributed to 
low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices as argued in section 5.2.1. Interviewees 
holding this view argued that nationalisation has managed to create the base for EDNR and made 
them see the importance of sharing resources among them. This position is predicated on the 
assumption that no ethnic group is self-reliant. Moreover, if the levels of development are left to 
grow disproportionately, conflicts between ethnic groups that are developed and those that are not, 
are likely to abound. This to their views will lead to ethnic voting revolving around the richer and 
poorer ethnic groups, something that they would not like to see. This is mainly because it will 
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endanger peace. The following observations from an interview with a teacher at Mapilinga express 
such views:  
“Utaifishaji uliweka uchumi mikononi mwa Watanzania na ukawapa ajira bila kuwauliza makabila yao. Fedha 
iliyotokana na mali iliyotaifishwa ililipia maendeleo katika sehemu zote za nchi. Hali hii inaendelea kufanya kazi 
sasa hivi kwani kodi za vitu vilivyobinafsishwa inakwenda kwa Watanzania wote kwa njia ya miradi ya 
maendeleo. Hili tendo huongeza umoja wa kitaifa na amani ambavyo ndio tunavyovipigia kura." 
85
 
 
“Nationalisation put the economy in the hands of Tanzanians and gave them employment without asking their 
tribal belonging. The money accrued from nationalised properties financed development pan-territorially. This 
situation works today as tax from privatised ventures goes back to all Tanzanians through development projects. 
This act enhances national unity and peace which we vote for.” 
 
Views from an extension officer in Misungwi concur with the opinion of the teacher of Mapilinga 
as he was of the opinion that: 
“Kutaifishwa mali kumepunguza nafasi ya ukabila katika kuhamasisha wapiga kura kwa sababu maendeleo yote ya 
kiuchumi yaliwekwa chini ya serikali kwa manufaa ya makundi makabila yote. Kwa hiyo, ikapunguza ushindani 
baina ya makundi ambayo yangeweza kuwa msingi wa ukabila katika kupiga kura."
86
  
 
“Nationalisation has lowered the role of ethnicity in soliciting voters support because it economic development was 
put under the hands of the government for the good of all ethnic groups. Therefore, it reduced competition among 
groups that could have provided the base for ethnic salience in voting.” 
 
The notion of ethnic cooperation and indiscrimination expressed in the two subsequent ideas 
presented above is further revealed by the words of the then MP aspirant from Rufiji Street: 
“Wasukuma ni matajiri wa rasilimali na kama rasilimali zao zote zingetumika kwa ajili ya maendeleo ya Mwanza 
peke yake, sisi tungekuwa tumeendelea zaidi. Hata hivyo, hatuna kila kitu; tunahitaji chumvi na mambo mengine 
kutoka kwa wengine. Kwa hiyo, ni muhimu kwamba hatuwabagui watu wengine. Badala yake tunapaswa 
kutegemeana ili kila mmoja ajaze mapengo yake kutoka kwa mwenzie. Utaifishaji umetufundisha somo hili na kila 
kabila linatimiza mahitaji yake kwa kuyapata kwa kabila lingine. Kwa ushirikiano kama huu kwanini tubaguane 
kwa makabila kwa ajili ya kupata madaraka?"
87
  
 
“The Sukuma are rich of resources and if all were used for the development of Mwanza alone, we would have been 
more developed. However, we do not have everything; we need salt and other things from others. Therefore, it is 
important that we do not discriminate other people. Instead we should complement each other to fill our gaps. 
Nationalisation taught this lesson and we complement each other across tribes. With such cooperation why shall 
we discriminate against tribes for the sake of gaining state power?” 
 
While views of the above may reflect an elitist bias, the general support of the ordinary people on 
nationalisation’s role in lowering ethnic voting presented below, blow away such suspension. This 
is evidenced by views of a young man from Shamalala who in a mockery fashion suggested: 
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  Personal interview with a female Primary School Teacher  in Mapilinga Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District 
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"Utaifishaji ulitoa fursa kwa serikali na chama tawala kupunguza ushawishi wa ukabila katika kuomba kura. Hii 
ilitokea kwa kufanya kila Mtanzania kwa namna moja au nyingine apate rasilimali za umma na kufikiri kitaifa. 
Utaifishaji ulifanya kila kitu kuwa cha kitaifa - Benki ya Taifa ya Biashara, Shirika la Nyumba la Taifa na 
mashirika mengine ya kitaifa. Hata timu ya soka ya taifa inaitwa Taifa Stars. "Taifa" ikawa neno kubwa, kwa 
namna hii mtu atafikiria vipi kikabila?"
88
 
 
 “Nationalisation gave the government and the ruling party chance to lower the influence of ethnicity in begging 
for votes. This happened by making every Tanzanian in one way or the other access public resources and think 
nationally. Nationalisation made everything national-the National Bank of Commerce, National Housing 
Corporation and other national corporations. Even the football national team was called Taifa (National) Stars. 
“National” became the catchword, how would one think ethnically?” 
 
Similarly, views from a hawker from Misungwi village justify the non-elitist view of 
nationalisation’s role in lowering ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices: 
“Makampuni yanayomilikiwa na serikali yanaajiri watu kutoka makabila mbalimbali nchini kote, na faida 
zilitumika kutoa huduma za umma kwa ajili yetu sote. Usawa kama huu hauchochei ukabila kukua katika upigaji 
wa kura kwakuwa hakuna kabila lenye kinyongo cha kubaguliwa.” 89  
 
“Government owned companies employ people from different tribes all over the country, and the gains are used to 
offer public services for all of us.  Such equity does not advocate ethnicity from growing in voting as no ethnic 
group holds grudges for being discriminated.” 
 
Views of an elderly woman from Nange further cement the role of nationalisation in undermining 
the influence of ethnicity in soliciting votes: 
"Hakuna kabila lililopewa rasilimali zaidi ya zilizotaifishwa, kwa nini watu wapigane na kupiga kura kikabila?"
90
 
 
“No tribe has been given more of the nationalised resources, why shall people fight and vote ethnically?” 
 
 
As much as the interviewees’ general view is that nationalisation has informed a negative base for 
ethnicity to inform voting, there were few interviewees (22%) who did not buy into this idea. The 
views of a male farmer from Nange attest to this position: 
"Utaifishaji haupo. Makampuni yote yaliyotaifishwa yamebinafsishwa na mapya binafsi yameanzishwa. Kwa hiyo, 
havina nafasi yeyote katika masuala ya ukabila na maamuzi ya wapiga kura."
91
 
 
 “Nationalisation does not exist. All of the nationalised companies have been privatised and new private ones have 
been formed. Therefore, they have no impact on the role of ethnicity on determining voting.”  
 
Likewise, a young man in Mapilinga expressed an identical argument when he remarked: 
"Utaifishaji upo wapi siku hizi? Tumeuza kila kitu isipokuwa magereza tu. National Milling, makampuni ya 
biashara za mikoa na makampuni mengine ya kitaifa hayapo tena. Sasa ni kwa jinsi gani utaifishaji unaweza 
kushawishi chochote? Utaifishaji umeleta umoja katika siku za nyuma na umoja bado upo. Hata hivyo, hii si kwa 
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sababu ya utaifishaji. Bali, tuna ukabila mdogo katika uchaguzi kwa sababu ya amani na umoja; si kuchukuliwa 
kwa mali za wageni wa nje." 
92
 
 
“Where is nationalisation nowadays? We have sold everything except prison cells. The National Milling, regional 
trading companies and all other national ventures are no more. How can nationalisation influence anything? 
Nationalisation brought unity in the past and unity still exists. However, this is not because of nationalisation. 
Instead, we have limited ethnicity in elections because of peace and unity; not confiscation of foreign properties.” 
 
An interesting view of a female Secondary School Teacher in Rufiji Street buys into this narrow 
view of nationalisation. In her own words she argued that:  
 
“Utaifishaji hauna uhusiano wowote na nia ya kupiga kura kwakuwa katika hali halisi utaifishaji haupo. Wala 
Ujamaa haupo ingawa katiba yetu inadai upo.  Nia ya waasisi kutaifisha kwa manufaa ya watu pia imekufa maana 
viongozi wanaiba fedha za umma kwa faida zao binafsi. Tuna bahati kwamba fedha zilizoibiwa hazikwenda 
kuendeleza ukabila wala hazikugaiwa kwa watu wa makabila yao tu. Lakini zinakwenda kwenye mifuko ya 
viongozi hao wasio na maadili. Wangezisambaza kikabila ingekuwa sababu ya kusababisha kura kwa misingi ya 
kikabila.”93 
 
“Nationalisation has nothing to do with voting intentions as in strict sense it does not exist.  Neither does Ujamaa 
although our constitution claims that it does. The founders’ intention to nationalise for the good of the people also 
died as leaders embezzle public funds for their selfish interest. We are lucky that the money they embezzle is not 
going to perpetuate ethnicity as is not shared among tribe mates. It goes to the pockets of those unethical leaders. 
Had they distributed it along tribal lines tribalism would have been a common factor in informing votes.” 
 
The views above in the main indicate that privatisation of the economy took back to private hands 
what was nationalised. Therefore, since confiscation of privately owned economic venture is no 
longer the state policy, nationalisation cannot have any impact on informing the influence of 
ethnicity in informing voters’ choices. In other words, anything that was associated with 
nationalisation died when liberal policies came into existence. This position is against the majority 
view of my interviewees that suggests that the legacy of nationalisation as defined in its broad 
sense has a significant role in influencing low salience of ethnicity in voting. This stance is based 
on the fact that the state still entails using taxes from the privatised ventures for financing equitable 
development. Moreover, while it is true that a lot of nationalised companies have been privatised, 
some still exist and new ones have been formed. Likewise, the broader view of empowering 
Tanzanians still exists in varied contexts. For instance, the EDNR meant to lay flat developmental 
differences among regions and people are still implemented. This is done through budgetary 
initiatives financed by tax as widely argued by most interviewees and scholars like Wangwe 
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(2005). Similarly, the Africanisation initiative though not spelt out in that term is relevant as the 
civil service is predominantly black African. Additionally, initiatives of inculcating patriotism as 
well as educating Tanzanians as provided in Lofchie’s definition of nationalisation, still exist.  
The view of the teacher that questions some leaders’ sense of nationality from the embezzlement 
point suggests no or limited chances of ethnicity gaining salience in influencing voters’ choices. 
This observation is anchored on the fact that although the acts depart from the PsIM, no evidence 
points to the fact that the embezzled monies have been disproportionately distributed among co-
ethnics to lure electoral support. Such division according to Wimmer (1997) is necessary for 
salience of ethnicity in voting to gain currency. In this regard, the argument made by the minority 
of our interviewees on the matter is based on the narrow definition of nationalisation. This 
definition considers nationalisation within the confines of confiscation of foreign-owned 
companies for equitable distribution. From this angle their position makes some sense. However, 
from the broader aspect of enhancing nationhood and giving people access to public resources 
irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds, it is rendered questionable.  
5.2.2.3. Synthesis of EDNR, Ethnicity and Voting 
The discussion of the elements of EDNR, ethnicity and voting above suggests that the component 
of EDNR enshrined in the PsIM have informed low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ 
choices in the 2010 elections. The degree of insistence on the role of nationalisation in enhancing 
national unity over divisive ethnic polarisation is a clear testament to the pride invested in the 
nation, as indicated in the previous subheading. Nationalisation according to the interviewees 
enhanced national pride and unity by equitably distributing resources across regional and ethnic 
demarcations. The EDNR curtailed the room for ethnic polarisation that breeds ethnic voting once 
resources are disproportionately distributed among ethnic groups. In the study area feelings of 
favoured distribution of resources could not be evidenced to inform ethnic competition of 
resources. The interviewees who thought nationalisation had nothing to do in lowering ethnicity 
base their argument on the fact that the current economic system does not support public 
ownership in the business world and, therefore, the impacts of nationalisation ended with the 
liberal reforms. However, the broader definition of nationalisation encompassing the national unity 
elements and the continued EDNR viewed within the framework of the PsIM still suggests a 
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continuation of the spirit of nationalisation as well described by scholars like Lofchie (2013), 
Mwiru (2013), Weber (2007) and Wangwe (2005).  
From the discussions above I deduce that the EDNR in the area of study has built on the already 
existing deep feelings of national unity in Tanzania and its mitigating effects on the use of 
ethnicity in soliciting votes. The nationalist feelings prevail over claims of embezzlement of public 
funds and favouritism that are levelled against some public officials. This is because although the 
embezzlement could have an effect on the ability to distribute public resources but it was not done 
to serve ethnic ends. In this regard, nationalistic feelings could be affected but without fuelling 
ethnicity as the unethical acts never meant to further ethnic interests which could inform salience 
of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices. Under such circumstances, I argue that the nationalist 
feelings and the legacy of EDNR promised by the PsIM has survived decades after the demise of 
the AD that provided its base. Thus the implementation of the promise of EDNR embedded in the 
PsIM transcended the ideological changes from socialism to capitalism. More important, its effect 
on informing low salience of ethnicity in voting is intact irrespective of the ideological shift. Such 
situation informs the widely agreed view among interviewees that contestants and parties in the 
2010 elections canvassed along nationalist rather that ethnic policies for electoral success.  Once 
again the sustenance of the socialist based nationalist discourse informed by the AD amid a liberal 
democratic capitalistic era raises the question why. Before providing answers to such a question, 
let us turn to the influences of the last PsIM on informing the role of ethnicity on determining 
voters’ choices.  
5.2.3. Peace, Ethnicity and Voting 
The third PsIM was to ensure that Tanzania is an Island of peace, and Tanzanians enjoy that peace 
to the fullest. The promise was given to all independent African states but Tanzania is among few 
countries that put the promise into practise. This is evidenced by the fact that it is more peaceful 
compared to other African countries if measured by violent conflicts as indicated in section 1.1 and 
3.4.5. This is the case despite the fact that most of the conventional theories of conflict suggest that 
Tanzania “should” be beset by violent conflict because of its ethnic and religious heterogeneity as 
well as the acute economic hurdles facing its citizens as argued in section 3.4.5. The structure of 
Tanzania’s ethnic heterogeneity in the light of the conflict theories does not only presuppose that 
violent ethnic conflicts should be high in Tanzania but also ethnic salience in voting (Bratton et al, 
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2011). Both suppositions have never been proven, as highlighted in the general introduction and 
the detailed ethno-political narrative of Tanzania. Below we discuss how the promise of peace as 
embedded in the PsIM, and manifested in varied efforts to ensure its existence has informed the 
influence of ethnicity on voters’ choices in the 2010 elections.  
86% of my interviewees were of the view that the promise of peace and the initiatives meant to 
implement it have thwarted the use of ethnicity in seeking electoral support. The data gathered 
from the interviewees generally suggest that initiatives like denouncing politicisation of ethnicity, 
application of violent means to demanding rights, national integration and EDNR have enhanced 
peace and made my interviewees fond of the concept of peace. They expressed opinions against 
ethnic salience in the conduct of politics and elections which have proven to be harmful in other 
countries of Africa. The main reason advanced revolves around the belief that ethnic salience in 
voting could trigger violent ethnic conflicts and subsequent adverse effects among the competing 
ethnic groups. This was detested because it would affect development and dent the peace that our 
founding fathers worked hard to build since independence. It is against this background that most 
interviewees were of the view that the use of ethnicity in political canvassing shall be avoided by 
all possible means. The following words well summarises this general position: 
"Kama kuna jambo moja ambalo Watanzania wanaweza kujivunia licha ya kuwa maskini, ni hali ya amani 
wanayoifurahia. Kwa kutumia ukabila kuungwa mkono  kisiasa tutajikuta tunakuwa Rwanda au Burundi nyingine 
ambapo mauaji ya kimbari yamesababisha vifo vya  maisha ya watu wasio na hatia kwa faida ya wanasiasa ambao  
kwa maslahi yao walitumia ukabila katika siasa. Mungu atuepushe nahali kama hiyo wakati tunaendelea kukataa 
migawanyiko ya kikabila katika siasa kama tulivyofanya katika uchaguzi uliopita."
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“If there is one thing that Tanzanians can boast of despite being poor, is the state of peace that they enjoy. Using 
ethnicity in garnering political support will make us another Rwanda or Burundi where ethnic cleansing claimed 
innocent lives for the advantage of politicians who politicised ethnicity for their political interests. God should 
spare us from such situation while we continue to reject tribal political divides in electioneering as we have in the 
previous elections.” 
 
More interviewees in the study area could not express the above sophistication but outrightly said 
ethnic voting is bad for peace which is necessary for socio-economic wellbeing. One interesting 
view was provided by a fisherman in Igoma who told me that ethnicity in elections should be 
avoided because Tanzania’s neighbours cannot harbour influx of refugees from Tanzania the way 
Tanzania did for Burundi, Rwanda and Congo. Therefore, a lot of us will die and those remaining 
will be indigent. 
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The views above are representative of many interviewees who lamented about Tanzania’s state of 
poverty particularly by staying that there is high level of joblessness, expensive social services and 
utilities. The hardships notwithstanding they are proud to be Tanzanians as discussed in section 
5.2.1, for the peace they enjoy compared to other countries. A feeling that is even envied by 
Tanzania’s neighbours as the following quote from a Kenyan known by the name of Chris while 
contributing to a discussion on the Global Voices blog about the 2010 GEs in Tanzania. Chris was 
of the view that:  
“For most Kenyans (as other non-Tanzanians who are not tired of inciting ethnic hatred on this blog) it will be hard 
to understand Tanzanian politics. Ethnicity has no political value in Tanzania despite being as big as Kenya and 
Uganda combined and having about 140 ethnic groups; History tells there is no tribe that has ruled the country than 
others. A person who should be singled out for ensuring unity is Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere. While Tom 
Mboya and Jomo Kenyatta were pride of national symbols with mighty connotation like Lion, Nyerere preferred 
the coolest animal in the jungle, Giraffe, depicting his commitment to peace. There is sufficient evidence that in his 
Life Mwalimu was very visionary to the extent that his legacy is so strong that it influences the decisions on varied 
matters. Nyerere unified Tanzanians through Swahili and managed to knit together the entire Tanzanian society” 
(Global Voices, 2010). 
 
The view of the Kenyan reaffirms the significance of peace and the concerted efforts made by the 
country’s founding father to build and nurture peace. The role of the founding fathers highlighted 
by Chris, inferably suggests that the implementation of the PsIM have had an impact on the way 
ethnicity determines voting. This is due to the fact that they are the ones who envisioned them and 
strived hard to implement them as well elaborated throughout Chapter IV. Chris associates peace 
to the communicative and interactive role of Swahili that has been widely discussed in Chapter IV 
and in section 5.2, as well as section 5.4.1 that deals with the use of Kisukuma in soliciting 
electoral support. An interesting innovation brought forward by Chris that has not been well 
documented is the use of pro-peace national symbols in promoting and nurturing peace. The 
comparison of the Giraffe used in peaceful Tanzania and Lion by the ethnic violent Kenya is quite 
interesting. It usefully explains tools of civic peace building in the two neighbouring states and 
their implications on peacefulness and national integrity. The symbol, chosen and instrumentally 
enacted by Nyerere in view of a national identity, partakes of the political imaginary shared by 
Tanzanians and made explicit in the PsIM.  
 
The denunciation of the use of ethnicity in soliciting votes based on the negative experiences it has 
had in countries like Rwanda, Kenya and Burundi highlighted in the first quotation under this 
section and other interviewees informed the significance of competing parties and candidates in 
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Mwanza to make peace an important element in their campaign. One interviewee summarises this 
aspect very well when he remarked:  
 
"Wakati wa mikutano ya CCM kama kuna jambo moja ambalo unaweza kuotea kwamba litasemwa zaidi ya neno 
lingine lolote ni amani. Wanatumia muda wao mwingi kuhusisha amani ya Tanzania na kazi ya waasisi wa taifa 
hili. Wanatuambia jinsi walivyotuunganisha dhidi ya migawanyiko ya kikabila kupitia kwa kusambaza kwa usawa 
rasilimali na kupunguza tofauti za kipato ambazo zinaweza kuchochea migogoro ya kikabila. Wanafanya hivi 
wakijua kwamba Watanzania wanapenda sana amani, hata kama baadhi ya haki zao za msingi zinaporwa. 
Wapinzani wanaujua ukweli huu, kwa hivyo nao wanahubiri amani na kukataa matumizi ya ukabila katika siasa 
pia. Hata hivyo, wao hawasisitizi uhusiano wa waasisi na amani kwa sababu inainufaisha CCM. Kwa ujumla, 
pande zote mbili ( CCM na wapinzani) wanaahadi amani na kukataa ukabila katika kushawishi upigaji wa kura."
95
  
 
“During CCMs meeting if there is one thing that you can bet that will be said more than any other word is peace. 
They use most of their time to associate it with the work of the founders of the nation. They tell us how they 
unified people against ethnic divisions through equitably distributing resources and reducing income inequalities 
that could fuel ethnic conflicts. They are doing this knowing that Tanzanians love peace so very much, even if 
some of their basic rights are infringed. The opposition know this fact so it preaches peace and reject political 
tribalism as well. However, they downplay the association of the founders and peace because it favours CCM. All 
in all both parties (CCM and the opposition) promise peace and reject ethnic salience in voting”  
 
The views of the civil servant tell us the importance placed on peace (amani in Swahili) by the 
ruling and opposition parties in luring votes. As for the ruling party, it is very common for their 
candidates and campaigners while campaigning to reflect the role of the founding fathers in 
building and nurturing peace by using a common Swahili saying “usione vinaelea vimeundwa” 
literally meaning “you should not just see things flowing, they have been made”. This common 
saying intends to convey to voters’ the message that the peace that Tanzania enjoys is a product of 
the nation-building policies implemented by TANU and its successor CCM as widely discussed 
throughout Chapter IV. The expression illustrates the instrumentalist and constructivist view on 
identity that is common among Tanzanians, to support a political imaginary in service of the 
nation, as Nyerere did. Peace does not come by itself. It is the product of concerted efforts - 
peacework so to say. An Extension Officer in an interview in Misungwi underlined this and 
seconded the idea of centrality of peace in the 2010 campaigns as well as its advantage to CCM 
presented in the view above when he asserted that: 
 "CCM wanatuambia kwamba amani tunayoifurahia haijaletwa na Mungu bali ni matokeo ya juhudi za makusudi 
za TANU na CCM kuepuka ukabila katika uendeshaji wa siasa. Wanatukumbusha kupitia vyombo vya habari 
ujumbe wa Mwalimu juu ya amani zinazokemea matumizi ya ukabila kuvuta wapiga kura kutokana na nafasi yake 
katika kusababisha migogoro ya kikabila na vita. Watanzania wanavutiwa na maneno haya kwa sababu wanapenda 
amani na kuunga mkono vyama vinavyosimamia amani."
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“CCM tell us that the peace that we enjoy is not God given but a result of TANU’s and CCM’s concerted efforts to 
avoid tribalism in the organisation of politics. They remind us through the media Mwalimu’s peace advocating 
messages that denounce the use of ethnicity in winning voters due to its chances of invoking violent ethnic 
conflicts. Tanzanians are moved by these words because they love peace and support peace loving parties.”   
 
The views above are well comprehended if read together with the opinion of a secondary school 
student in Kishiri A street who disclosed that:  
"Unajua maandamano yanayoandaliwa na CHADEMA ni msaada kwa CCM kushinda kwa sababu Watanzania 
wanachukia vitendo vya vurugu na maneno ambayo huchochea matumizi ya nguvu katika kudai haki 
yanayotamkwa na viongozi wa CHADEMA. Ni maoni yangu ya dhati kwamba jambo muhimu zaidi kwa ajili ya 
chama chochote kushinda uchaguzi nchini Tanzania ni amani! Sababu zengine zinazohusiana na utendaji zinafuata. 
Hatutaki kuwa kama Kenya ambako wakati wowote uchaguzi unapofanyika hofu ya kutokea kwa ghasia za 
kikabila kuhusiana na uchaguzi ipo juu." 
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“You know demonstrations organised by CHADEMA help CCM to win because Tanzanians hate violent acts and 
words that incite the use of force in claiming rights uttered by CHADEMA leaders. It is my frank opinion that the 
most important thing for a party to win elections in Tanzania is peace! Others related to performance follow. We 
do not want to be like Kenya where whenever elections are held the fears of ethnic related electoral violence to 
abound are great.”  
 
The view that Tanzanians do love peace is attested by the fact that most of my interviewees (91%) 
condemned the use of violence in demanding their economic and political rights even if the 
government commits grave breaches of democracy that could easily invoke chaos in other 
countries. For instance, when I asked them if they will resort to violence if the government 
suspends elections indefinitely, ends the ongoing constitutional making process or the President 
dissolves the NA. Many of them never wanted such things to happen but if they do they said they 
will not contest violently instead they would like political parties to engage in a dialogue to resolve 
the matters. More important, most of my interviewees (92%) told me that they never signed any 
petition and/or participated in demonstrations or boycott in their lifetime, and have not even 
written letters to newspapers or commented on social networks. The failure of the interviewees to 
take part in the matters pointed out above not only suggests that most of the people are politically 
inactive but also that political parties shall strive to address their differences amicably to win 
electoral support. Such love of peace and the adverse impacts of politicised ethnicity indicated 
above are enough to deduce that peace lovers would not be moved by ethnic political canvassing 
and much more vote ethnic-wise.  
Few interviewees (9%) who participated in the demonstrations were of the view that they had to 
apply violent means to stamp undemocratic tendencies. This is because most people are docile and 
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refrain from the use of violence in the organisation of politics. An opinion of a Kurya Street 
vendor who has completed advanced secondary education in Nyamagana and identified himself 
with CHADEMA portray this line of thought:   
 
"Watanzania ni wapole sana, hasa Wasukuma. Wao hawataki kushiriki katika maandamano kudai haki zao hata 
kama kwa kufanya hivyo watafaidika. Hawa ni watu ambao wanawaupigia kura wale ambao wanawaahidi amani 
na mambo ambayo hayataihatarisha ni kama matumizi ya ukabila katika siasa. Ndio maana chama tawala 
kinazungumzia amani na amani na amani badala ya ustawi wa kiuchumi na jamii. Amini ninakuambia, CCM 
wanaweza kuzungumzia ubaya wa matumizi ya ukabila kuhamasisha kura, kuonyesha vipande vya video vya 
mauaji ya kikabila na kuomba watu wawapigie kura na kushinda hasa katika maeneo ya vijijini. Katika maeneo ya 
mijini tunataka zaidi ya hayo. Ndio maana sisi tunaichagua CHADEMA. Hatuchukii amani au tunataka ukabila 
utumiwe kuomba kura lakini wakati mwingine tunahitaji kuandamana kuonyesha kutoridhika kwetu na kuifanya 
serikali ishughulikie mahitaji yetu."
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“Tanzanians are very docile, particularly the Sukuma. They do not want to engage in demonstrations to demand 
their rights even if by so doing they will benefit. These are the people who simply vote those who promise peace 
and things that will not endanger. That is why the ruling party talks of peace and peace and peace instead of the 
economic wellbeing of the people. Take it from me, CCM can talk of the negative impacts of the application of 
ethnicity in soliciting votes, show video clips of ethnic cleansing and ask people to vote for it and win particularly 
in the rural areas. In the urban areas we want more than that. That is why we choose CHADEMA. We don’t hate 
peace or want ethnicity to be used to solicit votes but sometimes we need to demonstrate to express our 
dissatisfaction and make the state address our needs.”   
 
The view of the street vendor adds an important dimension to the debate on peace, ethnicity and 
voting in Mwanza. First it does indicate a difference of opinions and perception on the role of 
peace and ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This is because to him, peace informed low 
ethnic salience is more common and applicable in the rural settings compared to the urban areas. 
Also the street vendor suggests that the Sukuma who are the main voters in Mwanza as indicated 
in the description of the study area in section 2.3 are docile and more peace loving than other 
ethnic groups in the Lake Zone. The submissive and peace-loving quality of the Sukuma is widely 
shared among Tanzanians as they have never used their numerical advantage to ensure political 
visibility (Malipula, 2014; Weber, 2009; Nyang’oro, 2004). Such characteristic contributes 
towards making most of them influenced by non-violent initiatives to limit the occurrence of 
violence. This inferably suggests that the use of ethnicity for garnering political support is 
discouraged among them and because of their numerical advantage contesting parties that wish to 
win the Sukuma should ensure them peace in exchange for their votes.  
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The vendor’s take on the Sukuma is understandable as most Tanzanians view the Sukuma to be 
polite and non-aggressive compared to his ethnic group (Kurya) and neighbours Jita both from 
Mara region. Although we do not have means to substantiate the stereotypes dominating the public 
imaginary, it can be said that the two ethnic groups are known for being rude and aggressive in 
fighting for their conceived rights leading to the occurrence of violent conflicts among ethnicities, 
locals and investors and sometimes with state apparatuses. A possible substantiation is the special 
police in Tarime district within Mara region due to the frequency of deadly conflicts related to 
cattle raiding and mining related conflicts between the indegeneous people and foreign miners. 
Actually in Tanzania there is a common understanding among people that the Kurya are militant in 
nature and a job well suited for them is serving in the Army. Two of the Chiefs of the Tanzania 
People Defence Force came from that ethnic group something unheard of in other security forces. 
In this context, it is understandable that the interviewee was of the view that the Sukuma are 
viewed cowardice and thus they compromise there basic rights. To the interviewee the peace 
threatening impacts associated with the salience of ethnicity on anchoring voters’ choices are are 
meant to deny people’s rights. He is of the view that the fear of the impacts of ethnic salience shall 
not take precedence over rational economic factors. More important, as indicated above stressing 
the country’s peace advantages the ruling party and, therefore, its political rivals would hardly 
wish to compete with it in this end. They prefer to debate on the economy and aspects like 
protection and use of public resources for which they could convincingly criticise the ruling party 
and its government.  
A point that is worth mentioning regarding the root of the difference of opinion between the rural 
and urban people on the role of peace, ethnicity and voting revolves around the urban complex 
socio-economic set-up and of the superior socio-economic characteristics of the urban people. The 
demonstrations mentioned by the militant Kurya are a product of the economic and political rights 
deemed relevant for the urban people involved in entrepreneurial and paid sectors to survive. This 
is justified by the re-occurrence of multi-ethnic small businessmen demonstrations in Mwanza 
geared towards demanding better conditions for doing business that got lots of followers in 
Mwanza town. These demands took centre stage in the campaigns in Nyamagana according to the 
interviewees from Nyamagana.  
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The street vendors and ordinary people who needed better conditions for doing business and 
entrepreneurial support irrespective of their ethnic background, saw demonstrations as a way of 
getting their rights despite its peace threatening perspective. Another point equally important here 
is that despite the opinion that the Sukuma are docile, the demonstrations were multi-ethnic and 
included Sukuma. More important, it was never informed by a clientelistic distribution of favours 
to a business community of one or few ethnic groups. In this way, the event suggested elements of 
non-ethnic issue-based interest aggregation and peaceful co-existence among ethnic groups. Such 
situation stands in the way of ethnic polarisation and salience of ethnicity in elections as people 
join cross-cutting interests instead of ethnic belonging. This is indeed a contributing factor to 
Wenje’s electoral success in 2010 although he is not a Sukuma by ethnic group. All in all, as much 
as different arguments on the relation between peace and ethnic salience apply to the rural and 
urban people in Mwanza (as in the Nyamagana and Misungwi situations), both categories of 
residents have proven to be admirers of peace. Such deduction can be derived from the views 
directly in favour of peace in the last sentence of the Kurya street vendor which indicates that he 
does not love violence but resorts to it as the last resort. In this regard, the significance of peace 
and its relevance in dissuading the salience of ethnicity in soliciting electoral support is indeed 
significant. 
To further show the interviewees’ love of peace and its influence on the use of ethnicity in 
soliciting votes in elections, most interviewees (88%) did not want national radio and television 
stations to broadcast in vernacular languages. They thought such act will increase the use of 
ethnicity in political canvassing which will turn to be detrimental to the peaceful situation that 
Tanzanians value far above a lot of other things as indicated in this and the previous sub-heading. 
This position is substantiated by the words of a Bar-maid in Shamalala Street, and collaborated by 
other interviewees:  
"Mwanza inakaliwa na Wasukuma wengi lakini kwa kutumia Kisukuma kutangaza televisheni na redio wakati wa 
kampeni haitakiwi maana ni ubaguzi dhidi ya wasio Wasukuma. Ubaguzi huu ni mbaya kwa amani kwakuwa 
itakuwa ni mwanzo wa migogoro ya kikabila.” 99  
 
“Mwanza is dominantly resided by the Sukuma but using Kisukuma to broadcast television and radio programmes 
during campaigns is uncalled for as it is discriminating against non-Sukuma. The discrimination is bad for peace as 
will be the beginning of tribal conflicts.” 
 
Correspondingly, an Extension Officer in Misungwi village was of the view that: 
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"Sitaki tuwe kama Afrika Kusini ambako taarifa za habari hurushwa hewani katika lugha mbalimbali za kikabili. 
Hali sio lazima Tanzania maana itatoa nafasi ya kueneza chuki za kikabila na migogoro miongoni mwa wagombea 
wa makabila tofauti. Watanzania wanataka amani na umoja, na matumizi ya Kiswahili kinachoeleweka na 
Watanzania wote. Lugha za makabila itaimarisha ukabila na kuchochea mgawanyiko wa kikabila na migogoro 
ambayo si ya kawaida Tanzania.” 100 
 
“I don’t want us to be like South Africa where several news bulletins are aired in vernacular languages. This is not 
necessary here as it will provide an avenue for spreading ethnic hatred and conflicts among contestants of different 
ethnic backgrounds. Tanzanians want peace and unity which is well served by using Swahili that is understood by 
all Tanzanians. Vernaculars will enhance tribalism and incite tribal divisions and conflicts that are uncommon in 
Tanzania.” 
 
A Primary School Teacher in Mapilinga Village also seconded the view that vernaculars should be 
avoided for the sake of peace and national integration by saying:  
".... wewe hujasikia mchango mbaya wa vituo vya redio za kikabila katika mauaji ya kimbari ya Rwanda? Mimi 
nimesikia na sitaki jambo kama hilo litokee hapa Tanzania. Sisi tusikilize lugha za makabila katika ngoma za jadi 
na nyimbo zinazochezwa kwenye vituo vya redio vinavyotangaza kwa kiswahili. Mikutano ya kampeni za 
uchaguzi isirushwe hewani katika lugha yeyote zaidi ya Kiswahili kuepuka matukio ya Rwanda.” 101  
 
“....haven’t you heard of the negative role played by the ethnic radio stations in the Rwandan genocide? I have, and 
therefore I don’t want such a thing to happen here in Tanzania. Let us hear the vernaculars in traditional dance 
songs played on Swahili transmitted radio stations. Election campaigns should not be aired in languages other than 
Swahili to avoid the Rwanda incidences.” 
 
Vernaculars are suitable within folklore activities and leisure but not in politics, where culture 
becomes ethnicity. An MP aspirant interviewed in Rufiji Street also followed suit by arguing that: 
  "Kwa nini tupige hatua kurudi nyuma? Kiswahili hujulikana nakila mtu na kutumia lugha za kikabili katika 
sehemu zenye watu wa makabila mbalimbali kutagawanya watu na kuimarisha matumizi ya ukabila katika 
uchaguzi, jambo ambalo limepingwa sana Tanzania. Lugha za makabila hazitumiki  katika utangazaji sasa na hii 
halipaswi kuruhusiwa kwa namna yeyote  ili kuendeleza amani na ushirikiano wa kitaifa unahitajika sana kwa ajili 
ya kuleta maendeleo.” 102 
 
 “Why shall we make a step backward? Swahili is known by everyone and going back to using vernaculars in 
cosmopolitan societies will divide people and enhance ethnic salience in elections, which has been widely 
denounced in Tanzania. Vernaculars are not used in broadcasting now and this shall not be allowed by all means to 
sustain peace and national integration much needed for development.” 
 
The views against the use of vernaculars widely presented above indicate that the love of peace 
predicated on the national integrative nature of Tanzania’s politics is valued so high. Examples of 
incidences of political mobilisation employed in other countries like Rwanda provided a basis for 
the interviewees to denounce the use of vernacular languages. This is against the neo-
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patrimonialist thesis that suggests Africans prefer traditionalism so as to enhance local patron-
client relationship. The rejection of the use of vernaculars concords with earlier observations that 
local patron-client relationships and ethnic canvassing were not significant in informing voters’ 
choices. 
5.2.3.1. Synthesis of the Peace, Ethnicity and Voters’ Choices 
A critical look at the relation between peace, ethnicity and voting suggests that the promise of 
peace enshrined in the PsIM has informed low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices. 
The interviewees have proven to be proud of their national identity, unity and comparative peace 
to its neighbours despite their high rate of poverty. While there are claims that the Sukuma do not 
love peace but are cowards and docile therefore taken advantage of by the ruling party’s promises 
of peace and calls for denouncing ethnic salience in politics, the frequency of the imperative of 
peace given by the interviewees rejects the claim. Indeed, the rationale provided for the need to 
avoid the adverse impacts of violence that have been triggered by politicisation of ethnicity in 
Kenya, Rwanda and  Burundi as depicted in the general introduction further questions the 
significance of the docile characteristic claimed to inform lower salience of ethnicity on 
determining  electoral choices in the study area. The interviewees’ opinions demonstrate that the 
discourse against violence is well-entrenched in the Tanzanian’s minds and a proactive choice 
against the effects of violent-prone ethnicity as in other countries providing practical experience. 
Moreover, the impetus for the PsIM started before the pointed violence gained currency in those 
countries.  Therefore, I argue that the rationale for enhancing peacefulness as informed by the 
PsIM serves as a frame through which Tanzanians reject ethnicity in mobilising voters support.  
5.2.4. Concluding Discussion: PsIM, Ethnicity and Voters’ Choices in Competitive Elections 
in Tanzania 
 A general conclusion to be made concerning this objective is the fact that the PsIM has informed 
low salience of ethnicity in the determination of electoral votes in Mwanza. This is in line with the 
general picture of Tanzania presented in the ethno-political narrative that constituted Chapter IV 
and is against the neo-patrimonial position that African states are traditional and paternalistic thus 
giving ethnicity a centre stage in informing voters’ choices.  A critical analysis of the PsIM as 
enshrined in section 3.4.4 and various initiatives done to put them to effect in the area of national 
unity, EDNR and peace broadly enshrined in the AD and beyond has created an environment 
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militating against the salience of ethnicity in voting. This is quite logical for any independent state 
that has tasted colonialism as such states wished to see that they benefit from the fruits of 
independence resource-wise and also have peace and security to enjoy their social and economic 
lives. It is against this background I argue that the voters in Mwanza substantiated that they are by 
far proud of and uphold their national identity, are appreciative of the EDNR and value peace 
when they are encountered with electoral decisions. All of this is clearly evidenced by the 
frequency with which the interviewees cited the significance of national unity, EDNR and peace in 
sections 5.2.1 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 as the primary sources of national pride and stumbling blocks to the 
salience of ethnicity on determining electoral votes.  In this way, the use of ethnicity in luring 
votes in the 2010 election would have been heading against the direction that the interviewees 
believe in. 
   
Cognisant of the fact that the 2010 elections took place after the collapse of the AD which is 
responsible for providing the foundation for actualising the PsIM through an extensive post-
independence socialist nation-building policy, entails that the PsIM have proven to be applicable 
even beyond the socialist era. This position I argue is predicated on the fact that Tanzania is 
implementing capitalist liberal democratic market-oriented policies which are against the letter and 
spirit of the famous AD and the monolithic political dispensation as extensively argued in Chapter 
IV. Such state of affairs intrigues the question why that is the case. This question is addressed in 
the next sub-section of this dissertation that endeavours to explain the dynamics behind influences 
of ethnicity on determining voting choices in the 2010 elections in Mwanza. 
5.3. Explaining the Influences of Ethnicity on determining Voters’ Choices in the 2010 
General Elections  
Section 5.2 above has managed to elicit how the PsIM and implementation of some policies meant 
to realise them have influenced low salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters’ choices in 
the 2010 elections in Mwanza. The section confirms that the intent of the PsIM that meant to 
reverse the divisive, exploitative and insecurity elements that colonialism instilled have influenced 
ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices in the studied area. In the section referred and in the fourth 
chapter of the dissertation, it was argued that the attainment of the PsIM was hinged upon the 
implementation of the socialist AD. However, Tanzania has witnessed varied political and 
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economic changes that are against the letter and spirit of Ujamaa, yet the level of ethnic salience in 
voting have remained low. Of interest to this dissertation was to explore why the PsIM have 
continued to inform the influences of ethnicity even after the collapse of the AD and 
commencement of liberal democratic market-oriented policies. 
 
Since socialism and liberalism are opposing ideological viewpoints, it was of interest to this 
dissertation to unveil the explanations as to why the socialist crafted PsIM still produced low 
salience of ethnicity on voters’ choices. To be able to capture this, a question on how the PsIM and 
initiatives meant to realise them have influenced the role of ethnicity in voters’ choices in 2010 
was succeeded by a follow-up question on why the PsIM have had such effect. Also, interviewees 
were asked a general question on what influences their voting choices, and why ethnicity has 
consistently remained low in Tanzanian electoral politics compared to other countries. The 
interviewees’ explanations revolve around the nation-building frame, the unifying efficiency of 
Swahili, civic education, the legacy of Mwalimu’s leadership and legal restrictions, as presented 
and discussed in the subheadings below.  
 
5.3.1. The Nation-building Frame 
The views of (84%) of my interviewees pointed out that the PsIM and efforts meant to realise them 
have sustainably lowered salience of ethnicity in the 2010 elections. This is due to a meticulous 
framing of an over-arching vision to unite Tanzanians nationally and avoiding divisive tendencies 
in the conduct of politics in general and voting in particular. The over-arching nationalist vision 
won the hearts of Tanzanians because the fight against ethnicity was framed as a war - a do or die 
phenomenon. The words of a teacher from Mapilinga village attest to this position:  
“Uongozi wa kisiasa umetangaza vita dhidi ya magonjwa, ujinga na umaskini ambavyo zinahitaji umoja wa kitaifa, 
mshikamano, amani na utulivu ili kufanikiwa. Matakwa haya yanakinzana na matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi 
kwa sababu ukabila utazua mfarakano na migogoro ambayo itatufanya kushindwa vita na kuimarisha maendeleo 
duni.” 103  
 
 “The political leadership waged war against diseases, ignorance and poverty; that needed national unity, solidarity, 
peace and tranquillity to succeed. These prerequisites stand in the way of ethnic salience in elections because it 
could breed disunity and conflicts which will make us lose the war and enhance underdevelopment” 
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The words of the teacher from Mapilinga were seconded by the then MP aspirant interviewed in 
Rufiji street who was of the view that: 
“Waanzilishi wa taifa hili wameweka msingi imara sana wa kujenga umoja wa kitaifa na kupinga matumizi ya 
ukabila katika kupiga kura. Hii ilifanyika kwa kutangaza vita dhidi ya masuala ambayo yanaweza kugawanya 
Watanzania kama ukabila, kidini, ukanda, matabaka, n.k. Msingi huu unaendelea kuwa muhimu katika kuondoa 
masuala ya ukabila katika siasa kwasababu Watanzania bila kujali mwelekeo wao wa kisiasa na maoni yao ya 
kiuchumi wanatambua umuhimu wa amani na mshikamano katika kuleta maendeleo kwa watu wote.”104  
 
“The founders of this nation set a very strong foundation for building nation unity and fighting the use of ethnicity in 
voting. This was done by announcing a war against aspects that can divide Tanzanians like ethnicity, religiosity, 
regionalism, classes, etc. This foundation continues to be relevant in depoliticising ethnicity because Tanzanians 
regardless of their political inclinations and economic viewpoints recognise the significance of peace and solidarity 
in bringing about development to all.” 
 
A retired civil servant in Rufiji Street further supported the idea put forward by the Mapilinga 
teacher and the then parliamentarian hopeful when she asserted that:  
"Taifa letu lina matatizo mengi ya kiuchumi, kijamii na kisiasa ya kupambana nayo ambayo yanahitaji umoja wa 
kitaifa. Vyama vyote vya siasa vinajua mambo haya na hawaungi mkono matumizi ya ukabila katika siasa. Nyerere 
hakutufundisha kuabudu ukabila na tuutumie ili kuungwa mkono kisiasa. Marais waliomfuata Mwinyi, Mkapa na 
Kikwete kamwe hawakutufundisha vinginevyo. Wagombea wote huhubiri umoja wa kitaifa na mshikamano wakati 
wa kampeni za uchaguzi. Wanajua wapiga kura wanapenda amani na umoja zaidi ya kitu kingine chochote.”105  
 
“Our nation has a lot of economic, social and political problems to fight which require national unity. All political 
parties know this and do not support the use of ethnicity in politics. Nyerere has not taught us to worship tribalism 
and use it to garner political support. His successors Mwinyi, Mkapa and Kikwete never taught us otherwise.  All 
candidates preach national unity and solidarity during election campaigns. They know voters prefer peace and 
unity ahead of anything else.” 
 
Arguing along the same lines a secondary school girl in an interview held at Kishiri A Street had 
this to say: 
"Katika nchi maskini kama zetu kuleta maendeleo ni suala la dharura linalohitaji umoja, amani na maelewano 
miongoni mwa makabila. Kuruhusu ukabila kupata nafasi kubwa katika uchaguzi itakuwa kusaliti maendeleo kwa 
kugawa vikosi vinavyopaswa kupambana kwa pamoja kuupiga umaskini."
106
 
 
“In poor countries like ours attainment of development is a matter of emergency that need unity, peace and 
understanding among ethnic groups. Allowing ethnicity to gain salience in elections would be sabotaging 
development by dividing the forces required to jointly fight poverty.”  
 
The views presented above suggest Tanzanians’ concern about ethnic salience in election that will 
disturb peace and unity. The variable is seen as central to bringing development.  An interesting 
point drawn out of the data presented above is the war imagery attuned to Tanzania’s development 
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enemies and the requisites for fighting them – national unity, peace and tranquillity. The requisites 
were considered so central to explain low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in a 
country that has prided itself on peacefulness for decades. The enemies of the nation of which 
Tanzanians had to fight could easily have been called challenges. As such, the aspects of national 
unity and peace deemed central for winning the challenges would not have been given war-like 
attention. According to Mzee Mwiru, the choice of war imagery was not unintentional. This choice 
was predicated on the fact that war is a powerful and commonly understood concept. It is a 
metaphor understood even by those who have not tasted its direct impacts. (The giraffe is another 
metaphor partaking of the political imaginary). More important, war is an immediate threat. War 
requires sacrifice and perseverance on the part of the fighters and the general citizenry. Moreover, 
those who do not participate in a war are traitors to the war’s course. From such line of thought, 
supporting ethnic salience in voting is tantamount to betraying the war against development by 
endangering unity which is a requisite for winning the war. The words of a STAR TV presenter in 
Mwanza that I interviewed, Doto Bulendu, well disclosed the centrality of the war imagery in 
ensuring low salience in voting when he explicitly argued that: 
 “Wapigania uhuru wetu wamefanikiwa kufanya raia wa nchi yetu kwa hiari kujiunga katika mapambano dhidi ya 
matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi. Wamewezesha mtu yeyote ambaye anaingilia mapambano dhidi ya matumizi 
ya ukabila katika siasa kujisikia kama msaliti na adui wa juhudi za kuleta amani na maendeleo ya nchi yetu. Hisia 
hizi za kina zinaelezea kwa nini Watanzania hawapigi kura kikabila."
107
  
 
 “The fighters of our independence managed to make citizens of our country to willingly join in the fight against 
the use of ethnicity in elections. They made anyone who interferes with the fight against the use of ethnicity in 
politics to feel as a traitor and an enemy of our country’s peace and development endeavours. These deep feelings 
explain why Tanzanians do not vote ethnically.”  
 
According to Bulendu the war imagery usefully guaranteed involvement and support from citizens 
in diffusing the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. In this regard, the war 
imagery acted as a unifying factor. This is based on the fact that during war enemies put aside their 
differences and unite against the immediate threat. The threat of ethnic salience in voting in 
Tanzania has been well framed in the PsIM and well articulated by the political leadership from a 
hypothetical and real standpoint. The framing of the enemies of development in war terms and the 
requisites for winning the war-national unity and peace provided Tanzanians with an opportunity 
to channel their aggressiveness against the enemies and ensure that the requisites for success are 
respected. The respect of national unity and peace all point to informing low salience of ethnicity 
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in voting. This is due to the fact that political canvassing along ethnic lines was considered to be a 
cause of disunity and violent conflicts, which will lead to losing the war whose triumph is vital for 
people’s wellbeing. Although the aggression necessary in a conventional war is different, and guns 
and blood may bring a more satisfying adrenaline rush, the efforts to win the war required sweat 
and sacrifice as intense as a conventional war. By aggressively fighting the enemies through 
nation-building and peaceful initiatives, Tanzanians could unite against a common foe; unleash 
their aggressiveness to ensure that the developmental problems are tackled in a non-ethnic 
polarised and peaceful manner. In this way, Tanzania’s framing of its development efforts as a war 
helped to unify its people toward denouncing ethnic salience in voting. This is mainly because 
national unity is a prerequisite for winning the war against poverty and bringing development.  The 
values instilled by this frame – that everyone’s effort is necessary for bringing development and 
that violent conflicts which in Africa are mostly ethnic-based, continue to inform Tanzanians 
perceptions of low ethnic salience in voting. Such position is anchored on the fact that ethnic 
violence like the ones experienced in Burundi and Rwanda deterred development from being 
registered. It is against this background that I argue that the framing of the major challenges of 
development as a war has informed low salience of ethnicity in Mwanza. This is mainly because 
requisites for winning the framed war (nation-building, peace and tranquillity) have proven to be 
significant in minimising the role of ethnicity in voting as seen in section 5.2.1 and 5.2.3.  
 
5.3.2. The Role of Swahili in Ethnic Integration and Peaceful Co-existence 
The importance of Swahili in influencing low salience of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices in 
the 2010 GEs was profoundly stated by 86 % of my interviewees. This was mainly due to 
Swahili’s role in enhancing national unity and peaceful co-existence among members of varied 
ethnic groups. This position was well argued by an NGO worker in Misungwi Village who was of 
the view that:  
"Matumizi ya Kiswahili kama lugha ya taifa na hasa katika kampeni za kisiasa zimetuepusha na mgawanyiko wa 
kikabila katika kupiga kura. Hii ni kwa sababu imewezesha mawasiliano na ushirikiano baina ya makabila. 
Kiswahili kimefanya Watanzania wote wawe ndugu ambao huwasiliana bila ya matatizo na kushirikiana katika 
juhudi za maendeleo. Nafasi ya Kiswahili katika kuimarisha utambulisho na umoja wa kitaifa umechangia sana 
kufanya ukabila usiwe na nguvu katika kuhamasisha kuungwa mkono na wapiga kura. Kwa kutumia Kiswahili 
kitaifa, lugha za makabila zimepewa nafasi ndogo kutumika kuvutia kura.”108 
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 “The use of Swahili as a national language and particularly in political campaigns spared us of ethnic divisions in 
voting. This is because it facilitates inter-ethnic communication and cooperation. Swahili has made all Tanzanians 
relatives who interact at ease and cooperate in development endeavours. The role of Swahili in enhancing national 
identity and unity contributed a lot in making ethnicity insignificant in mobilising voters’ support. By using 
Swahili nationally, ethnic languages have limited room of anchoring votes.” 
 
Similar views on the role of Swahili in informing limited role of ethnicity on determining  electoral 
support in the 2010 elections in Mwanza were advanced by a Secondary School Girl Kishiri-A: 
“Watanzania wameunganishwa na Kiswahili, na ni lugha rasmi ya kampeni. Ni lugha pekee ambayo mwanasiasa 
anaweza kuwafikia watu wote na kuungwa mkono kisiasa wakati wa uchaguzi. Hakuna mtu anayeweza kukana 
kwamba umoja wa kitaifa, amani na maendeleo yasingefikiwa bila ya Kiswahili. Lugha za makabila na ukabila 
hazina nafasi katika uchaguzi kwa sababu ya mchango wa Kiswahili wa kuwaunganisha Watanzania."
109
  
 
“Tanzanians are unified by Swahili and it is the official language of campaigns. It is the only one that a politician 
can reach out to all and gain political support in elections. Nobody can deny that national unity and interactions, 
peace and development could not have been realised without Swahili. Ethnic languages and ethnicity is 
insignificant in elections because of the role of Swahili in unifying Tanzanians.” 
 
Arguing alone the same line an elderly man from Misungwi had this to say: 
"Sisi (Watanzania) ni wamoja, na matumizi ya Kiswahili yamefanya watu wa makabila yote kusikilizana. 
Imefanya watu mijini kushindwa hata kuongea vilugha vyao. Sisi hatukupiga kura kikabila kwa sababu tumekuwa 
Kiswahili kimetufanya taifa moja."
110
  
 
“We (Tanzanians) are united, and Swahili has made members of different tribes communicate. It has made urban 
people fail to even speak their vernaculars. We did not vote ethnic-wise because Swahili has made us one nation.” 
 
An expert of Tanzania’s social structure, Dr Ezekiel also concurred with the national integrating 
role of Swahili in Tanzania, and its role in informing low salience of ethnicity on determining 
voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. In on his own words he argued: 
  “The use of vernaculars and English in seeking political mandate in Mwanza is not supported because our 
national language is Swahili. Tanzanians like unity and Swahili provides a vehicle for enhancing unity among 
ethnicities. We had candidates who know English and Kisukuma but did not use the two languages because they 
will not be able to reach out to all through those languages; and using those languages is against the unifying 
language of our founders-Swahili. Swahili is the language of unity and its continued use as a lingua franca in 
Tanzanians communications reduces the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.” 111 
 
The arguments presented above indicate that Swahili has consistently contributed to Tanzania’s 
nation-building and ethnic co-existence. The use of Swahili as a national language differentiates 
Tanzania from other states where members of different ethnic groups do not share a common 
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language, thus creating a challenge of inter-ethnic communication and ethnic political canvassing. 
Swahili in Tanzania was pertinent in enhancing national unity over ethnic identities as clearly 
indicated in section 5.2.1. This position is predicated on the fact that Swahili has spared Tanzania 
from the adverse effects of designating one or a few national languages or adopting the languages 
of a few large ethnic groups which reinforce ethnic solidarity and sub-national divisions in voting 
once politicised (Lofchie, 2013). The almost universal knowledge of Swahili among Tanzanians 
made Swahili become a source of shared identity for Tanzanians of all ethnic groups. This 
influenced low salience of ethnicity as inter-ethnic. Broadly based communication in the highly 
integrated state was made possible. The benefits of the language in accessing economic, social and 
political benefits explained in section 5.2.1 stood in the way of ethnicity gaining salience on 
determining voters’ choices. This was the case regardless of the pluralist liberal democratic 
dispensation that was fear of being able to breed ethnic salience in voting (Gasarasi, 1997; Mmuya, 
2000). This is because Swahili has crippled the chances of a significant mobilisational element of 
ethnicity – ethnic languages, from informing parochial identities which could easily be used in 
political canvassing and thus creating an opportunity for fuelling ethnic salience in voting once 
politicised. 
 
In my interviews with KIs on the role of Swahili in informing low salience of ethnicity on 
determining electorates’ choices was discussed beyond the communicative and integrative role it 
has among members of different ethnic groups.  The KIs second the views presented above but 
went ahead to argue that Swahili’s careful linkage to the concept of familyhood made it possible to 
explain the overall rationale of the nation-building policy. Without this common language, the 
national integrative intents of the PsIM which denounced ethnic salience and violence in politics 
could hardly be understood. These views are in line with Martin (1987) who argued that creation 
of a Swahili political discourse based on traditional notions of family interactions framed the 
country’s political arena as one in which all citizens live in harmony. In such life, violent conflicts 
and factors likely to contribute to them like ethnic salience in voting are deemed unacceptable. In 
other words, the use of Swahili to project notions of familyhood made each member of society 
easily recognise his or her proper role in supporting the overall good of the nation-family, which is 
to denounce the salience of ethnicity in voting among others. 
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The views presented above suggest that most of the variables employed to explore the role of the 
PsIM in informing the part that ethnicity plays in influencing electoral choices were made possible 
by the use of Swahili. For instance, without everyone speaking Swahili, nation-building policies 
like mixed-ethnicity Ujamaa villages, multi-ethnic recruiting schools, friendships, business 
partnerships, and marriages across ethnic groups would be impossible. Cities like Mwanza without 
Swahili could have simply developed rival ethnic enclaves as opposed to vastly integrated environs 
with lots of intermarriages that make many children lose their ethnic languages entirely. As such, 
they lose even an ethnic identity to use for political visibility. Political parties would not be able to 
reach out to penetrate the rural areas and would rely on narrow ethnic bases. Conflicts between 
groups would flare up more frequently as a result of miscommunication. In short, if the policy of 
spreading Swahili had not been so successful, Tanzanian society would have been significantly 
more parochial and prone to conflict. Moreover, other nation-building policies that diffused the 
significance of ethnicity in anchoring votes would have been almost impossible to implement. It is 
against this background that I argue that the voters in the study area were motivated to identify 
more with their national identity and give ethnicity less significance on determining voters’ 
choices. 
 
It is worth noting that although Swahili has been widely recognised for suppressing ethnic 
languages from strengthening feelings of ethnic salience, there still exist few interviewees (13%) 
who argued that Swahili has not buried ethnic sentiments. Representatives of this minority group 
base their argument on the fact that Kisukuma was used in the 2010 elections, and that it was 
instrumental in mobilising political support during elections. As much as this line of thought is 
relevant in providing an opposite view to the one widely presented in this subsection, it casts many 
doubts. This position is based on the fact that the debate on the use of Kisukuma in elections in 
section 5.4.2 indicates otherwise. In the referred section most voters argued with conviction that 
Swahili was the official and mostly used language of campaign due to legal and extra-legal factors 
as widely discussed in sections 5.3.5 and 5.4.1 below. In this regard, I argue that the national 
integrative role of Swahili was accorded room to flourish in the 2010 elections. Thus, it crippled 
the potential of vernaculars breeding ethnic salience and divisions to inform voters’ choices in the 
2010 elections. 
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5.3.3. Generational Denunciation of the use of Ethnicity in Soliciting Political Support  
The significance placed on Swahili in explaining the low salience of ethnicity in influencing 
voters’ choices was not the last factor identified by my interviewees. 78% of them were of the 
view that intergenerational reproduction of the ideas against ethnicity anchoring political support 
contributed towards explaining the continuous low salience of ethnicity in anchoring voter’s 
choices. Views of an Extension Officer in Misungwi village succinctly expressed this idea: 
“TANU na CCM wameelimisha watu ni vibaya kutumia ukabila na dini katika kushinda uchaguzi. Ujumbe huu 
hutolewa kwa njia ya vituo vya redio, shule na mikutano ya hadhara na watu wamekubali kutokutumia ukabila na 
udini katika uchaguzi.  Kwa bahati nzuri vyama vipya pia vinalaani ukabila kuhamasisha kuungwa mkono kisiasa 
na hivyo kuminya fursa ya hisia za kikabila kupewa nafasi kubwa katika maamuzi ya wapiga kura.” 112 
 
 “TANU and CCM have educated the masses that it is bad to use ethnicity and religiosity to win elections. This 
message is delivered through radio stations, schools and public rallies and people have agreed not to use tribalism 
and religiosity in elections. Luckily the new parties follow suite to condemn the use of ethnicity in mobilising 
political support thus providing limited room for ethnic sentiments to gain salience in determining voters’ choices.” 
 
Arguing along the same lines an elderly man in Mapilinga remarked that: 
"Watanzania wamefunzwa vizuri kuhusu ubaya wa kutumia ukabila kushinda uchaguzi. Sisi, watu wa zamani 
tulifundishwa haya na waasisi wa nchi yetu, tumefuata mafunzo hayo katika maisha yetu kwa sababu ni jambo 
tukufu kufanya. Sisi tumewafundisha vijana wetu haya na wao kusambaza jambo hili kwa walio wadogo kwao pia. 
Muendelezo wa mawazo haya (ubaya wa ukabila katika uchaguzi) kumewafanya Watanzania kuwa wamoja, 
wenye amani na kinyume na matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi.”113  
 
“Tanzanians have been well taught about the demerits of using ethnicity to win elections. We, the old people were 
taught this by the founders of our country, and carried those lessons with us throughout our life because it was a 
noble thing to do. We went on to teach our young ones and they spread it to their juniors as well. Continuation of 
these ideas (the demerits of using ethnicity in elections) made Tanzanians united, peaceful and against the use of 
ethnicity in elections.” 
 
Concurring with the views expressed above, an elderly woman in Utemini disclosed that: 
 
"Elimu ya Siasa inayotolewa shuleni na wanasiasa katika runinga, redio na mikutano vinapinga matumizi ya 
ukabila kupata kura. Elimu hii imesambazwa kutoka kizazi kimoja hadi kingine na mtu yeyote ambaye anapingana 
na elimu hii ni msaliti wa utaifa wetu.” 114 
 
 “Political education provided in schools and by politicians in television, radio and meetings denounces the use of 
ethnicity to win votes. This education has been transferred from one generation to another and anyone who is 
against these teachings is a traitor of our nationhood.” 
 
The views expressed above suggests that the nation-building policy in Tanzania and its role in 
ensuring low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices revolves around continued 
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denunciation, transmitted across generations, of the use of ethnicity to win electoral support. This 
was done through varied mass media. From the interviews, one thing that comes out clear is the 
involvement of the youth in the struggle against the use of divisive elements like ethnicity on 
determining electorates’ choices. The involvement of the younger people was critical as cultural 
maintenance and/or changes tend to be informed by generational reproduction of ideas (Malipula 
and Ngalawa, 2004). In the context of low salience of ethnicity in the 2010 elections, the elderly 
people and the young voters were influenced by the anti-ethnic salience teachings. However, the 
future of low salience of ethnicity in voting in Tanzania laid not so much in persuading the adults 
to buy into or sustain the idea since they already proved to have, but rather in appealing to the 
would-be voters to commit to such idea as they grow up.  This is significant because the young 
people are among the most unstable sections of any population. If they support an idea, they 
represent a source of energy, enthusiasm, and physical vigour to the implementation of an idea. In 
the same vein, if they oppose one, they do so with the same zeal. For these reasons, a teacher at 
Mapilinga argued that gaining young people support against the salience of ethnicity on 
determining voting is essential. He went on to argue that civic education in schools and beyond 
was an essential step taken by the government of the URT to make Tanzanians detest ethnic 
salience. As such, it contributed towards sustaining low salience of ethnicity on determining 
electoral votes. 
 
An interesting component related to the civic education that came out of the discussions with the 
comparatively learned interviewees like teachers and civil servants. This group was of the view 
that civic education not only swayed people away from ethnic salience, but also created a passive 
/subject citizenry that helped in suppressing the significance of ethnicity in politics. According to a 
teacher I interviewed in Mapilinga, civic education meant to: 
"... kuwafanya watu kuwa raia wema wanaopenda nchi yao, umoja wake wa kitaifa, amani, na ambao wako tayari 
kufanya kazi kwa bidii na kwa ajili ya taifa lao huku wakijua maarifa madogo tu ya msingi kuhusu majukumu 
mapana ya uraia na jinsi serikali inavyofanyakazi."
115
  
 
 “...mould the masses into good citizens who loved their country, its national unity, peace and who are willing to 
work hard for their nation with only a basic knowledge of broader civic duties and how the government functions.”  
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To the teacher, civic education meant to create uncritical/subject citizenry which deters the masses 
from violent conflicts resulting from questioning the establishment. Such relationship made 
citizens obey and succumb to what is forwarded to it by the political elites. Since national unity 
preoccupied political elites, then the chances of ethnic salience gaining significance on 
determining voters’ choices were limited in the 2010 elections. The following view from an elderly 
woman in Nange attests:  
"Watanzania wengi hawaulizi maswali mengi wanasiasa hasa kutoka chama tawala wanapowaambia vitu. 
Tuliambiwa kwamba kwa kutumia ukabila katika kutafuta kuungwa mkono kisiasa sio vizuri na watu walikubali. 
Siku hizi vijana kuhoji wazee wao juu ya masuala mbalimbali lakini hawaulizi wito wa kukataa matumizi ya 
ukabila katikasiasa.”116   
 
“Most Tanzanians do not question a lot once politicians particularly from the ruling party tell them things. We 
were told that using ethnicity in seeking political support is not good and people agreed. Nowadays young people 
question their elders on a lot of issues but do not question calls for rejecting the use of ethnicity in politics.”  
 
The views of the elderly woman suggest that civic education had a role to play in lowering the 
salience of ethnicity in voting in the 2010 elections to the younger and older generations. To the 
elderly woman, the elderly choose to reject salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices 
because they wished to maintain the status quo without questioning it. As for the younger ones 
who were trained to be critical, they did so because they bought into the merits of low salience of 
ethnicity in politics. In other words, the uncritical and critical minds converged to reject ethnic 
salience on determining voters’ choices. As much as the knowledge distinction that the elderly 
women impliedly draws on the basis of civic know-how, the discussions in sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 
5.2.3 on the PsIM and voting suggests otherwise. This is because in the referred sections even the 
uncritical voters exemplified an awareness of the demerits of the application of ethnic salience on 
determining voters’ choices. In this context, their decision to reject the application of ethnicity in 
luring political support is well informed.   
5.3.3.1 New media and Ethnicity  
The use of ICT and social media although not widely discussed by rural interviewees is quite 
interesting in the dissemination of information pro and against ethnicity. It is also relevant to the 
media ownership and coverage debate that constitutes part of the subsequent subheading. This is 
mainly because ICT and social media have been on the rise in recent years in Tanzania and for the 
first time in the 2010 elections particularly mobile phones were used to court voters. Tanzanians, 
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with mobile phone penetration of over 18 million Tanzanians judging by registration statistics, 
meant the gadget afforded around 50% of the population access to campaign messages (Mataba, 
2011). The phones were particularly useful in reaching the masses in the remotest parts of 
Tanzania. The phones’ impact is not limited to the young generation it seems. An elderly man in 
Mapilinga confessed to me that he was getting a lot of campaign messages from his mobile phone. 
As such, the use of mobile phones helped to break communication barriers that hitherto existed 
between aspirants for political office, their parties and the voters. Also, editorial barriers related to 
media owners interests that inform bias reporting as it will be discussed in the next subheading. In 
this context, the achievements ICT and social media are a boost to the coverage of elections 
particularly in overcoming principal aspects facing the conventional media like owners' editorials, 
power games as well as legal barriers mitigating free press that are common in Africa. Conversely, 
the key hitch, as far as the use of mobile phones is concerned, was the spreading with impunity of 
hate text messages (Tagalile, 2011). According to Tagalile, if such messages will be tolerated by 
the authorities in elections to come, Tanzania is likely to slither into another Kenya or Rwanda. 
Tagalile's fear could partly be associated with the fact that ICT in the name of electronic 
communication as an industry in stricto sensu, is unregulated in Tanzania. In this sense, the 
country is running the risk of being a cyber criminals' sanctuary (Ubena, 2009). The fear 
notwithstanding, interviewees widely referred to texts that required them not to vote for candidates 
who incite violence or have not been proven track record. Ethnic-based texts meant to lure voters 
were not mentioned to have been texted during the elections.  
Like mobile phones, social media (websites, blogs and networking sites like Facebook and 
Twitter) were remarkably used for the first time in the 2010 general election campaigns. Some of 
the renowned blogs and social forums in Tanzania include the Issa Michuzi 
(http://issamichuzi.blogspot.com) and Jamii Forums (http://jamiiforums.com). The main motive 
behind the use of websites was to capture the youth among the electorate (Tagalile, 2011). The 
youth constitute about 33 % of the total population and 68% of the labour force in Tanzania. The 
two leading candidates in the elections, CCM Chairman, Dr Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete and the 
CHADEMA Secretary General, Dr Wilbrod Slaa opened their own blogs and made full use of 
them to garner support through Facebook and Twitter. This was quite easy as social media 
operators in Tanzania are not required to register or obtain permission from state authority like 
print or broadcasting media. Only Internet Service Providers (ISPs) which are critical for people to 
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access information placed on the social media are required to register. However, the ease to open a 
blog does not entail that the social media is free of challenges. Indeed, it has several challenges and 
internet usage presents a major one. 
The hindrance to effective use of the internet and associated social media around the time of 2010 
elections was that only 1% of the Tanzanian population accesses the internet (Mataba, 2011). This 
is the case despite the inauguration of the Seacom Fibre Optic Cable and the National ICT Optical 
Fibre Backbone Network project meant to cheaply link South and East Africa countries to Europe 
and Asia. Internally a 10,000-kilometre inland optic fibre cable network to facilitate ICT 
connectivity to district level is underway to address ICT needs at grassroots level. Hopefully, this 
will promote citizens' participation in information collection and dissemination on various issues. 
Mobile phones could be an ideal answer to limited internet coverage but another hurdle is the fact 
that few people in rural areas can afford smart phones and those who could, might not be able to 
use them.  
Another important challenge of social media identified in my interview with Kilimwiko, is that it 
is mainly one-way information, with the potential of being a conveyer belt of the operators or 
mouthpieces of the political inclinations of the runners and contributors. In this way, the reliability 
of information provided can be more biased than professionally written conventional print or 
electronic news. In this regard, mechanisms need to be in place to ensure the the social media 
upholds journalistic ethos and avoid becaming a one way means of communication that can 
enhance ethnic divisions and hatred among citizens. In short, the newest media should not replace 
the conventional media, rather it should complement it and in a manner that furthers mass media 
ethics and national unity. Luckily, despite the possibility of ethnic canvassing that ICT and social 
media had, however, no evidence have been garnered to argue that it has impacted ethnic salience 
or denounced it to a satisfactory level due to the barriers discussed. 
A critical look at the views provided above indicates that low salience of ethnicity is not something 
that can be taken for granted. It is a product of concerted sustainable efforts done by varied 
political actors to ensure that the significance of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices is 
discouraged. The essence of the denunciation of ethnicity in elections can be traced back to the 
PsIM as they were against the use of ethnicity in politics. However, the PsIM needed extensive 
civic education to ensure that generations subscribed to them and spread them to generations to 
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come. Continuous transfers of ideas that reject the use of ethnicity in soliciting electoral support 
were widely disseminated before and during the campaigns of 2010. As such, the intentions of the 
PsIM of fighting ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices were reinvigorated. The 
continuous transfer of anti-ethnic feelings transmitted from both the formal and informal civic 
education teachings have sunk into Tanzanian’s minds. According to the interviewees’ views, the 
anti-ethnic feelings have sunk into Tanzanian’s minds to the level that even mammoth discourse 
against it can hardly reverse this position in the near future. The teachings are well supported by 
the effective practices of EDNR, which militates against the politicisation of ethnicity and its 
subsequent use in soliciting electoral votes as widely argued in the 5.2.2.  This generational 
denunciation of the use of ethnicity is further collaborated by Mwalimu’s Charismatic and 
Symbolic Leadership in the nation-building policy. This is discussed in the subsection below. 
5.3.4. Mwalimu’s Charismatic and Symbolic Leadership in the Nation-building policy  
A name that was widely mentioned in connection to the low salience of ethnicity in influencing 
voters’ choices by my interviewees was Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, the first President of 
the URT. Such views entail the sustained projection of Mwalimu’s critical role in denouncing the 
use of ethnicity in politics while fighting for independence and creating a highly integrated 
socialist state. This is the case despite Tanzanian’s plurality of ethnic groups and regional 
orientations. A view of a young man in Shamalala Street provides evidence to this position: 
"Masuala muhimu ya kitaifa kama dhambi ya kutumia ukabila katika siasa yanazama ndani ya mioyo ya watu pale 
yanapotokana na watu wanaoheshimiwa katika jamii. Wakati wa uchaguzi hapa Tanzania vipande vya video na 
sauti za hotuba ya Baba wa taifa letu, mwanasiasa anayeheshimiwa zaidi Tanzania akilaani matumizi ya ukabila 
katika kuhamasisha kura vinarushwa hewani. Maoni yake kwamba kupiga kura kwa misingi ya ukabila 
kutawagawanya Watanzania inafanya tusipige kura kikabila.”117 
 
“Serious national issues like sins of political tribalism sink into the people’s hearts when they are based on the 
views of respected public figures. In Tanzania during elections video and audio clips of speeches of the Father of 
our nation, the most respected politician in Tanzania denouncing the use of tribalism in mobilising votes are widely 
transmitted. His view that tribal based voting will divide Tanzanians informs Tanzanians rejection to vote 
ethnically.” 
 
The core of the views of the young man from Shamalala was echoed by an elderly man in 
Mapilinga Village who had this to say: 
“Wanasiasa wote tangu kurudishwa kwa vyama vingi wanajihusisha na mambo ya Nyerere ya umoja wa kitaifa na 
mapambano dhidi ya ukabila katika siasa. Waandishi wa habari wakati wa uchaguzi wanatoa mawazo ya Nyerere 
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yanayopinga kutumia ukabila kushinda uchaguzi. Mawazo ya Nyerere yamefanya ukabila usiongoze wakati wa 
kupiga kura.”118 
 
“All politicians since re-introduction of multi-partism are associating themselves with Nyerere’s visions of national 
unity and anti-tribalist politics. Journalists during elections present a lot of Nyerere’s views against using tribalism 
to win elections. Nyerere’s views tribalism insignificant when I vote.” 
 
The positions expressed above are seconded by another elderly man in Rufiji Street when he 
revealed the role of Mwalimu Nyerere’s speeches on lowering ethnic salience in politics. However, 
he added to that a dimension of Nyerere’s personal traits to explain how he managed to have an 
impact in the 2010 elections and years to come. 
“Mwalimu ni kiongozi mkubwa, na msimamo wake juu ya umoja wa kitaifa na kukana matumizi ya ukabila katika 
kuvutia wapiga kura vimegusa watu wengi. ... yeye aliishi imani yake kwa vitendo. Nyerere akitoka kabila dogo 
(Zanaki) aliwaongoza Watanzania wenzake bila kubagua na kwa amani na utulivu. Kwake, muungano wa kitaifa 
ulikuwa muhimu kuliko ukabila. Maneno ya Mwalimu na matendo yake ya kusimamia umoja wa kitaifa 
umewaachia Watanzania urithi ambao unawafanya waupe ukabila uzito mdogo kuwavutia wapiga kura.”119 
 
 “Mwalimu is a great leader, and his conviction on national unity and outright denunciation of the use of tribalism 
in attracting voters support touches many people. ....he practically lived his convictions. Nyerere as a member a 
small tribe (the Zanaki) led his fellow Tanzanians indiscriminately and in peace and harmony. To him, national 
integration was above tribal orientations. Mwalimu’s words and deeds in championing national unity has left 
Tanzanians a legacy that makes them accord tribalism low weight in winning voters’ support.” 
 
Similarly, an NGO worker in Misungwi concurred with the views that recognised Mwalimu’s 
efforts in informing low salience of ethnicity in voting, when he disclosed that: 
    “CCM, CHADEMA, CUF na vyama vingine vidogo vidogo vinayarudia maneno ya Nyerere kuhusu hasara ya 
ukabila katika siasa ambayo ni kama vile vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe na madhara yake. Pia wanarudia hotuba ya 
Mwalimu kuwaambia Watanzania kwamba viongozi wanapaswa kuwatumikia watu wote na kuzingatia maslahi ya 
kitaifa badala ya maslahi ya kikabila kama wapigania uhuru walivyofanya. Kwa maneno hayo kupiga kura kwa 
misingi ya kikabila ilikuwa kuchukuliwa tusi la moja kwa moja kwa Mwalimu na kile alichokisimamia."
120
  
 
“CCM, CHADEMA, CUF and other smaller parties echo Nyerere’s words about the disadvantages of tribalism in 
politics; like civil war and its associated effects. They also echo the speeches of Mwalimu telling Tanzanians that 
leaders should serve all of the people and uphold national instead of tribal interests like the freedom fighters did. With 
such words voting on tribal basis was considered a direct insult to Mwalimu and what he stood for.” 
 
The views expressed above indicate that as much as most political scientists avoid explanations of 
political processes based on the force of individual personality, Mwalimu has turned out to be an 
exception. This is because many associate his leadership to the country’s low salience of ethnicity 
on determining electorates’ choices. These views are in line with Mamdani (2013a) as widely 
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discussed in section 4.3.2. In a nutshell, Mamdani suggests that an inventory of governmental 
measures to promote low salience of ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices benefit from the 
sanctity, individual brilliance and charisma of Mwalimu. This argument is predicated on the fact 
that he used every opportunity to preach national unity and denounce ethnic salience in politics. To 
my interviewees, it was doubtful whether without Mwalimu’s zeal, skill and creativity Tanzanians 
in 2010, almost 16 years after his demise, could still hold high the anti-ethnic crusade. My 
interviewees were of the view that Julius Nyerere’s unique role as the leader of the independence 
movement, head of the Tanzania’s ruling party and state for almost an accumulated three decades, 
gave him an opportunity of influencing the limited role of ethnicity on determining electoral 
choice. Such stance is informed by the fact that during his tenure and beyond, he denounced in 
words and deeds, divisive elements in politics in general and in elections in particular. My KI’s 
argued that Nyerere presented himself to the Tanzanians as a compassionate, socially humanistic 
and determined anti-ethnic salient politician. Such presentation represents an indisputable personal 
contribution to the Tanzanian culture of low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices 
entrenched in the minds of the Tanzanian people and political actors. This distinguishes Mwalimu 
from African leaders who politicise ethnicity for their selfish political ends. It also distinguishes 
Tanzania from states like Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda where feelings of ethnic salience take the 
fore-front in elections. More importantly, Mwalimu presents an exception from the neo-
patrimonial view that African leaders politicise ethnicity to acquire political office. 
 
Mwalimu’s role in the fighting against the use of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices would have 
been less successful if Tanzania’s thought they could get to the corridors of power by appealing to 
ethnic identities (Lofchie, 2013).  In a KII with Mzee Mkali it was revealed that Nyerere’s credit in 
lowering the significance of ethnicity in the 2010 elections rests on his vision of minimising the 
role of ethnically based political and social organisations. The organisations referred to by Mzee 
Mkali were ethnically organised credit and burial associations as well as ethnically constituted 
recreational clubs and chiefdoms. To Mzee Mkali such ethnically based associations elsewhere in 
Africa have been the epitome of ethnic polarisation and ethnic voting. Subsequently, they bred 
violent effects among ethnic salient rival political competitors. Such rivalry according to Mzee 
Mkali adds impetus to Tanzanians denial to evoke ethnic salience on determining electorates’ 
choices. Such view is anchored on the fact that the violent consequences of politicised ethnicity in 
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countries like Rwanda and Kenya are used by politicians in Tanzania to complement Mwalimu’s 
speeches against the use of ethnicity in luring votes. As such, it can be said that the anti-ethnic 
salient views of Mwalimu benefit from the practical effects of ethnic salient political canvassing 
and voting in Tanzania’s neighbours.  
   
In my discussion with an announcer of the largest Television station in Mwanza- Star Television, 
Mr. Dotto Bulendu the role of Mwalimu came out. He shared with me the view that the national 
integrative symbolic posture of Mwalimu Nyerere was visible during the media coverage of the 
2010 elections. He was of the opinion that the media coverage extensively projected Mwalimu’s 
dream of Tanzania being a community that gives no attention to the use of ethnicity in luring 
votes. The media projected his image as an important model for Tanzanian unity, identity and civic 
values. For instance, Bulendu disclosed that although Nyerere was a devoted Catholic several 
photographs of him wearing a Baraghashia
121
 to blur the lines of division between Christians and 
Muslims, who also belong to varied ethnic groups. Mwalimu also has been shown carrying a 
chief’s staff of office -Kifimbo as a symbol of leadership and recognition of chiefly authority 
although he abolished chieftaincy in the early days of independence.  
 
Also, Mwalimu was projected in the media wearing a simple dress code, a simple Mao or safari 
suit, which became de facto the official attire for Tanzanian leaders. This projection promoted an 
ideal of sameness and equality across the nationals of varied ethnic groups and backgrounds. 
Indeed continuous projection of all of these points to national integration which is against ethnic 
salience in general terms. Most relevant to the dissertation, the media according to Bulendu 
presented Mwalimu as a leader who never favoured his ethnic group and/or his home region. Such 
projection based on his deeds is against the dictates of neo-patrimonialism which would expect 
him to distribute a share of patronage to them. Such image contributed in convincing Tanzanians 
to emulate the values of their national heroe in rejecting ethnic salience in the 2010 elections. 
 
As indicated earlier in this section, most political scientists avoid explanations of political 
processes based on the force of individual personality. However, it is worth noting that pictures of 
Mwalimu still hang in all public offices and almost all shops and sidewalk stalls in Tanzania. For 
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the rural settings where few offices and shops exist, memorial Kanga
122
 with his picture are owned 
by ruralites or seen by many of them. These photographs served as a reminder of the values that he 
promoted. Most Tanzanians including politicians publicly refer to him as Mwalimu or as Baba wa 
Taifa (Father of the Nation) which project Nyerere as an honoured, well read and knowledgeable, 
benign, affectionate figure whose citizens should obey. In this regard, the use of Nyerere as a 
symbol promotes national unity and influences low salience of ethnicity in voting. This position 
lays on the fact that Mwalimu condemned the practice with great anxiety. However, the continued 
use of Mwalimu’s symbol offers little for contemporary political reformers as Mwalimu is no 
longer alive to speak for himself, even if he wished to change some of his viewpoints. The danger 
of such practice is that contemporary leaders could at some point appropriate his popularity for 
their own purposes, and reframing his past speeches in the context of current debates. 
 
An interesting question that needs analysis is the massive space Mwalimu gets in the Tanzanian 
media during elections and its implications on ethnicity and voting in the 2010 elections. The 
views of the voters in Mwanza indicated that Mwalimu’s opinion influenced lower ethnic salience 
but said a little about why such space has been accorded to him. The answer was simple he is the 
father of our nation and talks sense. Here is where the KIIs from the media came in.  The views of 
the media practitioners interviewed argued that the rationale for Mwalimu’s extensive coverage is 
two-fold. On one hand the value of his views and on the other revolves around CCM’s dominance 
in the ownership of the media houses in Tanzania.  
According to the media practitioners interviewed, the nationalist frame informed by the PsIM 
spearheaded by Mwalimu forms a great part of the election agenda and news. This is because it 
depicts the Tanzanian political culture-national unity, peace and tranquillity. As for the ownership 
pattern view, it was argued that most of the major media houses are owned by the state, CCM or 
CCM followers, therefore, covering Mwalimu widely and projecting him in the manner he has 
been, is part of the campaigns of their party. These thoughts are in line with Mataba (2011) who 
argued that almost all of the privately-owned media outlets in Tanzania are owned by politicians 
cum-businessmen who have overt links to CCM. As such, they colour CCM good just as the state 
and CCM owned media houses do (Mataba, 2011). Kilimwiko (2012) concurs with Mataba but 
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goes a step further by mentioning them. These politicians cum-businessmen with overt links to 
CCM include Rostam Aziz (the former MP for Igunga constituency  and CCM's  National 
Treasurer), Anthony Diallo (CCM's Regional Chair for Mwanza, former MP for Ilemela 
constituency and Minister for Industries and Trade), Nazir Karamagi (the former MP for Bukoba 
Rural constituency and the Minister responsible for Energy and Minerals), Aden Rage (the then 
MP for Tabora Urban constituency), Richard Nyaulawa (former parliamentarian), Khamis 
Kagasheki (the former MP for Bukoba and the ex-Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism) 
Reginald Mengi (a businessman  known to be supporting CCM) among others. Kilimwiko in an 
earlier article indicates that even a Minister responsible for information while in office owned a 
media house (Kilimwiko, 2006). According to Mataba, (2011) there were only two media firms 
owned by politicians who have recognised links to CHADEMA, namely Freeman Mbowe 
(CHADEMA's national chair and MP for Hai constituency) and Phillemon Ndesamburo (one of 
CHADEMA's key financiers and the MP for Moshi Urban Constituency).  
The ownership pattern revealed above suggests that the media is unprecedentedly monopolised by 
the state, the ruling party and its merchant political cadres. Such state of affairs provides room for 
politically biased coverage and/or subjectivity in favour of the owners and their political 
inclinations which are pro the ruling CCM. Such situation was identified as a factor that 
contributed to, if not ensured, generational denunciation of the discourse against salience of 
ethnicity in voting and projecting Mwalimu as a symbol of national unity. This is because by so 
doing, they were advancing their policies and soliciting electoral support. This situation is 
imperative in the Mwanza elections as the biggest media house in the region - Sahara Media is 
owned by CCM’s regional chair who contested for a parliamentary seat in the 2010 elections. Both 
capacities partly explain the projections revealed by Bulendu, and the influences associated to 
those projections on informing ethnicity’s role in voting in the 2010 elections. This view is banked 
on the fact that no evidence was explored that suggests that the media has given credence to 
critical aspects of Mwalimu’s philosophy and policies. As such, no news that could question 
Mwalimu’s charisma and symbolic portrayal and their subsequent effect on the influencing voters’ 
choices were aired. However, although this was not aired, the discussions on Mwalimu criticise his 
socialist political and economic stances but have not downplayed his unifying effect (Lofchie, 
2013; Wangwe, 2005).  
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An opinion that can be deduced from this sub-heading is that Mwalimu Nyerere’s anti-ethnic 
views and deeds while in office and beyond has informed a legacy of rejecting ethnic voting. His 
words and deeds have contributed towards making appeals to ethnicity in political canvassing to be   
considered unpatriotic and un-Tanzanian to critical political actors. The mass media has most 
importantly contributed to this effect by massively projecting this anti-ethnic portrait. Informed by 
such portrait, political parties found it inevitable to recognise that their best prospects for winning 
elections depended on mobilising support in an inclusive multi-ethnic manner. Furthermore, 
project ethnically peaceful national ethos for electoral success. In this regard, the efficacy of 
Mwalimu’s charisma and symbol can be said to be epitomised on its merit in providing space for 
acquiring political office. Importantly, it furthers the PsIM which as argued above, barred ethnic 
salience in voting. 
5.3.5. Legal Restrictions on the Use of Ethnicity in Political Canvassing 
Legal restrictions on the use of ethnicity in mobilising political support during elections and 
beyond were also associated with low salience of ethnicity in voting. Words of a Secondary School 
girl in Kishiri A Street express the role of legal restrictions on lowering salience of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices in the 2010 elections: 
“Huwezi kutumia ukabila kuvutia kura Tanzania kwa sababu ni marufuku kisheria. Sheria inazuia vyama vya siasa 
kuwa vya kikabila kwa eneo la kufanyakazi na wakati wa uchaguzi wagombea na mawakala wao hawaruhusiwi 
hata kutumia lugha za makabila kuombea kura. Sheria hizi zinazuia matumizi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi? “123 
 
 “You cannot use ethnicity to lure votes in Tanzania because it is prohibited by law. Laws restrict political parties 
to be ethnic in their coverage and during elections candidates and their agents are not allowed even to use 
vernaculars to beg for votes. These laws stand in the way of exercising tribalism in elections?” 
 
An NGO worker in Misungwi supported this view when he argued that: 
"Mapambano ya serikali ya kupunguza ukabila katika siasa ni dhahiri hapa Tanzania. Vyama vya siasa na taasisi 
zote za umma zinatakiwa kuwa vya kitaifa na si vya kutumikia kabila fulani. Uchaguzi wa mgombea wowote 
unaweza kufutwa ikithibitika kwamba ukabila ulitumika kushinda. Hii imesaidia Tanzania kupunguza matumizi ya 
ukabila katika kupiga kura."
124
 
 
“The government’s fight to lessen tribalism in politics is obvious in Tanzania. Political partiesand all public 
organisations are supposed to be national in coverage and not intending to serve a particular tribe. Results of any 
election can be nullified if it is proven that tribalism was used to win. This helped Tanzania to lower the use of 
tribalism in voting”  
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Arguing along the same line but from a historical perspective an Extension Officer in Misungwi 
had this to say: 
"Matumizi ya ukabila Tanzania halichukuliwi kuwa jambo jema. Hii inaeleza kwa nini sheria mbalimbali 
zilitungwa ili kudhoofisha matumizi ya ukabila katika siasa. Mwalimu alipitisha sheria kukomesha uchifu na 
viongozi wengine wa kitamaduni waliokuwa na  madaraka ya kisiasa ili kuimarisha umoja wa kitaifa. Waliachiwa 
majukumu ya kufanya matambiko. ... vyama vyote vya siasa vinatakiwa kuwa vya kitaifa na mtu yeyote 
atakayechochea hisia za mgawanyiko wa kikabila katika jamii hasa wakati wa uchaguzi anaweza kushtakiwa 
kihalali na kufungwa jela. Hivi ndivyo dola la Tanzania daima imekuwa katika vita yake dhidi ya ukabila katika 
siasa. Vikwazo hivi na sera nyingine za ujenzi wa taifa, haishangazi kwamba ukabila una nafasi ndogo katika 
maamuzi ya kupiga kura."
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 “The use of ethnicity in Tanzania is not viewed to be a good thing. This explains why numerous laws were enacted 
to undermine its salience in politics. Mwalimu enacted laws to disband chieftaincy and other traditional leaders 
from holding political powers to enhance national unity. They were left with the role of conducting matambiko.  … 
all parties are supposed to be national and anyone inciting divisive ethnic sentiments in the society especially 
during elections can be lawfully charged and jailed. This is how serious the Tanzanian state has always been on its 
war against tribalism in politics. These restrictions and other nation-building policies, it is not surprising that ethnic 
salience on determining voting is low in elections.” 
 
The views expressed in the interviews above indicate that legal restrictions deterred candidates and 
their parties from using ethnic tendencies to lure voters. As such, voters were not enticed to vote 
on ethnic line. These views augur well with the views of Lofchie (2013), Malipula (2014) and 
Weber (2009) who argued that the Tanzanian government has taken an active stance against the 
use of ethnicity and other decisive elements in politics. This included enacting laws and policies 
that consider divisive elements like racism, religiosity and ethnic polarisation as taboos in political 
canvassing. It is against this background that the mass media have been legally made to control 
divisive statements that could propagate ethnic salience in voting (Kilimwiko, 2012; Rioba, 2008). 
In the same vein, numerous electoral requirements intended among other things, to enhance 
national integration and lower salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices (Makulilo, 
2012). For instance, as it was indicated in section 4.5.2, candidates are required to use Swahili 
while campaigning and an interpreter only if need be. Also, they are strictly forbidden from 
making appeals for support on an ethnic basis, and in case one does, the benefits accrued like 
electoral triumphs can be nullified. Likewise, the Political Parties Act of 1992 and its amendments 
stipulate that to be eligible for registration, a political party must be voluntary and that its 
membership must be open to all the citizens of the URT without discrimination on any divisive 
element like ethnic origin. Additionally, the same legislation further lays down that to qualify for 
registration, parties shall not aim to advocate or further the interests of any religious belief or 
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group; tribal, ethnic or racial group; or only a specific area within any part of the URT. To enforce 
compliance with these provisions, the Political Party Act requires political parties to demonstrate 
that it enjoys multi-ethnic pan-territorial support. This is measured by obtaining not less than 200 
registered members who are qualified to be registered as voters for purpose of Parliamentary 
elections from at least 10 regions of Tanzania. Out of the 10 regions, at least two regions should be 
from Zanzibar, one from Unguja and another from Pemba –the two Islands that form Zanzibar. 
Failure to meet these requirements means one thing, no registration. All these point to the direction 
that legal restrictions stand in the way of political actors from mobilising support ethnically and 
providing space for ethnicity gaining salience on determining voters’ choices. 
   
The restrictions made on the legislations highlighted above find legitimacy in the parent law of the 
land- the CURT. The CURT provides freedom of expression but does not specify that this freedom 
should be extended to individuals or political organisations that use the privilege to create ethnic 
animosity. Section 20 of CURT makes this limitation explicit. 
 20. - (1) Every person is entitled to freedom, subject to the laws of the land, to freely and peaceably assemble, 
associate and cooperate with other persons, express views publicly, and more specially to form or join associations or 
organisations formed for the purposes of preserving or furthering his beliefs or interests or any other interests.  
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-article (1) it shall not be lawful for any political entity to be registered 
which according to its constitution or policy -  
(a) aims at promoting or furthering the interests of:  
(i) any religious faith or group; (ii) any tribal group, place of origin, race or gender,  
(iii) only a particular area within any part of the United Republic…  
 
Another very paramount legal restriction raised by one interviewee is the restriction of private 
candidates in fear of the possibility that individuals could use ethnicity to garner political support. 
In his words the interviewee disclosed that: 
“Mwalimu na warithi wake hawakuwa wajinga kukataza wagombea binafsi. Walitumia Bunge kufanya 
marekebisho ya katiba wakati Mtikila
126
 alipokwenda mahakamani kudai haki ya mgombea binafsi na akashinda. 
Walifanya hivyo ili kuepuka uwezekano wa wagombea binafsi kutumia ukabila kushinda viti vya kisiasa na 
kupanda mbegu za ukabila katika kuvutia upigaji kura katika nchi yote.
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” 
 “Mwalimu and his successors were not stupid to disallow private candidature. They used the parliament to amend 
the constitution when Mtikila went to court to demand such right and was granted. They did that to avoid 
possibilities of private candidates using tribalism to win political seats and sow seeds of tribal salience in attracting 
voters nationally.” 
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According to this interviewee the drafters of CURT and the political leadership were concerned 
that independent candidates seeking political seats operating outside the party system use the 
ethnic ticket to acquire power. The basis of the fear of private candidates was that they lack 
systemic barriers to diffuse ethnic tendencies that political parties have. Such position is based on 
the fact that decisions are collectively made and informed by rules and regulations that are against 
ethnic salience in politics. As such, candidates and leaders who perpetuate ethnic salience can be 
dealt with by party organs. This is hardly the case for independent candidates who can only be 
controlled by his own conscious. As a way of preventing this from happening, all candidates in 
contest for political offices in Tanzania have to be sponsored by a political party. In this way, fears 
that and the potential of, private candidature breeding ethnic salience were curtailed. 
 
However, it is less convincing to suggest that legislations or even meticulously drafted 
constitutions can create and preserve a political culture. This is particularly so when the political 
culture shuns away an ethnically diverse society from ethnic salience in anchoring voters’ choices. 
This position is banked on the fact that laws do not ensure automatic implementation. It is worth 
recalling that even the most oppressive dictators that the world has experienced, had constitutional 
documents that had formally included a menu of political and economic freedoms. Tanzania can be 
exempted from such situation as it has managed to escape the gap between having and 
implementing laws meant to diffuse ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices. The views of 
an Extension Officer in Misungwi village suffice to express this position: 
"Sheria zinazolenga kuimarisha umoja wa kitaifa nchini Tanzania ni rahisi kutekelezwa, kwasababu zipo 
sambamba na mfumo jumuishi wa kisiasa ambayo waasisi wetu walitujengea, na ambao tunaupenda." 
128
 
 
“Laws meant to enhance national unity in Tanzania areyeasyto implement because they are in line with the 
integrativepolitical order that our founders built for us, and that we enjoy having” 
 
Arguing along the same direction but with a biased experience from his party, a staunch CCM 
supporter had this to say: 
" CCM inachuja  wagombea wake vizuri ili kuhakikisha wanawasimamisha wagombea ambao hawaamini katika 
matumizi ya ukabila kuvutia wapiga kura. Hii inafanywa na vyombo vya chama kuanzia ngazi ya wilaya hadi 
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ngazi ya Taifa. Sheria zetu zinahakikisha sera zetu za kukuza  umoja wa Taifa  na amani ambazo Watanzania 
wanazikubali . Kwasababu hii watu wengi wanatupigia kura sisi kwa wingi.”129 
  
“CCM always filters its candidates well to make sure it sponsors candidates who do not buy into the use of 
ethnicity in attracting voters. This is elaborately done by the party’s organs from the district to the national levels. 
The laws simply ensure our national unity and peace enhancement policies that Tanzanians buy into. That is why 
many people vote for us in abundance.” 
 
The views presented above suggest that laws geared towards barring ethnic salient practices 
contributed in informing low salience of ethnicity in 2010 elections. This is partly because the laws 
and the CURT, in which they are embedded, provide disincentives to politicise ethnicity. More 
important, the legislations are a consequence of the path-dependent nationalist political culture. 
This culture is informed by the PsIM and believed to be worth followed by the people as 
highlighted in section 3.4.4. Such culture sets the politicisation of ethnicity outside the perimeter of 
the permissible use in soliciting voters’ support. In this regard, Tanzanians wrote these restrictions 
into their laws to insure a value system they firmly believe in. This value system affords them a 
degree of political freedom without allowing politicisation of ethnic identities. As such, the values 
make ethnicity insignificant in informing voters’ choices.  
 
The views presented above suggest that laws geared towards barring ethnic salient practices in 
elections benefit from a path-dependent nationalist political culture informed by the PsIM. Without 
such culture, the fallacy between blueprint and reality that is common in most African states 
indicated by Mwiru (2013) and Mamdani (2013a) could have been obvious. Such culture sets the 
politicisation of ethnicity outside the perimeter of the permissible use in soliciting voters’ support. 
This is because the country’s political culture has projected the use of ethnicity in seeking political 
office as a taboo that would destroy national integration, peace, tranquillity and development as 
widely argued throughout this sub-heading. Interestingly, the fact LRIs oversee application of anti-
ethnic salient tendencies in elections questions the neo-patrimonial thesis that Africa lacks LRIs. 
Also, the content of the laws questions the premise that Africans prefer traditional issues like 
politicisation of ethnicity in the conduct of its politics. The fact that the laws are in line with the 
national integrative intent of the PsIM, and their role in mitigating ethnic salience in politics, 
convinces me that they add impetus to the PsIM role in explaining low influences of ethnicity in 
voting.  
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5.3.6. Synthesis of the Explanations of the Influences of Ethnicity on Voters’ Choices  
 Tanzania is widely acknowledged as having implemented one of the most extensive nation-
building policies that dealt successfully with diffusing the salience of ethnicity in politics 
compared to most independent African states (Malipula, 2014; Lofchie, 2013; Weber, 2009). 
According to the discussions presented above Tanzania’s success in lowering the salience of 
ethnicity in elections is attributable to the creation of a common narrative and a shared anti-ethnic 
salient culture in the conduct of politics. This culture among other things rejects luring voters 
through ethnic-based voters’ mobilisation. This common narrative and culture was made possible 
through a series of sustained nation-building strategies. As indicate by interviewees and I concur, 
the political leadership of Mwalimu and his successors never felt tired of explicitly emphasising 
nation-building as a goal that was necessary for Tanzania’s development. The leadership 
successfully stressed that the participation of all Tanzanians in ensuring that all divisive elements 
that can hinder nation-building was inevitable. Such conviction made the state and its people 
merge forces in quashing issues like the use of ethnicity in influencing voters to ensure the 
country’s development, peace and tranquillity.  
It is imperative to note that none of the nation-building policies used to ensure low salience of 
ethnicity were unique to Tanzania. However, the zeal, commitment and ability of the leadership to 
forge an alliance with the people, political actors and systems and processes made it successful 
than other African countries (Malipula, 2014; Lofchie, 2013; Rioba, 2008). Such argument is 
informed by the fact that calls for national unity in other African countries were hardly 
accompanied by the true will of implementing policies for diffusing ethnic salience (Weber, 2009). 
More important, the monolithic government of Mwalimu and his immediate successor Mzee Ali 
Hassan Mwinyi had almost free reign to pursue nation-building policies due to the lack of strong 
political opposition. Equally, the widespread popularity of the ruling party made a significant, 
long-term ideological and financial investment in the nation-building policy possible. Similar 
views are applicable to the governments of President Mkapa and President Kikwete. However, to a 
comparatively lesser degree as the opposition under both regimes were relatively stronger in 
parliament and their reach in the community. Nevertheless, CCM’s share of political power and 
authority by the time of the 2010 elections was still dominant. CCM and its government through 
the incorporation of the societal forces into the political realm including the control of the media, 
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civic organisations, school syllabuses, and major industries, as indicated in section 4.4.1.1 made it 
able to control the nation-building policy to a degree that was impossible for anyone to sabotage.  
 
In actual sense, the dominance of the political, social and media space curtailed the potential for an 
alternative view even when political and economic liberalisation came into being. In this way, the 
nationalistic movement denunciation of the use of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices widely 
reached out to the people. Importantly, it was seconded by the newly formed parties. However, this 
is not to say that there were no voices of dissent or alternate nationalising narratives. Nonetheless, 
in fact these voices rarely reached much of the populace. This is because of the government’s 
monopoly on political expression and organisation was stronger than the dissents. This partly 
explains why Tanzania has successfully managed to create a cross-cutting national identity 
incomparable to most African countries as the Afrobarometer data highlighted above suggest. By 
successfully establishing a cross-cutting national identity, Tanzania managed to reduce the 
legitimacy of ethnic polarisation and lowered the barriers to ethnic cooperation among members of 
ethnic groups. In this way, Tanzania’s relative lower rate of ethnic salience in voting can be said to 
be a legacy of the nation-building policy.  
 
With 24 years of multiparty politics and the rise of liberal democratic political and economic 
institutions, one would have expected that the media and other forms of non-government 
sanctioned political expressions to be free. As such, political pluralism was expected to have 
reduced the ability of the monistic dispensation to control national discourses and from this 
window they could even perpetuate ethnic salience as suggested by Gasarasi (1997). This has not 
been the case as only distant voices from ethnic salient individuals are heard. In this context, the 
foundation placed by the nation-building policies still proved to stand in informing low salience of 
ethnicity in the 2010 elections. As indicated above the civic discourses in the county’s school and 
media still denounce ethnicity. Importantly, the newly formed parties are striving hard to propagate 
the nation-building discourse as initially set by the PsIM. Indeed today, there are many more 
avenues for spreading ethnic salient elements in the country’s political debate due to competitive 
politics and economics. However, they have not been given a go. Whether this will be translated 
into awakening dangerous ethnic-based extremists’ views to gain followers remains to be seen.  
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An important point to be made with regard to the dynamics of the PsIM on informing the 
influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 elections is the limited role of 
legal restrictions. A critical review of the data presented above suggests that the efficacy of the 
legislations enacted to avoid divisive political canvassing relies on the implementation of the 
nation-building policy. In the main, this is because the PsIM and varied efforts made by the 
country’s founders and sustained the current political actors and institutions, have created a 
national identity that warrants reasonable adherence to the laws. The national culture emphasises 
national unity and EDNR and peacefulness as central national values which promote low salience 
of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This identity according to the data gathered in 
Mwanza, serves as a frame through which Tanzanians reject calls ethnic polarisation. This is due 
to the fact that it ethnic polarisation presupposes the potential of violent ethnic-based conflicts 
which will stand in the way of national development and peaceful co-existence of ethnicities.  
It can be deduced from the discussions above that the PsIM and efforts to actualise them have 
created a political culture responsible for Tanzania’s low salience of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ 
choices in the 2010 elections. In the main, this culture is a result of a set of norms, values, and 
institutions which have fostered extensive acceptance of national identity over ethnic identities; 
and rejection of politically violent and divisive trends as being “un-Tanzanian”. This path-
dependent low salience of ethnicity continued even in the absence of the socialist AD and the 
commencement of liberal democratic market-oriented policies which casted doubt on its 
sustenance. Such argument is anchored on the fact that well-entrenched cultures do not wither 
away rapidly. They take time to wither away especially if their relevance transcends the political 
and social orientations within which they take place. It can be argued that the merits of low 
salience of ethnicity meticulously framed within the nation-building policy informed by the PsIM 
are still relevant today. Moreover, they formed the base of influencing low salience of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. In a clearer statement, the political culture 
informed by the PsIM and well crafted in the AD, established the basis for ethnicity’s 
insignificance in luring voters’ choices. This means that the legacy of the PsIM is at work even 
after the collapse of the AD. It has been established that the AD promoted equality and 
discouraged divisiveness, enhanced peace, nation-building policies as well as the monolithic 
political institutions that created subject citizens; generated Tanzanian identity and national pride. 
This identity and pride contributed to establishment of a peaceful and self-reinforcing political 
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culture against ethnic polarisation and ethnic voting. Therefore, I argue that this political imagery 
culture is the primary cause of low salience of ethnicity in Tanzania. As such, the neo-patrimonial 
and hybrid accusation that Africa lacks a frame to guide it away from ethnic salience in voting is 
questioned. 
5.4. The Peripheral Politics of Origin, Being and Belonging in the 2010 Elections in Mwanza 
Knowing that the level of ethnic salience in Tanzania is low as argued widely in this thesis, I 
endeavoured to explore momentary outbursts, peaks or ‘flashes’ of ethnicity that manifest in 
Tanzania and which role they play in determining voters’ choices, even if they are peripheral to 
mainstream politics. For this objective, the relevant research question as put forward in section 1.4 
was:  In what forms and shapes have flashes of ethnicity manifested themselves in Tanzanian 
elections and how do they inform voters’ choices?  The main intent of this question was to gather 
information about the flashes of ethnicity involved in the 2010 elections. This is useful as cultural 
and social ethnicity is a salient reality in Tanzania. Such forms of ethnicity might sometimes be 
reflected in political ethnicity which could have political relevance in informing voters’ choices. 
The analysis in this connection is made by analysing politics of origin, being and belonging as 
defined in the conceptual and theoretical segment in section 3.2.6. The thesis identifies and 
analyses the role of candidates’ knowledge of Kisukuma and the politics of origin, being and 
belonging in informing electoral choices.   
5.4.1. The Use of Kisukuma and Voting 
In this thesis, the use of the most spoken ethnic language in the study area (Kisukuma) was used as 
an indicator of the significance of the flashes of ethnicity in anchoring votes. Cognisant of the fact 
that language and ethnicity are not synonymous as the detailed conceptualisation of ethnicity in 
chapter section 3.1 entails, yet language boundaries nonetheless frequently coincide with ethnic 
groups. For instance, in Tanzania, most ethnic groups have their own languages. These languages 
can be differentiated from others and be used to create identities for political visibility. In the 
context of this thesis, the dominance of Kisukuma over the other languages in the study area made 
me regard it as an indication of belonging to the region. Therefore, I included questions, asking 
whether Kisukuma was used in campaigning and if someone can be elected in Mwanza if he/she 
does not know Kisukuma. The responses to these questions were quite straightforward. 88% of my 
interviewees held the view that Kisukuma was not the most frequently used language in electoral 
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campaigns and rallies. It was Swahili that was mostly used in both urban and rural settings in 
Mwanza. Most of my interviewees (87%) also were of the view that knowledge of Kisukuma was 
not a prerequisite for, or guarantee of, getting elected in Mwanza.  
As explained earlier, Swahili is a lingua franca through which Tanzanians of all ethnic groups can 
readily communicate with one another and which contributed decisively to enhancing national 
integration (cf. sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.1.1 and 4.4.1.5). An elderly man in Misungwi had this to 
say on Swahili when I asked him about the use of Kisukuma in election campaigns:  
"Tuna lugha yetu ya taifa (Kiswahili) ambacho kimetuunganisha wakati wa kupambana na mkoloni. Lugha hii 
inatumiwa na Watanzania wote na vijana wengi wa Kitanzania hawana lugha nyingine wanayoijua zaidi ya 
Kiswahili. Tukiwa na lugha hii kwanini tutumie Kisukuma kuhukumu watu ambao wanataka kuongoza Wasukuma 
na wasiyo Wasukuma? Kisukuma kwanza hakitumiki katika mikutano ambayo viongozi wetu wanatuwakilisha!”  
130
 
 
 “We have a national language (Swahili) that unified us to fight colonialism. This language is used by all 
Tanzanians and a lot of young Tanzanians know no other language than Swahili. With this language why shall we 
use Kisukuma to judge people who want to lead the Sukuma and non-Sukuma? By the way Kisukuma is not used 
in the meetings that our leaders represent us!” 
 
The words of the elderly man urge Tanzanians to be proud of the national integration initiatives 
done by the state. He also wanted people to honour tools like Swahili that played a decisive role in 
the integration process. Inferably, using Kisukuma to solicit political support is tantamount to 
betraying the noble efforts of nation-building. The views of the elderly man in Misungwi were 
further corroborated by a bar-maid in Shamalala who remarked: 
“Kisukuma hakizungumzwi na kila mtu Mwanza, kwa hiyo kutumia Kisukuma katika kampeni ni kuwabagua wale 
ambao hawaelewi Kisukuma. Hii siyo sawa wala haki kwakuwa wabunge na madiwani si Machifu wa Wasukuma. 
Kiswahili hujulikana kwa kila Mtanzania, hivyo basi wacha kitumike katika kampeni kama tulivyozoea."
131
 
 
. “Kisukuma is not spoken by everyone in Mwanza therefore using it in campaigns is discriminating against those 
who do not understand Kisukuma. This is not fair and good for unity as MPs and Councillors are not Sukuma 
chiefs. Swahili is known by every Tanzanian, so let it be used in campaigns as we are used to.”  
 
The words of the bar-maid and those of the elderly man above, indicate that the use of Kisukuma 
in soliciting political support in elections is not a rational decision. Such position is predicated on 
the belief that the use of Kisukuma will breed ethnic tendencies that could act against the country’s 
nation-building efforts.  Furthermore, it was feared that it could discriminate those who do not 
speak the language while the political offices contested for are for all people living in the area of 
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contest. The view of this elderly man and the Bar-maid questions the neo-patrimonial thinking that 
African people are traditional and tend to stick to their traditional ways. In the context of language 
in Mwanza, the neo-patrimonial thinking would suggest that the parochial language – Kisukuma 
would have been preferred ahead of the national language. Such position is based on the fact that 
the Sukuma could exercise the local level patron-client relationship in electoral mobilisation. 
A primary school teacher in Mapilinga seconded the above views. Apart from supporting the 
negative use of Kisukuma in soliciting votes, the teacher rationalised the legal restriction on the 
use of vernaculars in election campaigns. In his words the teacher had this to say: 
"Kiswahili kinazungumzwa kwa fahari na Watanzania wote, Kwahiyo kabila moja kuwa bora kuliko kabila lingine 
kwa kigezo cha kutumia au kutotumia Kiswahili. Kwa kutumia Kisukuma katika kampeni za uchaguzi 
kutagawanya Watanzania, kuhatarisha umoja wao na kuchangia upigaji kura kwa mwelekeo wa kikabila. Hii 
haitokuwa vizuri hata kwa Sukuma pamoja na wingi wao kwa sababu za binafsi na thamani ya mchango wa kijamii 
na kiuchumi za Kiswahili kwa Watanzania ni kubwa sana kuzipoteza. Ndio maana sheria za nchi haziruhusu 
matumizi ya lugha za makabila katika kampeni."
132
  
 
 “Tanzanians of all walks of life speak Swahili with pleasure and pride, therefore Swahili does not carry a taint of 
ethnic superiority based on a tribe’s command of, or not not commanding Swahili. Using Kisukuma in election 
campaigns will divide Tanzanians, endanger their unity and contribute to tribal voting. This will not do well even 
to the Sukuma regardless of their big number because the personal and socio-economic value of Swahili to 
Tanzanians is so big to be foregone. This is why laws of the land do not allow the use of vernaculars in 
campaigning”  
 
The views of the teacher recapitulated the unifying role of Swahili and condemned the use of 
Kisukuma. This is because in his opinion, it will inform ethnic competition and voting around the 
Sukuma and non-Sukuma speakers. The teacher’s answer might be seen by oppossers of this line 
of thought as a socially desirable response leaning towards abiding with the establishment which 
denounces political tribalism. However, except for ethnic salient Tanzanians and those who do 
master Swahili the answer is practical and rational. The teacher rationalises Tanzania’s electoral 
law prohibiting political canvassing and mobilising votes discussed in section 5.3.5. The law in 
question restricts candidates and their agents to use vernaculars in campaigning as well as uttering 
of statements inciting ethnic divisions and chaos as highlighted in sections 4.5.2 and 5.3.5. The law 
in its content and objective presupposes that Tanzanians know Swahili. Inferably, it demands those 
who do not, to learn it. Such view is predicated on the fact that the legislation demands that the 
campaigns should be done in Swahili. And if there are people who cannot follow, an interpreter 
shall be used to make them understand what was said. When I took trouble to ask if the services of 
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an interpreter were used during the 2010 elections, no interviewee was able to give an example 
where such services were needed or used. In fact, asking for such service would not be socially 
desirable for anyone to come forward and request this service in Tanzania where ethnicity is 
widely denounced.This further attests to the fact that Swahili is well used, and serves the purpose 
of conveying the campaign message to multi-ethnic populations. Whether it served the rural 
audiences mastering Swahili less well, we cannot know for sure, since the chances of demanding 
an interpreter are slim for those groups.  
As much as it was widely argued above that the use of Kisukuma in campaigning was not 
supported by most interviewees it does not mean there were none who thought differently. Indeed, 
there were some interviewees (13%) who felt that it was used and would be a good idea for 
Kisukuma to be used in the future. Importantly, although the percentage is low it might be 
practically higher. This is especially because we are not basing our conclusions on a representative 
sample of the Tanzanian population with proportional inclusion of rural communities. As such, we 
cannot determine the percentage of rural farmers who barely speak Swahili and may share this 
position.  Interviewees are generally in support of the view that Sukuma identity as manifested in 
the use of Kisukuma was significant in luring votes in elections as the following observation 
suggests:.  
"Kisukuma ni muhimu ili kupata ufuasi wa kisiasa Mwanza na imekuwa lugha kuu ya kampeni muda wote. Ni 
kama lazima kwa mgombea kuonesha Usukuma wake kwa kuzungumza Kisukuma. Bila kujua Kisukuma 
mgombea anaweza kwa urahisi kupoteza uchaguzi katika majimbo yenye Wasukuma wengi."
133
 
 
. “Kisukuma is imperative in commanding political support in Mwanza and has always been the main language of 
campaigning. It is almost a must for a candidate to exemplify Sukuma identity by speaking Kisukuma. Without 
knowing Kisukuma a candidate can easily lose elections in Sukuma dominated constituencies.” 
 
The views of the elderly woman in Nange are quite important in terms of presenting an antithesis 
to the view that Kisukuma was insignificant in luring votes in the 2010 elections. However, they 
raise some pertinent questions. The first could be how and why Kisukuma has been used in 
elections campaigns while electoral laws exist barring the use of vernaculars in such campaigns. 
The answer could simply be having a law restricting the use of vernaculars does not ensure 
automatic enforcement. As such, the possibility of using it exists. However, this explanation is 
hypothetical and does not help much. The critical question to ask to verify the use of Kisukuma in 
the campaigns was whether it was actually used. Although we do not have data on actual 
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 Personal interview with an elderly woman  at Nange Village,Igokelo Ward,Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015 
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campaigning practices across Mwanza Region, the general conviction of the interviewees was that 
limited Kisukuma words were used in the campaign rallies that took place in rural areas. This view 
is well summarised by one young man in Mbela who asserted that:   
"Baadhi ya wagombea walitumia maneno machache yanayofahamika ya Kisukuma kama salamu wakati 
wakuhutubia wapiga kura kwenye kampeni za uchaguzi. Kwangu mimi hii si kuzungumza Kisukuma, ni kama 
mlevi katika kilabu cha pombe za kienyeji akizungumza maneno machache ya Kiingereza baada ya kunywa pombe 
nyingi zaidi ya wastani. Kwa kutamka maneno hayo machache mtu hawezi kusema mlevi huyo alikuwa akiongea 
Kiingereza."
134
  
 
“Some candidates used few common Kisukuma words like greetings when addressing voters during election 
campaigns. To me this is not speaking Kisukuma, it is just like a drunkard at a local brew club speaking few 
English words after taking above average alcohol. By uttering these few words one cannot say the drunkard was 
speaking English.” 
 
Arguing in the same vein, a university student interviewed in Utemini Street stated: 
"Mikutano ya Kampeni inafanyika maeneo ya wazi na inahudhuriwa na watu wa makabila mbalimbali, kwa hiyo 
njia pekee ya kuwavutia wote ni kwa kuongea katika lugha inayojulikana na watu wote. Ndio maana Kisukuma 
hakikutumika kama lugha kuu katika mikutano ya kampeni. Wagombea walitumia maneno machache ya Kisukuma 
kwamba ambayo hata mgeni anaweza kujifunza na kuzungumza mbele ya umati wa watu."
135
 
 
. “Campaign meetings are done in the open and people of different ethnic backgrounds attend, therefore the only 
way of winning all of them is by speaking in a language known to them. That is why Kisukuma was not used as the 
main language of campaigns. Candidates picked few Kisukuma words that even a foreigner can learn and speak in 
front of a crowd.”  
 
The views of the young men from Mbela and Utemini indicate the use of few Kisukuma words in 
the 2010 campaign rallies. However, in essence they second the opinion that Kisukuma has not 
been very influential in mobilising electoral support, particularly in formal campaign rallies. It 
does not seem that they were mainly voicing socially desirable opinions to the interviewer. Of 
course, there may be rural areas where the use of Kisukuma was significant in campaigning, as 
asserted by the elderly woman from Nange. However, on the basis of the limited magnitude of 
usage in the study area that salience of Kisukuma we have no reason to assume that the use of 
Kisukuma was significant luring votes across Mwanza. If as she suggested, the politician’s purpose 
was to make himself understandable among all present in a Sukuma-speaking community, then it 
is in this way that we must interpret her second argument that Kisukuma is essential in winning 
elections in Mwanza, as also discussed below. 
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 Personal interview with a young man at Mbela Village, Igokelo Ward,Misungwi District held on 11.01.2015 
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 Personal interview with a male university student in Utemini Street,  Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 
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An interesting exploration was made after asking if my interviewees knew any candidate in 
Mwanza who has been elected without knowing Kisukuma. The answers were divided among 
interviewees in the two districts under study. As for the parliamentary level in Nyamagana the 
interviewees were certain as the MP for Nyamagana Hon. Ezekia Wenje was widely referred to. 
The reference is due to the fact that Wenje is an ethnic Luo from Musoma, whose mother is said to 
be from Kenya. His mother, however, resides in Rorya, Mara - a district found close to the 
Tanzania and Kenya border. It is imperative to recall that Wenje’s citizenship was questioned 
during the 2010 electoral processes (Raia Mwema, 25
th
 June 2010). In this election, Wenje 
defeated the incumbent MP Lawrence Masha the then Minister for Home Affairs. Due to such 
portfolio, Masha was in charge of among other things, citizenship issues. In this regard, he was the 
boss of the officials who dealt with Wenje’s citizenship claim. Masha is an ethnic Zinza and a non-
Sukuma speaker whose ethnic group is closer to the Sukuma and found within Mwanza as 
described in the description of the study area.  
A similar verdict was given to Councillors in Nyamagana as several non-Sukuma candidates won 
Councillor Seats. It is imperative to note that in the 2010 elections Nyamagana was not the only 
Sukuma dominated constituency in Mwanza region that went to a non-Sukuma speakers. For 
instance, in Nyamagana’s neighbouring constituency Ilemela, Highness Kiwia an ethnic Chagga 
by origin defeated Anthony Diallo. Diallo is a Sukuma by ethnic group and happens to be Mwanza 
regional CCM chair. He is also a well established financial magnet owning the biggest media 
house in the regional and an Ex-Minister. Kwimba constituency also went to a non-Sukuma. In the 
constituency in question, a Tanzanian of Asian origin Hiran Mansoor unprecedentedly beat a 
Sukuma of Kwimba, Leticia Nyerere in the race for MP. Similarly, the then MP for the Geita 
urban constituency, Donald Max who was neither a native Sukuma nor a Sukuma speaker won 
against a Sukuma. Max’s citizenship like it was the case for Wenje was questioned during the 
electoral process (Raia Mwema, 25
th
 August, 2010). Questions emanated from the premise that 
Max’s father was from the southern part of Tanzania close to Mozambique (creating suspicion of 
his citizenship). His mother is a Sukuma. However, according to the Sukuma culture, Max is not a 
native Sukuma as ethnic group membership is patrilineally attuned, that is to the male parent. 
However, cases of non-Sukuma speakers were not found in Misungwi where interviewees were 
not able to mention an MP or Councillor who cannot speak Kisukuma. This was regardless of the 
fact whether they were Sukuma by origin or not.  
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The views presented above suggest that it is easier to be elected into political office without 
knowing Kisukuma if you vie for an urban constituency compared to a rural one. The cases of 
Wenje, Kiwia and Max suggest such fact. Only the Mansoor’s case deviates, since Kwimba is 
predominantly rural like Misungwi, yet elected a non-Sukuma and a non-Kisukuma speaker. In 
Misungwi which is predominantly rural, no interviewee could identify a candidate who does not 
know Kisukuma. A similar trend is applicable to other Sukuma dominated rural constituencies. 
We collected some data exceptionally indicating that the local language may be used not merely 
for communicative purposes but also to signal ethnic belonging or respect for the voters’ unique 
ethnicity. In an interview with a resident in Nyamagana who stood for a parliamentary seat in 
Mwanza, I managed to get an attention-grabbing observation of the significance of Kisukuma in 
elections in Mwanza. He told me that it is important to know Kisukuma if you are to win a 
parliamentary seat in the rural areas. This is particularly so if one aspires for a Sukuma dominated 
rural parliamentary or councillor constituency under CCM’s ticket. In his words he disclosed that:  
"Kama unataka kuwania wadhifa wa kisiasa katika majimbo ya vijijini ya Mwanza kupitia CCM, inabidi 
uzungumze Kisukuma kuonyesha kwamba wewe ni sehemu ya wapiga kura. Kisukuma inakuwa muhimu 
kuwasiliana na watu kwakuwa mambo ya kijamii yanayofanyika kwa kutumia Kisukuma. Hii inaweza isiwe 
muhimu kushinda uchaguzi kwa sababu uwezo wa kuleta maendeleo na utendaji ni vigezo muhimu pia."
136
. 
 
 “If you want to vie for a political post in rural constituencies of Mwanza through CCM, you have to speak 
Kisukuma to show that you are part of the voters. Kisukuma becomes imperative to interact with people, as the 
social issuesare done in Kisukuma. This might not be the key to winning elections because ability to bring 
development and other performance related criteria are also important.”   
 
The views of the then MP hopeful indicate the importance of Kisukuma in campaigning for 
electoral votes in informal campaign avenues in the study area. Interestingly, the informal avenues 
are said to be useful for candidates who seek the CCM ticket to vie for a parliamentary seat. This 
observation is based on the fact that CCM has an elaborate system of primaries whereby aspirants 
seek votes from ordinary members from CCM branches within the constituency. In these 
primaries, candidates are not well monitored by the electoral bodies compared to the formal 
elections. Therefore, when candidates reach out to people to declare their interests to stand for 
political seats, they do things to identify themselves with them. This may include speaking their 
language, claimed the ex-parliamentary hopeful. Since opposition parties in Tanzania are not 
found in the remote areas and lack elaborate primaries for their parliamentary nominees, it is 
                                                 
136
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understandable that the prospective parliamentary exonerated them in his observation. The view on 
the significance of Kisukuma in CCM primaries expressed above does indicate some use of 
Kisukuma in elections. However, it does not entail significance in influencing electoral choices in 
actual elections. This argument is based on the fact that the then parliamentary hopeful failed to 
claim that without knowing Kisukuma an aspirant for political office cannot win the primaries and 
the actual elections in Mwanza. Also, doubts can be cast on the role of Kisukuma in the setting of 
primaries and formal campaigns among sponsored candidates from different parties. While the 
enforcement of electoral laws regarding the use of vernaculars is overtly at play on the formal 
campaigning stage, it is not as effective in party primaries, particularly during non-formal 
interactions between candidates and the local people. As the interviewee disclosed, Kisukuma is 
used in the social settings and not in official primary campaigns. 
Another important dimension raised by the then parliamentary aspirant that waters down the 
significance of Kisukuma on determining voters’ choices is related to elements of being and 
belonging. His mention of candidate’s being viewed to belong to the constituencies and having the 
ability to deliver public goods, suggests that Kisukuma is not the sole factor that lures voters 
support. This questions the neo-patrimonial school that Africans are moved by traditional 
tendencies that exacerbate ethnic voting due to disproportionate ethnic-based client–patron 
relations. In the subsequent heading, we analyse the importance placed on candidates being known 
in the constituency, attached to it through lineage and clan, residence and owning property 
particularly land and housing. In other words, one may summarise that the section strives to 
explore if parties need to send locals to contest for political seats in the study area.  
5.4.2. Influences of Candidates’ Origin, Being and Belonging on Voting in Mwanza 
In section 3.2.6 of this thesis, I presented different ways in which identities related to origin, being 
and belonging may effect voting other than political tribalism as defined in this dissertation. The 
identities in this thesis are termed the politics of origin, being and belonging. The politics are 
referred to as flashes of ethnicity, mere peripheral moments, although they carry some of the 
constituting elements of ethnicity as thoroughly discussed in section 3.2.5. In the section referred, I 
argued that the politics of origin, being and belonging may manifest in the form of either locally or 
broadly defined ethnic group identities. More specific to our discussion, it was contended that 
when a community throws its weight in support of local aspirants in elections, it could be viewed 
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as a way of securing inclusion in the local political space and accessing public resources (Chabal, 
2009). As such, candidates’ attachment to the area of contest is viewed as a way of ensuring that 
communities get competent, accountable and trustworthy leaders (ibid). This is because the leaders 
are part of the community they serve and, therefore, will be basically serving their own community 
and themselves (Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). In this section, my interest is to discuss the 
interplay between common origin, being and belonging and its implications on voting. Based on 
the conceptualisation of politics of origin, being and belonging outlined in section 3.2.6, I set out 
to investigate the flashes of ethnicity termed the politics of origin and belonging deemed important 
in the study area and how they came to play in the 2010 elections.  To elicit the significance of 
different aspects of the politics of origin, being and belonging in influencing voting in the 2010 
elections, I set the following four questions:  
The First question: is it important that a candidate is from the constituency of contest to win a 
Councillor or MP seat?  The essence of this question was to unveil whether if belonging to a 
particular constituency in the autochthonous and the politics of being and belonging as described 
in section 3.2.6 is important or not in anchoring voters’ choices. At its core, the question will 
delineate the chances of extended versions of ethnic belonging in Tanzania’s political scene. This 
broad question is followed by a question that attempts to unveil the role of selected elements of 
belonging (land and residence) highlighted by Ghabal (2009) in anchoring voters’ choices.  Since 
the question is addressed to two levels in the 2010 elections- MP and Councillor Elections, we will 
be able to discuss implications of belonging in the lowest office contested in the 2010 and the one 
that follows it on top of the hierarchy. As such we are able to compare ramifications of belonging 
on elections of Councillors whose jurisdiction (in a ward) and functioning is relatively closer to the 
people than MP whose jurisdiction is an entire constituency constituted by several wards and most 
of his functions are in the national parliament. The relevance of this distinction lies on the 
assumption that the closer the leader is to the people in terms of jurisdiction, the higher the demand 
of having a native to hold the position. This logic of the Councillor- MP distinction is relevant to 
all questions. 
 
The Second question is whetherit is important that a candidate owns land and residence in the 
constituency of contest for him or her to win a Councillor or MP seat? This question as mentioned 
above intends to unveil the role of land that according to Chabal is a key element of belonging 
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since it entails that one is part of the community in question and in the rural setting ownership of 
land connotes the possession of a key factor of production. As such, owning land and working on it 
indicates that one is part of the community’s development agenda and therefore can be entrusted 
leadership. Land and in particular ancestral land is expected to ensure one’s adherence to the kin 
network recipriocity and representativeness explained in section 3.2.6. Residence is also viewed in 
the same way as one’s belonging to a particular community is associated to his ownership of, and 
more importantly, residing in the community connotes that he is part of the community one wishes 
to serve politically. In this context, land and residence are taken to measure how elements of 
belonging play in anchoring votes. The logic of the Councillor- MP distinction presented in the 
first question is applied to this question. This question is followed by one that attempts to unveil 
the role of exclusive ethnic membership (origin) in informing voters’ choices. 
 
The third question was: can someone get elected to the Councillor or MP position if he or she is 
not born within the areas of contest? This question intends to unveil the role of exclusive ethnic 
membership in informing electorates’ choices. At its core itcrosschecks the first one that meant to 
unveil the role of the politics of being and belonging. The question as indicated above follows the 
logic of the Councillor- MP distinction presented in the first question.  
 
Lastly, we intended to capture another basis of belonging significant in anchoring votes. The 
question set was: what issues and characteristics reflective of the politics of origin being and 
belonging are important when electing a political candidate at the local Councillor and MP levels? 
This question is open so as to capture anything beyond the elements of origin, being and belonging 
addressed in section 3.2.6.  
 
The first three questions provided specific knowledge of the interviewees on the issues of origin, 
being and belonging. The responses on the individual variables tell a little as asked separately each 
variable received high responses. However, when the variables are crossed to provide a holistic 
picture we obtain an analysis of pro-origin and pro-being and belonging and their role in 
influencing voting in Mwanza. For this reason, our analysis essentially deals with the debate 
among the proponents of origin over being and belonging. That is whether origin is significant 
than belonging in anchoring voting.  
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Generally, the results gathered in Mwanza, in both Nyamagana and Misungwi suggest that 
political representatives should either originate from the area of contest by birth and/or own land 
and residence within the area where they contest for a political seat. The explanations in favour of 
this line of thought revolve around the conviction that attachment to the area of contest will ensure 
trustworthiness and accountability, as well elaborated by Lindberg and Morrison (2008). 
According to Lindberg and Morrison (2008) native leaders ensure trustworthiness and 
accountability to the community because they are part of it and, therefore enjoy the fruits of the 
development registered in their constituencies.  Most of the interviewees (85%) had a conviction 
that politicians are more morally inclined to diligently serve their place of origin than an outsider 
as confirmed in the following interviews. 
  "...viongozi bora wanapaswa kuwa sehemu yetu, tunaowajua na kwa hivyo, kuwachagua kwa misingi ya uaminifu 
wao. Tunatarajia kwamba watalinda maslahi yetu na kuleta maendeleo, kama hawatafanya hivyo, wao hawatakuwa 
wanasaliti maendeleo ya jimbo lao la uchaguzi tu lakini pia wa watoto wao wenyewe na jamaa zao. Kama 
tukichagua watu wasio miongoni mwetu tunauhakika gani kuwa hawatotuma rasilimali zetu  maeneo watokako. 
"
137
 
 
 “...  best leaders should be part of us, one’s we know t and, therefore, elect them on basis of their trustworthiness. 
We expect that they will defend our interests and bring development. If they will not do so, they will not only be 
denying their constituency’s development but their own children and relatives. If we choose people from outside 
how far are we sure that they will not send our resources to their own places of domicile”  
 
 
"Tunahitaji binti au bin mwenye uwezo na anayeaminika aliyezaliwa au aliye na makazi Misungwi tumchague. 
Tunahitaji watu wa aina hii kwa sababu wanajua matatizo yetu kama wafugaji na wakulima kwahiyo wanaweza 
kutetea maslahi yetu kikamifu katika vyombo vya utoaji wa maamuzi.” 138  
 
“We need a competent and trustworthy son or daughter of this land by birth and /or residence to elect. We need 
such kind of people because they know our problems as pastoralist and farmers so they can competentlydefend our 
interests in the decision making organs.”  
 
The views of the elderly man in Nange and the young woman in Mbela represent the notion that 
the origin and belonging of a candidate was an important factor in motivating voters in elections. 
Their view suggests that if a political contender hails from or is believed to belonging to a 
constituency wherein he /she participates for elections, that will give voters a better chance of 
picking a right (trustworthy) candidate. This is a view anchored on the fact that voters would know 
the aspirants’ character and be able to judge it in an informed manner. This line of thought 
suggests that representatives needed to have an attachment to the area of contest in the form of 
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 Personal interview with an elderly man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 14.01.2015 
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 Personal interview with a Young  woman in Mbela Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 15.01.2015 
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family, relatives and property particularly land and shelter for people to be moved to elect them to 
hold political office. A retired civil servant well presents this view: 
"Viongozi wanapaswa kujulikana na kujichanganya na watu katika shughuli mbalimbali za kijamii, kisiasa na 
kiuchumi. Unaweza vipi kufanya hivyo kama humiliki ardhi na wala nyumba katika eneo la unalotaka kugombea? 
Unahitaji kuwa na nyumba utakaoitumia kukaribisha watu wakati wa mazishi na sherehe za jadi. Lazima uwe na 
ardhi ya kulima na ng'ombe ili uonekane kuwa wewe ni sehemu ya jamii ya Kisukuma. Ukizungumza lugha ya 
kisukuma unaongeza muonekano wa Usukuma wako. Hata hivyo, yote haya yatakuwa na maana ukioomba ofisi ya 
kisiasa kama watu wanauhakika kwamba unaweza kutatua matatizo yao...” 139 
 
 “Leaders have to be known and interact with the people in various activities - social, political and economic. How 
can you do that if you do not own land and house in the area of context? You need to have a house where you will 
invite people during funerals and traditional ceremonies. You must have land to till and cows to show you belong 
to Sukuma society. Speaking the language adds a lot to being viewed a Sukuma. However, this can be useful in a 
bid for political office if people are sure that you can solve their problems....”  
 
 
The retired civil servant has brought up an important element of the politics of origin, being and 
belonging. He has managed to point out how leaders are expected to be identified if they are to 
influence voters. He seconds the view that candidates have to be close to the people so that their 
trustworthiness and ability to deliver public goods that are in line with the needs of the people can 
be judged. To him, leaders shall be voted in, on the basis of proving to know the problems of the 
people by being among those who face them in one way or another. Since agriculture is the core 
economic activity in Mwanza, a leader has to be known to have participated in agricultural 
activities which take place on land. Therefore, he/she has to own land. Equally, land is important 
for housing. This is significant because housing suggests that someone is a bonafide member of the 
area of contest. Housing ensures that a candidate can take part in and share his social and/or 
traditional activities with the community he/she expects to lead. While the highlighted issues are 
important in projecting the sense of being and belonging, they do not ensure votes if one 
originating or belonging to the area of contest is considered incompetent of delivering public 
goods. 
In Nyamagana where the parliamentary contestant was a Minister in the previous government, 
common references were made to him that he had less connection to his home constituency. This is 
because it was claimed that he spent most of his time in Dar es Salaam and abroad fulfilling his 
ministerial duties. The references made to Masha in Nyamagana, were not put to the MP for 
Misungwi Hon. Charles Kitwanga, who was a Deputy Minister. This raises questions as Kitwanga 
                                                 
139
 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 
5.11.2014 
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then had similar ministerial duties in Dar es Salaam like Masha. I was moved to seek for answers 
to this difference of opinion upon two candidates with similar activities that limit the time they can 
spend in their constituencies. It was established that Hon. Kitwanga is an ethnic Sukuma with 
established ancestral links, land and residence in Misungwi. More so, interviewees indicated that 
the basic elements of origin, being and belonging were a trunk card for him as the following view 
indicates:  
"Mbunge wangu anatoka Misungwi, tunamjua yeye, wazazi wake na makazi yake. Yeye hatusaliti kwa kula fedha 
zetu au kujihusisha na masuala ya rushwa. Hii ndio aina ya kiongozi tunayetaka kumchagua na kushirikiana nae 
kuleta maendeleo. Hatuna tatizo na watu wageni na tunachanganyika nao, lakini ili mtu aweze kuwa kiongozi 
mzuri tunahitaji kumjua vizuri! Tunapaswa kuwajua wazazi wa mgombea, familia yake, historia yake na 
kuthibitisha uwezo wake wakufanyakazi."
140
 
 
 “My MP originates from Misungwi, we know him, his parents and his residence. He is not betraying us by eating 
our money or engaging in corrupt tendencies. This is the kind of leader we wish to elect and cooperate with to 
bring development. We have no problem with outsiders as we mingle with them but for one to be able to make a 
good leader we need to know him/her well! We have to know the candidate’s parents, family, history and proven 
ability perform.”  
 
The MP for Misungwi Hon. Kitwanga according to the view recorded above has all of the 
elements of the politics of origin, being and belonging measured in this study. He is from 
Misungwi by ancestral birth, owns land and residence and is well known to the people. More 
important, the views above suggest that people wish to elect MPs who stay in their area of political 
jurisdiction. However, if they cannot get one, they will settle for someone who does not, but has 
established links in terms of residence and land ownership by which they can measure their 
trustworthiness and ability to serve. From the views expressed in the three preceding interviews, 
for one to be considered as being of and belonging to the area of contest needs to reside or own a 
house in the area. Equally, s/he has to be known so that people can judge his/her trustworthiness 
and ability to deliver public goods. From a neo-patrimonial line of thought that considers ethnicity 
to be salient in Africa one would expect Sukuma origin to be salient in identifying the politics of 
origin, being and belonging. The reasoning is that the ethnic-based patron-client relationship 
prevails: since Misungwi is Sukuma-dominated, the people will vote for a Sukuma patron. 
However, the views depicted above do not exclusively refer to Sukuma as the only representatives 
of Misungwi people. Instead, they only wanted someone to come from among the Misungwi 
people, who understands well the problems of the people and whose roots can be traced to the 
district through ownership of land, family or residence. In this regard, even people whose origin is 
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 Personal interview with an elderly man in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 18.01.2015. 
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not from Misungwi qualify for election and stand a chance of winning votes. In the perspective of 
the voters, not the candidate’s ethnicity but knowledge of the problems constitutes belonging. In 
the same vein even a Sukuma who is not well vested with the problems of the people and whose 
history cannot be traced stands a little chance of winning elections. This is because they are viewed 
as not belonging to Misungwi. Therefore, in Misungwi origin is not equated with being a Sukuma. 
The same can be said of Nyamagana. This position lays on the fact that the cosmopolitan nature of 
the constituency and its urban context, the catchment for candidates to qualify for election was the 
entire Lake Zone Area. The word of the then MP hopeful well summarises the Nyamagana 
position:  
" Watu wa Nyamagana wanawachukulia wagombea wote kutoka Kanda nzima ya Ziwa wanaojua matatizo ya jiji 
letu na watu wake kama wenyeji wa jiji hili. Ndio maana ni jambo la kawaida kuwa na Mbunge na Madiwani 
ambao ni Wajita, Wakerewe, Wasukuma, Wazinza na makabila mengine kutoka Mara, Tabora, Bukoba na 
Shinyanga. Unaweza kukumbuka kuwa Paschal Kurwa Mabiti kutoka Mara alimtoa katika kiti cha Ubunge, Paul 
Bomani tajiri wa kisukuma na alieyekuwa na uzoefu tele  wa kisiasa wa kuwawakilisha Wasukuma unaoanzia 
wakati wa za  harakati ya uhuru wa nchi hii na harakati za vyama vya Ushirika. Uchaguzi wa 2010 umeleta  
maendeleo zaidi maana Mwanza ilimchagua Mbunge Mluo ambaye alilelewa Mwanza, anajulikana na anakaa 
Nyamagana."
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“Nyamagana people consider candidates hailing from the whole Lake Zone who know the problems of our city and 
its people as belonging to the city. That is why it is common to have MPs and Councillors who are Wajita, 
Wakerewe, Wasukuma, Wazinza and other tribes from Mara, Tabora, Bukoba and Shinyanga. You can recall that 
Paschal Kurwa Mabiti hailing from Mara ousted Paul Bomani a wealthy Sukuma with abundant political 
experience of representing the Sukuma, which can be traced back to the country’s cooperative and independence 
movement. The 2010 elections have made advancement the people of Mwanza elected a Luo MP who was brought 
up in Mwanza, well known and resides in Nyamagana.”  
 
A critical look at the views presented above suggests that in Nyamagana a broad definition of 
being and belonging puts less weight on origin. This is because residence, ownership of land, and 
knowledge of peoples’ problems are enough for one to be viewed as belonging to the area of 
contest. Even those who placed emphasis on origin basically looked at origin as an assurance of 
getting candidates who are familiar with the problems of the voters. As such, it can provide people 
with a chance of measuring a candidate’s trustworthiness and getting competent bearers of political 
vacancies during elections. From this line of argument, the interviewees’ suggestions point to the 
position that knowledge of the character of an aspirant of political office was vital for determining 
voters’ choices in Mwanza. In this regard, the chances of an outsider and a native of being elected 
in Mwanza is equal if he/she is well-known in the area of contest, resides or owns land in it, has 
proven to be trustworthy and able to deliver the development promises. This line of thought can 
                                                 
141
 Personal interview with a an MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 12.11.2014 
245 
 
explain why some non-Sukuma were elected to hold parliamentary seats in Nyamagana, and other 
constituencies like Geita and Ilemela as highlighted in the previous section. 
 
However, it is worth noting that there were few interviewees (15%) who proved to be ethnically 
salient. This group thought that only candidates born in the area of contest and living in it are true 
representative of the people. Therefore, they deserve to be the only persons to be elected to office 
in the study area. To them, it is not enough to own land, live and know people’s problem for one to 
attract political support in elections. The views derived from an interview with an elderly woman 
in Mapilinga well represent this view: 
 
"Napendelea kumchagua Msukuma aliyezaliwa Misungwi kushika madaraka ya kisiasa kwa sababu atakuwa 
anajua mahitaji yetu na hawezi kuchaguliwa kushika nafasi ya kisiasa katika mahali ambapo yeye hajazaliwa."
 142
 
 
 “I prefer to choose fellow Sukuma born in Misungwi to hold political office because he would know our needs 
and cannot be elected to hold political office at a place where he was not born.”143 
 
Likewise, an elderly man in Misungwi Village echoed the elderly woman’s views as he disclosed 
that:  
"Kila jimbo la uchaguzi katika nchi yetu inabidi liongozwe na kiongozi ambaye amezaliwa na kukulia kwa sababu 
wao wanajua nini wenyeji wenzake wanataka'. Wageni lazima wakubaliane na hili kwa sababu wana maeneo yao 
wenyewe ya asili."
144
 
 
 “Every constituency in our country shall be led by a leader who was born and grew up because  they know what 
their fellow bonafide inhabitants’ want. Outsiders should agree with this because they have their own places of 
origin.” 
 
Personal interview with a shop-keeper in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, also shares the view that 
being a native shall be a ticket to political office:  
"Nadhani ni vyema kama viongozi watachaguliwa miongoni mwa wale waliozaliwa hapa – ‘wazawa’ 145 kwa 
sababu wanajua maslahi yetu katika mioyo yao, hatimaye, mwisho wa siku makabila yote yatawakilishwa katika 
vyombo vya maamuzi kama bunge."
146
 
 
“I think it is good if leaders are elected among those who were born here-wazawa because they have our interest at 
heart,at the end of the day, all tribes will be represented in decision-making organs like the parliament.” 
                                                 
142
 Personal interview with an elderly woman in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 17.01.2015. 
143
 Personal interview with an elderly woman in Mapilinga, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 17.01.2015. 
144
 Personal interview with an elderly man in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 
14.01.2015 
145
 Wazawa is a racial nationalist vocabulary for indigenous people singlehandedly coined by Mtikila to express his 
exclusive sense of authentic Tanzanian identity 
146
  Personal interview with a male shop-keeper in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward , Nyamagana District held on 
16.11.2014 
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The comments above represent ethnically salient views in the determination of voters’ choices. 
The ethnic salience presented casts doubts on the possibility of non-Sukuma being elected in areas 
where they are not dominant. This is because the Sukuma are dominant in the study area as 
highlighted in the description of the study area in section 2.4. Their view is understandable as they 
mainly prefer ethnic voting. However, this view has not been preferred by most of the interviewees 
as highlighted above. Interestingly, it is contradicted by the practice in Nyamagana, where a non-
Sukuma won the parliamentary seat. In this regard, it is relevant to acknowledge the salience 
elements but we should also recognise that a strong basis of subjective ethnicity is lacking, as in 
our discussion of the position of the elderly woman from Mapilinga. In addition, the questions go 
beyond the parliamentary results in Nyamagana and the views of my most interviewees on the 
matter as presented throughout the current chapter. A critical dissection of the basis for preferring 
the native candidates provides a critique from supporters of the minority position on the 
importance of origin. This is because their argument for ethnic salience in voting revolves around 
the fact that they know better the environment and are able to be true representatives of the people. 
The ability to solve voters’ problems overshadows the centrality of origin, as it excludes 
incompetent originals from luring voters. In sum, we learn from our respondents that a marriage of 
origin and ability to deliver public goods to the masses has to be forged to influence voters’ 
choices. As such, one could question if a more competent non-Sukuma belonging to the area of 
context by residence will not be able to win such ethnic salient voters. Based on this criticism, I am 
convinced to argue that although the tone of the minority views leans more towards ethnic 
salience, they too bent in the opposite direction when issues of knowledge of problems and ability 
to solve them are factored in. 
 
In my interview with Mzee Mwiru in Dar es Salaam (Mwiru, 14.05.2014) he expressed the 
dilemma when he first stood for a parliamentary seat in his home area-Kilwa. He told me that 
friends he grew up and worked with in Dar es Salaam discouraged him when he sake their advise 
on the matter. They advised him to vie for one of the constituencies in Dar es Salaam where he is 
well known compared to his ancestral land Kilwa, where he never lived. He went against the 
advice by contesting for the Kilwa seat and winning it. He associated his triumph with his ancestral 
origin that is well known, his academic credentials, experience and proven capability of holding 
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political office exceeding his competitors. He confessed that indeed he lacked first-hand 
knowledge of the problems of Kilwa compared to other contestants because he was not residing in 
the area.  However, he thought people are more moved by candidates’ ability to solve problems 
than origin. At the time, he was a highly ranked Party and government leader which could have 
made people feel he has access to resources, so the ability to solve the known problems is part of 
the equation as well. The doubt expressed by Mzee Mwiru’s friends contradicts the ethnic-salience 
views. This is mainly because they wanted him to contest at a place where he belongs but does not 
originate, Dar es Salaam. Mzee Mwiru went for his place of origin and was elected. Mzee Mwiru 
felt he was elected on the basis of merit, because electorates apart from knowing his roots were 
moved more by his academic qualifications, leadership experience and presumed ability to deliver 
public goods. In light of the arguments of the interviewees, belonging to the majority camp on this 
issues, my critique on the minority group and Mzee Mwiru’s experience, the motivating appeals 
broader senses of being and belonging as well as presumed ability of solve electorates’ problems; 
reduces the weight of origin in terms of birth and even ethnic group in influencing voters’choices.  
 5.4.3. Synthesis of the Politics of Origin, Being and Belonging in the 2010 Elections  
 On the basis of the discussion of the politics of origin, being and belonging above, the importance 
of origin in terms of being native and the use of Kisukuma in mobilising political support have 
been proven to be nominal in Mwanza. The weight given to origin is diluded by the broadly based 
lake zone catchment for viewing candidates as ‘being from Mwanza’ (see expressed in 
Nyamagana). Equally, the vitality of belonging expressed by residing in Misungwi owning land 
and knowing the problems of the people in the area of contest diluded weight of origin. More 
significantly, candidate’s origin was only deemed relevant when it is accompanied by 
trustworthiness and ability to deliver socioeconomic development to the community that they 
aspire to have. The interviews proved that native candidates who reside in the area of contest or 
owned a house, know the problems of the people in question, have proved to be trustworthy and 
viewed to have the ability to deliver public goods, stand an equal chance of winning elections in 
Mwanza as the “outsiders”, Sukuma and non-Sukuma with similar characteristics. A point that at 
this juncture is worth mentioning is that the insistence placed on elements of trustworthiness and 
ability which are at the core of our discussion of the politics of origin, being and belonging have 
been put forward by interviewees who are dominantly Sukuma as the study’s sample indicates. 
People whom one would expect to prefer their ethnic identity to prevail expressed a view that they 
248 
 
meritocratically voted for candidates who had the ability to deliver development to the community; 
hence they voted in function of rational concerns of wellbeing.  
Interestingly, the distant voices that saw the significance of the use of Sukuma identity and 
Kisukuma in garnering political support during elections could not convincingly establish patterns 
that suggest significance in the 2010 elections. This position is anchored on the fact that no trend 
was evidenced among the political parties that they co-opted notable Sukuma politicians to contest 
in the 2010 elections due to their significance in winning elections. Political parties in some 
instances endorsed non-Sukuma to vie for political seats in Mwanza and won against prominent 
Sukuma contenders as highlighted above. Also, some parties in the region like TLP are led by a 
non-Sukuma. This would not be expected to happen if Sukuma identity and language were key 
determinants of votes. As it turns out, one’s image as a regional leader is not necessary for winning 
the support of the dominantly Sukuma-populated Mwanza region. In brief, we conclude that 
although Mwanza belongs to the Sukuma ethnic group by origin and numerical dominance, the 
Sukuma identity is not a determining factor when it comes to winning elections. Both the 
quantitative data (the afrobarometer statistics and the actual elections) and the qualitative data (the 
interviews) indicate that voters were moved by the broader elements of origin, being and belonging 
and not ethnicity. In this regard, if a sukuma meets these qualifications he can be elected. In case 
there is none, the people of Mwanza go for any other who fits the bill, regardless of where he/she 
come from as proven in Nyamagana, Geita and Ilemela. 
5.5. Concluding Remarks: PsIM, Ethnicity and Voting  
This chapter has as indicated in its introduction presented results, analysed and discussed the data 
related to the objectives of the study as indicated in part 1.4 of this dissertation. The objectives as 
put forward in the referred section revolved around determining how and why the PsIM informed 
the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the 2010 GEs in Mwanza region.  
The discussion in this chapter has shown that the role of political tribalism as defined in section 
3.2.6 was rare in influencing voters’ choices in the 2010 elections in Mwanza. Field data indicate 
that the PsIM and efforts made to put them into practice in their generality have informed low 
salience of ethnicity in the 2010 elections in Mwanza. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to argue 
that political tribalism is unthinkable in Tanzania, despite its historical and current low salience. 
This is because distant ethnic salient voices still exist and the ethnic composition of electoral 
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constituencies in the rural areas can attract ethnic canvassing. The possibility is anchored on the 
fact that almost all rural constituencies are dominated by one major ethnic group as argued by 
Nyaluke (2013). In light of this composition, we can expect that in all rural communities the local 
candidates will address their voters in the local language in informal meetings and possibly too at 
the start and finish of public speeches in those villages. Importantly, the one major ethnic group 
constituency composition presents the potential of the dominant ethnic group forging MWCs 
required to effectively evoke ethnic salience in voting as suggested by Weber (2009). Furthermore, 
accusations of ethnic mobilisation of votes in the Sukumaland that resemble Cheyo’s attempt in 
the 1995 elections as indicated in section 4.5.3 as well as fears of Gasarasi (1997) and Erdmann 
(2002) still exist. These accusations based on elements of political tribalism mostly occur in the 
lower level civic elections (although not part of the 2010 elections), attesting to signs or flashes of 
ethnicity which if not addressed could gain salience in future. However, currently the legacy of the 
PsIM in the areas of PNU, EDNR and love of peace as well as varied initiatives informed by the 
socialist AD have proven to be strong enough to curtail ethnic sentiments from gaining salience in 
the determination of voters’ choices. This has been proven to be the case despite liberal economic 
and political transformations that are against the letter and spirit of the AD which meant to guide 
the realisation of the PsIM. This is mainly because the reforms have failed to reverse the legacy of 
PNU, EDNR and love of peace. 
The data and discussions presented in this chapter indicate that there is a very strong normative 
foundation of Tanzania’s national unity that militated against ethnic salience in mobilising and 
motivating voters’ choices in Tanzania. The frequency to which my interviewees made reference 
to Mwalimu and policies and philosophies he stood for and their implications for crippling 
ethnicity from gaining salience in informing voters’ choices was high. Interviewees irrespective of 
the political orientation, age, residence and educational and/or economic background concurred 
that the founding fathers and especially Mwalimu had “taught” the people that ethnic salience on 
determining voters’ choices was to be avoided, and the people had understood. These views 
suggest that Mwalimu was a meticulous teacher to Tanzanians when it comes to Ujamaa and its 
associated elements of national unity, equity, human dignity and the like which have proven to 
contribute in mitigating ethnicity from gaining salience on determining voters’ choices in 
elections. Mwalimu’s teachings against the use of ethnicity in anchoring votes were widely 
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amplified and presented by the mass media thus contributing towards the creation of a political 
culture that denounces ethnic salience in voting. 
The firm normative foundation of national unity as presented above was further reinforced by the 
elements of EDNR and peace as enshrined in the PsIM. Nationalisation, according to the 
interviewees, enhanced national pride and unity by mobilising resources necessary for EDNR 
across regional and ethnic demarcations. In this way, the door was shut for ethnic voting based on 
disproportionate distribution of public goods among ethnic groups. The lack of evidence 
suggesting favoured distribution of resources to inform ethnic competition of resources not only 
informed national pride and unity, but also minimised ethnic violence. No base for serious ethnic 
resource competition to inform ethnic conflict and subsequently ethnic voting was in place. The 
arguments made with regard to the role of the PsIM-PNU, EDNR and peace on determining 
voters’ choices indicate that the neo-patrimonial ethnic-based patronage have little purchase to 
explain the influences of ethnicity on voting. However, this does not mean there are no elements to 
point against this general view among my interviewees. For instance, a relevant exception to the 
role of nationalisation as argued in this paragraph could be as indicated by some interviewees who 
felt nationalisation and villagisation had nothing to do with lowering ethnicity. Their position is 
based on the fact that Tanzania’s current economic system does not support public ownership of 
the major means of production, and villagisation is not an official policy now. As such, the impacts 
of nationalisation and villagisation are supposed to end with the liberal reforms. This deviation 
from the majority view on EDNR and salience of ethnicity in voting is based on a narrow 
definition of nationalisation and the limited role of historical effects in explaining the same. While 
the opposing camp claims that nationalisation (in terms of confiscation of private property) and 
villagisation (in terms of compulsory putting together of possessions) are over and thus could not 
influence current phenomena, proponents reject this view on the basis of a broader definition of 
nationalisation and its implications as well as those of villagisation. The broader definition of 
nationalisation encompassing national unity elements and the continued EDNR viewed within the 
framework of the PsIM still exist, and are widely furthered. The spirit of nationalisation according 
to Lofchie and most of our interviewees is alive through non-ethnic resource distribution. 
Likewise, the integrative role of villagisation and the distribution of social amenities that came 
with it still exist, and thus bar the potential of ethnic competitions that could ensue had the 
distribution taken ethnic root. Such situation plays down the biased neo-patrimonial view of 
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African politics that suggest Africans prefer ethnic-based clientelistic distribution of resources 
which leads to ethnic competition for votes. 
As mentioned in the above paragraph that national pride and unity was reinforced by peace and 
EDNR- two of the three major PsIM. We saw how EDNR had contributed to Tanzania’s peace. 
The interviewees in Mwanza have proven to be proud of their nationality due to among other 
things, the comparative peace Tanzania enjoys compared to its neighbours who have tasted the 
adverse consequences of ethnic-based civil violence. This way, the need to avoid the negative 
impacts of violence that have been triggered by politicisation of ethnicity in Kenya, Rwanda, 
Burundi and Nigeria informed low salience of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices in Mwanza. 
Furthermore, while the violence influenced denunciation of ethnicity in elections it enhanced 
national unity; national unity that was made possible by among other things EDNR and peace 
informed continued peace by militating against the salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ 
choices. While the reinforcing role of peace in lowering salience of ethnicity on informing voters’ 
choices is associated with effects of war in other countries, few interviewees associated it with the 
docile nature of the Sukuma people.  
A much as the significance of the docile characteristic claimed to inform lower salience of 
ethnicity on determining electorates’ choices in Mwanza holds water to its believers, it raises a lot 
of doubts. First of all, the effects of war in the neighbouring country compared to the peaceful 
Tanzania provide practical experience and impetus for the peace lovers to shun away from 
peacelessness. Likewise, to avoid them, the causes of violent conflicts include ethnic polarisation 
as evidenced in other African states. In this regard, the rationale for enhancing peacefulness is not 
based on cowardice but informed by the need to maintain and enhance peace. In this way, the 
promise of peace enshrined in the PsIM serves as a frame through which Tanzanians use to reject 
the significance of ethnicity in mobilising voters’ support. This frame existed even before the 
outbreak of the politicised ethnic violence in African states, widely referred to by my interviewees 
as sources of lowering ethnic voting in Mwanza. Therefore, the violence in these states added 
practical experience that augured well in furthering the anti-ethnic salient political order that forms 
an integral part of the PsIM.  
By the discussion of the politics of origin, being and belonging above, the importance of origin in 
terms of being native and the use of Kisukuma in mobilising political support, have been proven to 
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be nominal in Mwanza. The weight given to origin is diffused by the broadly based lake zone 
catchment for viewing candidates as being from Mwanza expressed in Nyamagana and the vitality 
of belonging expressed by residing in Misungwi, owning land and knowing the problems of the 
people in the area of contest. More significantly, candidate’s origin was only deemed relevant 
when it is accompanied by trustworthiness and ability to deliver public goods to the community. 
The interviews proved that native candidates who reside in the area of contest or owned a house, 
knew the problems of the people in question, have been proved to be trustworthy and viewed to 
have the ability to deliver development promises stand an equal chance of winning elections in 
Mwanza as the “outsiders”, Sukuma and non-Sukuma with similar characteristics. Given this 
attention paid locally to the candidate’s knowledge of the community’s problems and to the 
capacity to solve them, I argue that the politics of origin, being and belonging were employed in 
the 2010 elections in Mwanza while those flashes of ethnicity functioned as a means of getting 
competent representatives to win resources necessary for bringing about development.  
Importantly, distant voices that saw the significance of the use of native Sukuma and Kisukuma in 
garnering political support during elections could not convincingly establish patterns that are 
strong enough to suggest the significance of language and Sukuma identity in the 2010 elections. 
This position stems from the fact that no tendency was substantiated among the political parties 
that they took the trouble to persuade and co-opt Sukuma politicians to vie for political office in 
the 2010 elections in Mwanza because of the vitality of the Sukuma identity and language in luring 
political support for winning elections in the region. As it has been argued in the section that 
covered the politics of origin, voting and ethnicity, political parties sponsored several non-Sukuma 
and non-Sukuma speakers to contend for parliamentary and councillor positions in the elections in 
the region. Some of them won against prominent Sukuma contenders as highlighted in section 
5.4.2. As if this is not enough, even some political parties in the region like TLP and APPT 
Maendeleo are led by non-Sukuma in positions that require voting, like that of Regional Chairman. 
Had Sukuma identity and language been the main determinants of votes in the 2010 elections this 
would not have been the case. Since there were non-Sukuma who stood in the 2010 elections and 
won, as well as regional leaders who are not native Sukuma, the Sukuma identity was not a 
determining factor in voters’ choices in the 2010 elections, despite Mwanza’s belonging to the 
Sukuma ethnic group by origin and numerical dominance. As indicated above, most of the 
interviewees disclosed that voters were motivated more by broader elements of origin, being and 
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belonging than ethnicity in the form of political tribalism. It is against this background that I argue 
that the Sukuma who contested for the political seats in the 2010 elections were not elected by 
virtue of being Sukuma. Their ability to deliver public goods, and thus realise the PsIM, was a 
major factor. The chances of a Sukuma and non-Sukuma are more or less equal as people of 
Mwanza elect people who are trustworthy and can deliver public goods regardless of where they 
come from and/or the languages they speak as evidenced in the 2010 elections in Nyamagana, 
Geita and Ilemela. 
To conclude, our data-analysis and discussion in this chapter does indicate that the PsIM and 
initiatives meant to realise them under the broad guidance of the AD have managed to shape a 
sustained political culture that shuns Tanzanians away from the salience of ethnicity in motivating 
electorates. The PsIM in their broad sense indicates that Tanzanians do have the history and the 
political concepts as well as experiences together forming a political culture and frame that 
grounds low ethnic salience, as opposed to the neo-patrimonial and hybrid theories that regard 
Africans as traditionalists who vote ethnically to serve ethnic-based client-patron relations.   
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CHAPTER VI 
ETHNICITY AND VOTING IN YEARS TO COME 
6.1. Introduction  
In the preceding chapter we established how the PsIM as explained in the introductory and 
methodological chapters had influenced the salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in 
the 2010 election. Equally, we established why the PsIM have influenced the role of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices the way they have. The current chapter presents and discusses data 
related to the future of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. The main objective is to give out a picture 
of how the PsIM are expected to influence the role of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices in the 
years to come. The chapter is informed by interviewees’ views on a question that wished to gather 
their perceptions on the future of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. It comprises also experiences of 
political canvassing in the country derived from secondary information sources. Several incidences 
from the 2015 elections form part of the discussions. These are the most recent elections that 
availed an opportunity for Tanzanians to decide on their country’s destiny. These elections are the 
fifth after re-introduction of political pluralism in 1992. Unlike the 1995, 2000 and 2005 and 2010 
elections, the 2015 election in comparative terms was closely contested particularly in the 
presidential race as table V below indicates.  
Table V: 2015 Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results in Tanzania 
 Presidential Elections Parliamentary Elections 
Party Number of Votes % *Number  of Seats % 
CCM 8,882,935 58.46 252 68.8 
CHADEMA 6,072,848 39.97 70 19.1 
ACT 98,763 0.65 1 0.27 
ADC 66,049 0.43 0 0 
CHAUMA 49,256 0.32 0 0 
TLP 8,198 0.05 0 0 
NRA 8,028 0.05 0 0 
UPDP 7,785 0.05 0 0 
CUF N/A N/A 42 11.4 
NCCR-Mageuzi N/A N/A 1 0.27 
Others N/A N/A 0 0 
Total 15,596,110 100 366 100 
 Source: NEC 2015  
*The results exclude the ex-officials and presidential appointees as well as 5 members from the Zanzibar House of 
Representative and kijitiupole constituency. 
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Several explanations can be offered for this turn of events. First, CHADEMA was gradually rising 
into a formidable opposition political party. Second, in 2014 a Constitutional Review Commission 
roamed the country soliciting for peoples’ opinions for inclusion in a new constitution. Demands 
for a new constitution had been a long time agenda of the opposition political parties and not 
CCM’s. Third, CHADEMA led a loose coalition of four political parties known as Umoja wa 
Katiba ya Wananchi (UKAWA) to boycott the Constituent Assembly, protesting against the 
removal of the three-tier-government clause proposed by the commission that solicited peoples’ 
views and reinstated the current two-government Union structure. Fourth UKAWA’s decision of 
joining forces to unseat the ruling party-CCM. Our interest in the elections is related to issues of 
ethnicity and voting in the years to come and not each and every bit of the elections. 
6.2. The Future of Ethnicity and Voting in Tanzania 
The views on the future of ethnicity and voting in Tanzania were derived from the question about 
whether our interviewees think Tanzania will ever be ethnically salient in political terms and why. 
The results indicated a trend consistent with the discussions in the preceding chapters. Around 
80% of my interviewees were optimistic that ethnicity will not gain salience in anchoring voters’ 
choices in Tanzania, compared to 20% who argued otherwise. In the main, interviewees who were 
of the view that ethnicity will not gain salience on determining voters’ choices banked their 
opinions on Tanzanian’s sense of national unity, the legacy of EDNR, and the centrality of 
peacefulness. To them, these values provide a solid frame against salience of political tribalism 
and the politics of origin in voting. As for those pessimistic of continued low salience of ethnicity, 
they base their arguments on the assumption that the strength of the above mentioned ethnic 
salience mitigating factor is diminishing over time. Their arguments are based on the demise of the 
socialist principles and principled leaders to address growing inequalities in the society. An 
interesting convergence among the two opposing camps in this connection is the fact that both 
seem to agree that there are flashes of ethnicity that should not be left to grow into fully fledged 
ethnic voting. In this regard, they urged the political establishment and political actors to suppress 
such outbursts of ethnicity in elections. Likewise, they highlighted divisive elements that provide 
larger chances of threats to national unity and peaceful co-existence in the Country. Below let us 
discuss the findings. 
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6.2.1. The Sustained Sense of National Unity  
Most of my interviewees (83%) were of the view that Tanzanians’ lasting sense of national unity 
will bar ethnicity from gaining salience in determining voters’ choices. They basically argued that 
nationalist feelings are, and will continue to be strong among Tanzanians because they have made 
the country politically stable and peaceful, thusly diffusing ethnic identities’ role in politics. The 
views of a retired civil servant when asked if he sees the possibility of ethnicity gaining salience in 
voting in Tanzania well summarises this position: 
"Ukabila hautakuwa muhimu katika kupiga kura kwa sababu misingi ya umoja wa kitaifa ni imara sana. Pia, watu 
hawataki kuonja uzoefu wa madhara ya vurugu za ubaguzi wa kikabila."
147
 
 
 “Ethnicity will not be important in voting because the foundations of national unity are very strong. Also, people 
do not want to experience violent effects of ethnic polarisation”. 
 
The views of the retired civil servant were seconded by a lady in Kishiri A when she said: 
"Sisi tumeunganishwa vizuri na watu wote wenye mapenzi mema na nchi yetu hawataki kutuona tumegawanyika 
kikabila au kidini. Kwa kutumia mambo ya ukabila na dini kuomba kura kutatutenganisha na kuharibu nchi yetu. 
Kuna wachache ambao wanataka kuona sisi tukiingia katika matatizo ya mgawanyiko kama nchi nyingine za 
Afrika tunazopakana nazo..... Lakini, hatutatoa fursa kwa hilo kutokea. Waasisi wa Taifa letu hawakutaka 
tugawanyike! Wao wametuunganisha na kutuonesha umuhimu wa umoja kwa maendeleo yetu."
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 “We are united and all well wishers of this country do not want to see us divided ethnic or religiouswise. Using 
ethnicity and religion in anchoring votes will disintegrate us and destroy our country. There are few who wish to 
see us get into divisive problems like other African countries bordering us.... However, we are not going to let that 
happen. Our founding fathers did not want us to be divided! They unified us and made us see the importance of 
unity for our wellbeing.”  
 
The views expressed above seem to be reflective of the argument made throughout the dissertation 
that Tanzania has managed to keep itself away from falling into ethnic polarisation. This has been 
the case despite being bordered by countries like Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and others that have 
proven to be ethnically polarised and tasted violent ethnic conflicts. The interviewees quoted 
suggest that sustained denunciation of the use of ethnic identities in political canvassing and voting 
as widely argued throughout section 5.2.1 can ensure continued low salience of ethnicity in 
politics. The views of my interviewees indicated clearly that a key tenet in Tanzania’s post-
independence government was, and still is, to fight ethno-cultural divides and any other divisive 
factors which would hinder unity among its citizens. The interviewees held the view that the 
measures used to unify Tanzanians from Independence like using Swahili as national language to 
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 Personal interview with a retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District held on 
5.11.2014 
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 Personal interview with a lady at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District held on 08.11.2014 
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unite 120 ethnic groups, intermarriages, legal restrictions to the use of ethnicity in public life well 
explained in section 5.3 all set a national cohesion that is so strong for ethnicity to gain salience in 
voting. 
These views are indeed in line with varied stances for national unity evidenced in the 2015 
elections. In the said elections, contestants and their parties never went for the ethnic ticket to lure 
votes. All of them promised to enhance national unity. The CCM candidate (now President) Dr. 
John Pombe Magufuli as it has been usually the case, led the league of promising national unity, 
peace and tranquility which he associated to his party. The opposition did promise the same. 
However, the accusations of CHADEMA being a ‘Chagga party’ or party of the Northern Zone 
were not put to rest. This time, the feelings were invigorated by the crossover of two ex-Prime 
Ministers –Edward Lowassa, who stood as its presidential candidate, and Fredrick Sumaye - his 
chief campaigner, who are both from the Northern Zone. From the election results, one can be 
convinced that there is some truth as for the first time CHADEMA won in all Chagga dominated 
constituencies and increased seats in the Northern Zone. In the same vein, CCM whose candidate 
was from the Lake zone won in all Sukuma dominated parliamentary seats and almost all 
Councilor seats in the Sukuma dominated constituencies. The results notwithstanding CHADEMA 
in some constituencies like Arusha Town fielded a non-Arusha and won against CCM’s native 
candidate. Importantly, CHADEMA through its presidential candidate accused CCM of playing an 
ethnic campaign for its native contender for the Arusha parliamentary seat. He urged the people of 
Arusha to vote for Godbless Lema basing on the elements of politics of being and belonging 
beyond the purely ethnic genealogical factors. He appealed to them that he has spent most of his 
life in Arusha, knows the problems of the constituency and can solve them. Lema won by a 
landslide majority. In this sense, political tribalism and its impact on voting were diluted by the 
politics of being and belonging. 
In my interviews with the KIIs an overriding theme that came out to support low salience of 
ethnicity in the future is CCM’s overall hold of the country’s polity. In the main, they were of the 
view that CCM’s sustained control of political offices has formed an inclusive elitist political 
tradition that enhances unity and assures politicians access to, and maintenance of power. Since 
politicians are likely to use ethnicity instrumentally to gain power, their inclusion in the political 
establishment without using it decreases their likelihood of appealing to it. In other words, the 
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insignificance of ethnicity in political mobilisation demotivates political elites from invoking it to 
lure votes. Correspondingly, they uphold nationalist (as in nation-oriented) pleas. Interestingly, 
while the political elites are anti-ethnic, there seem to be no rural or commercial elites or lobbists 
to counter their position. The views of Bana and McCourt (2006) that rural and commercial 
economic elites have not (yet) developed points in this direction. The basis of Bana and McCourt’s 
position is that while the number of marginalised rural people are poorly organised and without 
much political influence, an indigenous urban capitalist class to champion ethnic polarisation is yet 
to emerge. Some critical reflections need to be made in this regard though, which concern the 
Tanzanian situation. First of all, the political history of Tanzania and TANU we described earlier 
has always had a rural scope, with AD integrating the views of ‘peasant intellectuals’ (Feierman 
1990), which means that through the latter the poor rural communities indirectly did have political 
influence. Cultivating this link with the rural grass-roots has been part of CCM’s success. 
Secondly, however successful an urban capitalist class may become, it will still have to reckon 
with the nation-building efforts discouraging ethnic canvassing. Thirdly, such as class does exist in 
a limited, ethnic version in the form of the economically dominant Asian business community. 
While negatively refererd to as neo-liberal by some and even as ‘parasitical’ (Magabacholi)149 by 
the late Rev. Mtikila, they keep a low political profile, also when being well-known members of 
CCM and part of its leadership. Their inclusion in the anti-ethnic move by CCM ensures limited 
use of their economic might, which could otherwise have incited the politics of affection among 
ethnically divided communities. CCM’s nationwide support in elections that cuts across regional, 
religious, ethnic, social, and class divides has never been shaken in all elections and this indicates a 
positive trend in the enhancement of national unity (Malipula, 2014; Ole Therkildsen, 2009). This 
being said, it does not mean there are no divisive elements or internal conflicts within the party and 
Tanzanian society. Indeed, there are economic disparities, ideological divergences among its 
members and so forth that come into the open during election campaigns. It is worth recalling that 
the party is not held together by a common ideology after the 1990’s effectively distanced the 
party from its socialist past. CCM now supports a market-driven, privatised economy and liberal 
politics which breed fears of ethnic salience in politics. This has caused some tensions between 
conservatives and reformers, but has not split the party up to now. Even with the defection of 
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 Magabacholi is a term coined by the late Rev. Mtikila referring to thieves or looters of Tanzania’s wealth. The 
terminology has its origin in the Indian word Choli which literary means thief. The vocabulary was meant to connote 
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Edward Lowassa who commanded massive support in the party, the base of CCM remains 
unshakable. It still controls around 80% of the parliament and the local government authorities in 
the country. However, the party’s inclusiveness suggests that it is a coalition of competing factions 
that mainly share a nationalistic outlook and pragmatic interest in staying in power.  
The strength of the coalition and its role in the anti-ethnic salience crusade according to my KIIs is 
attributed to two major factors. The first is the considerable degree of continuity in the party’s fight 
against divisive politics. This is mainly associated with the composition of the party’s central 
organs. This view is predicated on the fact that CCM has never relegated its “elders” in the Central 
Committee (CC), which is the party’s most powerful organ for decades. Some former ex-
presidents and ex-prime ministers sat in the CC and old party stalwarts like the KII Mzee Mwiru 
were rewarded ministerial posts. It is only in the past three years that the former presidents 
requested to be relieved of such membership. However, they constitute a council of elders to 
advise the party that played a crucial role in the nomination of CCM’s presidential candidate. As 
such, the core national integrative ethics are assured in the party that has had the exclusive 
opportunity to hold power in Tanzania. This position, however, is crystallised by the party’s 
grooming and replacement process that is carefully managed to ensure consistency, particularly in 
the nation-building policy. As Mzee Mkali told me that CCM elites are brought up through the 
party’s parent organs or its affiliated organisations like the CCM Youths League, the CCM 
Women’s Organisation, and the CCM Parents Association. Therefore, most of the leaders have 
been groomed to detest the use of ethnicity in politics. Today, we are seeing intellectuals and 
technocrats holding political offices through appointments without contesting for legislative seats. 
However, it is important to highlight the fact that social links between members of the political, 
intellectual and bureaucratic elites have been built through their education in a few high quality 
public secondary schools, a single national university (until relatively recently), and army 
conscription of university graduates (Therkildsen & Tidemand, 2007). Therefore, they are not 
isolated. More significantly, the monolithic political dispensation as discussed in sections 4.4.1.1 
and 4.4.1.2 established an institutionalised party apparatus, which helped to provide the do and 
don’ts among the political and bureaucratic domains. This ensured a predictable set of political 
incentives and signals to public figures. Tanzania is a pluralist state de jure. However, literature 
still recognises CCM as a state party with the legal and extra-legal muscles to execute the core 
intents of a monolithic political dispensation. This is particularly through appointment and 
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dismissal of public officials (Makulilo, 2012). In this regard, the party can weed out ethnic-salient 
officials groomed from the party’s ranks and beyond.  
Apart from the role that the ruling party plays in making my interviewees optimistic of continued 
low salience of ethnicity in politics, the opposition parties also have a role to play. This is because 
they have not decided to use the ethnic ticket as Gasarasi (1997) and Omari (1997) expected. The 
parties never agreed to use such ticket in lower elections where as highlighted in the past chapter 
the possibility of forming MWCs was provided, nor in the presidential elections that hardly 
provide such opportunity. This, as argued above, stems from the firm discourse against the use of 
ethnicity and the adverse impacts of ethnic polarisation in other African states. The parties as 
indicated above have been preaching national unity overtly despite claims of ethnic and/or regional 
biases levelled against them. For instance, the ethnic and /or regional biases levelled against the 
opossition party CHADEMA as argued in section 5.2.1 are politically meant to label the party as 
divisive. As such, it aimed to be viewed as an organisation that intends to dent Tanzania’s national 
unity, peaceful inter-ethnic co-existence and the country’s broad peaceful and tranquil nature. 
While this is said, we saw in the 2010 elections and in the current one that CHADEMA had several 
candidates like in Arusha constituency, Nyamagana and Ilemela who were not native. In Arusha 
they won with such candidates and in the other two they lost by a minuscule margin. Such 
incidences point to the fact that their support is trans-ethnic. At most they relied on the politics of 
origin, being and belonging couched in the idea of having someone competent to deliver public 
goods. These trends point to the limited role of ethnicity in luring votes now and in the future. 
The majority view was not without opposition as 17% claimed that weaknesses in spearheading 
national unity will make ethnicity gain salience in politics. In the main, this group of interviewees 
was of the view that the current political leadership has failed to crackdown on parochial 
tendencies in the manner that the past regimes have. The views of a young man from Mapilingo 
Village suffice to unveil this ethnic salient line of thinking:  
" Ukabila utakuwa muhimu Tanzania kwa sababu baadhi ya viongozi si wazalendo kabisa! Wao kusafiri nje ya 
nchi kila siku kwa mema yao wenyewe. Hawana maslahi ya nchi katika moyo yao, jinsi Mwalimu na wenzake 
walivyokuwa. Hali hii ya Utaifa unaotiliwa shaka unaweza kutufanya tuuchague kuwa wakabila."
150
.  
 
“Ethnicity will be important in Tanzania because some leaders are not patriotic at all! They travel out of the 
country daily for their own good. They do not have the interest of this country at heart; the way Mwalimu and his 
colleagues had. This doubtful nationalism can make us choose to be tribalist”  
                                                 
150
 Personal interview with a young man  in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015 
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 The young man’s ethnic salient view was echoed by a female teacher who argued that: 
"Kuna mambo ya ukabila wa kisiasa ambayo yanaweza kukua iwapo yataachwa kuendelea. Kwa mfano , watu 
wengi wanagombea viti vya siasa katika maeneo yao ya kuzaliwa na kuzikwa. Katika bunge wabunge hao 
wanazungumza zaidi mambo yanayohusu majimbo yao ikilinganishwa na masuala ya kitaifa. Hii ina maanisha 
wapo bungenikutafuta rasilimali kwa makabila yaokwa hali ya uchoyo. Mwenendo huu utaongeza ukabila katika 
siasa."
151
  
 
 “There are elements of political tribalism that can grow if left to continue. For instance, many people contest for 
political seats in their places of domicile. In the parliament these MPs talk more of their constituencies compared to 
national issues. This means they greedily solicit resources for their co-ethnics. This trend will add tribalism in 
politics.” 
 
Another view pointing to the likelihood of ethnic salience in Tanzania’s future was provided by 
Kurya Street vendor. In his own words the vendor retorted:  
"Hisia za ukabila zipo hai katika masuala mbalimbali ya kiuchumi na kijamii! Hii itakuwa sana kwa sababu 
viongozi hawafanyi juhudi za kutosha kuondoa hisia hizi. Wameshindwa hata kutupa vitambulisho vya Uraia! 
Hawa viongozi ni wataifa hili kweli? Kwanini wameshindwa kutufanya tutambulike rasminje na ndani ya nchi 
kama Watanzania?”152  
 
“Feelings of ethnicity exist in various social and economic fronts! This will be salient because leaders are not doing 
enough to stop these feelings. Are these leaders really nationalistic? Why have they failed even to give us national 
identity cards so that we can be formally identified domestically and internationally?” 
  
The views above suggest that shortcomings in upholding nationalist ethos by some political leaders 
in Tanzania will fuel ethnic salience in politics: unlike the elites losing their nationalist zeal and 
moving their assets abroad, the ethnically oriented candidates in the future may at least have the 
interest of their own community at heart. The interviewees compare the efforts of the past regimes 
especially Mwalimu’s zeal in nation-building to argue their case. As we saw throughout the fourth 
and fifth chapters, it is a fact that Mwalimu’s contribution in furthering national cohesion and unity 
was above the average. However, it does not mean that his successors have completely abandoned 
his crusade as indicated in section 5.2.2. It is a fact that the timing of Mwalimu as highlighted in 
section 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 was critical in the nation-building architecture. This is mainly because he 
led the country to its independence and the independent state building was wanted national 
integration and peace. It is against this backdrop that the AD which provided Tanzania’s critical 
juncture in the political, social and economic domains came into existence. Interestingly, it is 
imperative to recall that Mwalimu is the primary author of the AD. None of his successors enjoyed 
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 Personal interview with a Kurya Street vendor  in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District held on 
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such historical moment, yet in their own way and circumstances as argued throughout chapter V,  
they did honour the ideals embedded in the PsIM and used Mwalimu as an icon to further the 
nationalist crusade. In section 5.2.2 it is indicated how a strong frame militating against ethnic 
salience exists and informs national identities over ethnic identities. Similar views are presented 
with the majority who feel that ethnicity will not gain salience in Tanzania in this chapter. The 
views presented indeed explain comparative shortcomings which partly can be associated with the 
leadership era and political and economic history. Importantly, the observations do not suggest that 
flashes of limited nationalist practices will automatically fuel ethnic salience. This is against the 
constituting elements of politicisation of ethnicity advanced by Wimmer (1997). According to 
Wimmer ethnicity has to be politicised by vivid divisive distribution of resources which ensue 
conflictual relationship between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of national resources. 
Overall, we can see the interviewees still hope that the fostering of a national identity predicated in 
the PsIM has dismantled the strength of ethnic groups as a form of political identity and political 
canvassing. In this regard, political elites are curtailed from manipulating ethnic interests and fears 
in mobilising electoral support. The limited ethnic salient identities unveiled suggest the likelihood 
of limited ethnic-based voting in response to social and political differences. As of now limited 
evidence point to this direction, the differences are not ethnically battled out. This is mainly 
because they lack the constitutive elements of politicisation of ethnicity. At most the differences 
are battled out on issues in a broad national response which furthers nation-hood as opposed to 
ethnic orientations.  
6.2.2. The Sense of EDNR 
As it was the case for the element of national unity, EDNR also was viewed to be significant for 
crippling ethnic salience for anchoring voters’ choices in Tanzania. This position was held by 79% 
of my interviewees. A view of an NGO worker presented below asserts this viewpoint: 
"... Bunge kupita bajeti ya Taifa linasambaza rasilimali kwa kila mkoa kwa usawa. Hakuna kanda au kabila 
linalokuwa na upendeleo maalum usiokuwa na msingi. Mgawanyo huu wa haki utaongeza utaifa na kufanya 
ukabila kuwa na nafasi ndogo kuathiri upigaji wa kura."
153
 
 
 “… the parliament through the national budget distributes resources to every region equitably. No region or tribe 
is unrationally special. Such fair distribution enhances nationhood and will make ethnicity have less significance in 
anchoring voting” 
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 Personal interview with an NGO worker in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District held on 
16.01.2015 
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This view above was seconded by an extension officer in Misungwi through a practical example of 
the equitable distribution of gas resources found in Mtwara.  
"Ukabila hauwezi kupata nafasi kubwa katika siasa kwa sababu rasilimali zinagaiwa kwa usawa. Kwa mfano, gesi 
ya Mtwara imeelekezwa kwenye gridi ya taifa ili Watanzania wote wanufaike na umeme. Wakati wananchi wa 
Mtwara walipoonesha tabia ya kibaguzi ya kudai kwamba ni lazima wanufaike zaidi ya Watanzania wengine, 
Serikali ilikuwa makini kukandamiza madai hayo ya kibaguzi. Hii inaelezea jinsi gani viongozi wetu 
wanavyokuwa wakali wakati sehemu ya nchi inapotakakunufaika zaidi na rasilimali za kitaifa. "
154
  
 
“Tribalism cannot gain salience in politics because resources are always equitably distributed. For instance, the gas 
of Mtwara is directed to the national grid for all Tanzanians to enjoy electricity. When the people of Mtwara 
expressed parochial tendencies demanding that they must benefit more than others, the government was keen to 
suppress such discriminatory demands. This tells how serious our leaders are when a section of the country wants 
to disproportionately enjoy national resources”155 
 
A retired civil servant further echoes the views: 
“Tanzania itaendelea kuwa na umoja kwa sababu rasilimali za nchi zinaliwa kwa pamoja na watu wote. Hakuna 
ubaguzi wa kikabila katika mgawanyo wa rasilimali za nchi. Sasa tumebinafsisha uchumi wa taifa na kukaribisha 
wawekezaji lakini mirabaha tunayopokea kutoka katika madini na kodi nyingine kutoka kwa wawekezaji 
husambazwa kwa usawa. Kwa utekelezaji huu hakuna kabila linaloweza kujisikia limebaguliwa na hivyo migogoro 
ya kikabila na nafasi ya ukabilakatika siasa haiwezi kukua. "
156
 
 
“Tanzania will continue to be united because national resources are shared by all people. There is no ethnic 
discrimination in the distribution of national goods. Now we have privatised national economic ventures and 
invited investors but the loyalty received from minerals and other taxes from investors are equitably distributed. 
With such practices no tribe can feel discriminated and therefore ethnic conflicts and salience in politics cannot 
grow”157 
 
The views presented above indicate that the component of EDNR enshrined in the PsIM is 
expected to inform low salience of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in the years to come. 
The degree of insistence of the role of EDNR in enhancing national unity over divisive ethnic 
polarisation explains the optimism expressed by the majority of my interviewees. According to this 
group of interviewees, distribution of resources across regional and ethnic demarcations enhanced 
national pride and unity which militates against ethnic salience in voting. This is because national 
unity tends to curtail ethnic polarisation that breeds ethnic voting once resources are 
disproportionately distributed among ethnic groups. Interestingly, the interviewees indicated that 
the elements of EDNR raised are cognisant of the liberal reforms that took place in the country. It 
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is against this backdrop that the views discussed EDNR on the base of resources mobilised through 
the private and public sectors. An important element raised related to the EDNR, is the 
government’s response to parochial calls of favouritism put forward by people located where 
resources are found. The resolute position against parochial distribution of resources depicted in 
the Mtwara case suggests that ethnic-based resources distribution has no chance. As such, ethnic 
polarisation is diffused and in turn ethnic voting shall not be expected to gain salience. As argued 
above in section 5.2.2 the optimistic view of low salience of ethnicity in politics related to EDNR 
is banked on the broader definition of nationalisation as put forward by Lofchie (2013). This 
definition goes beyond the narrow view of nationalisation that confines it to confiscation of private 
property for EDNR. Such conceptualisation provides a broader view of nationalisation 
encompassing confiscation and other public efforts set to empower national capacity to enjoy the 
available resources in the country in all fronts. In this regard, EDNR complements the elements of 
national unity as discussed in section 5.2.1. Therefore, EDNR and PNU collectively militate 
against ethnic salience in politics. 
The optimistic views presented above suggest a paradox as in conflict theory: nations with 
ethnically diverse populations are deemed to be more susceptible to higher levels of ethnic-based 
inequality and conflicts. Such inequalities inform ethnic voting in African countries like Kenya, 
Burundi and Rwanda and Nigeria as indicated in the introduction section in section 1.1.  My 
interviewees’ position that such situation is unheard of despite the country’s ethnic diversity 
indicates that state policy has not been influenced by any ethnic group(s) to overtly invoke divisive 
distribution of national resources. It could be that in this case, grievances held by the Mtwara 
people, though not strictly ethnic, could spur conflict, but that they are drawn outside of ethnic 
lines as Tanzania has no history of ethnic groups in another part of the country enjoying favours 
for resources found in their region. As such, no ethnic group is significantly subjugated by the state 
or another ethnic group to effect ethnic salient feelings and political practices. 
The majority view that expressed optimism that ethnicity will not gain salience in Tanzania’s 
future was not unchallenged. There was a minority (19%) who were of an opposite view. The 
following view put forward by a farmer in rural Nange substantiates this: 
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 "Ukabila utakuwa Tanzania kwa sababu ya tofauti za kiuchumi kati ya mikoa na makabila. Serikali haiwezi kufuta 
ukweli huu, hivyo basi uwezekano wa migogoro kutokea ni mkubwa. Tofauti hizi zitasababisha ushindani wa 
kisiasa miongoni mwa watu wa makabila tajiri na makabila madogo katika uchaguzi."
158
  
 
“Ethnicity will gain salience in Tanzania because of the economic disparity among regions and tribes. The 
government cannot erase this fact and therefore conflicts are likely to abound. These differences will inform 
political competition among members of rich and small tribes in elections” 
 
This view was supported by a young man in Mapilinga who had this to say: 
“Ukabila utakuwa Mwanza kwa sababu ni maskini ingawa ina madini. Tumechoshwa na hali hii! Madini 
yanachukuliwa na sisi tunaachiwa mashimo matupu. Tutasimama kama Sukuma kudai maendeleo yetu. Cheyo 
alijaribu kutuunganisha kudai maendeleo yetulakini ameshindwa uchaguzi Bariadi."
159
  
 
“Ethnicity will take toll in Mwanza because it is poor although it has minerals. We are tired of this situation! 
Minerals are taken and we are left with empty holes. We will stand up as the Sukuma to demand for development. 
Cheyo
160
 tried to marshal us to this effect, but has lost elections in Bariadi”. 
 
The views presented above suggest that equitable distribution of resources found in regions may be 
a source of ethnic salience in politics. In the main, they indicate that resources found in the regions 
of Tanzania shall be enjoyed more by the people living in those regions instead of being equitably 
shared pan-territorially. Indeed, John Memose Cheyo as indicated in section 4.5.3 attempted to 
incite this kind of ethnicity to no avail. Today Cheyo is not an MP anymore. While this view 
sounds favourable to those regions endowed with resources, the opinions expressed in section 
5.2.2 indicate that no region is self-sufficient. In this regard, regions need to be and are 
complementing each other through the national government. In this context, furthering parochial 
enjoyment of resources has social and economic costs. It fuels disproportionate development 
which diminishes national cohesion and breeds inter-ethnic competition. Interestingly, although 
the interviewees attempted to sound as if Mwanza is an all Sukuma region, but it is not, as we saw 
in the description of the study area and the discussion of the PNU in section 5.2.1. In this regard, 
although using the resources in Mwanza will mean that the Sukuma will gain more resources, but 
they will also be consumed by non-Sukuma living there. More interesting, although now the 
resources are nationally distributed, it is not distributed along ethnic lines that can suggest inter-
ethnic tension. That is to say, no ethnic group was pointed out to have benefitted more from 
Mwanza resources for conflicts to ensue. Most of the accusations of failing to develop Mwanza 
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 Personal interview with an young man  in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District held on 19.01.2015 
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 John Memose Cheyo is a Sukuma politician who is accused of urging his fellow Sukuma ethnicmates to become 
politically active by supporting his presidential bid in 1995 as indicated in the opening quote of the fifth chapter.  
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through gold are directed to the state and investors. In the main, they claim that the big mining 
companies have not given much in the form of loyalty and corporate social responsibility to 
develop Mwanza. From such line of thinking, the battle is essentially on the economic reforms 
rather than economic based inter-ethnic resource distribution. 
 
From the discussions above it can be deduced that EDNR is viewed to be central in mitigating 
ethnic salience in politics in the future. EDNR’s contribution as argued widely in section 5.2.2 is 
complementing the existing deep feelings of national unity and its mitigating effects on the use of 
ethnicity in soliciting votes. The ethnic-salient feelings expressed by few interviewees seem to be 
less realistic as they lack the constituting elements of ethnic competition. This is due to the fact 
that the developmental disparity claimed to fuel ethnic salience does not indicate covert or overt 
ethnic competition. Instead, the dissatisfaction of few Tanzanians who wish to resort to ethnic 
tendencies in retaliation of limited benefits of privatisation. Importantly, sound feelings of national 
unity and resource complementarity defuse ethnic polarisation.  Let us see how elements of peace 
are expected to influence the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the future.  
6.2.3. The Longing for Peace 
The love of peace and the adverse impacts of ethnic-based conflicts attracted 81% of my 
interviewees to believe that ethnic salience in Tanzania will not gain significance in voting shortly.  
This position seems to augur well with the discussions made in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.3. The 
position is attributable to the fact that Tanzania is known as a heaven of peace in the civil-war 
prone continent of Africa. This line of thought is supported by the following opinion: 
“Tanzania ni pepo ya Afrika unapozungumzia amani. Hatujawahi kuona migogoro na vurugu za kikabila kama 
nchi nyingine ambazokila kucha tunaiona katika vyombo vya habari. Sisi hatuna sababu ya kuwa na ukabila katika 
kupiga kura na kujitumbukiza katika matatizo ambayo Kenya, Burundi au Rwanda waliokuwa nayo kutokana hizo 
siasa za kibaguzi. Hakuna Mtanzania anayetaka kuonja madhara ya vita vya Kikabila."
161
  
 
“Tanzania is the paradise of Africa when you talk about peace. We have never seen violent ethnic conflicts like 
other countries that are always broadcasted in the media. We have no reason to be ethnic salient in voting and 
expose ourselves to the problems that Kenya, Burundi or Rwanda had due such divisive politics. No Tanzanian 
wants to taste the impacts of ethnic war.”  
 
The views of the Extension Officer are predicated on the fact that Tanzania, as opposed to its 
neighbours Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and other African countries has neither experienced ethnic- 
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based civil wars. Neither has it experienced large scale violent religious conflicts nor ethnic-based 
income disparity conflicts or coups since independence (Hirschler, 2004). This is an interesting 
puzzle as according to John (2011) what happens at one end of the world has corresponding impact 
in the other parts of the world. From John’s line of thinking, ethnic-based violent conflicts like 
those that happened in Burundi, Rwanda and Kenya were expected to spill over into Tanzania. 
Instead, they stopped right there, and this despite the porous borders demarcating our countries 
which provide the potential of perpetrators of violence to penetrate their interests into Tanzania. 
The penetration into Tanzania could have been through its loose boundaries, also in other parts 
than the West, especially from the Indian Ocean, which are poorly patrolled thus offering room for 
penetration of weapons. Such weapons have entered the country. Coupled with the poverty of most 
Africans, they occasion indigenous involvement in terrorist acts like the bombing of the United 
States embassies in Tanzania by Al-Qaeda in 1998 prove (Rosand et al. 2008).  
In the views of John, human behaviour including violence does not occur in the vacuum. 
According to him, poverty is a crucial factor in influencing violence because it threatens people’s 
basic human needs and creates a sense of relative deprivation. As such, the poor people are prone 
to involvement in violent acts to reverse deprivation. In the context of ethnicity, the poor ethnic 
groups are expected to be likely to engage in violent acts against the richer to reverse poverty. In 
essence, this can manifest and later inform political identities and agendas worth of anchoring 
voting along the conflicting ethnic lines. This has not been the case as the degree of national 
cohesion as well as ethnic indiscrimination and trust are high despite different levels of wealth 
among ethnic groups as indicated in section 5.2.1. This is indeed attributable to deliberate 
initiatives against the significance of ethnicity in anchoring votes and Tanzanians love of peace 
among themselves and their neighbours.  
It is perhaps worth noting that Tanzania has not only been comparatively peaceful but also has 
facilitated peace in fellow African countries. Tanzania does so by stimulating mediation, 
negotiation and reconciliation among warring or conflicting parties. For example, through 
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Tanzania mediated the Burundi conflict (Mpangala, 2000). President 
Kikwete and President Benjamin Mkapa also played a role in addressing the ethnic-based electoral 
violence that claimed Kenyans lives in 2007 (Odallo, 2010).  Just recently, Tanzania as the chair of 
the East African Cooperation, has championed peace talks in Burundi. In such capacity, it has 
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appointed President Yoweri Museveni to negotiate the violent political conflict in Burundi related 
to President’ Nkurunzinza’s accused illegal third term in office. In this regard, Tanzania’s peace 
was used to make peace in war-torn areas. This seems to be internationalisation of the domestic 
philosophy embedded in the PsIM which among other things promised peacefulness and national 
integration. Although Tanzania could not directly cripple the factors that attract ethnic conflicts in 
those countries, it had and still is, addressing them within its borders. These include enhancing 
national unity and social cohesion, avoiding ethnic-based disproportionate distribution of resources 
and sustainable preaching of the importance of peace for development as widely argued throughout 
chapter V.  
My interviewees argued that the intensity of the discourse against peace threatening aspects has 
never been reduced in Tanzania. This had been the case even when liberal political and economic 
reforms came into existence. We still see the media preaching peace and national unity amid 
competitive political and economic practices. Political parties in elections indeed denounced peace 
threatening acts like politicising ethnicity and urged state organs to refrain from excessive force. 
The love of peace and peaceful co-existence among ethnicities still hold considerable currency in 
Tanzania (TACCEO, 2010). However, this does not mean there are no incidents of peace 
threatening or violent incidents in elections or beyond. For instance, incidents were reported that 
the state apparatuses have used excessive force particularly in the opposition campaigns in 
Mwanza and other urban centres. The following quote attests to the application of force in the 
management of the elections: 
"Hakuna amani wakati wa uchaguzi kama polisi wanawatupia mabomu ya machozi wapinzani wanaoanika uovu 
wa serikali katika kampeni."
162
  
 
“There is no peace during elections if the police throw tear gas at the opposition unveiling the ills of the state in 
campaigns.”    
  
As argued above those incidents of excessive uses of force were not ethnically selective. This is 
mainly because members and supporters of the opposition are not ethnically based. So are citizens 
and foreign observers, who attend such campaign meetings. Therefore, as much as flashes of 
violence take place, they do not in any way entail divisive ethnic conflict which can inform ethnic 
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voting. The same can be deduced from the views of the 19% of my interviewees who felt that 
peace may not limit ethnic salience in voting in the near future. 
The position of the minority of my interviewees on this matter was predicated on the occurrence of 
violent conflicts which challenge the peaceful atmosphere enjoyed by Tanzania since 
independence. To them, such violence can be politicised and hence cause ethnic voting. At its core, 
the argument rests on the idea that human identities can create ethnic conflicts and ethnic voting 
once politicised and used for acquiring state power (Wimmer, 1997). There are many violent 
conflicts in the country that made the headlines in the newspapers and were actually sung about in 
political hip hop known as Bongo Flava by artists such as Professa Jay. One example is the fight 
involving peasants and farmers of Mabwegere village, Kilosa District, Morogoro Region in the 
2000s that led to the deaths of around 23 people and more than 832 villagers took refuge in 
neighbouring villages (LEAT, 2008). Resource-based violent conflicts among local communities 
of North Mara and goldmine investors leading to deaths abounded in the 2000s (John, 2010).  
Also, religious based conflicts like the one that took place on 12th February, 1998 Moslems of the 
Mwembechai Mosque in Dar es Salaam orchestrated a violent demonstration, which vandalised 
properties like cars and crates of beer, and beating up people. Police officers’ forceful intervention 
to stop the riot claimed the life of 2 people and severely injured 20 others (John, 2011). Although 
these conflicts are not predominantly ethnic, if politicised they could turn out to be, and divide 
Tanzania.  
Of these threats, I am tempted to deal with the religious and racial and citizen identities and 
divides. Specifically, to see how they are linked to the neo-patrimonial and ethnic structure theses. 
I am dropping the resources-based component because it has been discussed earlier in subheading 
6.2.2. The views of the minority of my interviewees are basically anchored on the assumption that 
the form of identity, which in recent years appears to threaten social cohesion in Tanzania is 
religion (Ramadhani, 2015a, 2015b; Mallya, 2006; Chachage, 2006; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). 
There are several socio-economic problems that have been given religious expression in Tanzania. 
The expressions in question mainly revolve around improving Muslims' access to formal secular 
education and lucrative political and professional positions. These positions so far are 
meritocratically dominated by Christians due to their comparative academic superiority resulting 
from Christian missionaries’ investment in education in the country since colonialism. Zanzibar’s 
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failed bid to join the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and arrests of Muslim preachers 
are all cited to indicate religious-related tensions. We can add the most recent upsurge in religious 
tension occurring between 2013-2015 including assassinations of people, assault, attacks on 
religious leaders, destruction of property and Christian-Muslim disputes over who has the right to 
slaughter animals such as cows in Geita (Ramadhani, 2015a).  
Likewise, Muslims blame the government for refusing to incorporate the “Kadhi Courts” (Muslim 
courts) into the government machinery. Generally, the Muslims want the government to have 
affirmative actions to improve their academic standard. At one time in what can be viewed as 
helping them, the state sold to the Muslim Development Foundation a college previously owned by 
the country’s Electrical Company at a very low price (10 million163 Tanzania Shillings). This act 
and the preferential treatments requested by the Muslims are not well taken by the Christian 
community (Ramadhani, 2015b; Heilman and Kaiser, 2002). In the main, they argue that the cry 
must be addressed by the Muslims investing in education and that having a Kadhi Court in a 
secular state would be discriminating against other religions (Seymour, 2015). The two accusations 
point to a base for misunderstanding between Christian and Muslims and sometimes public dissent 
as well as violent acts.
164
 But this has never proven to crystallise into a politically salient trajectory 
in Tanzania (Heilman and Kaiser, 2002).  This seems to be a blessing because the neo-patrimonial 
client-patron relation thesis and the ethnic structure logic of MWC would all predict religious 
salience. This argument rests on the fact that the religious leadership have resources and statuses 
that provide room for practising patronage and the division between Muslims and Christians in the 
country is almost at par (Heilman & Kaiser, (2002: 703). Therefore, religious-based MWC can be 
easily forged. Likewise, the resource based religious client-patron relations could work. However, 
the national integration policies carried out in Tanzania mainly decreased such possibility legally 
and extra-legally. Actually, in Tanzania the discourse against ethnicity is more often than not 
accompanied by denunciation of religiosity-Ukabila (Tribalism) and Udini (Religiosity). These 
negatively connoted words are simultaneously used when one preaches national unity. Moreover, 
they are still widely preached in various media during and after electoral processes. In the 2015 
elections Tanzanians views against religious canvassing were put to test. This is when 
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 There were incidences of vandalising pork burthery in Kimara, Dar es Salaam,the Mwembechai riots explained 
earlier and varied incidences of putting churches on fore in Arusha and Zanzibar that are associated to the religious 
demands highlighted above. 
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CHADEMA’s candidate Edward Lowassa on 6th September 2015, while attending Sunday prayers 
in Tabora, was quoted by several media outlets canvassing the Lutheran votes, claiming that no 
Lutheran has ever been elected as President of Tanzania since independence. Tanzanians from 
different quarters criticised him. CCM, Imam Bukhary Islamic Institute and the National Electoral 
Commission issued statements to criticise Lowassa. NEC pointed out that what Lowassa did was 
unacceptable, calling upon other political parties to adhere to the 2015 Code of Ethics for 
Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillorship candidates, which prohibits the conduct of 
campaigns in places of worship. The ruling party CCM took advantage of Lowassa’s incident by 
publicising a clip found on YouTube showing him pleading for Lutherans’ support to brand him as 
politically religious and a divider of Tanzanians. 
Lowassa’s party was also accused of religious canvassing. On several occasions, CHADEMA 
invited religious leaders in its campaigns whereby they performed ceremonial deeds. The 
participation of Bishop Josephat Gwajima and the Sheikh Rico in CHADEMA’s campaign launch 
in Jangwani grounds on 29
th
 August 2015 provides a notable base of these accusations. The two 
clergymen in the occasion offered venomous prayers, which went against the customary assuaging 
religious tones. Sheikh Rico for instance prayed: “Tunamuomba Mwenyezi Mungu, msimamizi wa 
haki, kwamba mtu yeyote atakayeiba kura zetu au kufanya ulaghai wowote apate kansa ya damu, 
mirija ya mkojo izibe” [We pray to God, the dispenser of justice, that anybody who will steal our 
votes or indulge in any cheating, be inflicted with blood cancer and urethral stricture]. In the same 
vein, Bishop Gwajima implored: “Majira hayawafuati watu, watu hufuata majira; muda huu ni 
muda wa mabadiliko. Tunakuomba Bwana utufanyie Lowassa kuwa ndio Josho letu, uwaangamize 
wanaopinga haki kama ulivyowaangamiza waliopinga watu wake”165 [Times do not follow people, 
people follow times; this is a time for change. We pray to you our Lord that Lowassa be our 
cleanser. Destroy the opponents of justice the same way you destroyed his opponents].    
Providing room for religious leaders to participate in election campaigns might be construed 
spiritually accurate, but it was alienating. Indeed, CHADEMA might have wished to be projected 
to be religious and perhaps virtuous. Also having the services of a Christian and a Muslim leader 
in the campaigns meant to portray an image of having the support of the major religions groups in 
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Tanzania. However, many Tanzanians would hardly argue that the two clerics represented the 
mainstream religious sects in Tanzania. This is because Gwajima is not from the major Christian 
denominations- the Roman Catholic and Lutheran to mention few, and the Muslims in Tanzania 
are organised under the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (BAKWATA) and yet have several 
sects that do not operate under BAKWATA. In this regard, the clerics were not having any formal 
religious backing of the major religions structures and institutions. That being said, yet on many 
occasions CHADEMA meetings carried substantial religious traces, its leaders trenchantly 
reminding the audience that “Tulianza na Mungu na tutamaliza na Mungu” [We started with God 
and we shall finish with God] (Ramadhani, 2015a). Political parties seeking refuge in religion 
stimulate voter empathy and cultivate in-group solidarity. However, this is done at the risk of 
alienating a larger population that might wish to distance itself from the vagaries of political 
division.    
While the 2015 elections seem to revolve around CHADEMA’s incidences of religiosity, the 
religious leaders and the state politicians in Tanzania in the 2000s have developed a kind of 
complex interdependence (Mallya, 2006). The interdependence is two-fold. On one hand, religious 
leaders offer an authoritative voice against the degrading quality of life of the marginalised poor in 
Tanzania. In the main, they condemn the deterioration of social services resulting from the failure 
of the political leadership to control vices such as graft, corruption, embezzlement of public fund 
and accountability. Since the political system has proven to be unable to address these critical 
issues, and civil society organisations and political parties have not played their role effectively in 
holding it accountable, religious leaders filled the vacuum. They come out in the open to express 
the discontent that was pervasive amongst the general public (Mallya, 2006). As such, religious 
leaders have become a mouth-piece of the weak about sensitive current political issues, including 
grand corruption, nepotism and other social vices.  
On the other hand, there are elements of uncritical attitude of religious leaders towards the 
government. Such character stems from the clerics’ desire for the respectability bestowed by 
government recognition, and for the rewards a well-disposed government can dispense (Gifford, 
1994). In Tanzania, religious leaders give a strategic platform to politicians to press forward their 
political aspirations and in turn, the politicians guarantee the religious leaders a smooth 
environment for discharging their Godly activities. According to Ramadhani (2015a) when some 
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religious leaders are criticised of embracing politicians implicated in corruption scandals, their 
defence has been that they are out to save the wrongdoers and not the upright flocks. In such 
context, some politicians use religious platforms instrumentally to buttress their public image.    
A typical manoeuvre has been for politicians to fish around for invitations as guests of honour at 
fundraising events organised by religious institutions, mostly churches and mosques. At these 
fundraisings they contribute several millions of shillings, with staged media broadcast. As such, 
they project images of Godfearing and obedient servants, and inferably, politically clean. 
Interestingly, the civil society and the media hardly question the sources and cleanliness of the 
massive funds contributed in the name of religion. It pays very high dividends when a politician is 
bequeathed “the choice of God” accolade, as one bishop so bequeathed ex-President Jakaya 
Kikwete and many more who are doing the same to the sitting President John Magufuli 
(Ramadhani, 2015a). Again this might be viewed as a noble gesture, however when public figures 
promote their images using supposedly private space, secular dictates preserving religion as a 
private affair are consciously aborted. More importantly, the private sphere, the lifeblood of the 
civil society, is severely crippled.   
It is worth noting that prior to the 2015 elections, Tanzanians saw live on TV several would-be 
presidential aspirants then flocking to Nigeria to see the well-regarded Reverend, T.B. Joshua
166
. 
The aspirants for CCM’s flagbearership to run for the presidency, who had been to Nigeria167 
include but are not limited to, the current President John Pombe Magufuli, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries Hon. Mwigulu Nchemba and Hon. Lowassa who defected 
later, to seek spiritual acumen to find their way to the State House. Perhaps in what can be 
regarded as being intrigued by the “spiritual awakening” of Tanzanian political figures, Reverend 
T.B. Joshua paid a brief political visit to Tanzania after the elections
168
. He was received at the 
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airport by the president-elect John Magufuli and, later on, held talks with President Kikwete at 
Tanzania’s State House and the CHADEMA/UKAWA presidential candidate Hon. Edward 
Lowassa and the top UKAWA clique. He never performed his usual spiritual deeds although many 
Tanzanians wished and asked for such services. The contrasts were visibly evident: a visit by a 
religious leader on a purely political mission without any stint of spirituality. 
The role of religion in politics presented above, particularly the interdependence between religious 
and political leaders, is watered down by research data on the use of places of worship for election 
campaigning. In a study conducted by CEMOT
169
 the following results presented in Table VI 
below were garnered:  
Table VI: Use of Places of Worship for Election Campaigning 
Response Frequency Percentage 
Yes, witnessed 16 0.4 
Yes, heard of 74 2.0 
No 3689 97.6 
Total 3781 100 
Source: CEMOT dataset, 2015   
 
The Table indicates that incidents of using of places of worship for election campaigning were 
almost absent as 98% of the respondents said such acts never happened. A meagre 2% of CEMOT 
respondents indicated that they either heard or witnessed election campaigns in places of worship. 
The data does offer some consolation. However, the mention of few incidents of campaigning in 
places of worship by the respondents and the Lowassa’s Tabora incident dented the 2015 elections 
and sparked widespread criticism as indicated above. That being said, and as much as religion is 
capable of forging strong identities for political visibility and informing voting, the national 
integrative elements and peaceful co-existence still act against it. This is clearly illustrated by the 
criticism against political canvassing in the church. More practically, the discourse against divisive 
politics widely argued in this dissertation and the social integrative facts among Tanzanians of the 
major religious groups militate against religious salience in politics. It is worth noting that the 
degree of inter-marriages in Tanzania is so high that members of the two religions groups are even 
                                                 
169
 CEMOT is an acronym for Coalition on Election Monitoring and Observation in Tanzania that included observars 
from varied CSOs in Tanzania 
275 
 
bonded by blood. Likewise, the effects of violence as discussed in section 5.2.3 discourage 
Tanzanians from evoking religious salience in politics. 
 
Another divisive incident in Tanzania politics is racial and citizenship-based. This divide was laid 
bare by activities of the opposition parties led by Rev. Mtikila. Mtikila mobilised Tanzanian’s 
support by denouncing Asian-Tanzanians - magabacholi and demanding preferential legislation for 
wazawa (Aminzade, 2003). In his racial nationalistic plea for political support Mtikila targeted 
magabacholi as disloyal outsiders who are exploiting the nation for their own benefit at the 
expense of walala hoi
170
 (Campbell, 1999). Mtikila’s claims questioned an essential element of 
liberal democracy, the protection of minority rights. In response, CCM denounced advocates of 
indigenisation supporting Mtikila’s perspective as racist and shifted the focus of the indigenisation 
debate away from racial issues and magabacholi’s control of the economy toward citizenship and 
issues of free trade, foreign investment, and foreign economic domination (Aminzade, 2003). In 
this spirit, CCM’s government neutralised Mtikila’s claims by implementing indigenisation 
measures targeting non-citizens and featuring anti-liberal economic policies, including tariff 
barriers, local content laws, and restrictions on property ownership (ibid). Two decisions were 
invoked to neutralise Mtikila’s plea. These were the appointment of Iddi Simba, an advocate of 
indigenisation (though not as radical as Mtikila), to the Ministry of Trade, and enactment of an 
economic empowerment Act to support Tanzanians irrespective of their racial origin (Larson and 
Aminzade, 2008). However, wazawa due to their number and economic backwardness benefitted 
most from the micro-level empowerment measures. The indigenisation measures were 
implemented amid the danger of losing international support from foreign donors and international 
financial institutions that advocate liberalism (Aminzade, 2003).  
Apart from the measures that neutralised Mtikila’s indigenisation plea, the over-generalised nature 
of his claim that labelled all Tanzanians of Asian origin as magabacholi rose eyebrows. This is 
mainly because it included even those who are not in the business world. More important, it 
camouflaged wazawa known to be involved in the looting of public property either through their 
positions in public or private sectors. This critique partly explains the public outcry against 
mafisadi, a terminology meant to include all looters of public goods regardless of their colour or 
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origin. Such development waters down the racial and citizenship role in politics in general and in 
voting in particular, because the emphasis is put on graft practices instead of the colour of one’s 
skin. That is to say, one is not voted into power because of his/her colour but his/her ethical 
standing. More important, the racial divide has limited effect on Tanzania’s polity because the 
population of the Tanzanians of Asian origin is scattered and is only around 3% in the country, 
although visibly dominant in the large cities’ business neighbourhoods. They could hardly weigh 
in numerically in the formation of MWCs or ethnic-based patronage to compete against the black 
Tanzanians. However, their economic prowess could be useful in buying out support or sponsoring 
candidates in an ethnic manner. As much as this could be possible, no evidence was put to that 
effect. In essence, they are associated with the ruling party because of what Kilimwiko (2012) calls 
merchant politics. That is, the rich Tanzanians of Asian origin forge close political and economic 
relations with politicians so as to enjoy patronage once the politicians get to the corridors of power. 
In the same vein, politicians further the relationship so that they can get resources for financing 
their campaigns.Since the main polity is against ethnic salience in voting as argued throughout this 
dissertation, it is hard to expect ethnic-based sponsorship. In other words, the determinant of the 
political marriage between the rich Tanzanians of Asian origin and the native political elites is 
centred on patron-client relations meant to benefit businessmen and politicians cardinal interests-
profit and political power respectively.In certain occasions the two groups permeate the imaginary 
bounderies as the business people join politics and the viceversa. As for the businessmen who join 
politics their incusion among other things is guaranteed by their capability to use their economic 
musles to solve voters’ problems.  
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
The views discussed in this chapter suggest that the importance given to ethnicity in explaining 
voting behaviour in Africa is often overrated by neo-patrimonial observers of African politics. In 
other words, salience of ethnicity in African politics should be empirically established within each 
African country - not assumed a priori. Ethnic salience in countries like Tanzania is a product of 
political elites’ decisions on policies and implementation arrangements. The significance of 
ethnicity in Tanzania today and optimism of its continuity is a result of meticulous decisions to 
defuse the vitality of ethnicity in politics. The decisions in question that enhanced nationalist 
political feelings as argued above were made by the political elite decades ago, and sustained since 
then despite varied political and economic reforms. It has been argued in Chapter IV that the 
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bureaucratic elites recruited from a wide variety of ethnic groups are made to denounce ethnic 
sentiments by the political establishment, especially the nationally salient ruling party that controls 
them. In the same vein, in the absence of explicit nationalist ethos propagated by the PsIM and 
implemented before political pluralism, opposition parties could be enticed to mobilise religious, 
ethnic or other forms of identity to amass political support. This did not happen to an alarming 
degree as widely argued in Chapter V. The ruling party, opposition parties and bureaucratic merger 
in enhancing nationalist feelings through the nation-building policy widely discussed in Chapter 
IV and empirically confirmed Chapter V are highly responsible for the future of ethnicity in 
Tanzania presented in this chapter. However, the 2015 elections exemplified that augmented use of 
religion and religious platforms by some contestants and political parties intrude the civil society’s 
space, thusly threatening national cohesion. Likewise, increased interdependence between 
religious and political poses the danger of curtailing the much needed private space essential for 
civil society growth.  
The nationalist endeavours discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters inform political parties’ 
inclusive vote-winning initiatives that defuse ethnic salience. In the main, Tanzanians seem to 
believe that national salience and EDNR have enabled political stability, contained factional 
competitions, and build the peaceful nation they boast of. As such, any divisive tendencies like 
ethnicity are not welcomed to tarnish such development. This being said, it is imperative to plug 
the divisive holes centred on socio-economic disparities to enhance national cohesion and 
peacefulness which will contribute towards diffusing ethnic salience in elections. Of the divisive 
elements discussed above religiosity which does have a potential of making MWCs and economic 
disparity, although not necessarily ethnic, can be ethnicised as the beneficiaries and affected 
groups do have ethnic allegiances to a varying degree. This is very crucial as Crawford Young 
(1999) once argued, behind the success of political stability in ethnically diverse countries: there 
remains a vector of uncertainty, a prowling vulnerability to interethnic relationships. In this 
context, the fact that Tanzania has managed to stay clear of instability for decades and people are 
optimistic that such situation will continue is an achievement but not a guarantee.   
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I present a summary of the entire study about the PsIM, ethnicity and voting in 
Tanzania. As an aid to the reader, I give a brief overview of the study problem and methods; and 
summarise the study findings. I also provide the conclusions reached, the theoretical and policy 
implications of the study as well as suggestions for future research projects. 
7.2. The Study Problem, Methods’ Overview and Conclusion Summary 
This thesis has come a long way to elicit the influences of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices in 
elections in Tanzania. I believe that my results have some relevance to the state of ethnicity in 
Tanzania in general, although my conclusions should be seen as valid mainly for my region of 
research. At the beginning of this study, I introduced the theoretical arguments for ethnic salience 
in motivating voters’ choices in elections. These arguments cover a wide range of perspectives that 
are neo-patrimonial, hybrid, ethnic-structure and PsIM viewpoints. I recognise the existence of 
information about ethnicity and voting in Tanzania. However, I substantiate that there is limited 
updated documentation regarding ethnicity and voting that transcends the neo-patrimonial school. 
This dominant scholarship on ethnicity and voting ignores the African history and its political 
thought in analysing influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in elections. Informed 
by this gap, the current study engages African history and political thought through an alternative 
framework termed the PsIM. The proposed framework mends the gap identified in the analysis of 
the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in elections in Tanzania. 
This study employed a qualitative research approach called analytic narrative. The qualitative tools 
were applied in the present study to obtain, analyse and discuss the information as well as for 
drawing conclusions. The main qualitative means to garner data were interviews, KIIs and 
documentary reviews. The data collected was presented and analysed qualitatively throughout this 
dissertation and eventually conclusions drawn.  
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This thesis rejects the neo-patrimonial theory (the main theory used to explain influences of 
ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in African polities) as an inadequate tool for 
understanding the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. This study 
proposed an alternative framework which draws among others on Mustapha’s (2002) idea of 
political community. According to Mustapha do and don’ts of a political community are chiefly 
informed by ideals deduced from common history and political thoughts entrenched within the 
political community in question.  For the Tanzanian case, its political community is informed by a 
nationalist political culture embedded in the PsIM. These promises meant to enhance national 
unity, EDNR and peace which militate against salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. 
This conclusion contradicts the neo-patrimonial theoretical perspectives that claim that the 
influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in African states is explained in light of 
Africans’ preference to traditional primordial and paternalistic tendencies. Such tendencies are said 
to give impetus to ethnic salience in politics, personal rule and ethnically based patronage in the 
distribution of public resources. As a result, such tendencies breed ethnic voting. Since the current 
study could hardly find salience of the neo-patrimonial suppositions, I consider the theory to be 
over-generalist in explaining the influences of ethnicity in informing voting in Africa. Such over-
generalisation makes the neo-patrimonialism unappreciative of alternative political ideas relevant 
in explaining the role of ethnicity in influencing voters’ choices in Tanzania. This is because it 
shuns away from analysing the ideals entrenched in its ethno-political history and electoral 
practices which deviate from the primordial and paternalistic explanations.  
This study argues that the alternative framework of ideas in the name of the PsIM that usefully 
explain the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices emanate from the nationalist 
anti-colonial movement. At its core, this movement promised Tanzanians that their polity will be 
nationally unified, equitably developed and peaceful - issues that are against salience of ethnicity 
in political competition (Wimmer, 1997). These ideas formed the political community amongst 
Tanzanians during the struggle for independence and created a political contract between 
Tanzanian leaders and peoples. The PsIM informed the do and don’ts both during the struggle for 
independence and in independent Tanzania. Given the relatively recent date of the independence in 
historical terms and the relevance of the PsIM in the ethnically diverse Tanzania, this political 
framework still forms the basis of Tanzania’s political community.  If it is accepted, as this thesis 
argues, that this framework of ideas has the potential to delineate the influences of ethnicity on 
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determining voters’ choices, then this is a significant contradiction of the neo-patrimonial 
theorists’ argument that neo-patrimonialism which is dominant in explaining African politics. This 
position is predicated on the fact that it rejects the idea that African states’ lack of unity and shared 
values between the state and the society as argued by Clapham (1982).  This study has established 
that the values and ideas embedded in the PsIM and struggles for independence have the capacity 
to provide an association between state and society in informing low salience of ethnicity in 
motivating voters’ choices. More important, the PsIM have proven significant in sustaining such 
marriage for over 50 years. A concise abstract of the findings of each core issue studied is 
presented in the subsequent sections. I return to the three research questions presented in Chapter 
II to guide my presentation. 
7.3. Overview of Main Conclusions 
7.3.1. PsIM, Ethnicity and Voters’ Choices in Tanzania   
The first objective of the dissertation was to explore how the PsIM influenced voting in the 2010 
elections in Tanzania. I found that the PsIM informed low salience of ethnicity in the 
determination of voters’ choices in the elections. This position concurs with the general picture of 
Tanzania presented in the ethno-political narrative that constituted Chapter IV of this dissertation.   
The analysis and discussion of the PsIM and various initiatives done to put them to effect in the 
area of national unity, EDNR and peace have lowered the significance of ethnicity in motivating 
voters’ choices. The analysis indicates that the PsIM are responsible for creating a nationalistic 
political culture that militated against the salience of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices in 
elections. This political culture is manifested in Tanzanians’ unprecedented pride of their national 
identity over their ethnic groups’ identity, their appreciation to EDNR as well as the value they 
place on peace when they are encountered with electoral decisions. The culture is clearly 
evidenced by the frequency with which the interviewees cited the significance of national unity, 
EDNR and peace in sections 5.2.1 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. In the referred sections interviewees considered 
the culture to be the primary source of national pride and the stumbling blocks to salience of 
ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in elections.  From such background, salience of ethnicity 
in luring and informing voters’ choices in the 2010 elections would have been navigating against 
the direction that the nationalistic political culture they believe in.   
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The PsIM proved to be relevant in explaining the influences of ethnicity on voters’ choices even 
after the collapse of the backbone of the PsIM- The AD, and implementation of liberal economic 
and political policies. This position is made cognisant of the fact that the 2010 elections were held 
after the collapse of the AD which strived to actualise the PsIM through an extensive socialist 
nation-building policy in the late 1980s. The 2010 elections were held while the country is 
implementing liberal reforms. In this regard, I argue that the PsIM and the efforts to realise them 
have created a frame that informs Tanzanians rejection to letting ethnicity gain salience on 
determining voters’ choices in elections. This is regardless of the political and /or ideological 
changes it has underwent over-time. Such situation questions the claim advanced by the neo-
patrimonial and hybrid schools that African states including Tanzanians lack common political 
history and convictions that can lower the salience of ethnicity in elections. And therefore, are 
doomed to embrace traditional tendencies (tribalist client-patron relations) which among other 
things, breed salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices as argued in section 3.4.1. The 
view held by this dissertation on the relevance of the content of the PsIM in lowering ethnic 
salience confirm that Africans have a shared history and ideals that can explain varied 
developments. As such, we criticise the neo-patrimonial and hybrid schools of being reluctant to 
appreciate alternative political ideas, agencies and structures to their own, to explain African 
politics, including the influence of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. 
7.3.2. Explaining the Influences of Ethnicity on Determining Voters’ Choices  
 The second objective of the dissertation was to explore why the PsIM and efforts meant to realise 
them had influenced the way ethnicity had informed voters’ choices in the 2010 elections in 
Tanzania. The major finding under this objective is that the lower salience of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices in elections in Tanzania is a product a shared anti-ethnic salient 
culture in the conduct of politics. This common anti-ethnic salient culture was informed by the 
Ujamaa based PsIM and embraced by the Tanzanian state, the majority of its political elites and 
individuals. The rejection of the use of ethnicity in politics benefited from a well-framed vision of 
national unity informed by the PsIM and well articulated by the political leadership from a 
hypothetical and real standpoint. This nationalist culture is predicated on a set of norms, values, 
and institutions which have instilled overwhelming acceptance of national identity over ethnic 
identities and rejection of politically violent and divisive trends in elections. As such, national 
unity is almost regarded as a peremptory norm that should be upheld by all Tanzanians. In this 
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context, ethnic salience on determining voters’ choices is considered to be “un-Tanzanian” and, 
therefore, should be avoided by all means.  
Since the elections of 2010 studied were conducted over four decades after Tanzania’s 
independence, we argue that explanations of low salience of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices 
embedded in the PsIM are reliant on a meticulous path-dependent nationalist frame. This frame 
managed to survive amid major political and economic reforms that occurred overtime because of 
it is well-entrenched and relevant. This stance is anchored on the fact that well-entrenched and 
relevant cultures do not wither away easily. This position explains why ideas like the negative 
impacts of ethnic polarisation transcended the political and social changes that took place in 
Tanzania as indicated in the fourth chapter. It also explains why the fears of liberal policies 
breeding ethnic salience on determining electorates’ choices were not vindicated. According to the 
study findings and discussions, the culture against ethnic salience in motivating voters’ choices 
benefitted from a series of sustained nation-building tools especially through a war framed nation-
building crusade, the use of Swahili as a national language, national integration based civic 
education, the legacy of Mwalimu Nyerere’s leadership and legal restrictions against the use of 
ethnicity in election processes. 
 
In this study, it was revealed that low salience of ethnicity in voting has been influenced by the 
negative projection of ethnicity in the country’s development endeavours. As a starting point, the 
framing of the enemies of development in war terms, thus making the requisites for winning the 
war-national unity and peace do and die issues, helped to make ethnicity insignificant in politics. 
The war imagery provided Tanzanians with the motivation and conviction necessary for 
channelling their ferociousness against the enemies of development and guarantee that the 
requisite for success – national unity and peace are highly respected. The respect for national unity 
and peace diffused the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. This argument is 
informed by the fact that  political canvassing and voting along ethnic lines would breed disunity 
and violent conflicts among competing ethnic groups which would affect the victory in the war 
against the enemies of development whose success is essential for Tanzanians’ progress. In this 
way, Tanzania’s framing of its development efforts as a war helped to unify its people toward 
denouncing ethnic salience in voting and beyond. Likewise, the negative impacts of ethnic 
polarisation on development endeavours in countries like Burundi and Rwanda added impetus in 
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influencing Tanzanians low ethnic salient voting. This conclusion corroborates Mpangala (2000) 
who contends that experiences of civil wars in other African countries prove a lesson to 
Tanzanians not to engage in ethnic polarisation. In the main, this position questions the neo-
patrimonial thesis as advanced by Diamond (2008) and Van de Walle (2003) that Africans are 
short of political ideas and convictions that can make them lower the influence of ethnicity on 
determining voters’ choices. 
  
The study also reveals that the PsIM, particularly its national integration endeavour has benefitted 
a lot from the use of Swahili as a national language. It has been established in the dissertation that 
almost all of the multi-ethnic integrative initiatives would have been seriously crippled, if not 
impossible, without Tanzanians sharing a common lingua franca. All of the multi-ethnic 
communications and nationalist messages were made possible by Swahili. Therefore, I argue that 
Swahili has made Tanzanians ethnic groups loose a valuable tool for furthering ethnic identity that 
could be used for political visibility once politicised. Inferably, Swahili has facilitated the national 
unity and peace components of the PsIM by reducing lingual informed parochial identities and 
ethnic miscommunication. Correspondingly, Swahili enhanced multi-ethnic communication for the 
attainment of the nation-building policies that contributed in informing voters to harbour feelings 
of national identity over ethnic ones. The feelings as well put in the analysis of the PNU, diffused 
the significance of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. The choice of Swahili as a national 
language, its role in enhancing national unity and peace promised by the PsIM and subsequently 
informing low salience of ethnicity in voting questions the neo-patrimonial explanations of 
ethnicity and voting. This position is predicated on the misleading component of the neo-
patrimonial thesis that Africans are ethnic salient in voting because they are primordial, 
paternalistic and thus prefer divisive patronage ties over rationally integrative modern ones. I argue 
that the preference for national language and identity over vernacular and ethnic ones respectively, 
renders the neo-patrimonial thinking redundant. More important, the nationalist initiative of using 
Swahili from the independence movement to-date to facilitate a nationally integrated polity 
indicates that the neo-patrimonial claim that Africans lack political thoughts, history, and cultures 
to disentangle from the web of ethnic salience is far from relevant in Tanzania.  
 
284 
 
The importance of Swahili in informing low salience of ethnicity in elections is further laid bare by 
the role it has played in another basic explanation of low salience of ethnicity- sustained 
denunciation of the use of ethnicity in political canvassing and voting. This thesis has established 
that a series of concerted efforts by the political establishment and other stakeholders to 
sustainably denounced the significance of ethnicity in anchoring voters’ choices from 
independence to-date. The denunciation was made possible by extensive civic education. The civic 
education endeavoured to make sure that the post-independent movement generation subscribed to 
the idea of denouncing ethnicity in motivating voters and spreads the same to generations to come. 
This was made possible by among other things, the use of Swahili and implementation of the 
comprehensive nation-building policies. The sustained anti-ethnic civic education and the nation-
building efforts widely discussed in the dissertation points to an opposite direction to the neo-
patrimonial argument that Africans lack the ideals and zeal to lower the salience of ethnicity in 
voting. In the main, the thesis quashes the conception that Africans are fond of traditional ethnic-
based patronage tendencies which exacerbate ethnic polarisation and voting. The dissertation 
established that the PsIM have inspired extensive denunciation of ethnicity and the implementation 
of the PsIM further reinforced them. In this vein, I argue that the marriage between the nation-
building policies argued in the first objective above, and continuous transfer of anti-ethnic 
education have sunk into people’s minds to the level that an opposite discourse is hard to be 
bought. From such position then, we further argue that the marriage militates against salience of 
ethnicity on determining  voters’ choices as it curtails discourses for the use of ethnicity in political 
canvassing and voting. Generational denunciation of the use of ethnicity is further corroborated by 
Mwalimu’s charismatic and symbolic leadership in the nation-building policy and the legal 
restrictions to use ethnicity in electioneering.  
 
As established in the dissertation, political scientists tend to undermine the indispensability of 
individual agency in the realisation of outcomes of modern organisations. However, the frequency 
of mention Mwalimu in the fight against ethnic salience in voting indicates that organisations can 
benefit from charismatic individuals. Mwalimu Nyerere’s anti-ethnic views and deeds about 
rejecting ethnic voting have contributed towards making Tanzanians consider ethnic salience in 
motivating voters’ choices unpatriotic and un-Tanzanian. The fact that Mwalimu personally wrote 
the AD; his anti-ethnic views have been massively projected in the media because he was at the 
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epitome of the nation-building efforts; his successors sustained his nation-building crusade and 
Tanzanians supported the ideas over-time, renders the institutional mantra questionable. I argue 
that political actors informed by Mwalimu’s anti-ethnic salient opinions and deeds, and the adverse 
impacts of ethnic conflicts in other African countries contributed in making Tanzanians choose to 
amplify ethnically inclusive peaceful national ethos. In this regard, I argue that the influence of 
Mwalimu’s charisma and symbol in the furtherance of the PsIM particularly in unifying 
Tanzanians and ensuring peace and tranquillity inform continued lower influence of ethnicity in 
voting.  
The study also established that legal restrictions on the application of ethnicity in political 
canvassing particularly the restriction on the use of vernaculars in campaigning for office have had 
a contribution in lowering the salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. However, the 
legislation benefitted from the anti-ethnic culture informed by the PsIM. I argue that such culture 
mended the problem of having laws without being enforced. This view rests on the fact that the 
political culture prohibits the use of ethnicity in seeking political office. In fact, ethnic salience in 
voting is considered as a taboo that would destroy national integration, peace, tranquillity and 
development that most Tanzanians do not want to miss. The fact that there are laws prohibiting the 
use of ethnicity and LRIs supervising them, questions the relevance of the neo-patrimonial view 
that African state lacks legislations and LRIs to stamp ethnic salience in politics.  The efficacy of 
the laws in terms of actual use could not be established. However, I argue that the hypothetical 
restrictions coupled with the other conclusions made, point towards explaining the low salience of 
ethnicity on determining voters’ choices.  
 
Broadly speaking, the conclusions made under this objective express the complexity and 
interrelated explanations of sustained low salience of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in 
Tanzania. In other words, the demarcation between the conclusions made are not water tight, They 
overlap and, therefore, can well explain the low salience of ethnicity if eclectically and /or 
complementarily treated. In this sense, all of the factors should be considered as they relate to the 
PsIM in the context of the electoral politics, actors and structures to explain the way ethnicity 
motivates voting in Tanzania.    
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7.3.3. Influences of Candidates’ Origin, Being and Belonging on Voting  
As opposed to the neo-patrimonial theorists as well as the overriding literature of ethnicity and 
voting presented in the general introduction and sections 3.4.2.and 3.4.3 that suggest ethnic 
salience in Africa, this dissertation asserts that the importance of origin in terms of being native 
and the use of Kisukuma in mobilising political support have been proven to be nominal in the 
2010 elections. The low significance of being a native in luring voters is highly associated with the 
strong nationalist feeling as argued in the above conclusion, and the quest for candidates who are 
trustworthy and able to solve people’s problems. Interestingly, candidate’s origin was only viewed 
imperative in judging the trustworthiness and ability of candidates to deliver public goods. In this 
context, origin is important only if, and when, the candidate is considered to be trustworthy and 
able to deliver public goods to the community he or she vies to lead. In this regard, the voters have 
been proven to be moved more by rational and meritocratic calculations of benefitting from able 
candidates than aspirants originating from the area of contest. This being said, it follows that 
candidates who reside or own a house in the area of contest being a Sukuma or not; who are aware 
of the problems of the people where he or she wishes to lead; proven to be trustworthy and be able 
to bring development, are of equal standing when it comes to luring voters in elections.  
Furthermore, the broader zonal feeling of belonging to the study area adds impetus to the lower 
significance of having natives to stand in elections to win political support. This argument is based 
on the fact that voters in the studied area consider the Lake Zone, including non-Sukuma 
dominated regions like Mara, Kagera and Tabora, as a catchment area for accepting those 
candidates as being from Mwanza. As such, the extended catchment widens the number of ethnic 
groups that can claim being and belonging to Mwanza. Such categorisation also widens the base of 
gaining competent candidates to stand and lure voters. Equally, the importance placed on owning 
land and knowing the problems of the people in the area of contest, further widens the belonging 
catchment and its associated advantage of gaining competent and trustworthy people to stand in 
elections. The extension suggests the possibility of inter-ethnic competition. However, this has not 
been proven to be the case. Instead, the extension of being and belonging in the study area defuses 
the role of political tribalism on determining voters’ choices as the tribal ticket does not guarantee 
election unless it is accompanied by trustworthiness and competence to discharge leadership 
functions. Also, laws of the land and the culture of national unity entrenched in the PsIM which 
have proven to be well-entrenched in the mind of the people in the area of study, requires from the 
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ideal candidates to refrain from ethnic political canvassing. Under such circumstance it can hardly 
be said salience of ethnicity can emanate from the elements of the politics of origin, being and 
belonging as they are not informed by the constituting ingredients of politicisation of ethnicity. 
Better still, the basis of politicising ethnicity is discouraged by the nation-building ethos informed 
by the PsIM in the areas of national unity, EDNR and peace.  
With regard to the ethnic use of Kisukuma there were there no convincing facts to establish 
patterns that are strong enough to suggest its significance in the 2010 elections. This position is 
anchored on the fact that no evidence pointed to the fact that the language was dominantly used in 
the formal campaigns, neither did political parties rush to co-opt Sukuma speakers to lead their 
parties or to have only Sukuma speakers contest in the 2010 elections. In the study area and 
beyond, there are numerous cases where non-Sukuma speakers won in the elections against 
prominent Sukuma speakers or contenders as the Illemela, Kwimba and Geita parliamentary 
results indicate. The limited use of Kisukuma as a tool of ethnic identity in the election questions 
the claim made by the neo-patrimonial theorists that Africans are traditionalists and prefer 
traditional over modern things. This is because the language widely used in the elections was 
Swahili which has no traditional dominance of any ethnic group in Tanzania. Moreover, all ethnic 
groups respect Swahili as their national language and prefer it and its nationalising effect to their 
traditional ones in politics (Lofchie, 2013). In this regard, I argue that lingual identities are not 
static. They change according to relevance and contexts even if what comes out is against 
traditions. In the case of Kisukuma, its relevance was recognised in the social settings and 
traditions, but not in public issues of national interest like elections. This is due to the strong 
conviction towards national unity and peace that can be endangered by lingual propelled ethnic 
divisions. 
In light of the findings on the politics of origin, being and belonging, I am convinced to argue that 
the Sukuma’s numerical dominance and identity provides no significant guarantee to win political 
office in the region. The key to political office revolves around broader elements of origin, being 
and belonging and the ability to discharge the demands of public office. In this context, a 
trustworthy and competent native Sukuma and a non-Sukuma residing in the region with similar 
traits have equal chances of winning electoral support. In this regard, the people elect any 
candidate who meets the requisite qualifications for the vacancy contested for regardless of where 
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they come from, as Nyamagana, Geita and Ilemela parliamentary elections indicate. Such rational 
voting practices questions the ethnic salient and ethnic-based patronage central to neo-patrimonial 
explanations of voting in Africa. 
7.4. Implications of the Study 
7.4.1. Theoretical Implications of the Study 
The contribution of this study to the understanding of the interplay between the PsIM, ethnicity 
and voters’ choices in Tanzania is twofold. On one hand the current dissertation has synthesised 
various strands of emerging critiques of the neo-patrimonial theory regarding voters’ choices. On 
the other hand, from the synthesis the study has managed to come up with an alternative 
framework of ideas termed the PsIM. This framework is deemed useful in capturing the reality and 
understands the basis of the influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Tanzania. 
The framework does so through Tanzanians’ shared ideas embedded in the struggles for its 
independence and the legacy and dynamics thereof.  
Whereas the neo-patrimonial theorists turned a blind eye to the merits entrenched in indigenous 
African ideas and values as possible basis for low salience of ethnicity in the determination of 
voters’ choices, and went as far as pointing out that African primordial culture informs ethnic-
based patronage as the source of politicisation of ethnicity, the PsIM tells the opposite. This 
dissertation has established that indigenous political thoughts and processes informed by African 
culture and historical experiences informed by the PsIM and concretised by the AD, could provide 
a basis for informing low salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters’ choices in Tanzania. 
The dissertation has indicated that the PsIM were constructed by the Tanzanian people as it was 
the case for other African people through real historical experiences of living the colonial rule and 
its characteristics. These include brutal, racist, racial, religious, exploitative, undemocratic and 
more important ethnic divisive tendencies. As a reaction to these ills Tanzanians formulated ideas 
and visions of national unity, EDNR and peace and democratic monolithic political dispensations 
to further the three ideals and distinguish the independent Tanzania from the divisive and 
exploitative colonial regimes. The main inspiration for the formulation of this vision was the 
idealised culture of communalism that most Africans had had before colonialism to develop their 
independent state. In this regard, I reject the idea central to neo-partimonialist theorists that 
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African states lack common ideals and values for explaining varied political developments and 
curtailing salience of ethnicity as argued by Clapham (1982). 
Two important benefits are attributable to the alternative framework proposed by this dissertation 
over the neo-patrimonial theories that dominate analyses to African politics. The first is that one 
may be able to appreciate in full the underlying causes and internal contradictory dynamics of 
African history within the PsIM. While neo-patrimonial theorists combine causes and outcomes of 
salience of ethnicity in elections as an internal logic informed by the dynamics of paternalistic and 
parochial political culture that fuels competition among ethnic groups, the alternative framework 
proposes that the manifestation of ethnicity and influence on determining voters’ choices is not a 
product of a culture of ethnicity dictated by neo-patrimonialists but an outcome of contradictory 
forces functioning within a political community. In the case of Tanzania, contradictions were 
between the Tanzanian pro unity, equity, peace and harmony cultures and the divisive and 
exploitative colonial ones as pointed out by Pitcher et al (2009). This should be a significant 
contribution as the neo-patrimonial theories have erred to select the externally manifested features 
of ethnic belonging as if such external observable features are more important than the political 
culture and imaginary in explaining the role of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices. 
Secondly, the PsIM puts emphasis on Tanzanians’ (Africans) political thought. To comprehend the 
influence of ethnicity on voting, one will have to engage with the Tanzanians’ history of ideas, 
even if a scholar’s description of these is always an ideal-type rather than actual thoughts all 
Tanzanian share. Discussing the way the PsIM are actually thought by our respondents provided 
insight in the Tanzanian people’s viewpoint on how they think ethnicity may or may not shape 
electoral choices within their polity. In this dissertation, it is argued that based on the divisive and 
exploitative nature of colonialism, Tanzanians in the struggle for independence espoused an ideal 
comprehensive vision of how they wanted their nation to be ordered. In particular, how ethnicity 
should influence the general conduct of politics including voters’ choices. Neo-patrimonial 
research in its efforts to explain influences of ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in Africa 
without factoring in Africa’s political thought and ideals, thus treated what transpires in Tanzania 
as lacking indigenous political orientation.  Indeed, Tanzania lacks philosophers who have written 
down their thoughts about ethnicity and voting, and few who did have been informed by the neo-
patrimonial views. As such, their analysis cannot escape the theory’s critique. Tanzania and other 
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African countries had well-established traditions and culture before colonialism. They also had 
experiences of colonialism and beyond which have a role to play in explaining the influences of 
ethnicity on determining electorate’s choices. These experiences should not be left out in any 
analysis of African politics. Underplaying ideas and experiences of the African people and their 
political communities renders the analysis of this polity incomplete and biased.  
Using the case of Mwanza to explain influences of ethnicity in Tanzania, this study has engaged 
with the political thought of Africans. Specifically, how an African political thought in the name of 
PsIM developed and informed the influences of ethnicity in Tanzania and dynamics thereof. 
Arguably, the study has been able to point out how the PsIM and policies meant to realise them 
produced a political culture in Tanzania militating against the significance of ethnicity in 
influencing voters’ choices in the 2010 elections. It pointed out that the Tanzanian leadership past 
and present, stood for attainment of the PNU, EDNR and peace. As such, they contributed to 
defusing the chances of ethnic polarisation and politicisation, and acted in line with the aspirations 
that Tanzanians through the PSIM were made to believe in and do believe in. This way, Tanzania 
produced a united, peace-loving, equitably distributive functional nation-state, whose low political 
ethnicity negates the view held by neo-patrimonial theory and other western-centric evaluations of 
ethnicity in African politics which claim that Africa lacks common values and ideals to avoid 
divisive ethnic patronage and politicisation of ethnicity. This thesis establishes that Tanzania is an 
exception as it has shared values and ideals of a national community embedded in the PsIM, which 
are moreover opposite to the paternalistic and parochial values that the neo-patrimonial theorists 
envisage to be dominant in all African states. 
7.4.2. Policy Implications of the Study 
From the experience of the voters in Mwanza and other individuals involved in the study we can 
learn several policy-related issues. 
Firstly, the overall discussion indicates that exploitative and divisive colonial socio-economic and 
political policies can inform a strong nationalist culture capable of comprehensively analysing 
factors behind the low salience of ethnicity in the determination of voters’ choices. In this study, I 
argue that the PsIM which are resultant of the socio-economic and political ills of colonialism have 
informed the enactment of socialist nation-building policies embedded in the AD which provides a 
frame that navigates Tanzanians away from politicisation of ethnicity. This is the case even after 
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the collapse of the AD due to its strong discourse against ethnic polarisation, inequitable 
distribution of resources and violence. In this regard, continuation of low salience of ethnicity in 
political canvassing and determination of voters’ choices is dependent on the sustenance of these 
virtues regardless of the ideological or political orientation that Tanzania follows. 
Secondly, as much as the nationalist political culture entrenched in Tanzania through AD has been 
critical in navigating Tanzania away from politicisation of ethnicity and lowering its role in 
influencing voters’ choices, flashes of ethnicity still exist, but with nominal effect. This is mainly 
due to the benefits that national integration is believed to have and the reinforcing nature of the 
factors responsible for national integration. From the observations it was made apparent that the 
path-dependent anti-ethnic salient experiences in Tanzania has been influenced by the reinforcing 
effect of peace, and EDNR on the nationalist culture as well as the culture did on reinforcing peace 
and EDNR. Understanding the dynamics of low salience of ethnicity is complex because the 
dynamics are interlinked and reinforcing, and one factor cannot guarantee explanation of the 
phenomena in isolation. Therefore, in my view, I argue that to guarantee comprehensive 
understanding and to formulate policies sustaining lower salience of ethnicity in voting, one 
requires a holistic approach appreciating the underlying forces determining the factors behind 
voters’ choices.  
Thirdly, whereas most of my interviewees were keen to divulge that ethnicity in the form of 
Sukuma identity, common origin, language and heritage were not significant factors affecting 
voting decisions, it was commonly mentioned that candidates’ origin, being and belonging was 
necessary for the voters in a constituency to be able to judge candidate’s character, particularly 
their trustworthiness and ability to deliver development promises. In this regard, I am inclined to 
argue that the politics of origin, being and belonging was not considered to be a factor affecting 
ethnic voting in Mwanza except as a measure of determining the suitability of candidates to hold 
political office for the good of the community that they are part of. More important, it is a way of 
ensuring political inclusion by informing voters to choose suitable political representatives among 
proven trustworthy and able members in their constituencies.  
Fourthly, the data and its discussion provided an exception to political scientists who tend to use 
the “organisation-is-bigger-than-individual" mantra to undermine the indispensability of individual 
agency in the realisation of outcomes of modern organisations. The frequency of mentioning 
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Mwalimu in the efforts set out to lower salience of ethnicity indicate that structural and 
institutional coherence and sustainability of organisations can benefit from the sanctity, individual 
brilliance and charisma of charismatic individuals. Mwalimu has been the charismatic figure that 
made use of every opportunity to integrate Tanzanians nationally and to denounce any divisive 
elements including the use of ethnicity to lure voters. The fact that he wrote the AD and stood by it 
as well as being at the centre of nation-building efforts sustained by his successors renders this 
view relevant. In this regard, I argue that political will, zeal, awe of a charismatic figure for nation-
building coupled with national integration policies and formal and informal structures and 
processes can stand in the way of ethnicity influencing voters’ choices during elections.  
 
Lastly, the dissertation has clearly pointed out that a national language that is spoken by almost 
everyone in an ethnically diverse country like Tanzania can play a decisive role in diffusing the 
significance of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices. We have indicated Swahili as a tool of 
common national identity reduced the significance of the dominant vernacular in Mwanza-
Kisukuma in campaigning and motivating voters’ choices. This way an important ingredient of 
propelling ethnic differentiation and identity was curtailed hence reducing the possibilities of 
ethnicity gaining salience in motivating voters. I am arguing that common language alone could 
not bring about low salience of ethnicity. However, its role in ensuring inter-ethnic communication 
and nation-building policies like national service, sending students from their areas of origin, is 
critical and it could have been difficult to believe that Tanzania’s culture of low salience of 
ethnicity predicated on the nationalist political frame would have been possible without the use of 
Swahili as a national language. Therefore, maintenance of national integration and low salience of 
ethnicity on determining voters’ choices would benefit from the continuation of such language 
policy. 
7.5. Suggestions for Further Research 
This dissertation cannot claim to have exhausted all information concerning influences of ethnicity 
on determining voters’ choices. Therefore, more research has to be done to broaden understanding 
of the issues related to ethnicity and voting. The following suggestions are proposed. 
 
First, further research needs to be done to understand better the experiences of the influences of 
ethnicity and voting among ethnic groups so as to be able to compare and contrast varied 
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experiences among the diverse ethnic groups that Tanzania has. I find this interesting because there 
are cultural variations among ethnic groups which could provide a better understanding of 
elements of ethnic practices in elections in Tanzania. By comparing ethnic groups, detailed 
experiences in the influences of ethnicity and voting as informed by the cultures of the compared 
ethnic groups can be gathered and analysed.  
 
Secondly, I find that there is a need for further research to study how ethnicity influences voting in 
civic elections which involve elections of the bearer of the lowest ranks of governance in 
Tanzania. The significance of this suggestion stems from the fact that most elements of ethnicity as 
argued by Gasarasi (1997) are relevant to the lower level elections which were not part of the 2010 
GEs that this study dealt with. Such study will, therefore, contribute to filling the information gap 
between the intricacies of ethnicity and voting in higher and lower levels of elections. This will 
provide insight in how ethnicity takes shape and motivates voters’ choices in elections of leaders 
who are closer to the people geographically and thus interact with daily. The study will, therefore, 
unveil how ethnicity plays out in a jurisdiction that voters have comparative easier access to 
interact with compared to Councillors, MPs and President, who have broader geographical 
mandate and national issues to address.  
 
Thirdly, I suggest a comparative study of Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar to be able to 
understand the applicability of the PsIM on the previously sovereign states that form the URT. 
This would be interesting because it will shed light on the influences of ethnicity on voters’ 
choices among two parts of a political union with distinct history and levels of ethnic salience in 
voting. Whereas Tanzanian Mainland, which was studied here, harbours low feelings of ethnic 
salience and polarisation, the case is different in Zanzibar. In this regard, a comparative analysis of 
the role of the PsIM and the neo-patrimonial and hybrid as well as the ethnic structure on 
determining electorates’ choices can be put to the test to explain the divergence and/or 
convergence of elements of the ethnicity on determining voters’ choices in the two parts of the 
union. 
 
Fourthly, I propose a study on the role of globalisation on the influencing the role of ethnicity on 
determinating voters’ choices.The study is relevant because political and economic developments 
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within states in the current world do hardly avoid interactions and experiences of what takes place 
in other states. The present dissertation highlighted some elements external to Tanzania 
particularly in the area of peace and tranquillity but a full fledged analysis of globalisation will 
provide a broader picture.   
 
Fifthly, I suggest a nation-wide quantitative study on the influences of ethnicity and voting in 
Tanzania. To be able to generalise the findings and provide more contribution in the field of voting 
behaviour that is seriously lacking in developing societies including Tanzania. 
 
Lastly, I also find it timely to have a further study of the influences of ethnicity on determining 
voters’ choices in the most complex and cosmopolitan city of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. This 
suggestion is rooted in the fact that although Nyamagana that was studied is part of Mwanza city 
and thus cosmopolitan, and fitted well to provide the urban nature of Mwanza, the dominance of 
the original ethnic group, the Sukuma, and the ethnic groups found within the Lake Zone as shown 
in the description of the study area, is vivid. The cosmopolitan nature presented by Nyamagana is 
somewhat limited in describing and analysing the influences of ethnicity and voting from a purely 
cosmopolitan viewpoint. Dar es Salaam provides a real cosmopolitan environment as the original 
ethnic group of Dar es Salaam, the Zaramo, is not the dominant ethnic group numerically, and its 
culture is by no means the dominant one in the city. Members of ethnic groups from the entire 
country are found in Dar es Salaam in thousands and none of the seating MPs elected in the city 
are Zaramo by ethnic group. Such situation to my opinion presents an avenue for shedding more 
light on the motivations of ethnicity on voting in cosmopolitan settings. Such avenue will provide 
an opportunity for exploring how ethnicity is defined, takes shape and pulls strings on voters’ 
choices in a context invoking Weber’s (2009) argument about the impossibility of forging a MWC 
to influence voters’ choices through promises of resource benefits after their choices win elections. 
This type of research will help us to establish the influences of ethnicity in a situation where tribal 
origin has a limited role in effecting political tribalism.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I 
Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results in Tanzania 
  Presidential Elections Parliamentary Elections 
Year Party No of Votes  % of Votes Number of Seats   % 
1995 CCM 4,026,422 61.82 214 79.55 
NCCR-Mageuzi 1,808,616 27.77 19 7.06 
CUF 418,973 6.43 28 10.41 
UDP 258,734 3.97 4 1.49 
CHADEMA  N/A N/A 4 1.49 
Others N/A N/A - - 
Total 269 100 
2000 
CCM 5,863,201 71.74 243 87.10 
CUF 1,329,077 16.26 21 7.53 
TLP 637,115 7.80 5 1.79 
UDP 342,891 4.20 4 1.43 
CHADEMA N/A N/A 5 1.79 
NCCR- Mageuzi N/A N/A 1 0.36 
Others N/A N/A - - 
Total 279 100 
2
0
0
5
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
CCM 9,123,952 80.28% 264 85.99 
CUF 1,327,125 11.68% 30 9.77 
CHADEMA 668,756 5.88% 11 3.58 
TLP 84,901 0.75% 1 0.33 
NCCR-Mageuzi 55,819 0.49% - - 
DP 31,083 0.27% - - 
NLD 21,574 0.19% - - 
PPT-Maendeleo 18,783 0.17% - - 
MAKINI 17,070 0.15% - - 
SAU 16,414 0.14% - - 
UDP N/A N/A 1 0.33 
Other  N/A N/A - - 
Total 307 100 
2
0
1
0
 
 
CCM 5,276,827 62.83% 259 74.2 
CHADEMA 2,271,941 27.05% 48 13.7 
CUF 695,667 8.28% 36 10.3 
APPT-Maendeleo 96,933 1.15% -  
 (NCCR-
Mageuzi) 
26,388 0.31% 4 1.1 
TLP 17,462 0.21% 1 0.2 
UPDP 13,176 0.16% -  
UDP N/A N/A 1 0.2 
Others N/A N/A -  
Total 349 100 
Source: NEC 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 
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APPENDIX IV 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR PRIVILEDGED INTERVIEWEES (SEASONED POLITICIANS) 
Introduction 
Good day. My name is Mrisho Malipula, a doctoral student at Ghent University. I am conducting a 
study on the Influence of Ethnicity on Electoral choices in Tanzania. An essential element of this 
study is to see how the political, economic and social history of Tanzania has played and is playing 
a part in informing the role of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices. Knowing that you have lived 
the history and actively participated in the political realm, I would like to discuss with you some 
political and economic issues that have a bearing in Tanzanians voting behaviour over time. All 
information provided will be kept confidential by me and the institution, I am studying at. Equally, 
the information given will be used for the purpose of this study and this study alone.  
Utangulizi 
Habari za leo. Mimi naitwa Mrisho Malipula ambaye ni mwanafunzi wa shahada ya Udaktari wa 
Falsafa katika Chuo Kikuu Ghent nchini Ubeligiji. Ninafanya utafiti wa nafasi ya ukabila katika 
uchaguzi wa vyama vingi nchini Tanzania ikiwa ni sehemu ya mafunzo ya shahada ya udaktari wa 
Falsafa. Sehemu mojawapo muhimu ya utafiti huu ni kuibua nafasi ya historia yetu ya kisiasa, 
kiuchumi na kijamii katika kuelezea ushawishi wa ukabila kwa maamuzi ya wapiga kjura nchini 
Tanzania.  Kwa kutambua kwamba unaijua vizuri historia ya nchi yetu kutokana na kuwa sehemu 
yake na kushika nadhifa mbalimbali za kisiasa, ningefurahi iwapo tutajadili masuala mbalimbali ya 
kisiasa na kiuchumi  yenye uhusiano na tabia ya  upigaji kura wa watanzania kwa wakati 
mbalimbali. Maelezo yote yatokanayo na majadiliano yetu yatakuwa siri na kuhifadhiwa name an 
Taasisi ninayosoma. Vilevile, taarifa zote zitatumika kwa ajili ya utafiti huu pekee yake.  
Questions 
1. Could you share with me your personal biography? 
2. What motivated you to be a politician? 
3. How did your parents, peers and community view you when you embarked upon your 
political journey? 
4. Have you at any point in time felt pressure from your community resulted from the political 
career that you had nationally?  
5. If you are to write the history of Tanzania how many historical epochs would you suggest? 
What is the significance of each epoch in the political history of our country? 
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6. Were the changes from one epoch to the other smooth and logical? Or were there 
resistances resulted from ideological or power related interests?  
7. Were there any key turning points in the national building initiatives? Were there any 
surprises? What were the key sources of support and/or resistance? 
8. Why is ethnicity insignificant Tanzanian politics?  
9. Is there any link between the national unity, equitable distribution of resources and peace; 
and low salience of ethnicity in motivating votes? 
10. Political pluralism has raised worries of ethnicity gaining salience in elections. Do you 
think worries are real? Why?/why not? 
11. Have you personally encountered ethnic-based difficulties in sustaining a political position 
during your political life?  
12. Do think Tanzania will ever be ever ethnically politicised? Why 
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APPENDIX V 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LOCAL INTERVIEWEES IN MISUNGWI AND NYAMAGANA  
Introduction 
Good day. My name is Mrisho Malipula a PhD student at Ghent University. I am conducting a 
study on the Influence of Ethnicity on Electoral choices in Tanzania. The study mainly intends to 
explore influences of ethnicity on multi-party elections in Tanzania. An essential element of this 
study is to see how the political, economic and social history of Tanzania has played and the 
current trends are playing a part in informing voters’ choices in Tanzania. We would like to 
discuss this issue with a member of your household of the age above 22. All information provided 
will be kept confidential by the researcher. Equally, the information given will be used for the 
purpose of this study and this study alone. Every person in the ward has an equal chance of being 
selected in this study. Your household has been picked by chance. We would like to choose an 
adult from your household. Would you help us to pick one? Thank you for your help 
Utangulizi 
Habari za leo. Mimi naitwa Mrisho Malipula ambaye ni mwanafunzi wa shahada ya Udaktari wa 
Falsafa katika Chuo Kikuu Ghent nchini Ubeligiji. Ninafanya utafiti wa nafasi ya ukabila katika 
uchaguzi wa vyama vingi nchini Tanzania ikiwa ni sehemu ya mafunzo ya shahada ya udaktari wa 
Falsafa. Sehemu mojawapo muhimu ya utafiti huu ni kuibua nafasi ya historia yetu ya kisiasa, 
kiuchumi na kijamii katika kuelezea ushawishi wa ukabila kwa maamuzi ya wapiga kura nchini 
Tanzania.  Ningependa kuongea na mtu mmoja kutoka katika kaya yako aliye na miaka 22 na 
zaidi. Habari zote zitakazotolewa na mhojiwa zitakuwa siri na haitatumika kwa sababu yeyote 
zaidi ya utafiti huu. Kila mtu katika kata hii ana nafasi sawa ya kuchaguliwa kuhusika katika utafiti 
huu na kaya yako imechaguliwa kwa kwa bahati kuhusika katika utafiti huu. Sasa tungependa 
kuchagua mtu mwenye miaka 22 au zaidi. Naomba utusaidie kumpata.Nashukuru sana kwa 
msaada wako. 
Demographic Data: 
1. Age: _____     Sex: _____  3. Region: _______________  4. 
Tribe/ethnicity………………………. 5. Religion: ______________ 8. Highest education: 
___________________ 
 
Questions: 
1. How did you participate in the 2010 elections? 
2. What informed your choice of candidates in the 2010 elections?  
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3. Do you normally vote for the same party in presidential, parliamentary and council elections? 
Why? 
4. How do you participate in politics? Probe if they have participated in writing views in media, 
signing petitions, participate in demonstrations/boycotts, join political party, party rallies, etc 
5. How would you react if the government engages in undemocratic practices like suspending 
elections indefinitely, dissolving the parliament, suspending the constitution making process or 
force the electoral commission to declare election victory to a party that lost in the voting process 
6. Which groups of people took the centre stage in presidential campaigns when they came to 
Misungwi/Mwanza during the 2010 election elections?  
7. To what extent did the presidential campaigns make use of and reflect the cultural values of the 
Sukuma in the 2010 elections? 
8. What issues was key to winning presidential elections in the 2010 elections? 
9. If you are given the role of managing a presidential campaign what critical issues will you insist 
to ensure that your candidate is elected to office? 
10. Did traditional leaders participate in the 2010 elections in Misungwi/Mwanza? How did they? 
If they did why? If not why? 
11. It is important for an aspirant to 
 originate here (himself/herself or parents, born in the ward the ward, district or region? 
 Know Kisukuma 
 Own land, house 
 12. What languages were commonly used in the 2010 election campaigns? 
13. Are you proud to be a Tanzanian? Why? 
14. What are your views on dual citizenship? Why? 
15.  If you were to choose one identity between your ethnic group and being a Tanzanian which 
one will you prefer? Why? 
16. Some people believe that certain ethnic groups in Tanzania have an unfair amount of wealth 
and power compared to others. Do you agree with this view? Why? 
17. Do you think the government fairly treats your ethnic group/tribe compared to other ethnic 
groups/tribes? How? Why? 
18. Do you think a member of your ethnic group can become a president of our country one day?  
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19. Do you think Tanzanians today trust each other more, less, or the same amount as Tanzanians 
did during Ujamaa? 
20. What role has Ujamaa villages played on informing ethnicity in voting in the 2010 elections? 
21. Did equitable distribution of resources have anything to do in explaining the role of the 
ethnicity of voting in the 2010 general elections? 
22. Do you think multiparty politics provide room for different groups to organise themselves 
along ethnic lines and parochially further their interests? Why and how? 
23. How did peace influence voting in the 2010 elections? 
24. What would you advise a party that contests unfair management of elections? 
25. Do you believe in witchcraft? Have you ever been bewitched? 
26. Do you think Tanzania will ever be ethnic salient politically? Why? 
27. Do you own-   a house, car, cattle, tv, radio, bicycle 
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APPENDIX VI 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR JOURNALISTS 
Introduction 
Good day. My name is Mrisho Malipula, a doctoral student at Ghent University. I am conducting a 
study on the Influence of Ethnicity on Electoral choices in Tanzania. The study mainly intends to 
explore the role of ethnicity in informing voters’ choices in Tanzanian. An essential element of this 
study is to see how the media has played and is playing a part in the current voting patterns. 
Knowing that you have for some time actively participated in the media, I would like to discuss 
with you some media related issues that have a bearing in Tanzanians voting behaviour over time. 
All information provided will be kept confidential by me and the institution I am studying at. 
Equally, the information given will be used for the purpose of this study and this study alone. 
 
Utangulizi 
Habari za leo. Mimi naitwa Mrisho Malipula ni mwanafunzi wa shahada ya Udaktari wa Falsafa 
katika Chuo Kikuu Ghent nchini Ubeligiji. Ninafanya utafiti wa nafasi ya ukabila katika uchaguzi 
wa vyama vingi nchini Tanzania ikiwa ni sehemu ya mafunzo ya shahada ya udaktari wa Falsafa. 
Sehemu mojawapo muhimu ya utafiti huu ni kuibua nafasi ya vyombo vya habari  katika 
mwenendo wa upigaji kura nchini Tanzania.  Kwa kutambua  kwamba umeshiriki na unaendelea 
kushiriki katika kupasha habari , ningependa kuzungumza nawe kuhusu masuala mbalimbali ya 
mchango wa tasnia ya habari  tabia ya  upigaji kura wa watanzania kwa wakati mbalimbali. 
Maelezo yote yatokanayo na majadiliano yetu yatakuwa siri na kuhifadhiwa name an Taasisi 
ninayosoma. Vilevile, taarifa zote zitatumika kwa ajili ya utafiti huu pekee yake.  
Questions 
1. Could you share with me your personal biography?  
2. What would you say has motivated you to be a journalist?  Do you enjoy being one? 
3. How important is the media in Tanzania? 
4. What role has the media played Tanzania’s in the countries national building initiatives 
over time? 
5. Do you believe the media can affect the way ethnicity influence voters? 
6. How has the state influenced the role of ethnicity in motivating voters’ choices? 
7. Is there any difference between media reporting during single and multi-party rule? 
327 
 
8. Ethnicity in Tanzania’s elections is insignificant! What role has the media played in 
sustaining such situation? 
9. Currently, we have community radios and newspapers do think they can exacerbate 
ethnicity? 
10. Do you think the media can popularise the use of ethnicity in political canvassing? 
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APPENDIX VII 
INTERVIEWEES 
A. Key Informants 
1. Kingunge Ngombale Mwiru 
2. Dr. Juma Halifa Ngasongwa 
3. Hemed Bakari Mkali 
4. Dr. Mangi Ezekiel 
5. Lawrence Kilimwiko 
6. Doto Bulendu 
7. Suleiman Hegga 
 
B. Politicians/Government Representatives   
  8. CCM Assistant Regional Secretary 
  9. CHADEMA Regional Secretary 
10. Misungwi Village Executive Officer 
11. Mbela Village Executive Officer 
12. Mapilingo Village Executive Officer 
13. Nange Village Executive Officer 
14. Shamala Street Executive Officer 
15. Kishiri A Street Executive Officer 
16. Rufiji Street Executive Officer 
17. Utemini Street Executive Officer 
 
C. Ordinary Voters 
18. An elderly man in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District 
19. A male hawker in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District 
20. An elderly man in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District 
21. An Extension Officer in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District  
22. A young woman in Misungwi village, Misungwi ward, Misungwi District 
23. An NGO worker in Misungwi Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District 
24. A mid aged female food vendor in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District  
25. A young man in Shamalala, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District  
26. A Young man in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District   
27. A male shop-keeper in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District  
28. A Bar-maid in Shamalala Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District 
29. A young woman in Shamalala, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District 
30. A mid aged female teacher in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District 
31. An elderly women in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District 
32. A young man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District 
33. An elderly man in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District 
34. A female farmer in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District 
35. A male farmer in Nange Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District  
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36. A male farmer in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi 
37. An elderly man in Mapilingo, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District 
38. A Young man in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi District 
39. A female Primary School Teacher in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi 
40. A female farmer in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi 
41. A female farmer in Mapilingo Village, Igokelo Ward, Misungwi 
42. A male Primary School Teacher in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District 
43. A male retail shop owner in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District 
44. A nurse in Mbela, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District 
45. A housewife in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward Misungwi District 
46. A male farmer in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District 
47. A female farmer in Mbela Village, Misungwi Ward, Misungwi District 
48. A male hawker at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District  
49. A lady at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District 
50. A Secondary School Girl Kishiri A Street,Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District 
51. A civil servant in Kishiri A Street, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District 
52. A private sector employee at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District  
53. A male casual labourer at Kishiri A, Igoma Ward, Nyamagana District 
54. A woman in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District 
55. A woman trader in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District 
56. A young woman in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District 
57. A male university student in Utemini Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District 
58. A CCM supporter in Utemini, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District 
59. A young man in Utemini Street, Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District 
60. A female fish seller in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana 
61. An MP aspirant in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana 
62. A female Secondary School Teacher in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District 
63. A Kurya Street vendor in Rufiji Street, Mirongo Ward, Nyamagana District  
64. A young female entrepreneur in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District 
65. A retired civil servant in Rufiji Street in Mirongo ward, Nyamagana District 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
